ד7 October 1973: The Great Debacle

ד.1 | Forming the War Cabinet

The second day of the war was one of the most dramatic and perhaps the most difficult for the Israeli leadership. It began with optimism as shown in Allon’s telegram to the embassy in Washington (see the previous chapter)  summing up the first day of fighting (See: Telegram No. VL/769).  On the basis of this belief, Israel made every effort to stop all initiatives to declare a ceasefire that would freeze the existing situation. At 01:30 Golda composed another telegram, expressing her appreciation to Kissinger for stopping the initiative of Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayat to call for a special session of the General Assembly. She repeated that it was undesirable to convene the Security Council until the Egyptians had been pushed back to their own side of the border, which she thought would take about three days. She added that Israel was planning to attack strategic targets deep in enemy territory, but promised that there would be no attack on civilian targets (See: Telegram No. VL/770).

During the early hours of the morning, feverish contacts took place between the Israeli foreign minister and his staff and the US State Department on convening the Security Council. Eban reported that in a telephone conversation Kissinger said that the Americans could not oppose convening the Council, and therefore they were considering doing so themselves, in order to adopt a resolution on a ceasefire and a return to the 6 October lines. They would prolong the discussion as much as possible, so as to give Israel freedom of action on the military front. In any case, according to Kissinger, carrying out the American strategy was “dependent on our agreement” (See: Telegram No. NR/46). Later it was reported that the Americans had decided to postpone their call to convene the  Council, and that their ambassador to the UN had been successful in postponing any resolution to the following day at 10:00. In fact, the Egyptians and Syria also opposed a ceasefire, in light of their military success.

During the next hours it became clear that the optimistic reports were not supported by reality on the ground. During the night of 6/7 October and the following morning the military situation worsened from Israel’s point of view. The Egyptian army expanded the bridgeheads it had constructed and deployed additional forces across the Suez Canal. During the night many of the outposts that constituted the “Bar-Lev Line” along the Canal were surrounded, and some of them were captured by the Egyptian army. The situation in the north was also desperate. In the centre and the southern part of the Golan Heights, the main Syrian force broke through the IDF’s lines and penetrated deep into the Heights, faced only by sparse Israeli forces.

At 07:30 the prime minister crossed the lawn that separated her bureau from the IDF’s command headquarters (the ‘Pit’), and heard an update from the COGS, “Dado” Elazar. “We have had a bad night,” said Elazar, and gave details about the difficult position on the Golan Heights, while the situation at the Suez Canal “was a little better” (See: Cabinet Document No. 7).

During the first hours of the war Golda created the forum that would conduct it together with her. This unofficial “war cabinet” was based on the members of the “inner kitchen cabinet”: the prime minister, Dayan, Allon and Galili. They were joined, as needed, by other ministers, the COGS and other senior military officers, the head of Mossad Zamir and others. The cabinet dealt mainly with the management of the two principal theatres – the military and the political one. The latter focused on discussions in the UN Security Council on a ceasefire, and contacts with the American government to obtain urgently-needed supplies. Managing the political arena was greatly assisted by the close ties between Golda and Kissinger. At first messages were transmitted by exchange of telegrams between Gazit and Dinitz in Washington, who served as the contact with the Americans through Kissinger’s  deputy as National Security Assistant, Scowcroft, and Lawrence Eagleburger, his assistant at the State Department. After several days a direct communications line with the embassy was installed in the bureau. Eban, who was in New York, was involved in the discussions at the UN, but was largely kept out of political contacts with the Americans.

Civilians at a bus stop in Tel Aviv listen to reports from the battle fronts on a transistor radio, 7 October 1973. GPO.

ד.2 | Bar-Lev: "On the First Day of the War We Acted as if it Were the Seventh Day of the Six Day War....and That was a Mistake"

The severity of the situation was reflected in the consultations in the “war cabinet” and the government meetings that continued throughout the day and into the night. The first consultation was held at 09:10 and discussed ways to persuade Kissinger to prevent, in any way possible, a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a ceasefire “in place” while the various armies remained in their positions, in order to enable the IDF to push the Arab armies back. Despite her declaration that this was a bad night, Golda Meir expressed her confidence that all was not lost and was due to change for the better. However, in view of the grave military situation and the difficulties in the Security Council, Golda implied, for the first and only time throughout the war, regret that she had not allowed the IDF to initiate a preemptive strike: ” If God forbid we reach such a situation, it is necessary to disregard the world and to let the army begin first….. The result is, and this is the important thing, that we have scored points only with the Americans, and Kissinger can’t find another two or three [supporters] so that they [the Egyptians and the Syrians] will return to their positions”, she said (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 8).

