The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

ה.1 | Between Euphoria and Despondency

The third day of the war was one of extreme reversals in the feelings of Israel’s leadership, which ranged from euphoria to despondency. The morning seemed to predict good news, as the situation on the Golan Heights began to shift in favour of the IDF. Three divisions began an attack on the Syrian forces and pushed back their forward positions. In the south, the divisions led by “Bren” Adan and Arik Sharon began preparations for a gradual attack on the Egyptian bridgeheads in the central and southern sectors of the Suez Canal.

The reports Golda Meir received in the morning painted a more encouraging picture of the beginning of a counter-attack by the IDF in the south, as seen in a short consultation with the COGS at 09:50. Elazar requested and was granted permission by the prime minister for an air attack on a number of targets in the area of Port Said and Port Fuad. In view of the feeling that the Egyptians would soon be pushed back across the Canal, the COGS claimed that with regard to the ouposts on the Canal line, the ‘historic argument’ is over'”. Only two had fallen, some had been evacuated and others were being held by Israeli forces and doing their job well (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 12).

A consultation in the War Room of Southern Command, with Chief of Staff Elazar (third from the right), on his left OC Southern Command Gonen (Gorodish). Behind them: the ex-Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, 8 October 1973. Photograph: Shlomo Arad, GPO

The optimism continued during the government meeting immediately afterwards. The COGS hoped that by the next day the IDF would return to the ceasefire lines in the Golan and possibly even cross them, if the government gave them permission. He also reported on the successful progress of the counter-offensive in Sinai. They considered the possibility, if conditions permitted, of crossing the Canal in some places that same day and reaching the western side, using the Egyptian bridgeheads. Later Elazar reported that the IDF might already have a bridgehead on the western side. The ministers were also told about intercepted Egyptian communications which expressed distress and calls for help. Golda expressed complete support for the plan that the IDF would cross the ceasefire line in its counter-attack, in order to put Israel in a better strategic position, and also “because they [the Arabs] have to be taught a lesson, that for every act such as this, they have to pay”. Less than a day after the despair of 7 October and the discussions on how to defend Israel’s heartland, there was already a feeling of elation and approaching victory, and even talk by Allon of capturing extensive territories in Syria and threatening Damascus. Several ministers, including Galili, Pinhas Sapir and Joseph Burg warned against premature euphoria, when heavy fighting and many casualties were expected. The government decided that “the prime minister and the defence minister are authorized to permit the IDF, if possible, to occupy military holds on the other side of the Canal, and beyond the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights to improve our positions in the face of renewed offensives by the enemy” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 8).

The possibility that the IDF would soon push the enemy armies back made it imperative to prevent a ceasefire resolution in the Security Council. In a telegram sent by the prime minister to Eban before the next session, she reported the improving situation, and added that therefore “it is inconceivable that we will accept a  ceasefire resolution as long as the enemy has not been thrown back and his attack has not been broken.” She instructed him “to try to prolong the discussion and the resolution” (See: Telegram No. LV/786).

Message to Secretary Kissinger 8 October 1973, File A 4996/3, p. 129

The optimism in the bureau reached its peak that afternoon, when Lior reported that the Egyptians had issued a declaration which Israeli military intelligence interpreted as preparation of the public for a possible failure. The Canal crossing had not yet been carried out, but the force prepared for it was ready. “The Egyptian dispositions are collapsing and we are hitting them hard … “Bren” is on the Canal and moving down it”, in the words of the report. On the issue of American military supplies, it also seemed that the efforts were bearing fruit: “There is a decision in principle by Nixon on the Phantoms. Now it is only a matter of carrying it out… Kissinger is searching for a way to fly them over”, reported Golda after a telephone call with Dinitz, a report that later proved to be premature. The Americans also wanted to know if there were indeed Israeli forces west of the Canal, as Dinitz had said (See: Telegram No. LV/988).

In the contacts with Kissinger, it was repeatedly emphasized that Israel was fighting not only against the Arabs, but also against the Soviet arms with which they had been supplied for years (See: Telegram No. LV/34).  Kissinger spoke, on the one hand, of his support for Israel. In his words, “You must hit them hard and strong, and you must win”; and he promised to make every effort both to postpone the discussion in the Security Council and to ensure that military supplies were sent. On the other hand, Kissinger conveyed the message that Pentagon officials were creating great obstacles on the arms issue, and that of the Phantoms was even more difficult. Great pressures were being brought to bear on Nixon, and it was only thanks to Kissinger and White House chief of staff General Alexander Haig that Nixon continued to support Israel, the secretary emphasized (See, for example: Telegrams Nos. LV/983, 996).

