The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | "We Must Understand That the Russians Will Not Permit Us to Destroy the Third Army"

At 09:30 the government convened to discuss violations of the ceasefire by the Egyptians, the UN emergency force to supervise the ceasefire, the Third Army and the city of Suez. Dayan reported on the deployment of the UN observers on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. He outlined the differences between the various UN forces. Eban added that, unlike the observers, the emergency force would actually hold territory and serve as a buffer between the armies. He said that the force was created to “reduce the international temperature, which had reached virtually feverish heights”. As for the confrontation with the Soviets, he claimed that the crisis was genuine, and that the Soviets had made actual preparations for military intervention.

Dayan said that at present only the transfer of plasma to the Third Army was approved. As for Suez, the civilian governor wanted to surrender, but the forces of the Egyptian army there refused. The capture of Suez would  ensure the complete encirclement of the Third Army. With the memory of the failed attack still fresh, he proposed not to carry out a military attack and to wait for the city to surrender and the Egyptian commando forces to agree to leave. Several ministers, among them Warhaftig and Eban, opposed his proposal. The foreign minister said that the crisis was not yet over, because the Soviets were determined to prevent the surrender and humiliation of the Third Army. On the issues of return to the 22 October lines, the fate of the Third Army and of Suez, Israel could still expect great pressure. The capture of Suez, in this atmosphere, was a provocation that would stretch patience with Israel to the limit.

Several ministers, such as Kol and Sapir, agreed that the IDF should not enter the city and Israel should certainly not make this decision at this time. They wondered whether the US would stand with Israel against the Soviets if another crisis developed. Peres hinted that the crisis between the super-powers had been exaggerated out of all proportion, and thus there was no reason to panic in advance about political pressure on the issue of Suez. Allon and Hillel preferred to authorize the prime minister and the minister of defence to decide the issue in accordance with future developments; on the understanding that this did not include a military attack on the city. The general mood was that Israel should not withdraw to the 22 October lines, but confrontation with the Americans should be avoided. As for the Third Army, some proposed that Israel should continue, and even expand, humanitarian gestures and others opposed any step beyond sending plasma to the wounded.

The prime minister expressed surprise at the bitter argument that had developed. Discussions of this sort had occurred when the situation was bad, she said, whereas now the problems were the result of Israeli success, and there was no need for them. Despite the tension and sharp words between Israel and the US in recent days, “they’re pleased that we’ve reached the places we’ve reached on the west bank [of the Suez Canal]. They’re sorry we didn’t do more”. She called for the safeguarding of good relations with the Americans. “The US is precious to me, I come from there. It was actually my second homeland”. As for the city of Suez, she noted that if the Egyptian army left and the UN emergency force went in, that would not be to Israel’s advantage. She supported the IDF’s ‘quiet’ entry into the city and taking responsibility for it. The government decided to accept the creation of a UN emergency force to supervise the ceasefire. In addition, it decided that there would be no military initiative by the IDF to capture Suez. If an offer were made for the surrender of the city, the IDF commander there would be authorized to accept it, but the entry of IDF forces would be dependent on approval by the government. In addition, the government approved the continuation of the policy on the Third Army, aiming at its complete encirclement. No transfer of any supplies would be made, except for plasma for the wounded (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 24).

Israeli soldiers looking at a SAM 2 missile on the west bank of tthe Canal, 26 October 1973. Yigal Tumarkin, GPO

Later that day reports were received that the Egyptians were attacking in the Third Army sector and attempting to cross the Canal westwards at five points, and that Dayan had approved the use of the air force against them. These reports were sent to the Americans (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/29, 33).

The decisions of the government on supply of the Third Army were unacceptable to the Soviets, but they also did not suit the US. Kissinger had reached the conclusion that the destruction of the Third Army would harm the balance he wanted to create in the feelings of the two sides about their achievements in the war, a balance vital for the success of the diplomatic negotiations that he planned. Although Israel had won, it did so at a high price. Although the Arabs had lost, they did it in an honourable way, and they knew now that only the US was capable of obtaining territory for them.

The dispute between Israel and the Americans was at first conducted in a low key. Dinitz had relayed that Kissinger had received “a hysterical message from Sadat”, in which he complained that the Third Army was in a bad state, and that Israel was demanding its surrender. Sadat threatened that he would take “unilateral action”, and Kissinger asked Dinitz what Israel could propose “as a humanitarian gesture in the way of non-military supplies to the besieged force”(See: Telegram No. LV/300 above).

