The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | 10 October: The End of the Beginning

The fifth day of the war was to a large extent the end of its first stage – containment of the Arab attack and the battle for the existence of Israel, with all the uncertainty and fears that accompanied it. By the morning of 10 October, IDF forces had already succeeded in driving the Syrian forces almost completely back to the ceasefire line, and here and there even over it, except on Mt. Hermon. Syrian forces were no longer directly threatening Israel’s territory. In the south the situation was static, with the IDF forces deployed, more or less, on a north to south axis at a distance of 4 – 12 kilometres from the Canal, exchanging intermittent fire with the Egyptians. The atmosphere in the prime minister’s bureau had greatly improved. After the stabilization at the fronts and the American promises to supply arms, the immediate danger to the state, which Golda later defined in these words: “I am saying this in full awareness of its significance – we never faced so grave a danger in 1948”, seemed to have passed.  From now on, the government’s activities focused on ensuring conditions that would allow the IDF to conclude the war in the best possible position in preparation for the anticipated negotiations.

The cautious optimism in the bureau was also encouraged by what seemed to be a positive change in the US position on arms supply. The telegrams that Golda read on arriving caused her the greatest satisfaction since the outbreak of the war. She composed a telegram to Dinitz with an expression of deep appreciation to Kissinger for his role, and an emotional message of thanks to “Edward” (Nixon)  for his decision: “I knew that in this hour of dire need to Israel I could turn to you and count on your deep sympathy and understanding” (See: Telegram No. VL/819 )

Message from Golda Meir to President Nixon, 11 October 1973. File A 4996/3, p. 200

At this point, policy makers in Israel were misled by Kissinger’s presentation of the American position, and did not understand that although he was attempting to help them to some extent, he was still trying to maintain the policy of non-intervention adopted at the beginning of the war (See: “Issues of Arms Procurement and the Airlift”, Gazit’s Summary no. 5, File A 7023/1)).

In a consultation with Golda at 09:35, Dayan complained that OC Northern Command, Maj. General “Haka” Yizhak Hofi, “is not aggressive enough in the north. They’re tired”. He proposed that Elazar  put pressure on the northern command to step up the attacks on the Syrians. In addition, Dayan expressed concern at the state of the air force, whose commander, Benny Peled, judged that within three or four days it would find it difficult to function at all. The mood of the meeting was that steps should be taken to postpone a ceasefire resolution at the Security Council based on the present positions of the forces for as long as possible (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 16).

Immediately afterwards the government met, and the American promises and the improved situation on the fronts, apparently based on truthful reports, created a distinct improvement in the mood. Golda first announced the news from Washington, which she defined as “great news. All in all, it seems to me that the skies are brighter this morning”. She added: “The war, unfortunately, is not over; but there is an almost revolutionary difference in comparison to what it was several days ago. The change is real, but the war is still with us, and it will take days before we can say that it is behind us”. The deputy COGS, Maj. General Israel Tal, reported on a state of collapse in the Syrian army, also in morale, and therefore: “The situation is good, compared with the situation of near despair that reigned earlier”. He also reported on some improvement on the Egyptian front. However the Egyptian army was intact and its morale was high. In reply to a question, Tal refuted the rumours of atrocities by Egyptian commandos on male and female IDF soldiers. During the meeting the government decided to establish a civilian centre for labour volunteers, and since the festival of Succot (Tabernacles) began that day, they adjourned with greetings of “Happy holiday” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 12).

Due to the holiday Golda decided to take action to improve the public’s mood, by breaking her self-imposed silence since the first day of the war. From an improvised studio in the headquarters of the Israel Journalists’ Association, Beit Sokolov, Golda told television viewers that the Syrians had been pushed back from  the whole of the Golan Heights and there was an improvement in the situation in the Suez Canal sector. In a statement and in reply to journalists’ questions, she tried to disperse any illusions that the war would be short, like the wars that  Israel had been accustomed to, but she was adamant in her belief that it would be victorious. She prepared the nation for the heavy price that it would have to pay in casualties and concluded with holiday wishes. However, in contrast to the positive message that she tried to convey, Golda looked haggard and sad during the broadcast, and did not contribute to improving the atmosphere (See: the prime minister’s appearance on television).

