The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | 29 October: Preparations for Golda Meir's Trip to Washington

This was the calmest day in the prime minister’s bureau since the outbreak of the war, and for the first time since fighting began, she went to visit the front. She met with OC Southern Command,  Gorodish (Gonen), and asked him two questions, which were of great importance for the coming talks: A. Where were the IDF forces located on 22 October, at 18:52, the hour that the ceasefire was supposed to come into effect? B. Did the Egyptians open fire after that?

The general showed her the deployment of the forces on 22 October on a map, and confirmed that the Egyptians had opened fire after the ceasefire. After that, Gorodish described the problems that were holding up the transfer of supplies to the Third Army, and the dire straits it was in regarding the quantities of water, food and ammunition available (For the main points of the talk, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 29.10.73). Afterwards, Golda went to visit the IDF soldiers on the western bank of the Suez Canal, accompanied by Dayan, Elazar and Galili. She met with the division commanders and spoke with the soldiers. In answer to their questions, the prime minister explained the government’s motives in deciding on the ceasefire and allowing the transfer of limited supplies to the Third Army. No one doubted that they were capable of dealing with the Third Army appropriately, she told the soldiers.

Prime Minister Meir accompanied by Maj.-General Arik Sharon visiting the Southern Command in Sinai, 29 October 1973. Photograph: Tsiyon Yehuda, GPO

That evening Dinitz sent Gazit Kissinger’s announcement that Nixon would be happy to meet with the prime minister on Thursday, 31 October. She would also meet the secretary for a thorough examination of the issues overshadowing relations between Israel and the US (See: Telegram No. LV/342). However, that was the only positive sign, and meanwhile the disagreements between Israel and the Americans continued. Moreover, Dinitz warned that Kissinger was not prepared to support the Israeli proposal for an exchange of territories and forces at this stage, since he believed that Sadat would not accept it (See, for example: Telegrams Nos. LV/340, 341).

That same day, Egyptian Minister Fahmi and Kissinger met in Washington. Fahmi claimed that this was the first turning point in 25 years – that is, since 1948 – and that Sadat, together with the Arab and African countries, could change the situation. He emphasized the importance of implementing Security Council Resolution 338. Kissinger replied that he wanted to establish a real ceasefire, but it was more important that it result in peace talks within 3-6 months – otherwise they would be facing a new war. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, Memorandum of conversation, 29 October 1973, pp. 784-791).

After his meeting with Fahmi, the secretary told Dinitz that Nixon requested that Israel agree to an additional gesture on the eve of Golda’s visit, and respond positively to the request to approve an additional supply convoy “which can be smaller, say 50 vehicles”. Dinitz replied that if he wanted Israel to take his proposal seriously, perhaps he would persuade the Egyptians “also to make a special gesture, and at least begin releasing prisoners (in addition to the wounded ones)” (See: Telegram LV/350).

In view of these developments, it was clear that there were still points of dispute between the two countries, which could only be resolved during the visit. The following day was therefore dedicated entirely to preparations for Golda’s crucial trip to Washington

.2 | 30 October: Diplomacy and More Preparations

Early on 30 October Gazit reported to Dinitz that the Egyptians were continuing to violate the ceasefire, and that the Syrians were continuing to reorganize and “the number of Syrian tanks that have been spotted on the front and in the area up to Damascus has already exceeded 750” (See: Telegram No. VL/59 II).

The main part of the day was devoted to diplomacy. In the evening (Israel time), an official announcement was made in Washington and Jerusalem that Golda Meir would leave the following day for a working visit to the US, during which she would meet with the president and the secretary of state (See: Telegram No. LV/352). However, the announcement was the easy part. In contrast to Golda’s previous visits to Washington, which were prepared for months in advance, the Israeli leadership had to prepare for this visit within a day.

At 10:10 the cabinet met, joined by Eban, the COGS, Zamir and Yariv, the Israeli representative to the talks with Egypt. Zamir reported that the Egyptians had received a Soviet promise that diplomatic moves would be made to bring about Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, and added: “The Egyptians claim that the Soviets have an American promise on this matter, an American agreement to a withdrawal in stages”. Later Golda said on this issue: “Although Naftali [Kissinger] is indeed the son of a very religious [Jewish] father, he himself crosses himself three times a day, and claims that there is no agreement on that”. In contrast to previous reports, Zamir noted that the Egyptians were not too worried about the state of the Third Army. His words were reinforced by Dayan’s earlier remarks that in the first three trucks sent to the Third Army, there were cigarettes and biscuits and very little water…

