The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | Saturday, 13 October – The American Airlift Begins

Many of the central figures in the drama of October 1973 regarded 13-14 October as the turning point in the war. That morning, decision-makers in Israel were in a difficult position. The promised US arms supply was not forthcoming, the situation on the fronts, especially in the south, was not promising and the possibility hung over their heads of a ceasefire imposed by the Security Council that would perpetuate the situation, with Egyptian forces deployed along the entire length of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. However, by the end of Sunday, 14 October, things had changed completely – the American airlift was on its way, the ceasefire initiative failed due to Egyptian opposition (and further activity on the subject was frozen till 16 October); and on the southern front Israel’s military possibilities were more promising.

From this time on until 20 October the war cabinet no longer held regular ongoing meetings. The management of the war was mainly carried out by Prime Minister Meir herself, with the help of Galili, in consultation – when needed – with other cabinet members and with the COGS and the top ranks of the army. Contact with the embassy in Washington and transmission of messages to Kissinger was also improved, with the installment of an upgraded communications line in the prime minister’s bureau. Government meetings were no longer held every day, and on 13 October too, there was no meeting. However, in the bureau the intense activity continued as usual, and the main part of the documentation  for this day is found in the bureau journal.

In the morning Golda, Dayan, Galili and Allon discussed the continuation of the war. The delay in the anticipated Egyptian offensive (which did not take place until 14 October) caused them to reconsider the IDF’s strategy. Dayan proposed instructing Southern Command to plan an attack across the Suez Canal within 48 hours at most – whether the Egyptians attacked or not – and to bring the decision to cross the Canal to the  government for approval. However, after bitter experience, he understood that in view of the realisation that the Egyptian army’s fighting capabilities were far better than previously thought, this plan was a dangerous gamble. He therefore emphasized that he was proposing it although such an attack might cause heavy losses. If it failed, it might lead to an Israeli retreat deep into Sinai, and the loss of the important bases at Umm Hashiba and Refidim (Bir Gafgafa). Golda and Galili accepted his opinion, because of the need to improve Israel’s position before the debate on the ceasefire in the Security Council. Allon disagreed, and said that he wanted to see the plans before he would support it, because if failed, there might be serious consequences and “between us and the very existence of the Israeli nation stand only 200 tanks”. Another issue discussed was the problematic relationships between the officers on the southern front; especially the behavior of the commander of 143^rd Division, Maj. General Arik Sharon. Dayan said that Sharon had proposed that he appoint himself the head of Southern Command instead of Gorodish (Gonen). Dayan believed that no changes should be made, and said: “He has a mouth on him, but he’s an excellent officer… We’ll have to live with his [Sharon’s] mouth. We’ll live with it, and let the Egyptians live with his hand [fist]”.

Later the deputy COGS reported on the situation. In the north it was relatively good, and the IDF was bombarding the Damascus suburbs, which caused Golda to say: “We want there to be a state of nerves and uncertainty among them… Let the Arabs think that perhaps we will go into (Damascus). Let them hear the artillery, but civilians should not be injured”.  In the south,  additional Egyptian armoured forces seemed to be crossing of the Canal, perhaps in preparation for the beginning of their attack into Sinai.

Other issues discussed included postponing the elections for the Knesset, which were scheduled for 30 October and the possibility of a Security Council meeting. Although the soldiers were exhausted and were waiting for a ceasefire, now that it seemed that the US airlift was about to begin, Golda took a hard-line position, and declared: “Heaven forbid that we appear to be begging for a ceasefire”. They also discussed the number of casualties; the process of informing their families was to begin the next day (For the full entry for that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 13.10.73).

The second focus of activity  was contacts with Dinitz in Washington to solve the problem of arms supplies. In the morning Dinitiz and Shalev reported on the tense atmosphere in the urgent talks they had the previous night with Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and the meeting between Eban (who had arrived in Washington) and Kissinger. The Israeli representatives accused the US of not keeping its promises, and said that their approach was directly affecting the military situation. They were met with counter-accusations by Kissinger that Israel was not attacking enough, and was not living up to US  expectations.  Dinitz described his meeting with Schlesinger, on the background of what seemed to be deliberate delay by the Pentagon, orchestrated by Deputy Secretary Clements, in supplying the promised arms, despite an express order to do so by Nixon, as “the most unpleasant I have ever attended”. He even considered walking out. Kissinger promised to intervene and to ensure that the president’s instructions were carried out (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/87, 89, 100).

By now the Americans had already reached the conclusion that the war was not going to be over quickly, as expected, that a ceasefire would not be achieved soon and that in view of the massive Soviet arms supply, the US could not stand aside. Reports from their embassy in Tel Aviv confirmed Israel’s claims about the dire state of the army, due to the shortage of arms and ammunition. The US understood that without an improvement in Israel’s military situation, no ceasefire would be achieved, still less diplomatic negotiations. Global interests therefore obliged it to strengthen Israel militarily for the coming battles, as Eban later explained (See below: Government meeting, 20 October).

