אFrom “Low Probability” to the Outbreak of War

א.1 | December 1972 – The Winds of War – "It Isn't Logical, It Shouldn't Happen, But It Might"

In August 1970 the US brokered a ceasefire which ended the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt. But at the end of 1972 winds of war again began to blow in the Middle East. Following the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics (5 September 1972) the IDF carried out several attacks on terrorist bases in Syria. Hostile activities by terrorist organizations operating on Syrian soil were answered by IDF retaliation that developed into fighting on the Golan Heights between the IDF and the Syrian army. On the Egyptian front, along the Suez Canal the situation was quiet; but several steps during those months pointed to the Egyptians’ warlike intentions, including the replacement of Minister of War Saddaq by General Ahmed Ismail; bellicose speeches by the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and senior officials and the transfer of large quantities of advanced military equipment to the Canal zone. These signs were reinforced by intelligence reports. In November 1972 the Israeli prime minister’s bureau received reports from Mossad sources, according to which Egypt was planning to renew the fighting on the Canal, because of its frustration at the political stalemate and the lack of progress towards Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.  Sadat had ordered his army to open firing at the end of December, and after that, to prepare for a bigger operation. However the report noted that it was not certain that Sadat would, in fact, break the ceasefire.

The accumulation of intelligence reports caused Prime Minister Golda Meir to call a consultation in her bureau on 1 December, which included Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili, Chief of the General Staff (COGS) David “Dado” Elazar, the head of Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) Zvi Zamir, the head of the IDF Intelligence Branch Eliahu (Eli) Zeira, and others. Dayan opened the discussion, with an  assessment that Egypt planned to renew the fighting at the beginning of 1973. However he thought the intention was to start local shooting incidents on the Suez Canal, not to launch a full scale war. He thought that there was a high degree of certainty that Syria would join in. If that happened, Israel would not acquiesce in a war of attrition but would strike hard at the Syrians and the Egyptians. The IDF would aim to cross the northern part of the Suez Canal and capture Port Fuad and perhaps even Port Said. Dayan also declared that Israel’s operations in Syria in the near future were expected to influence these developments.

Eli Zeira said that the Military Intelligence estimate was that the chances that Egypt would start a war were not high: “The chance that they will attempt to cross the Canal – is close to zero. The chance that they would begin a war of attrition – is very small”. He thought there was a bigger chance, although also a low probability, that they would attempt to carry out local, limited actions, such as raids into the Sinai Desert using helicopters, in order to shoot a mortar or ‘Katyusha’ rocket at a specific military target, mainly for propaganda purposes. Zeira linked the possibility of renewed fighting with the shaky internal situation in Egypt and the Egyptians’ desire to come to the diplomatic talks expected in 1973 from a position of strength. If the Egyptians did not open fire, it would be because of a loss of confidence in their own strength, as a result of the Soviet experts leaving and fears that a military failure would weaken their political position.

The COGS accepted the Military Intelligence evaluation but said: “We can’t feel free not to make all the necessary preparations, because Sadat can do illogical and stupid things”; as he had done, for instance, in expelling the Soviet experts in 1972. He agreed with Dayan about the nature of the Israeli reaction, and presented the options available to the IDF to hit back at the Egyptians in case of their opening fire.Dayan said that the anti-aircraft weapons the Egyptians had now were better than those they had in the past, and that an Israeli attack from the air would necessarily involve the loss of a number of planes and pilots. Later, the COGS raised the possibility of a simultaneous combined attack by the Syrians and the Egyptians, which had “a low probability, but it is a possibility”. This was a very unpleasant possibility for Israel, and if it was impending “then before it begins – we have to act against Syria”, in a way that would prevent Syria from taking part in a war for at least several years. Here Elazar was referring to a preemptive strike.

Zamir expressed doubts about Zeira and Elazar’s evaluations, and said that “we have to base ourselves on the assumption that there can be fighting in any scenario”. However, Zamir emphasized that he too did not think that there would be a renewal of the war along the entire Suez Canal, but rather local incidents taking the form of harassment “more or less along the lines that Eli [Zeira) outlined here”. He said that the Egyptians were acting according to a political plan and were seeking movement on the diplomatic front. Sadat’s frustration was great, and in view of the global situation – which was disappointing, from his viewpoint – “this [Egyptian] army will not engage in big campaigns; but he will make a small war, of the type for which they are preparing”, in coordination with Syria.