Maj. General Aharon Yariv and General Mohamed Abd el Auni Gamasy at the Kilomtere 101 talks, I November 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, CIA historical collection

Yariv told of his talk the previous evening with the Egyptians, in which little progress had been made on the issue of the prisoners, and said that another meeting would take place that evening. Golda summarized the discussions with Dinitz on his contacts with Kissinger. and presented the subjects that would be raised in Washington: 1. The fate of the Third Army. 2. The ceasefire lines and the demand for a retreat to the lines of 22 October. 3. Israel’s proposal for an exchange of territories. 4. The issue of the prisoners, and its linkage to humanitarian aid to the Third Army. The prime minister proposed to adopt a hard-line policy on the fourth point, and not to agree to any step before the issue of the prisoners was resolved. If the issues of the wounded and the captured soldiers and the opening of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits were resolved, Israel would agree to an ongoing supply to the Third Army. Meanwhile the transfer of the supplies from the trucks on the western bank of the Suez Canal continued at a slow pace. In light of the public pressure, Dayan proposed announcing in the Knesset a halt to the transfer until information was received on the prisoners, and the transfer of the wounded to Israel was arranged. However, the prime minister again opposed the move which would constitute ‘throwing down a gauntlet’ to the Americans, and then “according to my best instincts – I have no reason to go to the US”. Later, she even said angrily: “If so, then I won’t go to Washington. I won’t make a fool of myself”.

The question of the progress of the talks with Egypt was also discussed, and the reply that the Egyptians were supposed to give on returning the wounded prisoners. It was decided that if there was no reply, the talks would be halted. The last part of the discussion focused on political matters. The prime minister said that she would emphasize to Nixon and Kissinger Israel’s proposal for a separation of forces. Acceptance of this proposal would stabilize the situation and it would be possible to begin peace negotiations. Dayan said that a refusal to exchange territories (disengagement) would undoubtedly cause a breakdown of the talks and renewed fighting. Israel must talk of continuing the political process, which would undoubtedly be accompanied by many interim agreements. (For full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 33 Telegram No. LV/356).

The feeling was that the visit to Washington would be accompanied by difficult discussions, and perhaps even confrontation, especially with Kissinger. Golda decided to consult with Yitzhak Rabin, who had a wealth of experience in contacts with Kissinger. “I don’t understand how he works”, Golda said to Rabin, and added: “My complete faith in him has been shattered”. Rabin, who was visiting the bureau for the first time since 7 October, analyzed Kissinger’s moves and said that the explanation for his policy could be found in relations with the Soviets, and that “from Nixon’s viewpoint, the destruction of the Third Army would be first and foremost, a crisis in the entire relationship between the USSR and the US”. He explained the deviousness which was Kissinger’s speciality, and claimed that according to his reasoning, “if Egypt is having problems, then there should be problems for both sides”. Kissinger would attempt to advance diplomatic negotiations whose conditions would not necessarily be good for Israel, Rabin thought, and therefore “I see that we’re heading for a difficult struggle with the Americans, and the result will depend on our endurance” (See: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 30.10.73).

Meanwhile, in Washington, Kissinger and Fahmi met again and came closer in their positions. One of the points of disagreement that remained was Fahmi’s demand that the supplies sent by Israel to its forces west of the Suez Canal would also be limited to non-military equipment. In addition, Nixon and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin met at Camp David. They discussed the two airlifts and Nixon emphasized that détente should be restored and confrontations such as these between the super-powers should be avoided. (See: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 25, pp. 793-797).

Issues remaining from the war and tensions between the ministers arose both at the beginning of the government meeting convened at 14:30 and at its end. The main part of the discussion was devoted to the ceasefire and the prime minister’s trip to the US. Dayan reported on his contacts with the head of the UN Observer corps, General Siilasvuo and on Yariv’s second meeting with the Egyptian representative, where they discussed a return to the 22 October lines, an ongoing arrangement for supply convoys to the Third Army and speeding up the unloading of the first convoy. Dayan shared with the ministers reports on the third meeting with the Egyptians, which was taking place at that very moment. The Egyptian delegation had agreed to return 45 wounded Israeli prisoners, but had not yet provided information on the rest. Dayan also told of initial feelers from the Egyptian side about the proposal for a disengagement of forces. In conclusion, he reviewed the Egyptian attempts to establish a link between the city of Suez and the Third Army, and the determined efforts Israel was making to prevent this. The ministers supported the IDF policy of not allowing the establishment of that link.

