12 October 1973 – An Atmosphere of Crisis

.1 | "The Families and Soldiers are Waiting for the Magic Word – Ceasefire"

The morning of the seventh day of the war, found Israel’s leaders exhausted from six days on an “emotional rollercoaster”. Exhaustion and ‘burnout’ also characterized the IDF and its officers. Sunrise on 12 October found the soldiers red-eyed from days of constant fighting. The available arms were wearing out and the supply of ammunition was nearly finished, while the promised supply from the US failed to arrive. It seemed that everyone was praying for a pause in the fighting, or even a ceasefire, which would enable the exhausted and injured army to regroup. “The families and soldiers are waiting for the magic word – ceasefire”, her military secretary, Lior, told the prime minister the following day.

The bureau journal indicates that, during the first days of the war, Golda Meir was overwhelmed with frustration and disappointment and tormented by uncertainty about her decision not to allow a preemptive strike. However, these doubts and inner struggles could not be detected in her behaviour or tone of speech. Reports by US ambassador Keating mention speculations as to how Golda was holding up, but claims that she had suffered some sort of breakdown were completely rejected by those around her. On the contrary, they praised her highly for her leadership and her undaunted spirit. Except in the discussion on 7 October, the strength she projected and her uncompromising authority were a very important element in the ability of the Israeli decision makers to continue to lead the country during the crisis.

In contrast, Dayan exhibited extreme mood swings. Dayan understood very early on that the main finger of accusation for the failure that preceded the war would be pointed at him. There are claims that he even offered Golda his resignation on 12 October, but she rejected the offer outright. His proposals at the beginning of the war to retreat to the passes in Sinai – which were logical given the situation – and especially the mood of despair he projected, were taken as signs that he had ‘lost his head’. From the documents, it is obvious that during the early stage of the war Golda no longer trusted Dayan as she had before. The same can be said about Yigal Allon. The person closest to her, who spent the entire time in her bureau, was Israel Galili.

For the first time since the war broke out, on 12 October there was no government meeting, and the meetings were held in the prime minister’s bureau and in two consultations with the war cabinet. The first focused on the Syrian front and whether to begin planning and executing a crossing of the Suez Canal – which required a government decision. Dayan presented the operative questions: whether to advance to a distance some 20 km. from Damascus and create a real threat to the city – a step that would probably involve a heavy price, or to stop at a distance of 32-34 km. “The difference is not in kilometres, but rather, that if we don’t get close to the further line – they’ll have the feeling that they are managing to defend Damascus… This is not a physical artillery threat to Damascus”, Dayan added, and hinted that he supported the first option. He reported that the General Staff wanted a ceasefire very much, and “we hold a winning card, if we force the Syrians to accept it by threatening Damascus”. As for crossing the Canal, he said that he supported it, if it would bring about an improvement in the military situation and expedite the ceasefire, but it would not lead to the collapse of the Egyptian army (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 19).

On 9 October the Israeli Air Force carried out a bombing strike on the Syrian General Staff headquarters in Damascus. Photograph: Wikimedia

For the second consultation held immediately afterwards, a broad forum was convened which included the war cabinet, Bar-Lev, Zamir, the COGS and several generals of the General Staff. Elazar reported that the General Staff was hesitating whether to begin an attack in the south, with the aim of crossing the Canal in one place. He argued that in view of the exhausted condition of the fighting forces and the air force, and without resupply of military equipment, the IDF was greatly in need of a ceasefire. If it was not achieved, a war of attrition might result under very difficult conditions, which would require the mobilization of high school students in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora, and similar steps. Therefore the main consideration was whether an attack would increase or decrease the chances of a ceasefire.

Bar-Lev thought that the Egyptians would only agree to a ceasefire if their army was weakened and the government felt threatened. He presented several options, and claimed that in his opinion the best was to cross the Canal in one location with 400 tanks, and to attack the Egyptian forces deployed in the area between the Suez Canal and Cairo. These included two armoured divisions “that are intended to cross the Canal and try to reach the passes [the Gidi and the Mitla passes], and then go on to Bir Gafgafa and Tel Aviv”. Bar-Lev’s words demonstrate that even on the seventh day of the war, the IDF commanders had still not internalized the fact that, as Zamir had told them two days earlier, the Egyptians’ war aims were limited and they intended only to reach the passes and not to carry out the old plan from the days of Nasser to reconquer the entire Sinai Desert.