In a discussion with the minister of defence and the COGS at 19:30, Dayan said that the situation on the northern border was now ripe for dealing with an exchange of POWs. They could also request evacuation of the Jews of Damascus. As for Kissinger’s question, Dayan proposed reaching a joint position with the Americans. He even proposed allowing the Third Army to withdraw with its equipment, in order not to allow Egypt to send in supplies that would turn it into an effective fighting force in its present location. The COGS repeated his opinion that “perhaps in one or two days they [the Third Army] would reach a catastrophic state”, which would result in them leaving without their weapons. Golda reminded them that after all, it was not Kissinger alone who would determine the way things went. “Congress will not allow Nixon to become entangled on this issue”, she said.

During the evening massive American pressure was exerted, and Israel’s proposals were rejected by Kissinger as insufficient. “You will bring on yourselves a confrontation with the Soviets, and make it difficult for us to stand by you”, Dinitz quoted Kissinger, who added that the president himself was exerting pressure on the issue. Israel must understand that the Russians will not permit it to destroy the Third Army. The secretary proposed to Israel that it announce its agreement to the transfer of food and water to the besieged Army, and requested an immediate reply (See: Telegram No. LV/304).

Gradually the tone of the exchanges grew more heated, as shown in the journal and the telegrams sent by Dinitz throughout the night. At 21:30 Dinitz sent a very tough message from Eagleburger, in Kissinger’s name, which claimed that American sources were reporting that Israel had started the fighting that day. If the reports were correct, they would have to come out publicly against it. Dinitz replied in a no less sharp tone, and asked him to tell Kissinger that he was not prepared constantly to receive threats even before the facts had been established (See Telegram No. LV/307). After this, Lior told Dinitz that the American military attaché in Israel had been briefed, and that the fighting had started as a result of the attempts of the Third Army to break out of the encirclement. He raised the proposal that Yariv should go to Washington to explain the true situation.

However, shortly afterwards, Lior told Golda that the COGS had authorized bombing by the air force on a scale much greater than that approved by the minister of defence. Dayan related that he had shouted at Elazar and proposed that the prime minister rebuke him. But even after Kissinger was convinced that it was not Israel that had initiated the fighting, he stepped up the pressure. In a tense talk with Dinitz, whose full text was sent to the prime minister’s bureau, the secretary pressed Israel to agree immediately to the transfer of food and water because the situation was nearing boiling point.

First page of the transcript of Dinitz’ talk with Kissinger, 26 October 1973, File A 4996/5, p. 181

“Why don’t you let them take their goddamn tanks with them, the Russians will replace them anyway” said the secretary, and added that Israel was dragging the super-powers into a global confrontation (See Telegrams Nos. LV/308, 310). Dinitz explained that Israel wanted something in return for its gesture and Kissinger urged him to produce a concrete proposal. The US would support immediate talks with the Egyptians on the problem.

Golda could not understand the American position. She told Dinitz that Israel was prepared to meet with the Egyptians “at any time and in any place”, in order to search for a solution that would preserve the Egyptians’ honour, and there would be “no surrender, no humiliation in it”. “The honour of every nation in the world must be preserved. It is only us that can be abandoned”, she said with cynicism. The day concluded with a kind of reprimand from Golda to Elazar, who claimed that all the operations by the air force had been carried out with the approval of Dayan (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 26.10.73).

.2 | 27 October 1973: The Proposal for Talks with the Egyptians

The night of 26/27 October was among the most difficult hours for Golda Meir and those close to her. Throughout the early hours of 27  October tense discussions were held by the war cabinet, which included the COGS, Zeira and Zamir, on the American demand to allow supplies to reach the Third Army. At the same time, the IDF was busy thwarting efforts by the Egyptians to transfer supplies to the besieged Army. In a telephone call to Dinitz, Kissinger demanded that Israel give its answer to their demand by 14:00 (Israel time). Kissinger declared, in Nixon’s name, that if Israel did not yield to the American demand, the US would be forced to vote against it in the UN, and to support the resolutions calling on it to return to the 22 October lines. In view of the American pressure Israel attempted to soften its position on the supply issue, but was not willing to relinquish the principle of full encirclement, to ensure that the Third Army did not again become a military threat.

