Golda Meir and the Agranat Commission: The Report that Brought Down a Government, November 1973–April 1974

Introduction: The Demand to Investigate the Yom Kippur War

It was the night of 7 October 1973 in the Prime Minister’s Bureau in Tel Aviv. The Israeli government was meeting in a crowded room filled with cigarette smoke, at the end of one of the most difficult and frustrating days of the Yom Kippur War. The atmosphere was tense in view of reports on the situation at the front.  Israel’s leadership seemed on the verge of despair. Frightening rumours were flying around and questions were raised about why Israel had been caught unprepared and why the reserves had not been called up. Minister of Immigrant Absorption Natan Peled asked why the reserves were called up so late: if the problem was lack of intelligence, then something had gone wrong. Golda Meir asked him angrily if he wanted the government to appoint a commission of inquiry immediately. This shows that as early as the second day of the war, the question of when and how to investigate the intelligence shortcomings preceding it and the insufficient preparations of the IDF was already in the air.

During the war the demand for an investigation came up again in Golda’s bureau, especially after the immediate danger had passed. For example, in the government meeting on 14 October, several speakers said that now the families of the fallen had been informed and the IDF was about to go on the offensive, previously suppressed public criticism of the government would emerge. They proposed a discussion in order to define their attitude in the coming storm. The prime minister said that there would be an investigation at the proper time, but it would be systematic and orderly, and “heads would not roll”. On 28 October she told the committee of newspaper editors that the matter was too serious and too painful to be solved by removing a few people from their posts. She herself was not sure who was responsible for the failure, but it should be properly investigated (See the record of the meeting, ISA, File A 7010/3).

As a result of the public pressure, on 21 November 1973 a commission of inquiry into the events leading to the outbreak of the war was set up, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat. On 1 April 1974 the commission published a partial report calling for the dismissal of several of those involved and for institutional changes. The report led to a political “earthquake”, the resignation of Prime Minister Meir and the fall of the government, and to controversy which is still active today.

Many aspects of the commission’s work have already been published, but this is the first time that the dramatic government debates on setting up the commission and its findings appear in full. They show us what the ministers thought about the limitations on the commission’s authority and what they said about its failure to tackle the issue of the ministerial responsibility of the prime minister and the minister of defence. Here the Israel State Archives presents a selection of documents focusing on six stenographic records of government meetings published on our Hebrew website. The first two deal with the establishment of the commission, the next with the demand to widen its authority and the rest with the partial report and its findings.

Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister Israel Galili visitng the Southern Command in the Sinai, 29 October 1973. Photograph: Yehuda Zion, GPO

Part 1. The Government Debates Establishing a Commission of Inquiry: Settling Accounts with the Prime Minister 

The first meeting, 11/11/1973

The war ended with the IDF close to the outskirts of Damascus and on the western bank of the Suez Canal, while the Egyptian Third Army was encircled and cut off. But these military successes did not relieve the gloom felt by the public. Its mood reflected Israel’s heavy losses, which included over 2,000 dead and over 7,000 wounded, the large number of soldiers held  prisoner or missing in action and the Arab proclamations of victory. Many asked why Israel had been taken by surprise and demands for an investigation were made in the Knesset and the media. They expected the government to answer these demands.

But this did not happen; instead the leadership turned its attention to the diplomatic moves which had already begun during the fighting. On 31 October Prime Minister Meir left for important talks in Washington with President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. While she was away the demands for an investigation mounted. On her return, Golda again met with the newspaper editors on 6 November, and repeated her criticism of the pressure for an immediate investigation and for heads to roll. “I know that [the failure] cannot be passed over. But does it have to be done now? Immediately?” she said. The editors replied that the press reflected public feeling and that the government was not sufficiently aware of it.