Bar-Lev presented the advantages and the dangers of the crossing, including the fear that if the only bridgehead was hit, the force that crossed the bridge would be cut off. However, he emphasized his belief that “the advantages justify the risks”, because this was the only step that could ensure a breakthrough on the southern front and bring the ceasefire closer. Air Force commander Peled also supported crossing the Canal, despite the air force’s critical state, while Tal opposed Bar-Lev’s proposal due to the state of the air force. While the discussion was going on in a grim atmosphere, reflecting the feeling that the IDF had reached its darkest hour, Zamir received a report that the Egyptians were about to begin the second phase of their attack on the passes. “Dado” Elazar said: “I hope they do attack. We’ve been waiting for that for several days”. They decided to postpone the Israeli attack, on the basis of the hope that the IDF would halt the Egyptian attack and destroy hundreds of tanks, and change the balance of forces in the south. The meeting revealed the full extent of the problem created by the delay in military supplies from the US. Elazar reported that the air force was dangerously close to a “critical position”, in which the number of planes it had at its disposal would not suffice to carry out its missions: providing urgent support to the IDF land forces and defence of Israel’s skies. Proposals were presented as to how to speed up the supply of planes. (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 20).

In her exchange of telegrams  with Dinitz, Golda continued to instruct him to put massive pressure on US policy-makers to speed up the supply of weapons and planes. She defined this as “a question of life and death for us”. In a telephone conversation, she said it was “simply SOS”. However, the replies from Dinitz and the Israeli military attaché in Washington, Mordechai “Motta” Gur, stated that the supply given was very sparse and was limited to two Phantoms a day (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/852, LV/73, 84). The Americans repeatedly promised to fly the equipment to Israel themselves, and declared that they intended to arrange an airlift of 15–20 planes every day until the equipment was transferred, but in fact  the airlift was held up.

In the prime minister’s bureau there was an atmosphere of crisis and, as Golda’s said, “a feeling of near despair”, because it seemed that there was deliberate sabotage of the transfer of equipment by the Pentagon. The US government was continuing a policy of promises on the one hand, and “foot-dragging” on the other. In view of the delays, Dinitz drafted a message from Golda to Nixon, asking him to keep his promise to supply Israel with replacements for its losses and to send 40 Phantom planes to Israel urgently. He requested that the prime minister approve his transmission of the message to the White House (See: Telegram No. LV/79 in English). Golda hesitated, but meanwhile she did not approve the message.

The first page of the draft message to Nixon, 12  October 1973, File A 4996/4, p. 68

.2 | Soviet Threats

The same day news was received of disturbing statements by the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. In a menacing tone he warned Israel categorically against conquering Damascus, and even threatened that if the IDF harmed Egyptian or Syrian civilians, “Tel Aviv would not be spared”. Dinitz reported that the USSR was taking steps such as putting airborne divisions on alert, which might indicate possible intervention. Kissinger reacted forcefully to Dobrynin’s message, and Dinitz reported that he had threatened that the US would not sit idly by, and “if they used their air force against Israel, they would be confronted by the USA which would activate the Sixth Fleet” (See Telegrams Nos. 81/VL, 85/VL).  Israel even received disturbing news that the USSR had supplied Scud missiles to Egypt, and feared that Russian experts might operate them for the Egyptians and fire them deep into Israeli territory, as Gazit reported to Dinitz (See: Telegram No. VL/864).

In view of the Soviet threats and the delay in the arms supply, Golda presented the full severity of the situation:: “At the end of the day, I know what the danger is. I am saying this with full awareness of its significance – we never faced so grave a danger in 1948”. The fear was expressed that the Russians would succeed in separating the UN debate on the Syrian front from that on the Egyptian front, and would put forward a ceasefire resolution calling for return to the previous lines in Syria but not in Sinai. It was decided to tell the Americans Israel would support a ceasefire including a POW exchange, in which all forces would return to the 6 October lines on both fronts. If it was not possible to carry out this programme simultaneously on both fronts, efforts must be made at least to reach a ceasefire on the northern front, in which the forces would remain where they were – “a standstill”. The prime minister briefed Dinitz on this by telephone. Several factors contributed to the change in the Israeli position: the feeling that progress on the Syrian front had been halted and the reinforcements from Iraq and Jordan entering Syria had changed the situation there (later some of them even engaged the IDF in battle); the  assessment that there was no hope of pushing the Egyptians back over the Canal at that time, especially with the looming shortage of arms and ammunition; the fear of Soviet involvement, etc.  Jordanian involvement too was still on the agenda. Gazit wrote to Dinitz that if Jordan joined in, it would be the beginning of a dangerous escalation, “and therefore, there can be no advance commitments” by Israel not to react (See: Telegram No. VL/860).

From time to time the issue of public relations was raised in the discussions. The journal indicates that despite the complaints by ministers that there was not enough contact with the media, Golda continued to isolate herself in her bureau and deal only with the issues she chose. After her unsuccessful TV appearance on 10 October, she avoided any similar attempts. Dayan argued that they should appoint someone to take charge of  this field. The public was confused and had no real knowledge about what was going on, and rumours were spreading. Golda replied: “Our public relations are not good even in peace time”, and took no steps on the matter. (For the full entry for that day, see: The Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 12.10.1973).