In fact, however, according to recently published US documents, at the beginning of the fighting the Administration adopted a policy of non-intervention, as required by the US interest of safeguarding the policy of détente with the USSR and relations with the Arab world. Supplying weapons to Israel at the height of the battles was in direct contradiction to that policy and a massive resupply of weapons could be carried out only after the fighting had ceased. They believed that even if the war lasted longer than expected, it would end with a crushing Israeli victory.  Thus, Israel’s desperate demands for arms, and especially for 40 warplanes, seemed to them unreasonable and exaggerated.

During the early evening hours the reports sent by Gazit to Dinitz still expressed confidence that the balance was clearly moving in the IDF’s favour (See: Telegram No. LV/792 English translation A 4996/3, p.147 ). However, after the elation of the morning and afternoon, events swung against Israel. At 19:50 another consultation was held, where it was reported that on the northern front there was fear of a renewed Syrian attack by two fresh armoured divisions, although the situation was already much better.

An artillery unit during the battle known as the Vale of Tears on the Golan front, October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit

However, in the south, it became clear that all the optimistic messages earlier that day resulted from a severe breakdown in communications between the fighting forces in the field and the command headquarters in the rear. Contrary to the reports, the counter-attack had failed and had entailed a heavy toll in tanks and casualties. Instead of crossing the Canal, there was again talk of establishing an alternative line in the Sinai. At this point, Golda Meir began to lose patience with the contradictory reports reaching her, turning the IDF’s impressive military successes into failures just hours afterwards and creating unrealistic illusions: “Only this morning Arik [Sharon] had to be ‘held back'”, she said, and added with surprise and a hint of criticism: “This morning “Dado” said “they (“Bren” and Arik) are asking for permission to cross [the Canal]” (For the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 13).

An hour later, a government meeting was held at 21:00. First Sapir reported on increased donations by Jews abroad to a fund-raising drive, and a plan for a voluntary loan from the Israeli public to finance the cost of the war. The euphoria of the morning  was now replaced by a dark mood. The COGS reported briefly on the situation at the fronts, a report very different from his previous statement, and on the failure of the counter-attack in the south. Sharon’s division, which had received the order to attack, did not even enter into a real fight. Afterwards, Bar-Lev, who had been sent the previous day by the COGS to assess the situation in the north, reviewed the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. Golda reported on Israel’s demand that any ceasefire agreement would be accompanied by an agreement for a prisoner-of-war exchange. After the ministers expressed their concern at the fact that already, at such an early stage of the war – which might continue for a long time – the IDF had been left with no reserves, the meeting broke up with the feeling that the situation was still serious and a long hard war was anticipated (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 9).

The changes in mood were also expressed in the bureau journal, together with Dayan’s feeling that the ministers had lost their faith in him. “Recently I haven’t been getting on with friends, with our friends”, he said, and Galili reported that “we’re beginning to feel internal public criticism and talk of an “Israeli fiasco” (For the full journal entry, see:  Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal 8.10.73).

ה.2 | 9 October: Kissinger - "As Long as I am Here, I Will not Let Israel be Abandoned"

On the morning of 9 October the full extent of the utter failure of the counter-attack in the south became clear, as well as the critical military situation in which it placed Israel.  The heavy losses of men and equipment suffered by the 162^nd Division made clear the urgent need for military supplies. There were indications that this time the war would be a long one, and that the IDF had thrown all it had into battle and was left with no significant reserves. Every weapon that was hit was taken off the supply list, with no replacement. The IDF believed that the Egyptians had now completed constructing their bridgehead and were preparing for the beginning of the second stage, an attack by armoured divisions deep into the Sinai Desert.

Previously, the Americans had been given contradictory information, which described the situation but was worded so as not to present Israel as weak. Now, however, the leadership decided to present the situation in its full seriousness to the US. The almost desperate telegrams sent to Washington throughout the day described the IDF’s heavy losses in fighting equipment – losses that on the morning of 9 October amounted to 49 planes and approximately 500 tanks – and the urgent need to replace this missing equipment, especially in view of the unceasing reinforcements that were pouring into Egypt and Syria from other Arab countries (See, for example: Telegrams Nos. VL/797, 801, 808, 998). Towards the end of the day, it was reported that the IDF had only 220 operational combat planes left of the 330 it had at the outbreak of the fighting, although some of them would be returned to use later (See: Telegram No. VL/809). However, the telegrams from Washington continued to indicate that there was no real change in the American position. In view of the reports from Israel, Dinitz decided to ‘take off the gloves’ . He reported that he had sent into action American friends who would put pressure on the US government, such as senators and congress members, religious leaders and public figures who supported Israel (See: Telegram No. NR/18).