Various compromise proposals were raised, such as allowing the Third Army soldiers to withdraw with their vehicles and personal weapons, to allow the transfer of water and plasma, the evacuation of the wounded, etc. But the Americans continued to maintain their inflexible position, encouraged by the reports of their representatives in Israel. According to US documents, the US ambassador, Keating, agreed that Israel should be prevented from forcing the surrender of the Third Army. At the same time, the Americans should demand from Egypt and the Soviet Union to adhere strictly to the ceasefire, and even agree to an immediate exchange of prisoners – a central issue for public opinion in Israel.

Great frustration was expressed in the bureau, with serious complaints about the inflexible, not to say hostile, position of Kissinger. This frustration was especially expressed by Golda: “He has started to make an impression on me of a person who’s really not serious. What does he really want from us?” she said angrily. Those present raised the possibility that there might be Russian military personnel in the encircled Third Army area, and this was the reason for the great US pressure. Possibly the pressure reflected the desire to end the oil embargo and “to prove to the Arabs that they [the US] are the party that can bring about a settlement in the Middle East”. This was the reason for their disappointing about-face, thought Dayan and Galili. The decision was reached to propose to the Americans that Israel should enter into negotiations with Egypt immediately, in order to find an honourable way out. Kissinger reacted with contempt, and continued to demand “supplies and opening the road”.

Telegrams continued to stream in from the embassy in Washington “We [Israel] are playing a very dangerous game. We may lose everything we’ve achieved because of our stubborn insistence on procedure”, Dinitz reported Kissinger’s words. He had replied: “We’re talking here of re-arming 20,000 murderers, who came to kill us, and we’ve managed to surround them… “. The ambassador passed on Israel’s proposal to enter into negotiations with Egypt (See Telegram No. LV/312).

At around 04:00 Kissinger told Dinitz that Brezhnev had sent another harsh message to the Americans, and passed it on to him in full.  Dinitz sent it to the bureau. Brezhnev, on behalf of Sadat, accused Israel of major violations of the ceasefire and wrote that Sadat’s request to the US to enable the transfer of non-military supplies to the Third Army had not been granted. In threatening language the Soviet leader claimed that the steps taken by Israel were endangering world peace and the prestige of the super-powers, and accused the US that the military steps it had taken, and putting the American army on alert unnecessarily, were enabling Israel to continue its adventuristic policy. He demanded that they take immediate action to stop Israeli aggression and transport supplies to the Third Army (See Telegram No. LV/ 317; see also Gazit’s summary on the problem of supplies to the Third Army and the US pressure, 24–28 October 1973, File A 7023/1).

At 08:15, before the government meeting, the cabinet met to discuss the American demand. Dayan reviewed the situation and what Israel should demand from the Americans, if it agreed.  It seemed that the achievements won at such a high price were about to slip away. Golda’s words were bitter. “In this situation, the Americans may want us to reach the 1967 borders in another three months “, she said. But in fact, she added, Israel had no choice but to acquiesce to the US demand, and presumably this would not be the last one, and would be followed by a demand to return to the 22 October lines. She dictated a message to Dinitz for Kissinger, which was very strongly phrased. The participants wanted to appease the Americans, but also to prevent at all costs a retreat to the 22 October lines. They were ready to agree to a limited transfer of food, water and medical supplies to the Third Army for a short time – according to the COGS’s proposal, for 48 hours – and to demand immediate talks with the Americans or the Egyptians on the various aspects of the ceasefire arrangements: POWs, oil, the ceasefire lines, etc. They rejected Sadat’s proposal for a retreat to the 22 October lines in return for a prisoner exchange, and repeated the demand for an immediate and unconditional exchange. They suggested that perhaps there were secret sections in the agreement between Kissinger and Brezhnev that Israel knew nothing about (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 28).

At 10:00 the government met. The prime minister reported on the ultimatum that Kissinger had presented to Israel. Golda assumed that he was responding to a Soviet threat that if Israel did not agree, they would transport the supplies themselves. In a grim atmosphere Golda read to the ministers the message that she had dictated to Dinitz, in which she accused the Americans that the super-power pressure on Israel was intended to enable the Egyptians to declare a victory as a result of their aggression: “There is only one thing that nobody can prevent us from doing, and that is to proclaim the truth of the situation – that Israel is being punished not for its deeds, but because of its size, and because it is on its own.” The text constituted a nadir in the crisis between the two countries and particularly between Golda and Kissinger.