The positive change in the situation on the fronts was overshadowed by the news that the USSR had begun to use cargo planes to fly great amounts of equipment, especially anti-aircraft missiles, to Syria.  It was feared that this was the beginning of a Soviet airlift, which would put the shattered Syrian army back on its feet. During consultations, Allon proposed to bomb the airport at Aleppo, which was both a civilian and military airfield, in order to deter the Soviet transport planes and prevent them from landing. Golda Meir hesitated because she feared hitting Russian planes and the reaction by the USSR, and possibly even the US. On the other hand, the news that the planes were already in the air, and apparently contained a supply of ground-to-air missiles, worried her greatly. In the end, Golda decided to approve bombing the airfield after sending the Americans a message explaining the decision. The discussion continued without her, and the bombing was approved conclusively. In a telegram to Dinitz he was instructed to convey the background to Kissinger, but only after the operation had already been carried out. Gazit would give him a coded telephone message: “Eliezer has left the hospital” (See Telegram No. VL/822). At 19:25 the bureau was informed that a successful attack had been made on the airfield. The runways were damaged, not the planes; however, the head of the Mossad related that the air force had apparently also hit one Russian Antonov plane.

.2 | The Decision to Advance on Syria

A decisive stage in the war had been reached, which demanded a strategic decision – whether to freeze the situation in the north and send a division  to the south, or to open an attack beyond the ceasefire line on the Golan Heights into Syrian territory. The question was first discussed by the war cabinet at 21:00. Dayan and the COGS supported the first option. They believed that, in contrast to what had been reported, the Syrian army had not yet collapsed, and an attack across the line would lead to fierce fighting with heavy casualties; whereas the present line on the Heights was easy to defend. In contrast, the situation in the south was still dangerous. Three fresh Egyptian armoured divisions had not yet crossed the canal, and the IDF needed more forces in place in order to stop them. Here Dayan and Elazar were in agreement. They both thought that there was no chance at this time to push the Egyptians back over the canal, and “Dado” was even convinced that a ceasefire “in place” was a good solution from Israel’s viewpoint. Dayan feared that a strike in the direction of Damascus would necessarily bring about involvement by Jordanian and Iraqi forces. It became apparent that further decisions in principle were required, and it was decided to hold a more detailed meeting the following day (For the full journal entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 10.10.73).

However, only half an hour later the COGS requested an immediate discussion on the same issues. Another consultation was held by the war cabinet and the top ranks of the IDF on whether to attack beyond the ceasefire line in the direction of Damascus or even to enter the capital, or to entrench on the Golan Heights and to send a division from the north to the southern front. The question became even more urgent in view of news from the embassy in Washington of great pressure on Nixon, mainly by the oil companies, to effect a ceasefire. Dinitz also reported an approach by the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, to Nixon, to present a joint proposal by the USSR and the US for a ceasefire. Nixon was leaning towards agreement due to the growing fear of a confrontation with the Soviets. Kissinger told Dinitz that the entire Administration – except for him – believed that the war was undermining what remained of the position of the US in the Middle East. He was making every effort to prevent a ceasefire initiative, or at least to postpone the reply, but it was doubtful that he would succeed (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/26, 29, 33, 43).

