17-19 October 1973: Attack on the West Bank of the Canal and Renewed Contacts for a Ceasefire

.1 | "Tell Kissinger: You Will Not Be Ashamed of Us"

On 17 and 18 October the IDF succeeded, after heavy fighting which cost many casualties, in opening up the corridor leading to the crossing point on the Suez Canal and built two bridges over the Canal. Large forces of the IDF’s three armoured divisions crossed the Canal, under heavy shelling by the Egyptians. After two days of shifting moods, on 17 and 18 October there was a growing sense of confidence as favourable reports kept streaming in from the southern front.

On 17 October there were no consultations held by the war cabinet nor the government. Information about events is mostly derived from the bureau journal. Golda received ongoing reports from Lior on the progress of the campaign, including that of the force on the western bank of the Canal, although the bottleneck on the main route along which forces were moving to the Canal, had not yet been opened up. Even an attack by the 890 paratroop battalion did not solve the problem. The defence minister’s assistant Tzur updated her on the progress of the airlift. In view of the delay in supplying TOW missiles, it was decided that Golda would send a message to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, asking Germany to give up its order for these missiles from the US in favour of Israel.

Occasionally Dayan updated her on the general picture. His optimistic mood had now returned and on 17 October he declared in high spirits that if the situation continued as it was and the Soviets did nothing extraordinary, this would be the turning point of the war. The success of the operation was received with a great sigh of relief by Dayan, who had previously expressed fear that it might fail with disastrous implications. It seems that it was only on that day that the leadership understood that the tide was finally beginning to turn in the IDF’s favour in the Canal sector as well. The mood was now  more relaxed, and it was even possible to hear flashes of humour. “Happy [Succot] holiday, if you even remember that it’s a holiday today!”, said Golda to Dinitz on the telephone, and added, laughing, “Did you sleep last night? Shame on you!” For Golda, Dayan’s report was very encouraging, because of her fear of the effect of the perception of Israeli weakness on its standing. Kissinger’s rebuke that Israel had “let down” the Americans were like a “cold shower” for Israel’s leaders. Dayan shared her concern; thus, now, when he updated Dinitz by telephone on the successes in the south for transmission to Kissinger, Dayan was insistent: Tell him “You will not be ashamed of us”.

One of the reasons for the Israeli success was the fact that the Egyptians had still not understood the scope and aims of the IDF operation, and assumed that this was only a local raid. Great efforts were made to keep the nature of the operation secret, and instructions to tone down their reports were transmitted by Gazit to Dinitz and to Eban (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/937, VN/9).

However, the stabilization of the military situation also had an influence on the public, which was not so pleasant for the leadership. The journal reflects the realization that complaints and questions were increasingly being heard about the intelligence and military fiasco of the first days of the war. People who until now had been careful to keep up a united front began to speak up. Allon referred to this when he said: “We have to have a discussion about the whispering and the rumours about the mobilization and the pre-emptive strike. People are already acting and publishing. A piece has already appeared in writing in ‘HaOlam HaZeh’ [a sensational magazine]”.

The change for the worse in the Arabs’ military situation caused the USSR to renew efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin flew to Cairo to consult with the Egyptian leadership. The embassy in Washington reported that at a meeting with Scowcroft in the White House, Dinitz was told that the Soviets were taking soundings to see if the US was willing to submit a resolution to the Security Council on a ceasefire “in place”, in the current positions and on the possibility of linking the ceasefire with Resolution 242. Dinitz expressed Israel’s opposition to linking the two subjects. (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/147, 149). In another meeting with Kissinger, Dinitz told him about the improved situation on the Canal (See: Telegram No. LV/152). Despite the reassuring messages from the Americans, Israel’s leaders felt that time was running out, and Israel must achieve as many successes in the field as possible before the ceasefire.(See Gazit’s summary no. 7 in Hebrew, File A7023/1).

Dinitz’ account of his talk with Scowcroft, 17 October 1973. File A 4996/4, p. 130.

The day ended with a report by Transport Minister Peres on the efforts to ensure the normal flow of public transport. He also mentioned efforts to ensure that all mail from the soldiers at the front reached their families as fast as possible. “At the beginning of the war I gave instructions that every letter to and from a soldier be considered a telegram; and thus the letters are arriving every day”, he said (For the full entry of the day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 17.10.73).