Kissinger claimed that the main reason for beginning the airlift on 13 October was the American understanding that a ceasefire could not be reached by diplomatic means. The war would end when the Arabs realized that a decision could not be reached on the battle field. Despite the belief that the Israeli description of the shortage of arms and ammunition was exaggerated and was intended to force the Americans into a massive arms supply; Kissinger began intensive and sometimes forceful activity to expedite the airlift, combined with Nixon’s direct and determined intervention. In a meeting between the military attaché, Gur, and Schlesinger, the latter declared that the airlift would begin that same day, and that the supply of Phantoms would be accelerated. “Our feeling is that in the future as well, the Defense Department will only act in our favour under orders from the top”, wrote Gur (See: Telegram No. LV/93).

The airlift was known as “Operation Nickel Grass”: here a M-60 tank is unloaded from a US Galaxy plane in Israel, 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, US Air Force

At 16:00 Dinitz reported that the airlift had started, with huge transport planes that would soon bring to Israel all the military equipment it had requested. “Some of the planes are already in the air; the rest will leave during the day”, wrote Dinitz. His telegram elicited sighs of profound relief in the bureau (See: Telegram No. LV/101). Later that day Kissinger and Schlesinger decided to fly the entire military supply in American planes directly to Israel. On the other side, the dimensions of the Soviet supply on 13 October reached 2,100 tons, which were transported in over 100 flights by cargo planes. From then on, a new stage in the war began, and the two super powers were involved in the conflict, competing through their airlifts.

On the diplomatic front, Kissinger had already devised a timetable for a resolution on a ceasefire to be proposed by Britain at the Security Council. However, in a talk with Eban, the secretary accepted Israel’s position, and said that despite his wish for a ceasefire, there was no sign of any desire on the part of the Arabs for such a resolution, and moves at the Security Council were proceeding very slowly. (See: Telegram No. 892/LV). In view of Egypt’s opposition, Britain retreated from its intention to raise it together with the Americans (See: Gazit’s summary on Israel’s and the super powers’ positions in negotiations to induce the Security Council to pass a ceasefire resolution, 6.10.73 – 22.10.73, File A 7023/1).

.2 | 14 October 1973: "The Egyptians Have Reverted to Type" – Should We Cross the Suez Canal?

“At dawn the Egyptian attack began, as expected, in 5 places along the canal. The estimate of the Egyptian forces available for the attack is approximately 800 tanks”, Gazit told Dinitz that morning of 14 October (See: Telegram No. VL/895). Later he reported on the opportunity that the Egyptian attack presented to the IDF, “for the widespread destruction of Egyptian tanks and the ‘Chinese’ infantry which leads them (The ‘Chinese’ is a nickname for the vast number of infantry soldiers equipped with personal light anti-tank missiles, who attack our armoured force)”, he explained (See: Telegram No. VL/899).

At the morning government meeting at 10:00 the COGS reported “that we are now entering a big battle”, and that the IDF’s defensive tactics, which had been carefully prepared, were succeeding and scores of Egyptian tanks had already been destroyed. In the north the situation was more or less static. Afterwards the government discussed the financing of the war by a drive for donations among Jews abroad and imposing a compulsory loan in Israel. The prime minister also reported on the contacts with the Administration for massive military supplies. “We were in a state close to despair”, she added, before large quantities of military equipment began to arrive. She also reported on the failure of the efforts to achieve a ceasefire resolution in the Security Council, partly as a result of a change in Israel’s position. Israel now opposed a ceasefire (See: Telegram No. LV/108). She added that a ceasefire agreement must include a POW exchange, and might also lead to the transfer of the remnants of Syrian Jewry to Israel.

At this stage, the Israeli public was beginning to express criticism of the leadership’s behaviour before the war. Several of the speakers thought that now that notices had been given to the families of the fallen (see below), and with the stabilization of the situation, criticism would increase. Questions would be raised about the failure to predict the outbreak of war and the inadequate preparations for it. A preliminary discussion in the government was suggested, in order to reach a united position to deal with the coming storm. Before ending the meeting with congratulations to David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, on his 87^th birthday, Golda promised that the government would discuss the subject as soon as possible. After a  report by Lior, the government reached decisions on recruitment of manpower for essential services, including recruitment of Jewish volunteers from abroad (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 14).

Yeshiva students donating blood in Ramat Gan, 14 October 1973. Photograph: Chanania Herman, GPO

Alongside the recent military successes, the ninth day of the war was a bitter one for hundreds of families and, in fact, for all Israelis. 14 October was the first time that the families of the fallen were informed of the loss of their loved ones; and announcements were also made, for the first time, to the families of those who were missing and it was definitely known that they had been captured. In total, announcements were made about 656 IDF soldiers who had fallen in battle. Many more were missing, although only 50 of them were officially declared as such. The number of wounded reached approximately 2,000. The announcements were accompanied by a speech by Dayan on radio and television: “We are fighting for our lives… in a war that is not similar to the previous two wars… This war is hard; the engagements are hard and fierce, armoured and air battles; a war that is costly in days and costly in blood”, said Dayan, adding emotional words of tribute to the fallen (See the report in the “Davar” newspaper ). Shock overwhelmed the public when the number of fallen was revealed, and it was reinforced by the knowledge that hundreds of families had not yet succeeded in making contact with their family members at the front.

