The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | 15 October 1973: "The IDF Has Broken An Egyptian Armoured Offensive" - Beginning of the Israeli Offensive

On the morning of Monday, 15 October, the headlines of the newspapers told of the impressive success of the IDF in the south. “The IDF has broken an Egyptian armoured offensive – 200 tanks were destroyed, 1,000 Egyptians were killed yesterday along the Suez Canal”, read the headline in “Davar”. This day marked the beginning of the third stage of the war – an attack on a wide front by the IDF in Sinai, aimed at striking a decisive blow at the Egyptian army to prevent a war of attrition.

In the early hours of the morning, the war cabinet held a discussion with the COGS about Jordanian involvement in the war, as described in the bureau journal. The Jordanian brigade sent by Hussein to the Syrian front was on the move and nearing the battle front.  There was general agreement not to attack the force unless it crossed a particular topographic line. Later that day information was received that the Jordanian brigade, under Iraqi command, was approaching the front and would probably soon enter the fighting. This information was sent to the Americans, with a clarification that, in any case, Israel would not attack Jordan itself (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/914, 915).

However, the main focus of attention was on the south and on preparations for the Israeli counter-attack. At 19:45  Lior reported to Golda “Now it’s really begun”. The IDF had started an attack in order to cross the Suez Canal and capture a bridgehead on its western bank. About an hour later, Golda reported on the developments to the head of the opposition, Begin and to the chairman of the Foreign and Defence Committee of the Knesset, Haim Zadok. At 21:30, Deputy COGS  Tal arrived to report. He said that at present the action in the south, which was codenamed “Operation Abirei Lev” (Valiant), was progressing as planned; and the plan was  that the next day there would be “four-five of our bridges on the Canal”. In the north the IDF had had a very successful day, and  had hit many Iraqi tanks (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 21).

By then, 18 Phantom planes had already reached Israel by direct flight, 14 US cargo planes had landed and an additional 18 were on their way, and the supply of the rest of the arms was progressing rapidly. The same day it was also learned that the US would soon begin sending tanks from Europe and would even fly in tanks in huge planes. Within several days an airlift would begin on aircraft carriers that would make it possible to transport dozens of Skyhawk planes to Israel (See: Telegram No. LV/121). The telegrams from Washington show that the Americans intended to supply arms to Israel “on an unprecedented scale and at an unprecedented speed” (See Telegrams Nos. LV/125, 126).

All this and more was discussed at a government meeting that met at 22:00. It began with a report by Tal, who repeated the optimistic reports on the situation in the north, and described the beginning of the operation to cross the Canal. Having received an update from  Elazar, Tal said that the operation was going well, although progress was a little slower than planned. It was impossible to know what the results would be, since this was “the biggest and most complicated operation the IDF had ever carried out”. The ministers’ questions expressed the scepticism felt in previous discussions on crossing the Canal. Tal explained the change that had occurred following the failure of the Egyptian attack, and said that this was the first time since the beginning of the war that the initiative had passed to the IDF on the Egyptian front, because “until yesterday they had the initiative, and they dictated what cards we played”. Golda Meir then presented a report on the Jordanian force and on the great improvement in transporting arms and  equipment from the US. American Patton M60 tanks would be sent to Israel from Europe (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 16).

Ten days after the outbreak of the fighting, the prime minister began to come out of her self-imposed  seclusion. On 15 October Golda visited wounded soldiers in Tel Hashomer Hospital, and the following day she planned to go to Jerusalem, for the first time since 6 October, to make a statement to the Knesset. In preparation for her appearance, Galili talked to Dinitz and telegrams were exchanged about the references to the Administration in her statement. On the one hand, it was necessary to express gratitude for the American help; but on the other, caution was advised in order not to harm the delicate relationship of the US with the Arabs. Dinitz showed Kissinger the proposed text, and Kissinger requested that an entire section relating to him be left out (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/129, /131, partially in English, 132. For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal, 15.10.73).

PM. Golda Meir visiting a wounded soldier in Tel Hashomer hospital, 15 October 1973. Photograph: Chananiah Herman, GPO.