.2 | 18 October 1973: "A Race Against Time" – The Focus Shifts to Diplomacy

At the beginning of the thirteenth day of the war Lior reported to Golda on the fierce battles the IDF was fighting in Sinai to widen the bridgehead over the Suez Canal. He said that the chief of staff was operating on the basis of the feeling that “this is the beginning of a race against time”, and wanted to press forward. The reports were accompanied by a discussion on Sharon’s behaviour. According to reports from OC Southern Command, he “does whatever he pleases”. The previous day Dayan had praised him on the success of the operation to cross the Suez Canal, but called him a “real character”, addingt “there are many things against him, but there are many things in his favour”. On 18 October Lior said in the bureau for the first time, that Elazar was debating whether “to get rid of Arik”. Lior had told him that this could not be done, because “he’s famous, it will cause a national crisis”.

Haim Bar-Lev consults with division commander Arik Sharon (with the famous bandage), 17 October 1973. Photograph: Yossi Greenberg, GPO

After a few days with little discussion of diplomatic issues, they again took centre stage. The Americans had adopted delaying tactics in their reply to the Soviets on their proposal for a ceasefire. Israel now objected to a ceasefire resolution until it had completed the operation on the southern front. This was not understood by Eban, who had not been updated about the political manoeuvres. He wrote to Golda that he believed that Israel had no choice but to accept mention of UN Resolution 242 as part of the Soviet ceasefire proposal, but it could oppose additions to or interpretation of the resolution. Eban even proposed not to wait for the Soviet draft, but to adopt a joint initiative with the Americans, who should draft a joint resolution with the Soviets, to which Israel would agree. For that purpose he planned to fly to Washington for discussions with Kissinger (See: Telegram No. NS/85). Dinitz and Shalev tried to prevent Eban coming to Washington, because such talks would have led to diplomatic momentum when Israel wanted to lower its profile on that front.

The telegram revealed the sensitive relationship that prevailed throughout the war between the embassy in Washington and Eban in New York. He was left in the dark more than once, did not receive all the reports and was largely kept out of contacts with the Administration. The US officials too were unwilling to involve Eban in anything related to diplomatic affairs, except for the UN. “Naftali [Kissinger’s code name] said that he would not say a word to Eban about the contacts with the Russians, or any other new development, because he must keep this within the president-prime minister channel”, Dinitz said in a telegram on his talk with Kissinger (See: Telegram No. LV/169). The Administration regarded the embassy as directly subordinate to the prime minister, and not to the foreign ministry. This was not the first time that the embassy had tried to prevent Eban from coming, without his knowledge; they asked the prime minister to do so, but without mentioning their opposition, because “we have to keep the peace with him as well, and to maintain proper relations”, in Shalev’s words (See: Telegram No. LV/155.

It was decided that the best way to neutralize the foreign minister was for Eban “to come home for a day or two for consultations, and that will give us some time”, as Golda said. She wrote to him saying that there was no need to hurry on the ceasefire resolution, and asked him to come to Israel. Mention of Resolution 242 in a ceasefire resolution was unacceptable, but she would discuss it with him when he arrived (See: Telegram No. VL/947A). To the staff in her bureau, Golda said: “I am not prepared to divide the nation now on the issue of mentioning Resolution 242”. However, she added: “If they [the Arabs] want serious negotiation for peace, that’s something else”. Eban cancelled his trip to Washington, and planned to leave for Israel the following day.

Golda asked Dinitz to meet privately with Kissinger and inform him of her objection to the mention of Resolution 242, because the Arabs might interpret it as a demand to return to the 1967 borders. She asked him to play on Kissinger’s emotions, using heartfelt expressions:

The battle is not yet over and the Soviets are already trying to dictate to Israel political moves designed not only to save their client States but also to reward them. We will not be a party to such a move. This was a terrible war. Our casualties in dead, if we calculate them in terms of the population of the United States, are in the magnitude of the losses that the United States suffered in Korea or Vietnam wars, that lasted, of course, a much longer time. It was a very cruel war, and it is not over yet. The prime minister is sure that Naftali [Kissinger] will understand and believe her when she says to him again what she told him on several occasions: that during a serious peace negotiation she will have no hesitation to bring before the government, the Knesset and the people, any difficult decision that will be necessary. But as long as there is not even a serious proposal on a ceasefire, and as long as we are still far from peace negotiations – she does not see any justification for the mention of [Resolution] 242″.