After this, the entire government met for a short session of reports from the prime minister and the COGS. Golda reviewed the efforts to prevent a ceasefire resolution at the UN. She especially emphasized the effort to force Kissinger to admit that Israel found itself in this situation because it had followed his instructions not to make a preemptive strike:”There is at least an advantage in the fact that America is with us – that we bided our time until their initiative – he understands this and appreciates it”, she said. The prime minister repeated this stand many times. On the military situation, she continued to project an undaunted spirit, merely reporting that the situation was not good, but there was hope that it would improve soon. The COGS told the astonished ministers, who only the previous night had heard that the situation was relatively good, of the deterioration on the fronts and especially on the Golan Heights, which had caused the IDF to give priority to air force activity in the north. However “Dado” Elazar continued to display optimism that perhaps even that night the situation would change for the better. (For the full minutesof the government meeting, see: Government Document No. 6).

In order to assess the situation with regard to equipment and ammunition, the prime minister met with the assistant to the minister of defence, ex-COGS Zvi Zur, at 13:40. Zur reported on Israel’s urgent requests for fighter planes and the attempts to acquire the means to counter Soviet ground-to-air missiles which were causing the air force heavy losses. He admitted that the defence establishment was not organized to transfer the entire fighting Armoured Corps to the front at once. With regard to battle equipment, he noted that the IDF had only enough for one week of fighting: “There are no indications of a lack of fighting equipment in the field. If the war ends within a week, we will not have a shortage. After that, there will be problems” (For the full minutes of the meeting in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 9). Despite this bleak picture, the prime minister sent an optimistic message to Kissinger,  writing that although the fighting was fierce, the military estimate was “that with the entrance of the reserves… a change in our favour is about to take place”. She reminded him again of her decision to avoid a preemptive strike and urged him to postpone the discussion in the Security Council till the fourth or fifth day, “when we have reason to assume that we will be in an attacking position, instead of a defensive one” (See: Telegram No. VL/773).

A message from Golda Meir in English sent to Kissinger on 7 October 1973, File A 4996/3 p. 115

The situation on both fronts continued to deteriorate. Hundreds of Egyptian tanks crossed the Suez Canal eastward. The tired and burnt-out forces of the 252nd Armoured Division , under the command of Brig. General Avraham ‘Albert’ Mendler, suffered heavy casualties and lost most of their tanks. The IDF decided, in fact, to abandon the line of outposts, and the two divisions of reserve soldiers that arrived that day in the sector, 162nd Armoured Division under the command of Maj. General Avraham “Bren” Adan and 143rd Armoured Division  under the command of Maj. General Ariel “Arik” Sharon, began to take up defensive positions on an axis 8-10 kilometres from the Suez Canal line. On the southern and central Golan Heights the Syrians deepened their hold and Syrian units reached a point a stone’s throw away from the Jordan River bridges leading to Israel proper and the Galilee Panhandle. They were faced only by depleted Israeli forces that could not stop them. The following day Allon described the situation: “The front was overrun yesterday. If the Syrians had been bolder, they would have achieved major accomplishments; they would even have reached Ginossar (his kibbutz)”.  Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles caused heavy damage to Israel Air Force planes, and personal anti-tank missiles devastated the Israeli armour. The IDF was not prepared for this type of war, and as Haim Bar-Lev said several days later: “On the first day of the war we acted as if it were the seventh day of the Six Day War and used the same methods, and that was a mistake.”

ד.3 | "War for the Land of Israel"; "Jews Are Not Loved at All, Weak Jews Even Less. We Will be Thrown to the Dogs"

At 14:50 the war cabinet met for another consultation. This was the lowest point for Israel’s leadership throughout the war. It focused on the report presented by Dayan, who had just returned deeply concerned from a tour of the fronts. His words produced an atmosphere of gloom and doom. Dayan, who had heard from his senior officers at  Northern Command headquarters that the battle on the Golan Heights might be lost, proposed to try and establish a defence line on the Heights, despite the doubts of the OC Northern Command, Maj. General Yizhak Hofi, whether it was possible. On the southern front, he proposed abandoning the outposts and leaving the soldiers to their fate: “In the places which cannot be evacuated – we will leave the wounded behind. Whoever gets through – gets through. If they decide to surrender – they will surrender. We have to tell them: ‘We can’t reach you. Try to break out or surrender”. He proposed establishing a defence line based on the line of the Mitleh and the Gidi passes, scores of kilometres from the Suez Canal. Although he said that “this is not the time for soul-searching”, Dayan began by repenting his earlier assessments. “I did not sufficiently appreciate the enemy’s strength, the weight of his fighting force and I overestimated our forces and their ability to stand fast. The Arabs are fighting much better than before,” he said, and added that in this situation, a pre-emptive strike would probably not have made much difference. He described a grim scenario in which the Arabs would not stop their attack. This was not the time to think of counter-attacks but rather of the defence of Israel itself. They “will come to fight us for the land of Israel itself” and therefore “descent from the Golan is not a solution, since they will go on to the Hula valley…..to conquer Israel, to finish off the Jews.” Dayan opposed the government stand and supported a ceasefire in place, since he and the General Staff believed that there was no chance of pushing the Egyptians back across the Canal.