During the evening Gazit reported that the Egyptian offensive had been repulsed and the Egyptian armoured corps had lost approximately 200 tanks, compared with relatively small losses to the Israeli forces (See: Telegram No. LV/907). Among the IDF leaders the failure of the Egyptian attack and its consequences were seen as a strategic change and a sign of a balance between the armoured forces of the two armies. This was the opportunity they had been waiting for – an offensive by the Egyptians that would give the IDF the chance to cross the Canal. That night the government was summoned and asked to decide whether to approve the proposal of Dayan and Elazar, with the agreement of the General Staff, to launch an attack during which the IDF would cross the Canal at one point and capture a bridgehead on the other side. Elazar reported on the Egyptian offensive, and the efforts of the IDF to deceive the Egyptians and cause them to step up their attack, allowing the IDF to destroy as much Egyptian armour as possible. He proposed taking advantage of the blow they had suffered to attack the next day, to cross the Canal, and strike a critical blow to the Egyptian rear. This was the only way to decide the war on that front.

Civilian trucks bringing supplies to an IDF unit in Sinai, 14 October 1973. Photograph: GPO

.3 | The Government Hesitates

However, the ministers – after previous bitter experience – hesitated to approve the plan. An acrimonious argument ensued, one of the most emotional during the war. The ministers asked difficult questions and requested detailed information. Several of them were afraid that the move might cost heavy losses and leave the Israeli force cut off on the other side of the Canal. They asked whether the IDF was taking too great a risk, and whether splitting the fighting force might not weaken the force on the eastern bank. The COGS replied that no-one could ensure the outcome or estimate the losses; but of the three options – remaining in the present situation, which meant in fact a war of attrition; attacking in order to clear the Egyptian army from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, which was not practical; or crossing the Canal – the last seemed to have the best chance of success.

Even after “Dado”‘s explanations, there was no unanimity. Some ministers felt that the severe shock of the first three days of the war, and the complete breakdown of all the theories presented to them in recent years by the top level of the security services, had profoundly influenced their thinking. Others said that despite the risks, they put their trust in the military commanders who had  weighed all the elements, and they should be allowed to act accordingly. Allon announced that he would only decide after finding out what the situation at the front really was, because “on principle, I’m for it; in practice, I’m for it only under very specific conditions”. Dayan emphasized the need for a decisive battle with the Egyptians, in order to expedite the end of the war. He rejected the possibility of the force that crossed the Canal being cut off from the rest of the army.

While the meeting was still in session, the prime minister received a telephone call from Bar-Lev at the southern front. It is possible that Bar-Lev had been told of the sceptical atmosphere and was asked to intervene. He told Golda of the great success of the day, and asked that the army be allowed to go on the offensive. He added that for the first time since the beginning of the fighting, the Egyptians had begun to make serious mistakes, and, as he put it, “the Egyptians have reverted to type”. Golda’s reaction faithfully expressed the hesitations of the government: “My heart is heavy enough at the very fact that a not inconsiderable number of soldiers will cross the Canal, with tanks with which we are not overly blessed, and I have nightmares because of all that may happen”. She added that this was not a choice between a good option and a bad one; but rather a choice between two difficult and dangerous courses, of which the least difficult must be chosen. Nevertheless, she had full confidence in the General Staff; and, in her experience, if the IDF Command recommended this step it should be approved, “and they’ll choose the appropriate timing – tomorrow or the day after”. Eventually the government gave its approval of the plan for the IDF to cross the Canal as proposed by Dayan and Elazar. The timing was to be approved by the prime minister and the minister of defence. In addition, the resolution declared that if, during the action, a proposal was made to prolong the IDF forces’ stay on the Egyptian side of the Canal, it would be brought to the government for approval (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 15).

On the ninth day of the war,  a calmer atmosphere could be felt in the bureau. The success of the struggle for American arms supplies and the developments on the southern front inspired the feeling of a  change that would bring Israel to its goals. The reports in the bureau journal, which were particularly short, dealt mainly with the description of the damage done to the Egyptian armoured corps, which resulted in the weakening of the Egyptian assault. Dayan planned to begin the attack to cross the Canal the next day at midnight, reported Lior. An additional issue that was raised repeatedly, and from then on became a central one, was the investigation of the alleged failures that preceded the war (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 13.10.73). The exchange of telegrams with  the embassy in Washington that night dealt with reports on the state of the Jordanian forces in Syria and the attempt to persuade Jordan to stay out of the fighting. Based on the IDF success in stopping the Egyptian army, Israel stepped up the pressure on the Americans to speed up the supply of planes, in order to achieve a definite conclusion of the war (See: Telegram No. LV/116).

A telegram of support to Golda Meir from Democratic senator Hubert Humphrey, 14 October 1973. File G 6498/6