After consultations with the attorney general, Meir Shamgar, Golda decided on a full commission of inquiry. Meanwhile on 8 November she left for a meeting of the Socialist International in London. On 11 November the government discussed the issue in her absence. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon told his colleagues that the prime minister would soon bring up the subject of investigation of the events of the war. The chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-General David “Dado” Elazar, said that the army would begin its own investigation of the IDF’s actions during the war. Elazar referred to the rumours and innuendos which were current and to criticism by senior reserve commanders. Although there was much to investigate, the army had been on alert before the outbreak of war and the fighting had been well managed. He added: “My feeling, which of course must be proven, is that the war was handled in the best way possible in the circumstances in which it broke out. I should mention that all the foreign press, professional and non-professional, regards it as a brilliant military success – but our media less so.” He rejected claims that the IDF did not know how to deal with the new types of weapon which had appeared or with the fighting methods of the Egyptians and the Syrians.

Some ministers could not refrain from hinting that they planned to ask the prime minister hard questions about her failure to share information with them just before the war. Tourism Minister Moshe Kol of the small Independent Liberal party, a gadfly who often said what others were thinking, asked why, as a minister with responsibility for the government’s actions, he had been informed only at 12 o’clock on the morning of Yom Kippur that there might be a war. “But there was information ten days earlier. Why was a government meeting not called?”

Stenographic record of the government meeting, 11/11/1973

The decision to set up a Commission of Inquiry, 18 November 1973: “First throw the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to the wolves?”

A week later the prime minister proposed to set up an official commission of inquiry according to the law, to be appointed by the president of the Supreme Court. The secrecy and the impartiality of the investigation would be ensured, it would examine everything without mercy and hear everything that needed to be said. In this case there would be no government debate on the circumstances of the war, especially as the contents of government meetings were constantly being leaked to the press. But the war had weakened Golda’s standing among her ministers, and many of them had been waiting for this moment to settle accounts. For years she had excluded most of them from sensitive security issues, and they resented it. Now, although the subject was not on the agenda, ministers from the coalition parties began to voice harsh criticism of the prime minister who had not shared sensitive information and excluded them from the discussions.

Again Kol came forward and said that “if there was information on the danger of war, of an Arab attack on us, you should have called a government meeting and given us the information, so that the government itself should consider what to do with it.” He was referring to the urgent meeting called by Golda in her bureau at noon on 5 October, to which only the ministers living in Tel Aviv were invited. “I was an hour away from Tel Aviv, couldn’t you have called me back on such a fateful issue for the state?” he asked. “Minister Allon had left for [Kibbutz] Ginossar, didn’t you disturb him? Is the danger of war a matter for consultations with Tel Aviv residents only? Is it not for the Ministerial Committee on Security to discuss such a fateful subject?” The full plenum and not the prime minister alone should have decided whether to make a pre-emptive strike.

Kol’s attack was the opening shot in an emotional debate. The ministers wanted to discuss the war and felt that Golda was blocking them. Minister Yosef Burg of the National Religious party rejected her argument that a debate was unnecessary if a commission of inquiry were set up. They also referred to the general elections scheduled for 31 December, and hinted that the Labour leadership had decided on a secret commission to prevent public debate and the full exposure of the failures on the eve of the elections. Another NRP minister, Zerah Warhaftig, said that the government should not keep information from the electorate which was to decide its fate.

Golda reacted angrily to these attacks, which she felt were politically motivated and directed against her and the defence minister, Moshe Dayan. If the commission called her to give evidence she would not hesitate for a moment: “I have nothing to hide. Whose heart is heavier? There is no X-ray machine to find out. What do you want? To throw – not you, you are all perfectly blameless, but first of all, to throw the prime minister and the defence minister and the other ministers to the wolves? No, Minister Warhaftig, that won’t happen. It might certainly be convenient for some, but not to me. And it won’t happen.”

She explained that she was responsible for two security agencies, the “Mossad” and the internal security service (Shin Bet) and had mountains of [intelligence] material to review. She could not call a meeting over every issue. If the leader of the opposition, Menachem Begin, was elected he would call a government meeting three times a day. She would accept all the conclusions of the commission even if they went against her.

“The best thing for me is if they declare the prime minister is at fault. Let them. I would give a year’s salary for it.”

In the end, the government decided to ask Supreme Justice Shimon Agranat to set up a commission of five to examine the intelligence information for the days preceding the war on the enemy’s moves and intentions, the evaluation of this information, the decisions taken by the responsible military and civil authorities in response and “the general deployment of the IDF in case of war, its state of readiness during the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, and its operations up to the containment of the enemy.” It would not examine the later stages of the war, when the IDF went on the offensive.