.2 | 16 October 1973: Difficulties in the Operation to Cross the Suez Canal

After the improvement over the past two days, the morning of 16 October again brought great anxiety to Prime Minister Meir and her staff . It seemed that the attack in the south was not going as planned. A paratroop force in boats had managed to cross the Suez Canal, but many delays and unexpected difficulties were preventing the IDF from bringing up the pontoon bridge and placing it in the Canal, in order to enable a significant armoured force to cross to the other side. The news that a small force was on the other side, but it was impossible to link up with it or reinforce it, aroused in Golda the very deep fears that had troubled her before approving the operation (See above: Introduction to 14 October). Had the leadership again disregarded the warning signs raised at the government meeting, and involved Israel in a dangerous military adventure? Throughout the early morning she remained in her bureau, waiting anxiously for news. At 06:10 Dayan updated her. Despite the difficulties, the force that had crossed the Canal had not yet been discovered. Therefore it should not be seen as being cut off, there was presently no intention to return it and it would continue the mission. After talking to Dayan, Golda went home.

Map of “Operation Valiant” , known in the US as “Operatrion Gazelle”, 15-17 October 1973. Wikimedia, Department of History, US Military Academy

On her return to her bureau at 10:15, Lior and Allon, who just returned from the southern front, informed her that the situation had improved. Despite the delay in positioning the bridge, 18 IDF tanks had already crossed the Suez Canal on rafts, and the forces had begun to advance west of the Canal. However, in a meeting with the CGOS, Golda heard harsh criticism of the conduct of the battle to cross the Canal. Elazar, who was very angry, told her that the operation was not going as planned. Under existing conditions, among them the fact that the Egyptians had not understood the picture of the battle at all, they could have achieved much better results if they had cleared the bottleneck which had prevented the arrival of the bridge and the transfer of the main force to the other side of the Canal. He laid most of the blame on the commander of the division responsible for the crossing, Sharon; and claimed that he transmitted unreliable reports, did not follow orders and did not manage the battle successfully. “Arik is a battle commander who is more of a politician than a soldier”, he said; and added: “arrogant, not practical management. The battles are fictitious”.  Allon too voiced criticism, mainly of the division under Sharon and his exaggerated concern for public relations. He reported that: “the division is swarming with journalists, more than 25 of them, and all of them are waiting for the redemption that will come from Arik’s division”.

Another worrying development was connected to reports that during the morning the Jordanian brigade in Syria had begun an attack, coordinated with the Iraqi forces, on the forces in the enclave in Syrian territory captured by the IDF, and had been repelled after losing several scores of tanks (See: Telegram No. 923/LV). These developments strengthened the fear that Jordan might attack Israel from its own territory.

During the afternoon the prime minister made a statement to the Knesset. Golda briefly reviewed the situation on the fronts and the relative positions of the forces since additional countries had joined the war, and reported for the first time that IDF forces were fighting west of the Suez Canal – a report that turned out to be premature and caused considerable problems later. She claimed that it would have been a disaster for Israel if the war had broken out on the lines of 4 June 1967, because the true goal of the Arab countries was Israel’s complete surrender, and declared: “There is no doubt that the war for the very existence of the Jewish State has been renewed; this is a war for our very existence as a state and as a nation” (See: the prime minister’s speech in the Knesset). Golda attacked the USSR and its massive assistance to the Arabs, and praised the help extended by the US. Her words about the Americans were composed with caution. She omitted, as noted above, a whole paragraph in which she intended to speak warmly about the involvement of Secretary Kissinger and about the supply of American military equipment during the war. Golda also referred to complaints that had begun to be heard about the intelligence failure and the army’s lack of preparedness. She understood those who were criticizing and demanding answers, but asked them to postpone the discussion until complete victory had been achieved. In the debate that followed, the Knesset members respected her request, even though hints were heard that difficult questions would definitely be raised later.