Galili proposed that if pressure was put on Israel to be more flexible in order to prevent a war, it should announce that it was ready for proximity talks about a partial settlement. (Proposals for such a settlement had discussed by Israel and the US in 1971.) It was decided to refer the question to the government, but to give only a general report, without going into operative details on the IDF’s response in the case of renewed fire (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 1).

(L to R) Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, incoming Chief of Staff David Elazar and outgoing Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev, 30 December 1971. Photograph: Wikimedia, IDF Spokesman’s Unit

Two days later, on 3 December 1972, the government also discussed an item on the agenda  defined as “the situation on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts”. The discussion opened with a lengthy review by Zeira, which focused on both countries and the situation on the lines. He said that the Syrians wanted a permanent conflict with Israel, in the form of hostile terrorist activities.  Israel’s actions were intended to prevent this, on a limited scale so as not to strengthen Soviet influence in Syria. Zeira noted that recently open talk of war had been heard in Egypt, and that on the Egyptian front, steps were being taken that looked like preparations for war. He gave a similar analysis of Egypt’s political and military considerations to that given two days earlier and repeated his opinion that for Egypt opening fire would be “an illogical act”, and that the probability of it was very low. However, he noted, “in our region, logic doesn’t always work”. COGS Elazar also repeated his view that the Egyptians’ motivation was the need to prepare for the political developments expected in 1973, and “the concern that without fighting and without a dramatization of the conflict in the Middle East, there is a danger of a continuation of the stalemate and of a lack of progress”. He explained the Egyptians’ fears of a military failure which, in his opinion, had prevented them from opening fire at the end of 1971. Despite the low probability of the scenario, the IDF was making preparations. He also reviewed various possible scenarios on the Syrian front and explained that Israel would not allow a war of attrition, but did not go into details.

Defence Minister Dayan agreed with the logic of Zeira’s assessment. However, he argued that this assessment did not indicate any way out of Egypt’s internal and external problems, and therefore: “there is something of a shock in what is known as the smell of gunpowder in the Egyptian trends”, and it was definitely possible that the Egyptians would open fire on any given date in the future.

Several ministers, such as Minister of Tourism Moshe Kol, Minister of Religious Affairs Zerach Warhaftig, Minister of Immigrant Absorption Natan Peled, Minister of Social Welfare Michael Hazani and Minister of Health Victor Shem-Tov, spoke against relying too much on logical analysis in judging the probability of war breaking out. Most of them criticized what they considered exaggerated military reactions against the terrorist activities in Syria and the belligerent character of the speeches by Israeli leaders, which might inflame the atmosphere. Golda replied to Kol that the logic behind the speeches was “so that you, and the entire nation will not be surprised one fine day… that a war has really broken out”.

The discussion also dealt with the link between diplomatic negotiations and the military situation, and the danger of war. Warhaftig thought that the Egyptians’ actions in the long run were in fact very logical, and Peled called on the government to uphold the plan for a partial agreement and to present a flexible position, in order to reduce the threat. A similar position was put forward by his colleague in the Mapam faction, Shem-Tov. Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel disagreed, and claimed that a tough Israeli position in the face of political pressures would postpone war and bring peace closer.

The prime minister rejected the claims that almost everything was up to Israel and the complaints about overreaction on the northern front. As in the past, Golda found herself in a sceptical position regarding estimates made by the defence establishment. As for the chances of a war breaking out, she said: “It isn’t logical, it shouldn’t happen, but it might”. She argued that Sadat’s difficult internal situation and the Egyptians’ conclusion that the US would not put pressure on Israel, might cause him to  decide on opening fire together with Syria, in order to bring about movement and end the stalemate. She justified the government’s intransigent policy, and declared that “we are ready to jump at any chance of negotiations”, but “every day that passes in which Hussein and Sadat have not achieved what they want, brings us closer to peace”.