Contrary to his previous stand, this time the COGS supported an attack over the ceasefire line on the Golan Heights, on the Kuneitra-Damascus axis. He argued that failure to attack would convey a message of weakness, which would encourage countries such as Jordan and organizations such as the PLO to carry out military action and prolong the war, putting a great burden on Israel. The deputy COGS, Tal, opposed an attack on Syria. He claimed that the great danger at the moment was not on the Syrian front, but on the Egyptian one. Under these circumstances, an Israeli attack on Syria was an unjustified gamble. It might also drag Jordan and Iraq into intervention. He called for a heavy blow against the Egyptian army. The other members of the General Staff present, including Air Force Commander Peled, assistant to the COGS Maj. General Recha’vam Ze’evi and Intelligence chief Zeira, supported the COGS’s opinion. Some ministers – Dayan and Allon – also joined the supporters of an attack, based on the prospect of an imminent ceasefire. However, they proposed that the attack be limited to an area 15- 20 kilometres north of Kuneitra and avoid approaching Damascus. Golda too supported an attack, following the line that had guided her since the outbreak of war –  the need to prove that Israel was still strong: “Since the beginning of the campaign I have lived with the feeling that we cannot (and that has a long term influence) come out of this in a situation where the world will say: “That’s it; whatever we thought about Israel and the IDF – that’s it… Because any nation can win or lose. but if we, heaven forbid, do not win – then all is lost”. She supported an attack deep into Syrian territory. “If we can strike a serious blow, so that the Russians ask for a ceasefire, with the Syrians’ agreement, or if they force them to do so – that, for me, is a tremendous thing”, she added. Her position was reinforced by telegrams from Dinitz, in which he repeated, in Kissinger’s name, that Israel must make every effort to hurry and conquer territory over the ceasefire line, in preparation for the political struggle (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/26, 50). The final speakers at the meeting were Yariv, who called for action on the Egyptian front as well, and  Zamir, who argued that it had been a mistake to decide on hopeless attacks against well-equipped anti-tank forces, at a tremendous price. For the first time Zamir also stated explicitly that in his opinion Sadat was aiming at a limited war. The Egyptians did not intend to drive deep into Sinai, but rather their “ideal target is the line of the passes [the Mitla and the Gidi]. They are building on that”.

Yariv and Zamir’s words moved Dayan to begin soul-searching with regard to the first days of the war. “Haka [Hofi] said five times a day that he was not sure that it [the situation on the Golan Heights] was stabilizing. When he prepared to blow up the Bnot Ya’acov bridges, so they [the Syrians] wouldn’t be able to cross the Jordan, it [the situation] was not good”, said Dayan.  It was decided to give the IDF approval for a concentrated military operation across the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights on the following day, in order to shatter the Syrian forces.  The IDF would advance to threaten Damascus, but no decision had been taken to conquer it, and bombing the city was dependent on approval by the prime minister (who had opposed it at the meeting). The aim of the decision was to achieve the best possible bargaining position before the ceasefire and to influence the Jordanians not to join the war, or to limit their involvement to Syrian territory only (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 17). A message about the decision was sent to Dinitz for Kissinger (See: Telegram No. VL/829).

The day ended with Golda’s declaration that even greater demands must be made to expedite the supply of US arms and that Kissinger must understand that after entering Syrian territory, Israel would accept a ceasefire resolution that included return of all the forces back over the lines.

.3 | 11 October 1973 – Taking the Attack Into Syrian Territory – "Are We Going In or Not? Are We Bombing or Not?"

The sixth day of the Yom Kippur War signalled the beginning of a new stage, as Israel went on the attack, a move intended mainly to lead to a ceasefire under improved conditions. The search for a ceasefire expressed the exhaustion of the fighting forces and the leadership’s fear of a long drawn-out war

That morning the prime minister’s bureau was busy dealing with problems with Jordan. The Jordanians had protested to the Americans about Israeli air force planes overflying their territory on their way to missions above the Golan Heights and Syria. Reports that the Jordanians planned to send an armoured division to Syria were also checked out. In addition Lior reported on the preparations for the attack on Syrian territory on which the cabinet had decided, which was to begin later that morning.