In the middle of the meeting, when they seemed to be at an impasse, the prime minister was called to speak to Dinitz. The ambassador told her of the secretary’s request to postpone the government meeting, to give him time to give her message to Nixon (See: Telegram No. LV/329). However, the conversation also indicated a new and surprising turn of events. It seemed that Kissinger had transmitted Israel’s proposal for talks to Egypt after all, and Hafez Ismail, Sadat’s senior advisor, replied that Egypt was prepared to have a meeting of military representatives from both sides.

The text of Hafez Ismail’s message as transmitted by Dinitz, 27 October 1973/ File A 4996/6, p. 576

The goal of the meeting, in the Egyptian view, was a discussion on implementing the military elements of the Security Council’s resolutions about a ceasefire. However they also demanded, as a condition for holding it, that Israel agree to the passage of a convoy of non-military supplies for the Third Army, which would reach its destination at the same time as the meeting would begin (See: Telegram No. 318/VL). Dinitz said that Kissinger defined the Egyptian agreement as a miracle, and had begged Israel to agree and not to make a fuss about the supply convoy, which was a one-time gesture of good will (See: Telegram No. LV/319).

How large would the convoy be and what types of supplies would it include, asked the ministers, while the discussion was overshadowed by the thought of the confrontation with the Americans if Israel refused. Golda and Eban reviewed the stormy discussions: “I was appalled when all differences between Brezhnev and Nixon were erased”, said the prime minister. Afterwards Dayan and the COGS joined them, and Golda instructed Elazar to stop firing at 13:00. A preliminary discussion was held about the meeting with the Egyptians, which was in fact to serve as an introduction to the contacts to follow. Dayan proposed an outline for a separation agreement between the two armies – Israel east of the Suez Canal and the Egyptians west of it, with a demilitarized disengagement zone between the two. Elazar said that this was an excellent proposal for Israel, but the Egyptians would not accept it, and proposed preparing alternatives. Sapir and Galili argued that the discussion was premature, but Golda answered that she supported bringing such a proposal to the meeting, because remaining on the present lines was not to Israel’s advantage and the search for a solution should begin. Eban agreed. In conclusion it was officially decided to accept the proposal for a meeting with the Egyptians and to approve the passage of the convoy. The Israeli representative at the talks would present Dayan’s proposal to exchange positions, with a demilitarized zone of 10 kilometres on each side. In addition, it was decided to demand an exchange of prisoners and free passage in the Suez Gulf and the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, blocked by the Egyptian navy at the beginning of the war. The government also decided that the Israeli representative would not be authorized to discuss withdrawal to the 22 October lines (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 25).

Immediately afterwards, Golda held another consultation with Dayan, Galili, the COGS and Yariv, who was to represent Israel at the meeting. He was told to focus on the transfer of supplies to the Third Army, and to avoid any discussion on a return to the 22 October lines, even if the Egyptian representative raised it. Golda said that she agreed with this approach, but a way must be found to discuss everything, and to present a proposal “that doesn’t resolve things just from today till tomorrow, but deals with the problems that [might arise] until peace comes – we are also prepared to go immediately to peace “, she said. She proposed setting up a mechanism for continuing the talks. Yariv was instructed to insist on the exchange of prisoners (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 29).

The Israeli decision improved the atmosphere between Israel and the Americans at a stroke. Nixon wrote to Brezhnev that “we were able to arrange” for direct talks between Israeli and Egyptian army officers on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. In addition Israel had agreed to the passage of a convoy of non-military supplies to the Third Army (See: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, p.777). Dinitz reported that he had spoken with Leonard Garment, Nixon’s special counsel and among the people closest to him, who said “that the relationship between us had returned to normal” (See Telegram No. LV/325).

At 15:00 Yariv arrived at the predetermined meeting point, but did not find the Egyptian representative there. The supply convoy was also delayed, and it seemed that the coordination with the UN observers had been faulty, and a serious mistake was made by the IDF. In a telephone conversation with Kissinger, the prime minister explained the misunderstanding, and it was decided to postpone the meeting to the next morning. However, the Egyptians demanded that it be held that night, at 22:00; and then changed their demand to midnight.

At 19:20 an additional consultation was held. Golda reported that Kissinger was exerting pressure on Israel to accede to the Egyptian demand. He claimed that the Administration was blaming Israel for the errors, and that there was anti-Israel feeling among the various government agencies. Proposals were being made, which he opposed, that the Americans themselves directly transport supplies to the Third Army. There were even “guys that are beginning to think how to make trouble for us about the airlift”, he said. Golda was very angry about the failure in coordination with the UN observers, but suggested concentrating on the future. The COGS and Dayan agreed to hold the meeting at midnight, despite the inconvenience and the danger of holding such a meeting late at night in a battle zone. The meeting ended with a report that the supply convoy had already started out (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 30).