No war panic could be discerned at the meeting. It concluded with a decision, in continuation of a meeting held the previous week, that if the Syrians bombed Israeli settlements, the prime minister and the defence minister were authorized to give their approval to the COGS for a light “shower” of artillery fire on Syrian villages in the border area (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 1).

A building on the Golan Heights hit by a Syrian artillery shell, 8 January 1973. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

In the following weeks, news was received that Sadat had retreated for the moment from his plan to open fire, and the ceasefire on the Canal was preserved. On the Golan Heights  incidents of Syrian fire and Israeli reactions continued, but did not develop into a general conflict.

א.2 | April – May 1973: Serious Warnings of an Outbreak of War – "Are We Prepared to Even Risk War, In Order Not to Return to the Old Line?"

At the beginning of 1973 several political steps were taken on the initiative of US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to try to advance a diplomatic settlement in the Middle East. These included visits to Washington in January–February 1973 by King Hussein of Jordan, Hafez Ismail, Egyptian President Sadat’s advisor for national security and  Golda Meir.

Israeli premier Golda Meir and President Richard Nixon after the visit to the White House, 1 March 1973

However, neither the talks nor the political moves that followed them brought any change in the stalemate and no significant progress was made towards a  settlement. While they dragged on, the drums of war again began to beat. The Egyptians saw Ismail’s mission to Washington as a major failure.  In a government meeting on 8 April 1973, following a bellicose speech by Sadat on 26 March, Golda said: “It doesn’t appear that we are faced with the threat of war. But I wouldn’t sign my name to it that he won’t do something”.

Intelligence reports received during 11 – 13 April reported that Egypt was planning to go to war very soon in order to break the political stalemate. These reports were much more serious than those of December 1972, and they indicated that Sadat had neither the ability or the desire to retreat from his plans.  The reports even gave a date for beginning the war – the second week in May – and gave the Egyptian war plan down to the smallest details.

On 18 April a consultation was convened in the prime minister’s home about the warnings received about Egypt’s and Syria’s intentions. Those participating were Golda, Dayan, Galili, the COGS, the head of Intelligence Branch, the head of Mossad and senior military officers. From the outset there was again a difference of opinion between the heads of the two intelligence bodies –  Zeira and Mossad head Zamir. Zeira reiterated the three options – in his opinion – facing the Egyptians, in similar terms to those he had used in December 1972: a full scale war, a war of attrition or local raids on targets deep in the Sinai Desert. All three had very slim chances of success. He gave a similar evaluation of the Syrians’ intentions and noted that even Qaddafi, the Libyan ruler, was putting pressure on them not to go to war, because they were not prepared for it. The USSR did not want a war either.

In contrast, Zamir said that this time he took the warnings very seriously, more so than at any other time in the past few years. He pointed out the difference between an all-out war and a war whose goal was to advance a political solution to the conflict, as Sadat had proposed all the time. He summed up: “I think that based on their preparations, there is a chance of war. I don’t want to specify percentages, but we need to prepare ourselves to deal with this challenge”.

The COGS agreed with Zamir’s evaluation, although with certain reservations, and argued that preparations should be started, but also efforts to deter and avoid the outbreak of war. Dayan also thought that the Egyptians were heading for war at some stage, but probably not in the short term. He thought that if they started firing, it would not be a small action. The prime minister raised the question of whether Israel could do anything on the political front to prevent war. Golda expressed the fear that if Israel appraoched the Americans, they would put pressure on it for far-reaching political concessions, which Israel was not prepared to make. Galili said that in the Egyptian view, the escalation of the situation was caused by Israel’s refusal to accede to Sadat’s demand, which Hafez Ismail had presented, that Israel commit itself in advance to withdrawal to the borders of June 1967. He proposed that the government renew its commitment not to enter into any negotiations on the basis of an Egyptian demand of this kind, even if it might lead to war. Golda claimed the Egyptian threat was also intended to create a war climate on the eve of the US-Soviet summit, which was to take place in June. Dayan opposed Galili’s proposal to present the issue to the government in connection with Ismail’s initiative, and to present the subject of the discussion as “Are we prepared even to risk war, in order not to return to the Green Line (the pre-1967 border)”? He proposed to present to the government only the intelligence information on the danger of war. If a political discussion began on the issue that Galili raised – so be it. (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 2).