Eban related that the Red Cross was expected to receive a list of the Israeli prisoners in Egypt soon, and to visit the wounded among them. A discussion developed on the prisoners in Syria, and whether their release should be linked to the release of the prisoners in Egypt. The last part of the discussion dealt with the prime minister’s report on her impending trip to Washington. Golda reported in short about the goals of her visit along the lines discussed at the consultation and the government approved the trip.

Before the meeting adjourned, the government secretary gave the ministers the announcement of the minister of justice, Ya’acov Shimshon Shapira, on his decision to resign because his demand to fire the defence minister had not been met. In reply to Warhaftig’s proposal to try to postpone Shapira’s resignation until after the elections, the prime minister explained why she had accepted it. She criticized Shapira for demanding that “heads would roll” even before the war was over. She had told him to wait and then “we’ll take the time to discuss it in a responsible manner. We will all sit together and examine all the material in order to know [what happened]. But here – first a head must be chosen, and that head must roll, and everything [is done] in public and in the nation’s hearing, in the hearing of the whole country”, she said. (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 27).

During the evening an emotional debate took place in the Knesset on the issue of the POWs. After it the prime minister was scheduled to receive a delegation of parents. In that public mood, the prime minister did not want to approve the passage of an additional convoy to the Third Army as a gesture of good will, as Nixon had requested. On the other hand, she did not want to be seen as someone who refused a request from the president, on the eve of her visit to his capital. The solution found was to tell the Americans that since the first supply convoy had expanded greatly beyond one hundred trucks, and several trucks with medical equipment had been added since then, Nixon’s request for an Israeli gesture of the passage of an additional 50 supply trucks had already, in fact, been carried out. Dinitz was requested to transmit this information to the president; and the request that Nixon help on the issue of the prisoners was again emphasized (See: Telegram No. VL/68). Dinitz passed the message to Kissinger, and asked that Nixon “demand from Fahmi to implement a general exchange of all the prisoners – at maximum speed” (See: Telegram No. LV/355).

.3 | 31 October: The Egyptian Proposal for Separation of Forces - "We could have achieved that without a war"

At noon Prime Minister Meir was to leave for Washington. This time the visit would not be a round of compliments and agreements, as her previous visits to the US had been to a great degree. It was clear to Golda and her senior aides that not only the issues of the ceasefire and the fate of the Third Army would come up for discussion, but Kissinger would certainly want also to speak of peace negotiations according to Security Council Resolution 338. As long as peace negotiations were on the table, the call for Israel’s withdrawal to the lines of July 4, 1967 would accompany them.

Secretary Kissinger, President Nixon and Egyptian minister Ismail Fahmy in the White House, 31 October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, NARA

During the morning, the prime minister held a last consultation with Galili and  Allon. “We have to get it out of their heads that this will be a return to ’67”, said Golda. The discussion centred mainly on the Egyptian stand in their meeting with the Israeli delegation at the 101 Kilometre post. They were prepared to consider a separation of forces based on the IDF’s retreat from the western bank of the Suez Canal, and also on its retreat to a distance of 30 kilometres east of the Canal. On the eastern bank token Egyptian forces would remain; the UN forces would be deployed between the armies, and afterwards peace negotiations would begin. Galili said that the deputy COGS, Tal, and, in fact, also the COGS, proposed not to reject this proposal outright, because the alternative was a war of attrition on the present lines, which would put an unbearable burden on Israel. The prime minister said: “We could have achieved that without a war”, and hinted that this was, in fact, the Israeli proposal for an interim agreement at the Suez Canal, which was presented to the Americans before the war. She expressed concern about its implications for negotiations on the Golan Heights and the Jordan River. Allon said: “I won’t go to a partial agreement of this sort, without concurrently going towards an overall agreement”. Summing up, Golda said that there had been a war that had not been decided. Therefore if the Egyptians remained east of the Suez Canal, then Israel must remain west of it. “If it’s a draw – then it’s a draw, then we will also be on the western side; if not – then it’s an admission of defeat”, said the prime minister (See: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 31.10.73). But in fact this was  – more or less – the basis of the agreement reached in January 1974, which included an Israeli withdrawal of 20 kilometres from the Suez Canal.

At noon, Golda Meir’s plane took off, and all eyes turned to the discussions in the US capital. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon in preparation for the talks: he expected Golda to oppose a ceasefire on the 22 October lines, and to request assurances that there would be no American-Soviet deal to force a settlement on Israel. Kissinger proposed accommodating Israel on these points, but to stand firm that the purpose of the negotiations was achieving a final Arab-Israeli settlement.