.1 | "Tell Kissinger: You Will Not Be Ashamed of Us"
On 17 and 18 October the IDF succeeded, after heavy fighting which cost many casualties, in opening up the corridor leading to the crossing point on the Suez Canal and built two bridges over the Canal. Large forces of the IDF’s three armoured divisions crossed the Canal, under heavy shelling by the Egyptians. After two days of shifting moods, on 17 and 18 October there was a growing sense of confidence as favourable reports kept streaming in from the southern front.
On 17 October there were no consultations held by the war cabinet nor the government. Information about events is mostly derived from the bureau journal. Golda received ongoing reports from Lior on the progress of the campaign, including that of the force on the western bank of the Canal, although the bottleneck on the main route along which forces were moving to the Canal, had not yet been opened up. Even an attack by the 890 paratroop battalion did not solve the problem. The defence minister’s assistant Tzur updated her on the progress of the airlift. In view of the delay in supplying TOW missiles, it was decided that Golda would send a message to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, asking Germany to give up its order for these missiles from the US in favour of Israel.
Occasionally Dayan updated her on the general picture. His optimistic mood had now returned and on 17 October he declared in high spirits that if the situation continued as it was and the Soviets did nothing extraordinary, this would be the turning point of the war. The success of the operation was received with a great sigh of relief by Dayan, who had previously expressed fear that it might fail with disastrous implications. It seems that it was only on that day that the leadership understood that the tide was finally beginning to turn in the IDF’s favour in the Canal sector as well. The mood was now more relaxed, and it was even possible to hear flashes of humour. “Happy [Succot] holiday, if you even remember that it’s a holiday today!”, said Golda to Dinitz on the telephone, and added, laughing, “Did you sleep last night? Shame on you!” For Golda, Dayan’s report was very encouraging, because of her fear of the effect of the perception of Israeli weakness on its standing. Kissinger’s rebuke that Israel had “let down” the Americans were like a “cold shower” for Israel’s leaders. Dayan shared her concern; thus, now, when he updated Dinitz by telephone on the successes in the south for transmission to Kissinger, Dayan was insistent: Tell him “You will not be ashamed of us”.
One of the reasons for the Israeli success was the fact that the Egyptians had still not understood the scope and aims of the IDF operation, and assumed that this was only a local raid. Great efforts were made to keep the nature of the operation secret, and instructions to tone down their reports were transmitted by Gazit to Dinitz and to Eban (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/937, VN/9).
However, the stabilization of the military situation also had an influence on the public, which was not so pleasant for the leadership. The journal reflects the realization that complaints and questions were increasingly being heard about the intelligence and military fiasco of the first days of the war. People who until now had been careful to keep up a united front began to speak up. Allon referred to this when he said: “We have to have a discussion about the whispering and the rumours about the mobilization and the pre-emptive strike. People are already acting and publishing. A piece has already appeared in writing in ‘HaOlam HaZeh’ [a sensational magazine]”.
The change for the worse in the Arabs’ military situation caused the USSR to renew efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin flew to Cairo to consult with the Egyptian leadership. The embassy in Washington reported that at a meeting with Scowcroft in the White House, Dinitz was told that the Soviets were taking soundings to see if the US was willing to submit a resolution to the Security Council on a ceasefire “in place”, in the current positions and on the possibility of linking the ceasefire with Resolution 242. Dinitz expressed Israel’s opposition to linking the two subjects. (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/147, 149). In another meeting with Kissinger, Dinitz told him about the improved situation on the Canal (See: Telegram No. LV/152). Despite the reassuring messages from the Americans, Israel’s leaders felt that time was running out, and Israel must achieve as many successes in the field as possible before the ceasefire.(See Gazit’s summary no. 7 in Hebrew, File A7023/1).
The day ended with a report by Transport Minister Peres on the efforts to ensure the normal flow of public transport. He also mentioned efforts to ensure that all mail from the soldiers at the front reached their families as fast as possible. “At the beginning of the war I gave instructions that every letter to and from a soldier be considered a telegram; and thus the letters are arriving every day”, he said (For the full entry of the day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 17.10.73).