On 24 April the government discussed the issue. Zeira repeated the reports about the Egyptian and Syrian intentions and the three options open to Egypt. He noted that Syria had two options: opening fire on a limited scale or an operation to recapture the Golan Heights. Zeira estimated that the Egyptians’ goal was to create political pressure by threats of war on the eve of the US-Soviet leaders’ summit meeting and said that although this time the reports were more serious than at the end of 1972, the probability of war breaking out was low. There was a lack of trust between Egypt and Syria, and therefore he did not believe that the Syrians would begin a coordinated attack, but rather, if Egypt opened fire, the Syrians would examine developments before joining in. Zeira qualified his remarks, declaring that nevertheless, war was possible. It was necessary to wait for further signs in the field and then make a renewed evaluation.

Dayan agreed with Zeira’s assessment. However, he argued that since the Egyptians had not changed their military dispositions in recent years and had not entered a significant  process of peace negotiations, they were on the path of renewed warfare. In any case, until the debate on the Middle East in the Security Council in May, and until the summit in May or June, the Egyptians would only make threats. After that, they might open fire.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban claimed that the Egyptians were trying to create a “war panic” as a form of political pressure. Egypt was in a state of deep frustration, which was the fruit of a joint strategy by Israel and the Americans to induce them to enter negotiations for an agreement on a partial settlement, which was the Americans’ preferred option. However, after Ismail’s visit to Washington, the assumption was that Egypt did not intend to take the route of a settlement in stages.

The prime minister said again that she found it difficult to accept the assessments of the head of Military Intelligence, which were based on logical analysis, since Arab leaders did not always act logically. “Is it important whether a war breaks out because it is logical, or because it is illogical? After it breaks out, it is a war, and then it has a logic of its own”, she said. Therefore, although she thought with considerable certainty that there would not be war, “we must live with a feeling that it may happen”.

The COGS agreed with the prime minister. Although he agreed with the estimate of a low probability of war, nevertheless, the IDF was making certain preparations for the possibility that hostilities might break out. Zeira summed up and repeated his evaluations that there were no signs of Egyptian activity on the ground pointing to preparations for an attack. He emphasised that the Intelligence Branch would be able to give a warning if the Egyptians were to plan a large-scale action to cross the Suez Canal. Howwever it had a lower capability with regard to activities which did not involve extensive preparations, such as opening fire or raids. In conclusion, he said that the Arabs had no intentions of capturing all of Sinai or of defeating Israel, because they knew that they were not capable of it. If they did open fire, it would be in order to set off a political reaction and to cause the super-powers to force a settlement on Israel (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 2).

In the following weeks, the prime minister’s bureau continued to receive a constant stream of serious warnings of the outbreak of war. These occasionally indicated a change in the date of the attack, but the message remained the same – Sadat had decided to go to war, no matter what; although it would probably be limited in scope – a campaign that would suffice to cause shock and to get negotiations moving. Although Egypt and Syria did not initiate war in May 1973, and although the Military Intelligence evaluation remained the same – that the probability of a war breaking out was extremely low – the heads of Israeli intelligence believed that Egypt and Syria intended to go to war in the summer and a higher alert was declared by the IDF, which continued up to August 1973 (“Blue and White” alert). During those months the defence establishment made preparations which included enlarging, reinforcing and improving the fighting forces of the IDF.

א.3 | 3 – 5 October: "Low Probability" of War– "All This Is Stationed On the Border, and They Would Risk It All….. Just To Bomb Some Settlement?"

In August 1973 it was decided to end the “Blue and White” alert and return the IDF to its regular routine. The fact that at this point the assessments by military intelligence that Sadat would not start a war had proved correct had a great influence on the attitude of decision-makers in Israel to the reports on the possibility of war that came later.