But Kissinger made it clear that he had no doubt that Nixon would gladly accept a Soviet proposal for a ceasefire mentioning Resolution 242 without interpretation, and would not understand the Israeli objection to a resolution to which it had already agreed in the past. When alone with Dinitz, Kissinger even claimed that Israeli opposition to this step would result in a direct rift with Nixon, who wanted to be seen as a peace-maker, and this might harm the airlift. However, Kissinger expressed his satisfaction at the developments on the fronts, and emphasised more than once that “at the end of the day, the decisive factor is what you do in the field. If you succeed in destroying most of the Egyptian army, and I hope you do, then that fact has much more significance than one version or another [of the resolution]” (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/169, 171, 172). (See Gazit’s summary: US – Israel, A Summary of Contacts between the States, 17–22 October 1973, File A 7023/1; see also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1974, Vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston, 1982, pp. 532–591)

Another subject discussed that day was the speech by Egyptian President Sadat on 16 October. Sadat declared that he was ready for a ceasefire if Israel would announce its willingness to return to the borders of 5 June 1967, and that he was ready for a peace conference afterwards. In addition, he threatened to attack Israel with long-range surface-to-surface missiles, which were already in position, if Israel attacked civilian targets in Egypt. At noon a consultation was held with Zamir, at which Jordanian involvement in the war was also discussed. Zamir reported that “Sadat has already won his war… he has united the Arab world”. He thought that the Egyptians would not cave in, but would be prepared for a ceasefire if they felt threatened. He reported that the Egyptians had purchased long-range Scud missiles. They were not capable of operating them; and if they were fired, it would be the Soviets who would do it. Golda requested that Dinitz tell this to Kissinger.

In the evening the COGS reported with great relief that “the operation to cross the Suez Canal has succeeded”, and now the initiative was all in the IDF’s hands. At the beginning the bridgehead “had no bridge and barely had a head”. But now the IDF had two bridges and by morning there would be 250 tanks on the other side of the canal. He told Golda that the IDF had found a Soviet bridge among the equipment abandoned by the Egyptian army, “and thus, the Egyptians are really putting up another bridge for us” (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 18.10.73).

The COGS went on to a government meeting at 21:00. He reported on successes on the southern front, which had cost the IDF a heavy price. He noted that there were familiar sights of Egyptian soldiers running away, but said that this was not the army of 1967, and it was not characterized by the same expressions of panic. In reply to questions about possibile Scud missile attacks, Elazar replied that Israel had no way of hitting a missile after it had been fired, and the way to deter the Egyptians was to make it clear that its response would be extremely painful. Golda reviewed the political situation, but as Eban had not yet arrived, she did not discuss the ceasefire. She shared with the ministers the developments in the arms supply from the US, and her experience when she visited the military airfield at which the American cargo planes were arriving. Among the pilots there were also some Jews, she noted, and added: “they say that sometimes our people speak to them in English, and they reply in the Hebrew they learned at Talmud Torah [Hebrew school]”.

Several ministers referred to the question whether to react in public to Sadat’s threats and whether to warn  him not to use long-range missiles. Galili even asked Dayan whether the threats did not demand greater caution with regard to civilian targets in Egypt. Dayan reported on Israel’s reaction to shots fired from Lebanon and Golda replied to questions on the possibility of Jordan joining the war from its own territory; the oil boycott declared by the Arab countries; the European countries’ attitude to Israel as a result; the arms embargo declared by France and Britain etc. In conclusion Golda referred to the threats by Sadat and said, as Zamir had told her, that although such missiles could be found in Egypt, they could only be fired by the Russians. She suggested that they should not get too excited and not publish a reaction at that time (For the full minutes of the meeting, see; Government Document No. 17).

Close to midnight Dinitz sent the draft resolution Kissinger had received from the Soviets, which spoke of an immediate ceasefire in the current positions and immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories to the lines mentioned in UN Resolution 242. Kissinger asked to tell Golda not to get upset at this version, which was completely unacceptable to the Americans, and that he agreed that the Arabs and Soviets “live in shadows of delusions and illusions, and not in reality” (See: Telegram No. LV/173). In fact, Kissinger did not tell Dinitz about the third section of the Soviet proposal, which spoke of a general call to the parties to begin the relevant consultations in order to achieve a just peace. According to his memoirs, he was working towards including, at a later date, a reference to direct negotiations between the parties (Years of Renewal, pp. 539-540). Golda’s reply urged Kissinger not to enter into contacts with the Soviets on the basis of this proposal.