Israeli Mirage aircraft flying over the Golan Heights,  October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

As the military situation stabilized, political aspects began to take up more of the agenda. The bureau journal shows that efforts continued to focus on the Security Council ceasefire resolution and expediting the supply of American arms. In addition to the arms and the few planes that had arrived on 10 October, Israel was requesting 80 Phantom and 80 Skyhawk planes. The American promise to replace all the arms that were lost did not provide a solution for transferring them as needed, especially tanks. The only achievement was a vague promise to consider transporting the tanks in American planes, if an urgent need arose. El Al planes, which had all been recruited for this mission, could not provide an adequate solution to transferring the arms, especially heavy ones. Gazit told Dinitz that since attempts to solve the problem by using charter flights by private companies had failed, the Americans should be asked to use their own planes (See: Telegram No. VL/844).

In a meeting with Kissinger the previous day, Dinitz argued that the massive Soviet airlift, which had been expanded to include Egypt, had created a new situation that required speeding up the arms supply. No American company was prepared to lease planes to Israel for that purpose, and in order to put pressure on the US, he again raised the idea of Golda Meir coming to Washington. Kissinger said this was unnecessary and still seemed to be surprised at Israel’s difficulties. He promised that 20 charter planes would immediately be put at Israel’s disposal for the arms transfer (See: Telegram No. LV/44/). In fact, despite these promises, the Administration was still attempting to avoid directly supplying Israel with heavy arms in a war situation. Based on estimates from Israel, the Americans believed that the war would be decided in Israel’s favour by 13 October at the very latest, and then a ceasefire resolution would be adopted, making the supply of arms unnecessary. Kissinger missed no opportunity to emphasize that he stood alone in his efforts against most of the Administration, and he and the US were paying a high price for their support of Israel. He repeated again that he was doing his best, and if it were not for him, Israel would not receive anything. However, an analysis later made by Gazit showed that this was not the full story. The secretary presented the situation in one way to Israel, and another when dealing with other officials  (See Gazit’s summary on the issue of arms procurement between Israel and the US, File A 7023/1).

Maps of the fighting on the Golan Heights, 6-11 October 1973. The US survey, Wikimedia

The reports on the military situation told of concern that the Egyptians might soon begin an offensive and of fresh Egyptian divisions crossing the Suez Canal. There was no change in the deployment of the Jordanian army in the Jordan Valley. However, the reports mainly dealt with the Syrian front. At 11:00 IDF forces began an attack across the ceasefire line, on the Kuneitra-Damascus axis, and made a significant advance into Syrian territory.The IDF’s progress, and reports attributed to Dayan that it was on its way to Damascus, aroused Kissinger’s anger, and he feared accusations of collusion. Golda told him that Israel stood by its assurance that it had no intention of conquering Damascus and that it would never mislead him (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/52, VL/ 840).

As for the UN, Israel was still attempting to postpone the adoption of a ceasefire resolution. Gazit forwarded to Dinitz a message to Kissinger that Israel required 48 more hours to complete its mission in the north. (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/830, 831). Kissinger responded that an understanding was taking shape between the two superpowers, according to which Britain would present a ceasefire proposal and they would both abstain (See: Telegram No. LV/50). Kissinger used various tactics that would allow the US to “agree” to the Soviet proposal, but to delay the resolution for as long as possible. He repeated his proposal to Israel to “grab as much territory as you possibly can”, for the purposes of the bargaining to follow. Although later Kissinger’s involvement in ensuring that Israel received diplomatic aid and military supplies was seen in a different  light, at the time, his apparent full-hearted commitment to Israel was greatly praised. “Kissinger has assured his place in Jewish and American history books”, said Allon, and Golda added: “With regard to the Jews, he wasn’t like that at the beginning; it was only later that the Jew inside him woke up” (For the full journal entry, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 11.10.73). Eban and Yosef Tekoah, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, reported from New York that the efforts at delay in the Security Council were succeeding, and the Arabs were not trying to speed up the ceasefire resolution (See: Telegram No. NR/81).