Throughout these months shooting incidents between the IDF and the Syrian army continued on the Golan Heights. On 13 September 1973 Syrian Air Force fighter planes attacked planes of the Israeli Air Force, on a photography mission. In the air battle that developed, the Israeli planes shot down 13 Syrian fighters. From then on, tension rose along the ceasefire lines on the Golan Heights. Several days later reports were even received on the reinforcement of the Syrian army deployment on the Golan Heights front, although the reports indicated that the deployment was defensive. Some see this incident as the first step on the path that led to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.

Three days later, at the weekly government meeting, COGS Elazar reviewed the development of the air battle with the Syrians, in which one Israeli Mirage was also shot down. In reply to questions from the ministers, “Dado” said that there might be a reaction by the Syrian army but he thought that it would not be on a large scale. Defence Minister Dayan also repeated the view that the Syrian reaction would be limited.  Eban reviewed the international reaction to the incident. None of the speakers raised the possibility that it might develop into large-scale hostilities (For the full minutes of the discussion of this item at the government meeting, see: Government Document No. 3).

During all these months Egypt and Syria prepared their war plans in great secrecy, together with the intelligence ruse that preceded the war, and successfully deceived Israeli military intelligence. The plan included a joint lighting attack by Syria and Egypt against Israel, which was intended to return the Golan Heights to Syria and part of the Sinai to Egypt.

President Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, the Air Force commander, going over war plans, 1 October 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, CIA historical collection

At the end of September there was an increase in the stream of intelligence reports about continuing reinforcement of the Syrian deployment on the Golan Heights and massive movement of Egyptian army forces in the area of the Suez Canal. Consultations and situation evaluations were held about the intentions of the Egyptians and Syrians. However, a reassuring report from IDF Intelligence Branch, which was responsible for the national intelligence evaluation, stated that there was no information that pointed to a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack in the near future. This evaluation was based on the assumption, later known as “the Concept”, that Egypt would only go to war when several conditions had been met that would assure it of victory, and these had not yet appeared, and Syria would not attack without Egypt. Military intelligence regarded the movements of the Egyptian army as a routine exercise held every autumn, and the reinforcement of the Syrian deployment was seen as defensive steps against an Israeli attack. Nevertheless, it was decided at the beginning of October to send some reinforcements to the IDF forces on the Golan Heights.

The Intelligence Branch’s success in May gave its evaluations great credibility in the eyes of the decision-makers in Israel.  Golda decided to ignore the disturbing intuitions she had about the situation. On 30 September she flew to Strasbourg for a meeting of the European Council. She even extended her stay and went on to Vienna, to meet with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and to try to persuade him to reverse his decision to close the transit camp for immigrants from the USSR in Schönau, near Vienna, in response to demands by Palestinian terrorists who had attacked a trainload of immigrants and took some of them hostage.

On 2 October Golda returned to Israel. Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies in Israel continued to receive reports of the reinforcement of the Syrians on the Golan Heights and the raised state of alert in the Egyptian army along the Suez Canal. But all the signs that pointed at the possibility of war were repeatedly rejected by the heads of Intelligence Branch, and their evaluations were accepted by the army command. The defence minister Dayan was less calm about the situation, especially in the north, and feared a local Syrian surprise attack. At his request, on  3 October, a military-political consultation was convened, with the participation of the prime minister, minister of defence, Ministers Allon and Galili, COGS Elazar, and senior officers of the intelligence community, but without intelligence chief Zeira.

Dayan opened the meeting and proposed to discuss the situation on the borders, the intelligence reports on the Egyptian and Syrian intentions and the IDF’s state of readiness. Dayan said that in the Egyptian sector there was a natural obstacle with a wide desert behind it, and no Israeli settlements nearby and, therefore, “If there will be a war there – so there’ll be a war”. He was more anxious at the prospect of an outbreak of hostilities in the Syrian sector, where there was no natural obstacle and Israeli settlements were located near the border. Aryeh Shalev, head of the research division in Intelligence Branch, presented the view of military intelligence. He reviewed the disquieting reports that pointed to an imminent attack, but emphasized that they came from only a limited number of sources. Although the Syrian army forces in the Golan Heights zone were in an emergency formation, they were in a defence deployment that resulted from the fear of an Israeli attack. However, there were unusual features in this deployment that might also indicate the possibility of preparations for an attack. Shalev continued that the Egyptian army was in the middle of an extensive exercise that apparently simulated conquering Sinai. He reported that the Israeli army was at the highest state of alert, but added that “there are definite reports that this is an exercise”. Shalev summed up with the confident statement: “Therefore, the possibility of a joint Egyptian-Syrian war does not seem probable to me”, because there had been no change in the Egyptians’ assessment that they were not yet prepared for war.