One of the Israeli outposts along the Suez Canal. Photograph: Wikimedia, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

This was the only time the prime minister was dragged down, to some extent, into the pessimistic mood.  She expressed frustration that the estimates she had been given of the IDF’s ability to hit back at the Arabs severely in any situation had proven false. Faithful to her belief that Israel’s existence was dependent on its strength and military superiority, Golda was deeply concerned about the influence that the IDF’s failure would have on its position in the international arena. Israel would be seen as weaker than previously thought – and, in Dayan’s words, as a “paper tiger”. She and her deputy, Allon, agreed with Dayan’s assessments of the Arabs’ goals, and Golda said: “There is no reason for them not to continue, not only now. They’ve tasted blood… This is the second round since 1948”. The despair and gloom caused Galili to call in the COGS, in order to hear another and possibly more positive view. “Dado” Elazar presented a slightly different picture, and especially a more determined attitude. He showed that the situation was slightly better in the north. In the south he proposed not to yield to counsels of despair, but to plan a counter attack the next day against the Egyptian bridgeheads. It was decided that Elazar should go to the southern front, and give the order to attack if he thought it possible. (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 10).

At a government meeting held at 21:00, Dayan presented a report on the IDF’s heavy losses, alongside a slightly more encouraging description of the situation on the fronts. Several ministers, such as Allon, began soul searching and drawing conclusions. Allon stated that a preemptive strike would not have helped significantly, because the Syrians were making almost no use of their air force. He proposed an attack on them and threatening Damascus. The atmosphere was strained and included exchanges of words, sometimes harsh, between Dayan and other ministers.  Natan Peled even voiced criticism about the failure of the intelligence assessments and the delay in calling up the reserves. This is what’s at the root of the severe situation, he said, and even used the word ‘failure’. Golda was scathing in her objection to criticism at this fateful hour. “Do you want us to appoint an enquiry commission?” she asked Peled. His words meant,  in fact, the opening of a third front, along with the military and political ones, for Israel’s leaders – the front of internal public relations, in the face of complaints and rumours about the drastic shortcomings of army intelligence and the lack of preparation of the army for war. This emotional confrontation was to accompany the government throughout the coming days.

During the discussion, Golda said that despite Israel’s efforts, the Americans were apparently going to put forward a proposal for a ceasefire that evening, because they and Israel saw this as preferable to a discussion in the UN General Assembly. Efforts to secure military supplies were continuing, and the chances were good, since Israel “now has the credit of not having started the war” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 7).  No operative decisions were reached but the general consensus, as reported in a telegram to Eban, was that the goals remained the same as before: “A. To drive back the Egyptian army to the other side of the [Suez] Canal, B. To drive back the Syrian army over the ceasefire line on the Golan Heights, C. During those two actions, to inflict severe blows on the two enemy armies” (See: Telegram No. VL/778).

Following the reports on the grave military situation, the Israeli leadership changed its demands for military aid from the US. No more requests for individual items were made, but rather demands for massive aid, especially the supply of fighter planes and tanks, with the prime minister exerting the full weight of her position (See Telegram No. VL/775). During the night, Shalev reported on a meeting between Dinitz and Kissinger, in which Dinitz “presented him with [the prime minister’s] urgent request for Phantoms (planes)”. Dinitz also referred to Golda’s decision not to order a preemptive strike, partly on Kissinger’s advice, and claimed that this put the US under a moral obligation to help Israel. Kissinger praised the decision, but said that supplying planes was very difficult. He told Dinitz that he had received a message from Hafez Ismail, according to which the Egyptians had no intention of expanding the bridgeheads they had established, and if Israel would announce its willingness to withdraw to the ’67 borders, they would be prepared to open negotiations. The secretary added that he was only transmitting the information and was not making any recommendation (See: Telegram No. LV/982). The Egyptians repeated this proposal several times during the coming days.

The foreboding atmosphere that overcame the Israeli leadership were well expressed in the bureau journal for that day. It describes  Golda’s frustration, as she repeatedly requests “to do them serious damage”, and describes her wondering whether “perhaps the Pentagon has something that can be used against the missiles”. The deep concern that she felt is also expressed in her words: “Jews are not loved at all, weak Jews even less. We will be thrown to the dogs” (For the full journal entry, see: Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal 7.10.73).

During the night the atmosphere in the bureau began to improve. Close to midnight a consultation was held with the participation of Yitzhak Rabin, who reported on a tour of the southern front with the COGS. Rabin said that it had been decided to launch a counter-attack against the Egyptian army the following day, which would be carried out gradually: only one of the three divisions there would attack at any one time, because “only these tanks stand between Tel Aviv and the Canal”. He concluded with the statement that despite the difficulties and problems with Israel’s forces, “all in all, the situation is satisfactory” (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 11).