The first page of PM Meir’s reply. File A4996/5

 

.3 | 19 October: Defining Israel's War Aims

On 19 October there were already some 260 Israeli tanks west of the Canal, and the Israeli forces had begun expanding their control on the western bank, while clearing the territory of enemy forces north towards Ismailia and south towards the Suez-Cairo road. On the northern front the fighting continued, but there were no significant developments.

On this day too, there were no cabinet or government meetings, and our knowledge of  events is based mainly on the bureau journal. That morning Golda already told Dayan and those present: “I can see the first signs of victory. They are beginning to put pressure on us. That’s a sign that things are going well…”. However, the heavy price Israel had paid in loss of life, which grew every day, made her very sad, especially since she had known some of the casualties personally.

In army circles questions were beginning to be asked about the goals for ending the war. OC Northern Command Hofi asked: “What does the government want, where does it want to go?” Golda discussed this issue with Dayan, who told her that “we are nearing the point where our planes and armour will be completely worn out”. Up till that point the IDF had lost about 100 planes, approximately 700 tanks (some of which could be repaired) and more than 1,000 men from the tank crews. Therefore, they should avoid actions that might cause heavy loss of lives or equipment, and decide the question of along what lines to deploy, so that reaching them would cost the least. He personally preferred the Suez Canal line. He described a plan to capture as much territory as possible west of the Canal, while avoiding any battles that involved a heavy price, for example, to avoid air strikes at batteries of anti-aircraft missiles, which might lead to the loss of planes.

By now Israel’s leaders were ready to take stock of the initial stages of the war. Dayan, who had a high regard for Soviet arms and fighting methods compared with those of the Americans, openly confessed to Golda that two things had not been seen clearly before the war: 1) the way that the Arabs used the Soviet arms, which was much better than expected, and 2) the basic concept of the Bar-Lev Line. He wondered how the Egyptians had succeeded in crossing the Canal almost unimpeded, when a warning about their plans had been given in advance and there were 300 Israeli tanks in the field  with the air force operating at full strength. The explanation could only be one of two things: either the commanders did not deploy their troops well, or the evaluation of those troops’ ability to prevent the crossing was mistaken. Both agreed that the events had to be closely examined and lessons drawn for the future. Golda herself had not visited the fronts at all. She even suggested to Dayan, to his surprise, that he not “move around in places where it was not vital to be”, because if he were injured, it would cause great joy to the other side.

Later reports said that the attack west of the Canal was advancing quickly and going exceptionally well. In view of the great Israeli success, the threat that had been hanging over it almost from the first day of the war – a possible attack using Scud missiles by the Egyptians, or by the Soviets on their behalf – became even more relevant. During the war the Egyptians had received Scud type surface-to-surface missiles for medium ranges of 300 and 400 kilometres, with conventional warheads. The Israeli leaders feared, based on intelligence reports, that if there were an Egyptian collapse, Sadat might give the order to fire missiles deep inside Israel or to use chemical weapons at the front. Although approaching the Americans on this issue might be seen as a sign of panic, there was a consensus that they had to be contacted, so as to warn the Soviets and the Egyptians. The bureau reported Sadat’s threats to Dinitz, and said that “when he finds out what the real situation is, he might carry out an act of insanity and use the missiles or gas; that is, escalatory arms”. Kissinger was asked to transmit Israel’s warning that such a step would lead to major retaliation (See: Telegram No. VL/964).

That afternoon Golda met with the deputy CGOS at 16:40, and they talked about the goals of the war. Tal reported on the progress of the offensive in the south and the Egyptian attempts, which he defined almost as “suicide missions”, to destroy the bridges from the air. “When will it end, Talik?” Golda asked, and added: “Is it possible to agree to a ceasefire when we have tens of thousands of Egyptians among us [on the eastern bank of the Canal]?” Tal replied that the answer to that question depended on Israel’s war aims, which were very clear at the beginning– survival – and now were not clear enough. Golda’s reply was: “Now we want to survive in the future, as well”. During this  meeting  and one with Dayan, plans prepared by the IDF for the capture of Port Fuad and the Morgan oil field were also presented.