Golda also explained her decision not order a pre-emptive strike as proposed by the COGS, as it would have prevented Israel from getting US aid: “I am sure that if we had started the war, we were in danger of getting nothing [from the US]. During the first few days we were weak, and weak people have nothing to hope for in this world. There were voices, which are still being heard… saying never mind, let both sides suffer, it will help. I am sure that the basis for our stand is that we were attacked.  Try and explain afterwards that it was perfectly clear that we would be attacked and therefore we attacked first. From the Six Day War until today we have not managed to explain it.”

See the stenographic record of the government meeting, 18/11/1973

The Agranat Commission. From left to right: Yigael Yadin, Moshe Landau, Shimon Agranat, Yitzhak Nebenzahl and Haim Laskow. Photograph: Ya’akov Sa’ar, GPO

On 21 November the commission was set up, headed by Dr. Agranat, together with Justice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Yitzhak Nebenzahl and former chiefs of staff Prof. Yigael Yadin and Haim Laskov. There was much public criticism of the delay, and Golda admitted in a party meeting on 5 December that the government might have been a week or two late in setting up the commission.

Part 2. Proposals to Widen the Authority of the Commission and the Controversy Surrounding Ariel Sharon, 27 January 1974

Many raised eyebrows greeted the decision to limit the scope of the Agranat commission’s authority and proposals were made to enlarge its remit. For example, in January 1974 Prof. Shlomo Avineri attacked the decision-making process before the war in an article in the daily Yediot Ahronot, and compared it to “the running of a haberdashers’ shop”. Avneri claimed that a “troika” or triumvirate of three – Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Israel Galili – had made policy and ignored the rest of the government completely on critical issues. The article, which seemed inspired by inside information, aroused Galili’s anger, and he wrote to Golda proposing that the Agranat commission should be asked to examine the accusations against the three ministers, without result.

On 27 January the government discussed a series of interviews given by General (Res.) Ariel “Arik” Sharon, commander of the 143^rd Division during the war, in which he made a fierce attack on COGS Elazar and the “fossilization” of the army as revealed in the fighting. During the debate, Health Minister Victor Shemtov also raised the accusations against Sharon made by the head of the Southern Command during the war, Shmuel Gonen (Gorodish). On five occasions, according to Gonen, Sharon had disobeyed his specific orders and his actions had led to failures which cost many lives. Shemtov said that discipline in the army must be maintained and asked if a judicial commission of inquiry should examine both Sharon’s accusations and the complaints against him. If they could not set up a committee, perhaps the Agranat commission’s authority could be widened to allow it to examine all stages of the fighting.

The Chief of Staff, David Elazar, (on the left) and General Ariel Sharon, 19 October 1973. Photograph: David Rubinger, GPO

A long discussion on Sharon’s role followed, in which Golda said that she could not remember such scandalous behaviour as his interviews in the foreign press and the order of the day to his men which he published on his demobilization on 20 January, which she saw as a call to the soldiers to mutiny, no less. “He did not say so explicitly, but the order gives them every reason why they do not need to obey their commanding officers.” Golda asked Attorney General Shamgar if investigation of Sharon’s charges was included in the remit of the Agranat Commission. Meanwhile COGS Elazar confirmed Gonen’s accusations against Sharon and described the steps he had taken to investigate. Both the military advocate general and the attorney general had recommended disciplinary action against Sharon. The Agranat commission would only examine Gonen’s first complaint which referred to the early stages of the war. Elazar himself had talked to Sharon, who promised to stop giving interviews, but had not kept his word. As for Sharon’s own charges and claims of “politicization” (Sharon was a leading figure in the Likud party) and the “war between the generals”, “Dado” said that this was a distortion. There was no “war between the generals” on the northern front, in the air force, the navy or the armoured corps. The “war” broke out around one man, and was in fact the war of one general against his fellows.