COGS Elazar agreed with the summary, but explained that the Syrian army could suddenly switch to an attack position from its defence deployment. If that happened, the IDF’s reaction should be very strong and include attacks by the air force on many strategic targets in Syria. In reply to a question by Golda, Elazar said that even if there were a Syrian attack, with local successes here and there, the IDF could stop the offensive. “With regard to a more extensive attack, I estimate that we’ll know about it in advance”, said the COGS; and added that some reinforcement of the forces on the Golan Heights, with the air force on alert, “are reasonable measures”. Elazar concluded with a reservation that, despite everythingid, he had no convincing explanation why the Syrians were in such an emergency formation.

Dayan noted two important points: a. The Syrians, contrary to defensive logic, had concentrated their surface-to-air missile formation in the southern zone of the Golan Heights and not in positions defending Damascus, which pointed to a desire to strengthen their ability to operate under a missile umbrella; b. Unlike the Egyptians, who required several stages to conquer the Sinai, the Syrians could capture the Golan Heights in one step, and then hold it using natural obstacles, “and they’ve solved their national problem from this aspect, that they’ve liberated the Golan Heights from us. This is a very, very attractive and enticing motive”, Dayan said. The prime minister focused on the need to take advantage of the situation to improve the supply of arms from the US. No decisions were taken, but the consensus was that the IDF would continue in its present deployment, except for reinforcement of the forces on the Golan Heights. It was decided to hold a discussion in the government meeting on the Sunday after Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement fast day, which was due to fall on Saturday (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 3).

Golda and her senior ministers held firm to the concept put forward by Intelligence Branch and the army commanders, that there was a very strong chance that Israel would have at least 48 hours warning about war breaking out and a crossing of the Suez Canal. Therefore, she continued her usual routine, which included a government meeting on 3 October, where the security situation was not mentioned at all. The next day the prime minister took part in a meeting on the platform for the coming elections, and in a public meeting which opened the election campaign. The newspapers in Israel also projected an atmosphere of “business as usual”. Items about the military alerts in the Arab countries were pushed to the back pages. Thus, for example, on 5 October a very small item appeared in the Ma’ariv newspaper, according to which “The IDF is following the activities on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, where a state of general alert has been declared”.

On Friday, 5 October,  Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year, when Israel generally comes to a standstill, was about to begin. However, during the night reports had arrived of a major evacuation of the families of the Soviet advisors in Egypt and Syria, with the help of a fleet of planes sent by the USSR during the night. As a result, a general alert of the highest order was declared in the regular forces of the IDF, but still without calling up the reserves. That morning an urgent meeting was convened with the minister of defence, the COGS and the head of Intelligence Branch.  Zeira described the reports on the evacuation and the possible reasons for this surprising step, saying that  Israel had no good explanation for it. Nevertheless he repeated that these were not preparations for an attack, and the alert of the Arab armies was defensive. He reported that the head of Mossad, Zamir, had gone abroad for an important meeting on this matter with an agent (in fact, Ashraf Marwan) and would be sending very important information during the night. The COGS remained convinced that no Egyptian-Syrian attack was expected, but said that the IDF had made preparations for any event. He assumed “that if we’re going to be attacked, we will receive better indications of it”. In the light of the worrying news, it was decided to send a message through the Americans and the Soviets, clarifying to Syria and Egypt that Israel was not planning an attack. In addition, it was decided to call an urgent government meeting with the ministers who had remained in the Tel Aviv area, without those who had already left for their homes for the holiday (See: Cabinet Document No. 4).