Since the outbreak of war the public in Israel, like its leaders, had been on an emotional rollercoaster. Information had reached it through the media and official government spokesmen, but the public was also overwhelmed by a flood of rumours. The hasty general mobilization of the reserves  changed the face of the country at a stroke. Many workplaces were closed, or worked only at a much reduced capacity. Some private and public motor vehicles were mobilized for army service. Youngsters and the elderly signed up to continue the operation of vital services. The question that hung over the leadership’s heads was how the public saw the situation and the role of the government. On 16 October the Communications Institute at the Hebrew University conducted a survey entitled “The Public’s Morale on the Eleventh Day of the Yom Kippur War”, which examined the public’s attitudes on a list of issues related to the war and its management. It revealed that half of those surveyed supported thegovernment’s decision not to initiate a pre-emptive strike, but half opposed it. The survey also presented data from previous surveys conducted during the first days of the war, and, on certain issues, also data from surveys conducted during the Six Day War, and compared them with the current one. The results indicated only small differences during the various days of the war. In the end, the overwhelming majority of those surveyed expressed satisfaction with the way in which the government had dealt with the situation, its public relations policy, and the IDF’s fighting and the data were not significantly different from those of the 1967 war (See: “The Public’s Morale on the Eleventh Day of the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew)”).

Pontoon bridge used by the 143th Division during the Canal crossing, 15-16th October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

After Golda’s return from the Knesset, Dayan reported on events in the south. He again took a gloomy view, and presented a picture that was less than encouraging about the progress of the operation. He expressed doubts about the chances of opening up the corridor  to the Canal crossing site, on which all agreed that the success of the operation depended. Since the axis leading to the bridgehead had not been cleared of enemy forces, and there was no stable bridge across the water, the COGS had decided not to transfer large forces to the western bank, for fear that they would be cut off. However, since the Egyptian leadership clearly did not yet understand the logic of the IDF’s operation, for the present the force that had already crossed would not be returned. Dayan expressed grave doubts as to whether the operation would succeed, but also recommended that it continue. In his report on the Golan front, he told of the preparations for recapturing the Hermon outpost, and even capturing the Syrian part of the Hermon mountains. He presented a disturbing report about the intentions of the Jordanians in the Jordan Valley. “Army officers are examining the crossing points, walking around and creating planning groups, as if they were preparing to attack”, he said (for the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 16.10.73). This worrying information was sent to Dinitz, with the comment that “these signs may indicate that Jordan will enter the war soon” (See: Telegram No. VL/929). The information was sent to Scowcroft, who had promised to deal immediately with Israel’s request that the Administration try to prevent the Jordanians from entering the war from their own territory (See: Telegram No. LV/142). The Americans sent Israel reassuring reports that the Jordanian preparations were defensive only, and that Jordan would only use its forces in Syria.

Although Israel had not received all the arms it had requested, what was sent was still a great help and transformed the nature of the war. Some in the US questioned the presence of US army personnel on Israeli soil to help in transporting the cargo, which might  lead to US involvement as in South East Asia, but the supplies continued arriving in full strength. At the same time the massive Soviet supply to the Arabs continued. In a telegram giving a routine summary of the situation on the fronts, many of which were sent to Dinitz for the Americans, Gazit added that the number of cargo planes with arms for the Arabs had reached 287 by 16 October. Most  flights came from the USSR, with some from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; Soviet supplies also arrived in  cargo ships (See: Telegram No. VL/930).

During the evening a report was sent to the Americans about the IDF operations on the west bank of the Suez Canal. In view of the Israeli military successes and the beginning of the airlift, Nixon and Kissinger hardened their stand. They hinted to the Arabs and Soviets that the US was determined to stand by Israel by supplying it with arms, in reaction to the arming of the Arabs, and would not hesitate to intervene by force if the Soviets did so. In an internal consultation of the heads of the Administration, it was decided to speed up the supply of arms to Israel, and to give it more than the Soviets were giving the Arabs. This policy, and statements which would accompany it, would make it clear to the Arabs that they had no military option and the diplomatic process should be renewed. As a result of these political decisions, shipments were increased and widely reported by the media. The Administration’s vigorous support for Israel was also made public in movements by the US fleet towards the Mediterranean Sea.