After the meeting Lior argued that organizing the meeting would take a long time, due to its complexity, and he doubted that it would take place. Golda, exhausted from a sleepless night and a full day of discussions,  demanded that the arrangements be adhered to. “We can’t have a crisis of confidence with the Americans three times a day”, she said. (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 27.10.73).

Dinitz met with Kissinger and reported that the meeting and convoy would be carried out as planned. He again emphasized how important the prisoner exchange was to Israel in general, and to Golda in particular. “Hundreds of families in Israel do not know the fate of their loved ones”, said the ambassador, adding that when the Israeli gesture of good will towards the Third Army was publicized, without a resolution of the problem of the prisoners, Golda feared a ” public rebellion”. Kissinger replied that he would not rest until the issue was resolved. Dinitz complained about the anti-Israel sentiments in the Administration, especially the Pentagon and the Department of State, and Kissinger promised to deal with this too. He vehemently denied the talk of the airlift being stopped, and gave his word that it would continue until it was replaced by a sea-lift (See: Telegram No. LV/326).

.3 | 28 October 1973: Israel Opens Talks with the Egyptians at the 101 Kilometre Point

After many delays, on 28 October at 01.45 the Israeli delegation headed by Maj. General (retd.) Aharon Yariv met with the Egyptian delegation headed by General Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy. Yariv described the talks at a government meeting that met at 10:30. He said to the Egyptian general at the beginning of the meeting that “through these negotiations we wish to reach peace and a proper relationship with them”. He then presented the questions which had to be settled in order to maintain the ceasefire. He raised Dayan’s proposal to exchange territories between Israel and Egypt with a buffer zone between them. On the issue of a POW exchange, he received a promise from the Egyptians to give Israel a list of the Israeli prisoners in Egypt. He announced Israel’s agreement to the passage of one supply convoy to the Third Army, but rejected Gamasy’s demand to discuss withdrawal to the 22 October lines and the passage of additional convoys, claiming that he had no authority to discuss them. He told the ministers that his impression was that the Egyptians’ main interest lay in preserving the Third Army, and towards that end they were prepared to compromise on the issue of the prisoners and opening the Bab el-Mandeb Straits.

The discussion that developed dealt mainly with the issue of the prisoners and the link between this and humanitarian aid to the Third Army, which might cause great public outcry in Israel. Parents of soldiers, prisoners and soldiers missing in action were writing to Golda’s bureau demanding to step up the government’s efforts to free the prisoners and obtain information on the fate of the missing. Some of these requests were published in the media. “As prime minister you did not agree to a ceasefire when our sons were languishing in the captivity of a cruel enemy with no conscience. And where are you now, as a mother in Israel?”, wrote a group of parents, who demanded that Israel renounce the ceasefire and prevent any passage of supplies to the Third Army, until the fate of their sons was revealed.  This mood was also described to the Americans. (See: Telegram No. VL/47).

The participants at the meeting were well aware of the problem. Dayan reported on contacts with the Red Cross about the state of the Israeli prisoners, and shared his desire to make the evacuation of the wounded of the Third Army conditional on receiving information about them. The chief of staff spoke of unprecedented unrest in the IDF about the fact that while Israel was providing humanitarian aid to the Egyptian army, there was no progress on an exchange of prisoners, unrest “going as far as an atmosphere of mutiny”, he said. Despite Elazar’s emotional words, the ministers were divided as to whether the two issues – supplies to the Third Army and the exchange of prisoners – should be linked. It was decided “to delay the implementation of our positive reply to the Red Cross on evacuating the wounded soldiers of the Third Army, until receipt of a reasonable reply on the issue of our prisoners” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 26).

However, the American pressure had its effect, and the supply convoy whose passage had been decided on at the meeting at the 101 Kilometre point could not be stopped. At 17:00 the convoy for the Third Army began making its way eastward. At 18:05 Lior reported to Golda that there were many difficulties in transporting the convoy and its cargo to the surrounded Third Army. Shortly afterwards Dinitz relayed a message from Kissinger that the Egyptians were asking for an additional meeting, and the ambassador believed that they wanted to discuss the passage of another convoy. Kissinger even related that Nixon had received a proposal from the Pentagon that the US should transport the supplies (See: Telegram No. LV/328 and Gazit’s summary on supplies to the Third Army and the US pressure, 24–28 October 1973).

