Israeli-Egyptian relations

Revolution in Iran and renewal of negotiations with Egypt, February 1979

Row of demonstrators holding Khomeini’s portrait, Iran, 1978. Photograph: Wikimedia Commons

Meanwhile the attention of the world had turned to Iran. During 1978 the Shah’s regime had lost its hold and by January 1979 some government authorities had ceased to function. Riots were organized by religious bodies led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini from his place of exile in Paris. On 16 January the Shah left Iran. On 1 February Khomeini returned to Teheran and on 11 February he deposed the prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, and set up an Islamic republic (See the ISA publication on Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power). These developments had an important influence on the peace process between Israel and Egypt. The Islamic regime was hostile to the US and Israel and cut off relations with them. Carter  wanted to tie Egypt more closely to the US and to prevent the spread of the revolution, and  Egypt’s role as a moderate force in the region became even more important. However Israel, now cut off from Iranian oil, needed a substitute source of supply and also feared the fall of the regime in Egypt, as had happened in Iran.

Although Brzezinski still hoped that Israel would make concessions on the Palestinian issue in order to obtain Saudi support, feeling was growing that the US might need to go ahead without it. The Israelis felt that the US had not pressurized Saudi Arabia enough. On 5 February Dayan held a consultation in the Foreign Ministry. David Ofek, an expert on the regime, explained that as an oil-rich country with a weak army, Saudi Arabia felt it was essential to preserve Arab unity and not to take sides with either camp in order to preserve its stability. Sadat, in taking his initiative and signing the Camp David accords, had acted without consulting them. At Baghdad they had attacked the accords but not the diplomatic process. Sadat’s attacks on Prince Fahd had caused their position to harden. The Saudis were worried by the undermining of the Western position in Iran, Yemen and Africa by Libya, Iraq and other radical forces and felt that the US response was inadequate. The Saudi press was deeply critical of the US over Camp David, but they would not endanger their alliance with it. Some of those present proposed a discreet attempt to weaken the image of Saudi power in the US. Meir Rosenne criticized the hypocrisy of the Administration in glossing over Saudi human rights abuses. However Dayan said that he was more concerned with Saudi influence on Egypt. Undermining Saudi relations with the US would not help Israel, which could not serve as an alternative to the Arab world, and if possible, the Americans should not be forced to choose between them (Doc. No. 70).

By now Carter had decided on a final effort to wrap up the talks, and he sent a letter to Begin saying that the best answer to the revolution in Iran was to complete the negotiations on the peace treaty. He proposed that Dayan, Vance and Khalil should meet again at Camp David on 21 February. “It would be a tragedy if we failed to complete the journey which began with President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem” and Begin’s response to that visit (See Document No. 71). Carter hoped that again the isolation of Camp David might help to break the impasse. If the talks were successful he would hold another summit. A similar letter was sent to Sadat. Begin agreed to send Dayan.

On 11 February Israel’s new ambassador in Washington, Ephraim Evron, wrote to Dayan, surveying the aims and positions of the Administration. Congress and public opinion alike agreed that “peace between Israel and Egypt is the most necessary thing for the West in general and the United States in particular at this moment”. Carter badly needed a foreign policy success. Evron warned that Vance and other senior officials believed that Begin was trying to evade setting up autonomy in view of internal opposition, since they thought that the issues holding up the treaty were not really serious. But if Israel concentrated on its essential interests, the climate in the US was favourable to a deal. If the talks failed, Israel would be blamed.  (See Document No. 72).

U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown with Defence Minister Weizman at Ben-Gurion airport, 13 February 1979. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

Since he had lost Begin’s confidence, Dayan was pessimistic about prospects for the talks, even though he had received a message from Boutros Ghali, saying that Egypt wanted to sign the treaty as it was worried about unrest at home. 90% of the questions in the treaty were settled and they hoped to settle the remaining ones at Camp David. This message was not sent directly to Israel, since there was no direct channel with the Egyptians after Weizman had left the talks. (Tamir and Magdub too had left Washington in January after settling almost all the details of the Military Annex). However Weizman took part in the talks with Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who visited Israel in February as part of a tour to shore up US allies in the Middle East. Brown made it clear that the US would oppose an overt attempt by the Soviets to interfere in the Middle East but the countries of the region must act to prevent encroachment via proxies such as the Cubans.  Dayan expressed fears about the stability of the Egyptian regime and the fate of US arms if it fell, and asked if the US could take over the Israeli bases in Sinai rather than Egypt.

Extract from the stenographic record of Dayan and Weizman’s talk with Brown, 14 February 1978. ISA, File MFA 6914/5, p. 114

The second Camp David conference

Carter drags a reluctant Begin back to Camp David: “I’m going to speak to your parents!” Caricature by Shmuel Katz, courtesy of the Katz family

Dayan was accompanied by Yitzhak Zamir, the new Attorney-General, and other legal experts and by Ephraim Poran, Begin’s military secretary, whose job was to make sure he did not step out of line. The night before the talks opened, they met with the US delegation and Atherton, who put forward the “package deal” idea: each side would make mutual concessions based on a US proposal. The next day Vance met with Khalil alone and then with Dayan. Dayan said that, unlike Khalil, he did not have the authority to settle the details of the treaty, but only to make recommendations to the government. They discussed holding a summit immediately after the talks and the situation in Iran. Dayan claimed that Sadat was the next in line for difficulties like those suffered by the Shah, since conditions in Egypt were similar. Vance said that Sadat had turned down the idea of US airbases in Sinai (see Document No. 73).