Message for Kissinger sent on 5 October 1973. File A 4996/3, p. 40

In the afternoon an improvised government meeting was held. Other than the prime minister, only six ministers participated, as well as Zeira and the COGS, and it was defined as a political-military consultation, not a government meeting. Dayan said that the new reports received during the past day and night painted a slightly different picture as to the chances of war, compared with the previous  negative evaluations; in any case, they reports justified calling an urgent meeting. Zeira said that the Syrian army was in full emergency deployment and was holding exercises on what seemed to be a plan to conquer the Golan Heights. He also said that a significant reinforcement of the Egyptian forces in the area of the Suez Canal had taken place, and there were many signs of preparations for war. In both armies the deployment was defensive, out of a fear of an attack by the IDF, but it also made an attack option possible. He reported on the Soviet preparations for evacuation and the wholesale departure of Soviet ships from the port of Alexandria.  Zeira again reiterated his evaluation of the low probability of Syria and Egypt opening fire, especially with regard to starting a major war.

The COGS repeated what he had said at the morning meeting, that military intelligence’s estimate “that we are not facing a war is, in my eyes, the most reasonable evaluation”. However, like Zeira and Dayan before him, this time “Dado” was less decisive in his statement that war would not break out.  He repeated his estimate that if it did, the intelligence systems would provide sufficient warning beforehand, and therefore there was no need to call up the reserves at present. “We are saving the call-up of the reserves and other means for additional indicators”, said Dado. He was referring to the “special intelligence means” which were later found not to have even been activated at that time by military intelligence.

The feelings expressed by the speakers were different than those heard in previous discussions.  It seemed that they now believed that an outbreak of hostilities at some level in the near future was more probable. Golda responded with scepticism to the evaluation that the Syrians might carry out a limited operation to bomb settlements. “It’s hard to assume that all this is stationed there on the border, and they would risk it all just because they want to bomb some settlement…” Nevertheless, they expressed confidence in the IDF’s ability,   even in its present deployment, to deal with any threat  that might develop until the reserves could be called up. Several decisions were made at the meeting delegating authority to the prime minister and the minister of defence, in case operative decisions had to be made during the fast about calling up the reserves or military action by the IDF. Just before they dispersed, Golda surprised those present by saying that everything that was happening and the reports arriving from the Arab side, reminded her strongly of the days before the Six Day War. “It reminds me so much of what happened at the end of May, or the beginning or middle of May, until 5 June, that that too should perhaps tell us something”, she said (See Cabinet Document No. 5).

During the entire period from the end of September till 5 October, there was close coordination and exchange of information between Israeli and American intelligence (the CIA), about the intentions of the Egyptians and the Syrians, and both agreed that they were not heading for war. Following the decisions reached on 5 October, the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit, sent a telegram to Mordechai Shalev, the minister in Washington who was then in charge of the Israeli embassy (The ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, was in Israel due to a death in the family). Gazit sent Shalev the prime minister’s request to provide Kissinger (who had now been appointed as secretary of state as well as national security adviser)  with information on the unusual troop concentrations on Israel’s borders, and the government’s evaluation as to the possible reasons. Kissinger was asked again to relay a message through diplomatic channels to Egypt, Syria and the USSR, that Israel had no intentions of attacking its neighbours. However, if they dared to attack it – Israel would respond with all its strength. In the margins of the telegram it was added that if it turned out that there was a reasonable possibility of the Arabs opening fire, then Israel requested a number of items of military equipment immediately (See Telegram No. VL/760). Shalev replied that he had informed General Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s assistant at the National Security Council, about the telegram and its contents and Scowcroft promised to relay it immediately to Kissinger, who was in New York. Scowcroft replied that American intelligence agreed with the estimate that the deployment of the Egyptian and Syrian armies was defensive, but it was hard to understand the  meaning of the landings of Soviet planes in Cairo and Damascus. It was decided to keep the communications channels open even during Yom Kippur (See Telegram No. VL/952) (See also Gazit’s summary: “Contacts with the Americans in the days prior to the outbreak of war” File A 7023/1).

Meanwhile, all private and public activities in Israel were already winding down in preparation for the sanctity of the Yom Kippur holiday. The citizens in the synagogues or in their homes had no idea that in less than a day, the silence in the streets would be broken, and a war would break out that would rock Israel’s very foundations.