 

.4 | "We See It As Vital That This Terrible War Does Not End With Only a Questionable Ceasefire"

As the Soviets became aware that the Egyptian army’s situation was growing worse, their contacts with the Americans were stepped up. On 19 October at 18:50, Shalev reported in a telephone conversation surprising information about a message from Brezhnev to the White House, in which the Soviets urgently demanded a decision on the ceasefire within several hours. Kissinger was summoned to Moscow to discuss the issue. The president and the secretary decided to accept the invitation, on condition that the talks begin on 21st October, and that they would focus on the ceasefire alone, and not on Soviet demands for Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories according to Resolution 242, to begin immediately and be carried out in stages (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 542-3). At the prime minister’s bureau, Kissinger’s haste was not understood. Golda held a long telephone conversation with Shalev, who said that the Americans were convinced that the panic was caused by the Soviets’ understanding of the Egyptians’ dire situation, and that Kissinger’s trip might actually make it possible to delay  the ceasefire. Eban reported that  Kissinger had agreed that there was no need to hurry. At the moment there was no practical proposal for a ceasefire (See: Telegram No.VL/969).

Immediately afterwards, at 19:45, a consultation was held by the war cabinet, as described in the journal. The cabinet was told that according to Scowcroft, the Soviets might even be considering military action themselves if their demands were not met. The general opinion was that although Kissinger’s trip to Moscow might buy time for Israel, it might end with a ceasefire agreement concluded by the two super-powers, which would not be to Israel’s liking. During the meeting Golda called Dinitz and informed him of her position on the anticipated talks in Moscow. After the terrible price Israel had paid, nothing should be decided that was to the Arabs’ advantage, and no mention should be made of Resolution 242. Some days earlier she had received an intelligence evaluation, saying that an Israeli attack seen as threatening Cairo would greatly increase the probability of Soviet military intervention. Therefore she made it clear that Israel had no intention of attacking Cairo: “Just as we did not go after a capital city in the north [Damascus], we have no intention of going after the second capital. We have one eternal capital city, and that’s enough for us”. The prevailing view was that the sands were running out and the military moves must be accelerated.

At Golda’s meeting with Dayan and Elazar at 21:00, they tried to assess how much time the IDF needed to complete the tasks in hand. Elazar thought that clearing the western bank of the Canal from Egyptian soldiers, including occupying Port Fuad, would require about three days. Dayan said that he preferred that the ceasefire agreement would demand a return to the 5 October lines; that is, a return to the 1973 borders and not to those of 5 June 1967, as the Egyptians demanded. “This has a huge significance”, he said. They estimated that the IDF had – at the most – two or three additional days of fighting. However they did not decide to step up the pace, due to the exhaustion of the forces and the need for a proper evaluation of the situation.

At 21:30 Golda again spoke with Dinitz. She repeated her opposition to a link between the ceasefire agreement and Resolution 242 and, of course, to any commitment to withdraw to the ’67 lines. In view of the terrible losses, the war should end with peace negotiations. That evening Golda expressed her agreement to a ceasefire with the forces in place, an exchange of prisoners, and a call to the parties to begin negotiations. In a telegram drafted by Gazit, he outlined the faults inherent in Resolution 242, and concluded it with the words: “We see it as vital that this terrible war does not end with only a questionable ceasefire.  Our aim is to enter negotiations and to achieve peace agreements. The mention of Resolution 242 will constitute a stumbling block. A simple formula about a ceasefire and a freeze [of the military situation], and a call for entering direct negotiations for peace is what is required now” (See: Telegram No. VL/968).

At 23:30 Dinitz reported by telephone on his meeting with Kissinger and his assistant Eagleburger. Kissinger explained that his trip to Moscow gave Israel some advantage, giving it at least another 48 hours for military operations, and expressed his hope and belief that by then a large part of the Egyptian army would be destroyed. “That’s the biggest thing that you can do”. He promised that no decision would be made without consultation with Israel, and said that he would work towards a softened version of the ceasefire resolution, although it would include some mention of the beginning of negotiations for carrying out Resolution 242, because Nixon was committed to it. However, in a private talk with Dinitz, Kissinger said that he would try to act according to Golda’s wishes, and not raise Resolution 242 at all. The Soviets should not be pushed into desperate measures following the Egyptian defeat, which might drag them into involvement in the fighting. He discounted the possibility that the Egyptians or Soviets would fire Scud missiles into Israeli territory or use chemical weapons, which would mean a confrontation with the US. He asked for the prime minister’s permission to come to Israel on his way back from Moscow, and was answered that he would be welcomed with open arms.

Dinitz and Shalev reported on these talks in telegrams (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/184, 185, 188). After her conversation with Dinitz, Golda told Dayan that the IDF apparently had three days, and the plans should be adapted to this time framework (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 19.10.73).