ג6 October 1973: Day of Judgement

ג.1 | War with Egypt and Syria breaks out

On the morning of 6 October 1973, at 03:50 a.m on Yom Kippur, Prime Minister Meir was woken by a phone call from her military secretary, Israel Lior, who told her of a message from Zvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad, who had gone to London to meet with a highly placed source (Ashraf Marwan). Zamir reported that Egypt and Syria were about to launch a combined attack on Israel that evening. A few hours later a telegram reached the Prime Minister’s bureau with the full report from Zamir, with detailed information on the Egyptian plan which, according to the source, had a 99% chance of being carried out (Marwan left a 1% chance for the possibility that Sadat would change his mind at the last minute). The attack would begin with an air and artillery bombardment of Israeli targets in the Sinai Desert and continue with the crossing of the Suez Canal and the capture of a strip along it, air, sea, commando attacks etc. The Egyptian army would attempt to take control of a strip approximately 10 kilometres wide, and the decision whether to advance further would be made according to the results. The Syrian army would simultaneously begin an attack on the Golan Heights in order to regain the territory lost to Israel in 1967. (See the previous chapter for a translation of the telegram, 6.10.73). Golda was not taken by surprise by the call, and her reaction was: “I knew that this would happen, Israel – what do we do now?”

The news from the Mossad threw the entire military and political establishment into a frenzy of preparations. A short time later, Golda was already making her way to her bureau through the empty Tel Aviv streets, with only a small number of people on their way to synagogue breaking the absolute silence. At 07:30 she arrived there and received details of Zamir’s full report. Now that the die was cast, Golda began to take action on several levels – checking the preparations for the army’s deployment and making vigorous diplomatic efforts to persuade the US to accept Israel’s evaluations and perhaps to avoid the war; if not, to hasten vital arms supplies. On her instructions, a telegram was sent to the embassy in Washington and to Foreign Minister Eban, who was at the UN Assembly in New York, with details of the news and an instruction to keep US policy-makers informed (See: Telegram No. TA-14).

At 08:05 a consultation was held in the bureau in Tel Aviv between the prime minister and Defence Minister Dayan, COGS Elazar, the head of the IDf Intelligence Branch Zeira, and ministers Galili and Deputy Prime Minister Allon, who were brought urgently from their homes in Kibbutz Na’an and Kibbutz Ginossar respectively. The meeting focused on two issues. The first was the extent of mobilization of the reserves, on which the military experts disagreed. The COGS supported extensive mobilization of the fighting forces, while the minister of defence proposed only a partial mobilization. The second was the question of a preemptive military strike. The COGS presented the advantages of this step, which would destroy the Syrian air force, hit the anti-aircraft missiles and give the Israeli air force freedom of action during the fighting. Dayan was opposed. The prime minister, an elderly woman with no military experience, was forced to decide between them  On mobilization, Golda decided in favour of Elazar’s position because, in her words, ‘if there really is a war, we need to be in the best position possible’. With regard to a strike, like Dayan, she presented the political difficulties involved, and postponed the decision; in fact she decided against it. She assumed that Israel would need significant American diplomatic support and military aid in the coming days, and was guided by advice given by Henry Kissinger to the previous Israeli ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, and the current one, Simcha Dinitz – never to put Israel in a position where it would be accused of having started a war, and would be placed in a highly uncomfortable position in connection with aid from the US (For the full minutes of the consultation, see Cabinet Document No. 6 in Hebrew).

At 10:15 Golda Meir met with the American ambassador in Israel, Kenneth Keating, and updated him on the situation. In reply to a direct question, Golda promised that Israel would not initiate a pre-emptive strike, “although it would make the situation much easier for us”; but Egypt and Syria should be aware that Israel knew of their plans and would hit back hard. She expressed confidence in an Israeli victory, and suggested that the US should still attempt to talk to the Egyptians and the Soviets in order to prevent the outbreak of war (See: Telegram No. VL762/A). Ambassadors from other countries were invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a report and an update. Golda instructed Dinitz, who was in Israel due to his father’s death, to hurry back to Washington and to do everything possible to speed up the supply of military equipment to Israel. Later the minister in Washington, Mordechai Shalev, reported that after receiving the first urgent message from Keating, Kissinger telephoned him and said that he had begun vigorous efforts to prevent war. The secretary asked him to tell the prime minister immediately that her message of 5 October (See Introduction to 3-5 October, above) had been transmitted to the Soviets, who had even agreed to cooperate, and to the Egyptians. He warned Israel against a pre-emptive strike. Some 45 minutes later, Shalev reported that Kissinger had called him again and told him that Keating’s full report had arrived, and the news that Israel was not planning a strike had been relayed to the Soviets and the Egyptians. “We have hereby undertaken a commitment that you will indeed not initiate any action”, said Kissinger (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/954, 955).

At 12:00 an urgent government meeting began, after ministers had been rushed from their homes. Dayan reviewed the reports that war was about to break out at 18:00 and the IDF’s preparations for the  attack. The news came as a surprise to several of the ministers, who had not been privy to inside information in the past few days. Golda Meir explained the political considerations that had caused her to decide against a pre-emptive strike, so that Israel would not be seen as the aggressor, even though “I readily admit that I was very drawn to it”. An argument followed as to how to deal with the Syrians if only Egypt opened fire. The prime minister surprised the ministers by saying that it was not certain when the war would start, and 16:00 might be the intended hour. As she spoke, the wail of a siren could be heard, and Lior entered and announced that the Syrians had opened fire, and apparently the Egyptians as well. Golda’s reaction was: “So they did surprise us, after all… I am angry that they surprised us”. She repeated this several times during the coming hours (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 4).