The severe military situation and the problem of arms supplies were discussed at length in a war cabinet consultation at 07:30. The COGS and Dayan reported on the failure of the counter-offensive in the Suez Canal sector and on the worsening situation, which made it necessary to give up the attempt to reach the bank of the Canal for the moment. In the north, Syrian attacks had been repelled and the IDF counter-offensive was proceeding satisfactorily. Elazar and Dayan asked for permission to decide the battle on the Syrian front in order to focus on the south and to prevent Jordan and Iraq from joining in. To this end they called for air strikes on military targets in the heart of Damascus, the Syrian capital. Golda Meir agreed to this request after considerable hesitation.

With regard to the south, Dayan was again pessimistic. He said that the Egyptians were hitting Israel hard and preventing any attempt to push them back across the Canal. They had large reserves which had not yet been used,  in preparation for the expected attack beyond the bridgeheads. Dayan argued that after all the assumptions and accepted truths had proved false, Israel had to face a new reality – an extended war which would require the mobilization of older men, the return of retired officers to active service, and even recruitment of Jews from abroad. He added that, so far as tanks were concerned, Israel was in the same situation as in the Six Day War. Elazar too presented a grim prospect and even raised the possibility that the IDF would be forced to regroup on defence lines deep inside the Sinai. In this case preparations should be made for a long war which would demand major reinforcements of equipment and ammunition. “We prepare for 5 days of war, not for a war that lasts months,” he said.

It now became clear that resupply from the US was becoming critical and might mean the difference between success and failure. The signs of an impending shortage of arms and the frustrating reports from Washington convinced Golda that the efforts made so far were not sufficient. She believed that the Americans did not really understand Israel’s situation, and proposed that she should fly to Washington for 24 hours, accompanied by an army officer, to meet the president and persuade him of the seriousness of the situation and the need to ship arms to Israel immediately. She proposed to keep the journey completely secret, even from members of the government. She would tell him “to give everything he has. He has tanks in Europe, let him give them. We want Phantoms, let him give them”. In view of the personal ties which she had forged with Nixon on her visits to Washington, in a heart to heart talk she thought she would succeed in persuading him. (For an extract in English, see Extract from a meeting 9 October;  for the full minutes of the consultation in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 14). Gazit transmitted Golda’s proposal to Dinitz, adding: “We are aware of the uniqueness, and perhaps the lack of precedent, of a secret meeting between the president and the prime minister; and therefore, the prime minister is prepared to arrive by air at any location to be decided on, and will take off again at the end of the meeting ” (See: Telegram No. VL/799).

At the government meeting held at 10:30, the issue was raised of focusing on the north in order to reach a decision on the Syrian front. Dayan presented the difficulties on the Egyptian front which demanded an immediate resolution in the north, and the COGS spoke of the need to ‘break’ Syria. The prime minister reported on the approval she had given the air force to bomb targets near Damascus, and explained that the attack on Damascus was also vital to “hint” to King Hussein of Jordan that he should sit tight, in view of the great pressure being put on him by the Arab states to enter the war.

After presenting excuses for the mistaken reports he had presented the previous day, Elazar described options on the Egyptian front, including that of a retreat into the heart of the Sinai and preparations for a prolonged war. The ministers addressed several issues that in their opinion the situation demanded, among them the wave of rumours sweeping the country on events at the fronts, which required re-organization of public relations, and in particular the prime minister’s appearance in the media, in order to explain the situation and what was required from the citizens. In addition, they discussed a proposal (made by Minister of Transport Shimon Peres, and Minister of Commerce and Industry Haim Bar-Lev) to initiate a widespread call up of various age groups in Israel and among Jews abroad, “like during the War of Independence”, for civilian service and assistance to the military industries. In conclusion, the government approved the prime minister’s announcement on the bombing of central targets in Syria (For  full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 10).

Later that day, Dinitz presented Kissinger with Golda’s request for a private meeting with Nixon, and Kissinger forwarded it to the president. However, he rejected the proposal and argued that it was unnecessary, since the Americans had already decided to supply Israel with all the arms it needed. Reporting this, Dinitz added: “I have no doubt that the very fact that a proposal was raised for a visit by Malachi [the prime minister] contributed greatly to Edward’s [the president’s] positive reply today” (See: Telegram No. VL/19).

Later, when the military situation had greatly improved, Golda allowed herself to joke about the matter. In a talk with newspaper editors on 18 October she related:”During those weeks, there were many memorable moments. There was a particularly difficult moment on the issue of military equipment. Out of desperation, I decided that I had to try somehow to get to America, incognito and without any publicity, by hook or by crook, whatever it took to get one meeting with the president, and to ask him: ‘What will become of us?’

I don’t know if the news reached the president, but it certainly reached someone else. Within two hours we received a message that the equipment issue was settled. I was very happy to hear that I have the reputation of being a witch, and rather than meet with me – he preferred that Israel get its equipment… ” she said, amidst the laughter of the editors.