Haim Bar-Lev, who had preceded Elazar as COGS and was also the target of Sharon’s accusations, rejected his claims and said that he should be disciplined. If he admitted disobeying orders, it could not be ignored. All the ministers expressed deep concern about the effects of the affair on the IDF and the damage to its image. Most supported passing on the issue to the commission, even though it referred to the later stages of the war. Burg proposed to widen its authority to deal with Sharon’s insubordination. Shimon Peres, Pinhas Sapir and Warhaftig proposed to extend the time period examined. However Warhaftig also defended Sharon’s right to express an opinion now that he had been demobilized and was a civilian.

The most violent in his criticism was Allon, who attacked the “unfortunate” way in which the defence minister and the attorney general had dealt with the complaints against Sharon. He condemned the lenience shown towards him, and was especially harsh towards Dayan, his political rival, who said that no-one had died because of Sharon’s interviews in the New York Times :

“First of all I don’t know if anyone died, I haven’t investigated and I don’t want to. But for General Sharon, for General Sharon’s division and for all the top ranks of the IDF, what does this pleasant and indulgent remark, made with the defence minister’s usual charm, mean as a licence to – excuse me – make a mockery of military discipline?”

Allon proposed that the prime minister should ask the commission to examine all Gonen’s charges of action or inaction by Sharon against orders. If it could not do so, he would propose setting up a special commission. Dayan said that he had received the first complaint that Sharon was disobeying Gonen’s orders before Haim Bar-Lev was sent to the Southern command to sort things out. “I told Haim that if he decided that Sharon should be dismissed, he would be. Haim was not in a hurry to dismiss him, to dismiss a division commander…I’m not talking about formal dismissal. As for Gorodish [Gonen], he has complaints. His complaints are against me and not Arik. It was not Arik who relieved him of the Southern command, it was I. Gorodish is screaming to high heaven.”

Bar-Lev said that he had in fact recommended twice to the COGS that Sharon be relieved of his command during the war, but “I was told that for certain reasons it had been decided not to do so. I did not sign the appointment of Sharon as a divisional commander and I could not cancel it. I wouldn’t have made this recommendation if I thought he was a first class divisional commander. I was not a great admirer of him as a great divisional commander. On this subject I differ from the defence minister. So I think that in this war only good would have come out of it if he had been removed earlier. But my recommendation was not accepted.”

Golda Meir had reservations about extending the authority of the commission to examine Gonen’s accusations and warned that the opposition would see it as a political step against Sharon, who was a Likud member of Knesset. The government decided to condemn his statements and to back the COGS. However the commission’s authority was not widened.

Stenographic report of the government meeting, 27/1/1974

 Part 3. The Government Debates the Partial Report of the Commission

The meeting on 2 April 1974: differences  between Army Intelligence and the Mossad, the question of ministerial responsibility

During the winter of 1973-1974 the Agranat commission held 140 sessions and heard 58 witnesses, among them army officers, Mossad head Zvi Zamir and members of the government.

On 1 April it published a partial report (sometimes mistakenly called the interim report). It included a series of recommendations, but public attention focused on the personal ones. The commission concluded that Military Intelligence had failed to evaluate correctly the reports which it received on the possible outbreak of war, due to its slavish adherence to the “concept” that Egypt would only attack in certain circumstances which had not yet arrived. The commission blamed the head of Military Intelligence Eli Zeira and the head of his Research Unit Arye Shalev for this failure, and recommended they be removed. The COGS was found responsible for the operational and intelligence failures up to the outbreak of war and his removal was also recommended. The commission did not find any fault with Defence Minister Dayan and found that he “was not required to order further cautionary measures beyond those proposed by the IDF General Staff.” With regard to the prime minister it found that her conduct “during the crucial days before the war reveals an attitude appropriate to the heavy responsibility she bore.” It also praised her decision to order full mobilization of the reserves on the morning of 6 October and described it as “an important act to defend the state.” But did the commission completely exonerate the political leadership, as many have assumed? What about their ministerial responsibility?