From the moment Golda reached her bureau on the morning of 6 October 1973, her bureau director, Eli Mizrachi, began to write down everything that took place and all that was said in a notebook. This practice continued throughout the war, and the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal of the Yom Kippur War, which appears in the Hebrew publication in its entirety, is a rare example of documentation of the conduct of the war by the political echelon. It provides a glimpse into the dramas, feelings, hesitations and personal relationships that accompanied the proceedings. A section of the journal from 6 October describes the diplomatic preparations made immediately on receipt of the news about the approach of war. In addition, it contains a detailed description of the reports received by the ministers who remained after the government meeting on events on both fronts during the initial hours of fighting.

The siren that was heard at 14:00 interrupted the silence of Yom Kippur. Residents of the northern part of Israel clearly heard the sound of Syrian cannons, which sounded like continuous rolling thunder. In a short time Israel was transformed from a country deep in prayer and fasting, into one gripped by frantic preparations for war. Radio broadcasts, which had shut down for Yom Kippur, were resumed and announced the outbreak of fighting. Call-up codes for mobilizing the reserves were broadcast and communicated the emergency atmosphere to the entire nation.

An Army reservist taking leave of his wife in Ramat Gan, 6 October 1973. Photograph: Chanania Herman, GPO

At 18:00 the prime minister’s statement was broadcast on radio and television. In her speech Golda announced the outbreak of war and said that Israel had not been surprised; preliminary reports had accumulated on the Arabs’ intention to attack and the reserves were being mobilized. She asked the citizens to accept with patience and understanding the difficulties that would arise and to do their best, and concluded with the words: “We are completely confident of the IDF’s spirit and ability to vanquish the enemy” (See: Golda Meir’s broadcast to the nation, 6.10.1973).

The outbreak of fighting was accompanied by vigorous diplomatic activity. Eban and the staff of the prime minister’s bureau worked to refute Egyptian claims that Israel had started hostilities with a naval attack on Egyptian forces in the Gulf of Suez region (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/956, 959). The Israeli leaders also tried to prevent a meeting of the Security Council and adoption of a ceasefire resolution before Israel had thrown back the attackers, and to ensure a supply of vital arms from the Americans. “There will be no ceasefire before the situation returns to what it was before”, declared the prime minister. In a telegram to the embassy in Washington and Eban in New York, they were told under no circumstances to accept proposals to convene the Council to decide on a ceasefire resolution: “On both fronts, we intend to fight until we have pushed the last of the Syrian and Egyptian soldiers back over the ceasefire lines”, it said. Shalev reported that the Americans were indeed working to prevent a meeting of the Council (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/765, LV/965). In discussions at the bureau and at an additional government meeting that same evening, there was a fairly confident feeling that the IDF was in control of the situation, and that it would soon strike a decisive blow at the Arab armies, who would realize what a huge mistake they had made. At the government meeting Elazar described the situation: all “the Syrian attacks have been repelled and they have no significant successes”, except for a worrying and unclear situation at the Hermon outpost. He added: “We are holding up as we thought we should, in the battle to halt the enemy… If we continue stopping them as we’ve done till now, we’ll be in good shape”, before the IDF’s counter-attack which would begin, in his opinion, within two or three days. The government decided to continue military action to repel the Arab armies and to restore the previous situation, and not to request a meeting of the Security Council (For the full minutes of the government meeting, see: Government Document No. 5). A similar atmosphere reigned in the meeting of the Foreign and Defence Committee of the Knesset that evening, with the participation of the prime minister. That evening Dayan spoke on television. He mentioned a number of local victories for the Arab armies, especially the Egyptian one, and explained why Israel had not initiated a pre-emptive strike and did not mobilize the reserves before it was certain that a war would break out. He expressed his confidence that “we will be able to smite them [the enemy] hip and thigh” (Judges, 15:8); and concluded with a confident statement: “And I believe that we can say with confidence “G’mar hatima tova [A good conclusion]” (traditional Yom Kippur blessing) (See: Dayan’s speech on television).

Defence Minister Moshe Dayan at a press conference, 6 October 1973. Photograph: GPO

The end of the first day of the war thus found the leadership confident and convinced of the IDF’s ability to repel the enemy and to strike hard at them within a short period of time. After the end of the second government meeting, the journal describes the reports on the Egyptian and Syrian attacks which flowed into the bureau, painting a very encouraging picture of the situation. This picture bore little resemblance to the situation on the ground, and resulted from a communications breakdown between those reporting and the forces in the field. (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 6.10.73). At 01:30 a telegram was sent to the embassy in Washington and to Eban in New York, written by Allon, summing up the first day of fighting for Secretary Kissinger. Allon reviewed the situation and passed on Israel’s estimate that the Egyptians were planning to transfer major forces to the front, in order to penetrate to the heart of the Sinai Desert. The text of the telegram radiated optimism. Allon summed up with the words: “Taking into account the fact that for political reasons which he [Kissinger] is aware of, we did not begin with a preemptive strike, and are concentrating on the containment stage; despite local successes, especially by the Egyptians, the situation is satisfactory” (See: Telegram No. VL/769).

Egyptian troops crossing the Suez Canal. 6 October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, CIA historical collection