The change in the American position began to be felt that evening. In a meeting Dinitz had with Kissinger and his assistants, they were astonished at the extent of Israel’s losses and its inability to fulfill its promises, according to which it would only take two or three days of fighting in order to restore the previous situation. “Naphtali [Kissinger] asked: “What has happened that has overturned all our joint assessments?” reported Dinitz (See: Telegram No. LV/05). It seems that in this conversation, and in a private conversation between Kissinger and Dinitz, at which Golda’s request for a meeting was raised, Kissinger actually understood for the first time that Israel’s situation was desperate, and that the American expectation of a speedy victory was not realistic. He realized that a massive and quick supply of arms was essential for that victory, which he wanted for political reasons. He began to act vigorously, or at least to give that impression, to overcome the obstacles to responding to Israel’s requests. Later, Dinitz quoted Kissinger as saying that, in his meeting with Nixon, the latter approved the entire list that Israel had presented of arms, ammunition and electronic equipment, and added “that all our losses in planes and tanks would be made up, and we should plan our campaigns on the basis of that knowledge“. He asked Israel to do everything possible to hit the Arabs hard and fast, before a ceasefire resolution was passed. It should do so without any worry regarding arms and ammunition, since these would be supplied by the US. In private he said, in a voice choked with emotion, to the moved ambassador: “As long as I am here, I will not let Israel be abandoned” (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/15, 18).

First page of a discussion by the US working group during the Yom Kippur War on the Israeli arms request,, 9 October 1973. Wikimedia, Gerald Ford Presidential Library

At the same time, activity at the UN continued. According to reports by Eban, the efforts to postpone the discussion in the Security Council were succeeding. He also reported on the massive mobilization of Jews in the US on behalf of Israel: “The emotions are similar to those of May ’48 and June ’67. There were deep expressions of anxiety yesterday and the day before”, he wrote (See: Telegram No. NR/12).

An issue that repeatedly troubled the decision-makers was the question whether Jordan would join the war alongside Egypt and Syria. Great efforts were made to prevent King Hussein from doing so.  Jordan’s stand was also discussed in a talk between Dayan and the prime minister at 19:00, together with the Egyptian attack in the direction of Ras Sudar. In view of the difficulties with arms supply, Dayan said: “I won’t ‘commit suicide’ if the call for a ceasefire is accepted without a demand for withdrawal”. He began to discuss proposals by Sharon, which were supported in the Foreign and Security Committee of the Knesset by the opposition, headed by Menachem Begin, to cross the Canal and threaten Cairo. Dayan expressed doubts about the IDF’s ability to do so. “So Begin wants to cross the line; let him go down to Arik, and he’ll drive him over”, he said cynically (For full minutes of the meeting in Hebrew, see: Cabinet Document No. 15).

The bureau journal contains many expressions of the prime minister’s inner struggles before deciding to approve bombing targets in Damascus, and her fears of American reaction. Reports were presented on the air strike in Syria and developments in the south, in the sector of Port Said and Port Fuad. To the difficulties there were added the “Wars of the Generals”, which had begun to develop following the military failures, and the difficulties OC Southern Command Maj. General Shmuel Gorodish (Gonen) was having in enforcing his authority on the division commanders. Dayan proposed, and Golda agreed, to return the ex-COGS, Minister Haim Bar-Lev, to active service, and to give him the command over the southern front. This was good news for the prime minister. Since the great debacle of the second day of the war, her faith in Dayan had been undermined. She wanted to rely more on the old generation, and sending Bar-Lev to the southern front torn by personal disputes seemed  a good idea: “I’m both excited and happy”, said Golda to Bar-Lev on the telephone, and added: “I will feel more secure if you’re there, with all the ‘geniuses’ who are sitting there” (For the full journal entry of that day, see: Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal 9.10.73).

By now the government had begun to meet twice a day, in the morning and in the evening. During the evening meeting that concluded the fourth day of the war, Maj.General Aharon Yariv, who was serving as a special aide to the COGS, reviewed the situation on the fronts, and reported on the blocking of the Egyptian attack in the Ras Sudar area. Yariv also responded to ministers’ questions on the Iraqi force that was being sent to Syria and the preparations to deal with the Jordanian army in the Jordan Valley – if Jordan decided to join in. The government also discussed Bar-Lev’s return to service. Golda reported that in the opinion of the COGS and Dayan this step was necessary to provide an authority accepted by all. The government decided to approve Bar-Lev’s return and the mechanism that would overcome the legal problems created by his mobilization while serving as a member of the government (For full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 11).

An example of the messages of support from Jews and non-Jews abroad flooding in to Golda Meir’s office. Telegram from the community of Orangetown, New York, 9 October 1973. File G 6498/6