א.1 | December 1972 – The Winds of War – "It Isn't Logical, It Shouldn't Happen, But It Might"
In August 1970 the US brokered a ceasefire which ended the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt. But at the end of 1972 winds of war again began to blow in the Middle East. Following the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics (5 September 1972) the IDF carried out several attacks on terrorist bases in Syria. Hostile activities by terrorist organizations operating on Syrian soil were answered by IDF retaliation that developed into fighting on the Golan Heights between the IDF and the Syrian army. On the Egyptian front, along the Suez Canal the situation was quiet; but several steps during those months pointed to the Egyptians’ warlike intentions, including the replacement of Minister of War Saddaq by General Ahmed Ismail; bellicose speeches by the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and senior officials and the transfer of large quantities of advanced military equipment to the Canal zone. These signs were reinforced by intelligence reports. In November 1972 the Israeli prime minister’s bureau received reports from Mossad sources, according to which Egypt was planning to renew the fighting on the Canal, because of its frustration at the political stalemate and the lack of progress towards Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Sadat had ordered his army to open firing at the end of December, and after that, to prepare for a bigger operation. However the report noted that it was not certain that Sadat would, in fact, break the ceasefire.
The accumulation of intelligence reports caused Prime Minister Golda Meir to call a consultation in her bureau on 1 December, which included Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili, Chief of the General Staff (COGS) David “Dado” Elazar, the head of Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) Zvi Zamir, the head of the IDF Intelligence Branch Eliahu (Eli) Zeira, and others. Dayan opened the discussion, with an assessment that Egypt planned to renew the fighting at the beginning of 1973. However he thought the intention was to start local shooting incidents on the Suez Canal, not to launch a full scale war. He thought that there was a high degree of certainty that Syria would join in. If that happened, Israel would not acquiesce in a war of attrition but would strike hard at the Syrians and the Egyptians. The IDF would aim to cross the northern part of the Suez Canal and capture Port Fuad and perhaps even Port Said. Dayan also declared that Israel’s operations in Syria in the near future were expected to influence these developments.
Eli Zeira said that the Military Intelligence estimate was that the chances that Egypt would start a war were not high: “The chance that they will attempt to cross the Canal – is close to zero. The chance that they would begin a war of attrition – is very small”. He thought there was a bigger chance, although also a low probability, that they would attempt to carry out local, limited actions, such as raids into the Sinai Desert using helicopters, in order to shoot a mortar or ‘Katyusha’ rocket at a specific military target, mainly for propaganda purposes. Zeira linked the possibility of renewed fighting with the shaky internal situation in Egypt and the Egyptians’ desire to come to the diplomatic talks expected in 1973 from a position of strength. If the Egyptians did not open fire, it would be because of a loss of confidence in their own strength, as a result of the Soviet experts leaving and fears that a military failure would weaken their political position.
The COGS accepted the Military Intelligence evaluation but said: “We can’t feel free not to make all the necessary preparations, because Sadat can do illogical and stupid things”; as he had done, for instance, in expelling the Soviet experts in 1972. He agreed with Dayan about the nature of the Israeli reaction, and presented the options available to the IDF to hit back at the Egyptians in case of their opening fire.Dayan said that the anti-aircraft weapons the Egyptians had now were better than those they had in the past, and that an Israeli attack from the air would necessarily involve the loss of a number of planes and pilots. Later, the COGS raised the possibility of a simultaneous combined attack by the Syrians and the Egyptians, which had “a low probability, but it is a possibility”. This was a very unpleasant possibility for Israel, and if it was impending “then before it begins – we have to act against Syria”, in a way that would prevent Syria from taking part in a war for at least several years. Here Elazar was referring to a preemptive strike.
Zamir expressed doubts about Zeira and Elazar’s evaluations, and said that “we have to base ourselves on the assumption that there can be fighting in any scenario”. However, Zamir emphasized that he too did not think that there would be a renewal of the war along the entire Suez Canal, but rather local incidents taking the form of harassment “more or less along the lines that Eli [Zeira) outlined here”. He said that the Egyptians were acting according to a political plan and were seeking movement on the diplomatic front. Sadat’s frustration was great, and in view of the global situation – which was disappointing, from his viewpoint – “this [Egyptian] army will not engage in big campaigns; but he will make a small war, of the type for which they are preparing”, in coordination with Syria.