On 2 April an extraordinary government meeting was held to discuss the partial report. First Justice Minister Haim Zadok surveyed the conclusions and recommendations in the report, followed by the personal recommendations. With regard to the political leadership, Zadok emphasized that the report had not absolved Golda and Dayan from parliamentary and ministerial responsibility, but had decided that ministers’ resignations were a political matter, and thus not in their jurisdiction. Zadok was followed by Kol, who questioned the prime minister about the role of Military Intelligence and the Mossad in passing on intelligence warnings that war might break out. Meir explained the distinction between reports and evaluation of the data. “The Mossad is an arm of first importance in collecting reports, the Mossad is not an arm for assessment. It gets reports, and passes them on to Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence also collects reports, but its main task is assessing all the reports it receives.” Kol asked if the information received by both bodies was the same, or if there was a conflict between them. Golda  replied: “So far as I know the problem was not differing reports. The problem was in their assessment. I personally don’t know about any argument at that time between the Mossad and Military Intelligence, when one said, “I received these reports” and the other said, “I have opposite reports”….But there was a matter of assessment of all those reports which reached us directly and also those which came from foreigners. There were reports and assessments from outsiders, but there was no conflict in reports.”  Golda seems to imply here that there were differences between the two bodies in assessment of the reports, although Military Intelligence alone was designated as responsible for assessment. This is the only know comment by Golda Meir on a subject which remains a matter of controversy to this day.

While the ministers were arguing about the recommendations, the new minister of labour, ex-Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, suddenly intervened, asking Zadok if it was possible to return the report to the commission and to ask why it had evaded one of the main questions in their terms of reference, in deciding not to go into the authority and responsibility of the government. Rabin thus hinted that the commission had placed all the blame on the army, while the government got off scot free. Zadok said that the report could not be returned to the committee. COGS Elazar then spoke with great emotion. He announced his decision to resign and read out the letter of resignation he had sent the prime minister, in which he rejected the conclusions of the commission on his actions one by one. He expressed surprise that the commission had reached different conclusions towards him and towards the defence minister regarding the decision to mobilize the reserves before the war: “It seems that the commission did not treat us according to the same criteria”.

In the war room of Southern Command, 8 October 1973. In the first row, third from the right Chief of Staff David Elazar, on his left the commander of Southern Command Shmuel Gonen Gorodish, behind them on the right, ex-Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin. Photograph: Shlomo Arad, GPO

Rabin proposed not to accept the resignation of the COGS until after the government debate. Pinhas Sapir also hinted that the recommendations had been made in a hurry and he was supported by another ex-general, Aharon Yariv. There was an argument whether to appoint a replacement for the COGS at once, and other ministers hinted that the discussion was not over, and that the commission had in fact put the ball in the court of the government. Zadok confirmed this view and said that the subject should be discussed in a political forum: he was not sure if the government was the right one.

Golda then referred to the operational conclusions and said that it seemed that Military Intelligence should no longer be the only body to provide the “national intelligence assessment”. She did not take up the suggestion for a debate on ministerial responsibility. The government decided to accept Elazar’s resignation with regret and to adopt the Agranat commission’s recommendations with regard to other IDF officers. The rest of the recommendations would be discussed later. It seemed that the conclusions of the commission on Golda and Dayan were not final and that ministerial responsibility would be discussed at the next meeting. (Stenographic report of the government meeting, 2/4/1974)

 Correspondence with Chief Justice Agranat, May-June 1974

The ministers’ remarks were leaked to the press, which claimed that Rabin had attacked the report of the commission, had accused its members of evasion and even said the report was “patched together” (Maariv, 5 April 1974). At the time the commission members did not respond. But when Rabin became prime minister in June 1974, Chief Justice Agranat wrote to him asking whether the press reports reflected his views, since the commission was continuing with its work (Agranat to Rabin, 5 June 1974, ISA, File A7027/2). Rabin replied, denying the reports and quoting the main points he had made in the meeting. He wrote: “These are distorted leaks and words were put in my mouth which I never said.” (9 June 1974, ISA, ibid.).

“Dado” Elazar, who was deeply injured by the report which found him personally responsible for the events on the eve of the war, felt that the commission had not given him a proper hearing or a chance to defend himself. He decided to seek representation by a firm of lawyers, and two weeks after the first publication they wrote to Agranat, asking him to postpone the publication of the explanations for their ruling. Agranat rejected their arguments (see File A7027/2).