Lieut. General (Res.) Haim Bar-Lev and Egyptian brigadier Bashir Sharif meeting on the west bank of the Canal before the transfer of supplied for the Third Army, 28 October 1973. Photograph: Yitzhak Segev, GPO

At 18:40 a cabinet consultation was held with Eban on contacts with the Egyptians. Dayan said that he was surprised at the willingness of the Egyptian delegation to discuss everything, including the proposal for disengagement. He said that the situation was very complicated and it was difficult to find solutions within the existing framework of talks. Therefore he proposed to Golda “that perhaps you should go to Washington and speak with them, to try to reach some understanding with Nixon or Kissinger”. He rejected outright the Egyptian demands for a return to the 22 October lines and for an ongoing supply of the Third Army. He proposed presenting the disengagement proposal as a basis for a solution, and Golda supported his view. Golda, Allon and other ministers supported another meeting with the Egyptians and a visit to Washington for talks; their aim was also to forestall Kissinger’s anticipated visit to Cairo. In view of this, she rejected Dayan’s proposal to prevent the unloading of the supply trucks that were about to reach the Suez Canal and transport of their contents to the eastern side, as long as no information had been received on the fate of the prisoners. Golda said that this would be a provocation towards the Americans, and “we can’t do that and also ask for a meeting [with them]”. She summed up the steps to be taken as follows: “A. To ask Simcha [Dinitz] to try to arrange a meeting. B. To inform him [Kissinger] that the meeting [with the Egyptians] tomorrow, will take place. C. To announce to Naftali [Kissinger] in advance, that we do not even imagine continuing the convoys, but tomorrow we will request an answer to our plan [for exchanging territories] and will ask them what they’re doing on the issue of the prisoners”. The consensus was that if Golda went to Washington, she should present the plan for exchanging territories (disengagement) and obtain a promise that there would be no return to the lines of 22 October. In addition, she should insist on a solution to the problem of the prisoners. It was also decided that at the next meeting with Gamasy, the Israeli representatives would request a meeting at the political level, in order to advance their proposal. Golda, who was troubled by the POW issue, summed up that the Egyptians would not be permitted to evacuate the wounded of the Third Army; “no prisoners, no wounded, no medical supplies and no anything”, until information was received about the Israeli prisoners. (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 31).

A few minutes later, the prime minister called Dinitz, as described in the journal, and gave him the main points. Golda told him of the seriousness with which Israel regarded the issue of the prisoners and said that there had already “been a small demonstration against this meeting, against the convoy. We cannot continue to allow the convoys, and if the situation remains as it is, then a new war will break out within days or a week, at the most. The only possible solution is the Israeli proposal for an exchange of territories”. Golda said that she wanted to meet with Nixon and Kissinger because of the uncertainty of the present situation. She added: “I can come incognito. I’ll take out the clothes I wore to come to Abdullah [in 1948], and I can even come as the Mufti…”. It was decided that Dinitz would ask Kissinger whether the Americans would agree to the visit (For the full contents of the talk, see: Cabinet Document No. 32).

The Egyptians, too, were not idle. In a message Hafez Ismail sent to Kissinger he wrote that Sadat had decided to send Ismail Fahmi, the minister of tourism, who would shortly be appointed minister of foreign affairs to Washington. Kissinger replied that the US’s ability to influence Israel had been weakened due to Egypt’s refusal to release the prisoners (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, p. 782).

Dinitz met with Kissinger and presented Golda’s request to come to Washington. Kissinger’s initial reaction was negative, as he saw no need at this stage for political proposals, and wanted to settle the issue of the Third Army. He said angrily that what Israel really wanted was to destroy the Third Army. No one would allow them to do that, he said, and if they would not allow the transfer of non-military supplies, others would do it, including the Americans. In an Administration so hostile to Israel, where only he – Kissinger – is a true friend, Israel has no choice but to act in that spirit. Dinitz denied his accusations and presented the dangers facing Israel and the importance of the visit. Gradually the secretary’s tone softened, and he promised to check with the president on the possibility. In effect, he hinted that the visit would take place after all (See: Telegram No. LV/335).

28 October closed without any real breakthrough, but with the beginning of moves that seemed to offer a solution to the crisis (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 28.10).