Galili proposed that if pressure was put on Israel to be more flexible in order to prevent a war, it should announce that it was ready for proximity talks about a partial settlement. (Proposals for such a settlement had discussed by Israel and the US in 1971.) It was decided to refer the question to the government, but to give only a general report, without going into operative details on the IDF’s response in the case of renewed fire (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 1).
Two days later, on 3 December 1972, the government also discussed an item on the agenda defined as “the situation on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts”. The discussion opened with a lengthy review by Zeira, which focused on both countries and the situation on the lines. He said that the Syrians wanted a permanent conflict with Israel, in the form of hostile terrorist activities. Israel’s actions were intended to prevent this, on a limited scale so as not to strengthen Soviet influence in Syria. Zeira noted that recently open talk of war had been heard in Egypt, and that on the Egyptian front, steps were being taken that looked like preparations for war. He gave a similar analysis of Egypt’s political and military considerations to that given two days earlier and repeated his opinion that for Egypt opening fire would be “an illogical act”, and that the probability of it was very low. However, he noted, “in our region, logic doesn’t always work”. COGS Elazar also repeated his view that the Egyptians’ motivation was the need to prepare for the political developments expected in 1973, and “the concern that without fighting and without a dramatization of the conflict in the Middle East, there is a danger of a continuation of the stalemate and of a lack of progress”. He explained the Egyptians’ fears of a military failure which, in his opinion, had prevented them from opening fire at the end of 1971. Despite the low probability of the scenario, the IDF was making preparations. He also reviewed various possible scenarios on the Syrian front and explained that Israel would not allow a war of attrition, but did not go into details.
Defence Minister Dayan agreed with the logic of Zeira’s assessment. However, he argued that this assessment did not indicate any way out of Egypt’s internal and external problems, and therefore: “there is something of a shock in what is known as the smell of gunpowder in the Egyptian trends”, and it was definitely possible that the Egyptians would open fire on any given date in the future.
Several ministers, such as Minister of Tourism Moshe Kol, Minister of Religious Affairs Zerach Warhaftig, Minister of Immigrant Absorption Natan Peled, Minister of Social Welfare Michael Hazani and Minister of Health Victor Shem-Tov, spoke against relying too much on logical analysis in judging the probability of war breaking out. Most of them criticized what they considered exaggerated military reactions against the terrorist activities in Syria and the belligerent character of the speeches by Israeli leaders, which might inflame the atmosphere. Golda replied to Kol that the logic behind the speeches was “so that you, and the entire nation will not be surprised one fine day… that a war has really broken out”.
The discussion also dealt with the link between diplomatic negotiations and the military situation, and the danger of war. Warhaftig thought that the Egyptians’ actions in the long run were in fact very logical, and Peled called on the government to uphold the plan for a partial agreement and to present a flexible position, in order to reduce the threat. A similar position was put forward by his colleague in the Mapam faction, Shem-Tov. Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel disagreed, and claimed that a tough Israeli position in the face of political pressures would postpone war and bring peace closer.
The prime minister rejected the claims that almost everything was up to Israel and the complaints about overreaction on the northern front. As in the past, Golda found herself in a sceptical position regarding estimates made by the defence establishment. As for the chances of a war breaking out, she said: “It isn’t logical, it shouldn’t happen, but it might”. She argued that Sadat’s difficult internal situation and the Egyptians’ conclusion that the US would not put pressure on Israel, might cause him to decide on opening fire together with Syria, in order to bring about movement and end the stalemate. She justified the government’s intransigent policy, and declared that “we are ready to jump at any chance of negotiations”, but “every day that passes in which Hussein and Sadat have not achieved what they want, brings us closer to peace”.
No war panic could be discerned at the meeting. It concluded with a decision, in continuation of a meeting held the previous week, that if the Syrians bombed Israeli settlements, the prime minister and the defence minister were authorized to give their approval to the COGS for a light “shower” of artillery fire on Syrian villages in the border area (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 1).
In the following weeks, news was received that Sadat had retreated for the moment from his plan to open fire, and the ceasefire on the Canal was preserved. On the Golan Heights incidents of Syrian fire and Israeli reactions continued, but did not develop into a general conflict.