The government debates on the report, 9 April  and 11 April 1974: Golda’s resignation

Demonstrations outside the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem demanding the resignation of the leadership, 1 April 1974. Photograh: Moshe Milner, GPO

The report aroused a storm and encouraged the protest movement led by Motti Ashkenazi, a reserve officer who held a sit down strike outside the Prime Minister’s Office. Many could not understand why the commission had made a distinction in its findings between the COGS and Dayan, and called for Golda and Dayan to accept responsibility and to resign. The question of ministerial responsibility dominated the press and the opposition in the Knesset brought an urgent motion to discuss the report in the middle of the Passover recess. Many letters were received in Golda’s bureau calling on her to dismiss Dayan. But she still did not realize that the public was determined to remove the old leadership. After some hesitation, she decided not to resign and to wait for a decision by the party institutions. The public saw this as an attempt to cling to power.

On 9 April the government held a special meeting where the agenda included further discussion of the partial report. First the prime minister presented an exchange of letters with Justice Agranat on the forthcoming further partial report giving the reasons for the commission’s recommendations in full. The report would include material which might endanger national security, and he proposed special measures to ensure total secrecy. She had replied that she could not guarantee such secrecy, and the commission should take this into account when deciding whether to publish top secret information. After a long debate the government adopted her conclusion. Since complete secrecy was impossible, the ministers decided not to insist on seeing the transcripts of the discussions of the commission.

After this the government turned to the question of parliamentary responsibility. Although Golda proposed not to discuss it, the minister for religious affairs, Yitzhak Raphael, said that they could not ignore the raging controversy over the commission’s recommendations. Dayan proposed proceeding to the appointment of a new chief of staff. His shaky position had turned this subject into a party issue, and the media had proposed no less than eight candidates. After it was decided not to discuss the appointment, he asked the justice minister for an opinion whether parliamentary responsibility, as understood in Israel, meant that the minister of defence should resign. Zadok said that he would reply at the beginning of the next meeting, but Dayan demanded an immediate answer. If the answer was clear cut, he would write a letter of resignation immediately.

Moshe Dayan at a press conference in Tel Aviv, 6 October 1973. Photograph: Chananiah Herman, GPO

Stenographic report of the government meeting, 9/4/1974

On 10 April Zadok gave the ministers his opinion on ministerial responsibility, focusing on the constitutional position. Examples from Britain and Israel showed that a minister was responsible for the failures of his ministry. He or she could expect the government to back him if he was carrying out authorized policy, but not if he had acted in an incompetent way, due to the failings of his ministry or to personal errors. Zadok said that the subject was certainly fit for discussion by the government, which could choose whether to stand behind the minister or to suggest that he resign. Foreign Minister Abba Eban also asked the legal adviser to his ministry, Meir Rosenne, for an opinion, which he gave to Zadok.

But the discussion never took place. On the same day Golda Meir announced her resignation, which entailed the fall of the government. She did not give any reason for the timing of her decision, although it may be linked to a fierce debate on the demand for Dayan’s resignation which took place in a meeting of the party bureau and the parliamentary faction. Perhaps she was influenced by Zadok’s opinion and the unfriendly mood of some ministers as shown by Eban’s step, and feared that the government would reach a conclusion that would give her no choice but to resign. She decided not to wait, but to take the decision herself.

The protest against Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan on the website of the National Library 

On 11 April the government meeting heard her announcement. Golda added that to her regret, the entire government would have to resign. A discussion was held on the commission’s recommendations on the powers of the intelligence bodies, their connections with decision makers, the way decisions were reached by the government on sensitive issues and to the problem of leaks. The government decided to set up machinery to carry out the commission’s recommendations on the institutional level and to deal with leaks. As for ministerial responsibility, nothing was said.

Stenographic record of the government meeting, 11/4.1974

This was the last meeting of the Meir government on the subject. It then became a transitional government, which remained in office until Yitzhak Rabin, who was chosen as the party candidate, had formed a coalition and presented his government to the Knesset on 3 June 1974. The commission continued its work and published two more reports. But these are a subject for another publication.