During the evening, the COGS and Dayan arrived to report and to consult on future plans. Elazar reported on an advance of about 10 kilometres on the Syrian front, but no collapse of the Syrian forces. As for the Egyptians, he claimed that the situation was improving and proposed an attack the following day, which would lead to the capture of Port Said and Port Fuad and to crossing the Canal in at least one place. In view of the coming debate in the Security Council, questions arose regarding Damascus – how close to it would the IDF forces reach, and whether to bombard the city or its outskirts with artillery or ground-to-ground missiles. The prime minister said that “we must do everything in order to reach a distance of 20 kilometres (from Damascus)… if we can create “booms” that they can hear, all the better”. Dayan and Elazar differed on these questions. It was decided to continue the advance without capturing Damascus and without bombing it. As for using ground-to-ground missiles on the ‘Maza’ airfield near Damascus, there was still no decision; in any case, this required the approval of the government (For the full minutes of the discussion, see: Cabinet Document No. 18).

The government met immediately afterwards, and for the first time the COGS gave an assessment of the extent of the losses suffered by the IDF, at approximately 500 killed, and approximately 260-270 missing in action. Golda explained why she had approved the attack on the airfields in Syria, and the cabinet’s decision to approve the advance onto Syrian territory, whose progress was outlined by the COGS. Elazar proposed to continue the advance on Damascus, but not to capture it. Golda repeated her satisfaction that Israel had demonstrated its strength, in view of the contempt towards it at the beginning of the war in the Arab world and in the media, which had suggested that “we were already finished”. She asked the ministers to decide: “What requires a decision now is the Damascus issue – are we going in, or not going in? Are we bombing, or not bombing?”

Now that it appeared that the immediate danger to Israel’s existence had passed, there was a much more relaxed atmosphere among the ministers. For the first time, after their efforts to ‘keep a stiff upper lip’, they could breathe a sigh of relief.  Peres said: “We’ve had six terrible days. No-one can deny that he had moments of elation and moment of anxiety and endless fears”. Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel added: “During the past week we’ve undergone great fluctuations in mood, of hopes, fears, opportunities and despair”. There was also soul-searching about the outbreak of the war and the decision to not to carry out a preemptive strike. Allon claimed that a strike would not have made any difference, and Golda shared with the ministers the great dilemma she was faced with on 6 October.

For the first time, a long and serious discussion was held by the government on the next stage of the war on the Syrian front and the question of crossing the Canal and capturing Port Said. Peres proposed reaching the gates of Damascus and crossing the Canal in order to begin the future negotiations from a better position. Minister of Religious Affairs Zerah Warhaftig disagreed, but most of the ministers believed that the IDF should advance close to Damascus and threaten it with artillery, but not enter it. They agreed that under no circumstances should Egyptian keep control of the entire eastern bank of the Canal, since this would be a terrible defeat for Israel. The prime minister said that if the situation allowed, it would be worthwhile to cross the Canal. She too proposed to threaten Damascus , but not to capture it. After an argument over Galili’s demand that the decision on crossing the Canal receive government approval, the ministers gave retrospective approval to the war cabinet’s decisions on the IDF’s advance in Syria and on Damascus – to approach it but not to capture or bombard it. It was also decided to try to postpone the ceasefire for at least 48 hours, to make it conditional on a POW exchange, and if there was a call for return to the 6 October borders –  this should include the Egyptians as well (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 13).

An officer distributing mail from home in a forward position on Mt. Hermon. Photograph: Eytan Harris, GPO

As the war continued, civilian issues, which had apparently been pushed aside due to the severity of the military situation, began to arouse interest. On 11 October, Knesset Member Shlomo Lorincz, of the ultra-Orthodox Agudat Yisrael party, sent a request to Golda to limit the Sabbath desecration caused by the war, and to carry out the decision to distribute mail and parcels to the soldiers on the Sabbath without damage to its sanctity.