At noon Vance, Khalil and Dayan met alone. Khalil again warned against the danger of an Islamic wave sweeping the Middle East. In view of this, a separate peace with Israel was unthinkable and the Palestinian issue had priority. The atmosphere was tense and Khalil argued that, since Dayan did not have authority, perhaps the talks were a waste of time. He said that leaks from the government committee on autonomy on Israel’s plans to secure its interests in Judea and Samaria cast doubt on its desire for peace. Dayan replied that the government would consider his recommendation. If the talks were a waste of time, he could go home. He denied that Israel did not want peace. Khalil made it clear that Sadat would not come to negotiate on the details but only to give his blessing once things were settled (See Document No. 74). The talks continued, focusing on the “Gaza first “proposal, without success. On the other hand the Americans began to deal seriously with Israel’s requests for aid and a memorandum of understanding, a sign that negotiations were reaching their final stage. On 25 February Dayan, Khalil and Vance met with Carter, who said that they were running out of time. Dayan claimed that not only had there been no progress, but the Egyptians had retreated from previous positions on normalization and linkage between the treaty and autonomy. Furthermore, in some clauses what had previously been Egyptian positions were now American ones (See Document No. 75).

Carter asked Begin to come to Camp David to decide the issues. Begin saw the invitation to meet Khalil and not Sadat as an insult, but the government did not want to refuse and to break off the talks. The solution was an invitation from Carter for bilateral talks with Begin, which he could not turn down

Bulletin by a government spokesman, 27 February 1979. ISA, File A4174/9

On March 1 Begin flew to Washington. In their first talk Carter again referred to the revolution in Iran and the dangerous situation in Egypt. Begin argued that Israel was the only stable factor in the region and should be strengthened. As for peace with Egypt, Israel had already agreed to pay a heavy price and was now being asked for concessions which would make the treaty worthless. Begin explained Israel’s objections on the issues of linkage and priority of obligations. If these were not met, Egypt could cancel the treaty at any moment and join a war against Israel. He also raised normalization and the exchange of ambassadors (See Document No. 76).

The talks continued the following day, Friday, with the legal teams participating. Begin repeated his objections, threw doubt on Sadat’s sincerity and even said that Israel could not withdraw from the oil fields unless Egypt committed itself to selling oil to it. But towards the end of the meeting a compromise formula on priority of obligations began to emerge. On Saturday night the meeting between the two delegations was cancelled and Carter and Begin met alone. According to Begin’s report, the president admitted that they were at an impasse; the two sides were entrenched in their positions and Sadat might be forced into the extremist Arab camp. Begin argued that the Americans’ actions had convinced Egypt that the US supported them unconditionally. He proposed they should ask for concessions from Egypt. Carter said that the problematic statements of Israeli ministers and turning down the early withdrawal from Sinai were responsible. Nevertheless, they agreed to continue the search for a solution (See Document No. 77).

On learning of the lack of progress, Sadat sent a message to Carter that he intended to come to Washington, to condemn Begin and to put the problem before Congress and the UN. Carter decided that only his personal intervention could help. On 4 March some new proposals acceptable to Begin were reached on Article VI and the joint letter, and Begin sent Yadin and Dayan an urgent message, saying: “I have no doubt that, thanks to the firm stand of the government, as expressed over the last three days in Washington, there has been a change in the US stand on three important points.” Although Begin presented the proposals as a breakthrough, Carter later told Sadat that he had suddenly become more forthcoming and accepted their ideas. It seems that he realized the moment had come to close the deal, and he did not want to be blamed for the failure of the talks.

Carter decided to take the plunge and to go to the Middle East himself. He planned to meet with Sadat, to present the latest proposals and to finalize the details of the treaty, so that it could be signed during his visit.

Now or never: President Carter’s visit to Egypt and the talks in Israel, March 1979

Before leaving for Egypt Carter made a statement saying: “I leave today on a new mission in the service of the oldest of human dreams – the dream of peace. Nowhere is the hope of peace more fervent, more alive, than in the Middle East. Nowhere is the path to the realization more difficult, nowhere might the price of failure be more terrible…”

Carter flew to Cairo with a large entourage, including Vance, Brown and his Jewish advisers, Sanders and Lifschutz. He was welcomed by cheering crowds and it was clear that this was a mission which could not be allowed to fail.

Carter and Sadat waving to the crowd in the streets of Cairo, 8 March 1979. The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Collection, NARA

On 7 March Dayan was asked in a meeting with senior Foreign Ministry staff (Document  No. 78) if Carter’s visit was a “gamble” or if his success was virtually assured. Dayan replied “I think that for Carter this is a political necessity. The United States has a major need to stabilize the situation in the Middle East after Iran….It is not a “gamble” either way, even if nothing comes out of it.” In any case the US would need Egypt, but it would be much easier to obtain assistance from Congress if there was peace with Israel. Dayan said that his talks at Camp David were inconclusive because Begin and Sadat were not there. He did not know why Sadat had not come, and the president himself was being forced to “shuttle” between Cairo and Jerusalem.  On the same day, a report from Cairo (Document No. 79) suggested that the Egyptian reaction to the new proposals was positive. Later the Israelis learned that Sadat had demanded changes in Article VI which Begin and Carter had agreed in Washington and additions to the joint letter. But if all was settled he would come to Jerusalem to sign, and afterwards Begin would come to Cairo .In fact, Carter received full powers from Sadat to settle the problems as he saw fit, while honouring Egypt’s concerns. According to Carter, Sadat agreed to return to the original arrangement of exchanging ambassadors if Israel agreed to an early withdrawal and asked him to make one more effort to persuade Israel to agree to his proposals on Gaza.

Carter arrived in Israel on Saturday night, 10 March 1979, and met with the prime minister. Begin said that the treaty could not be signed during the president’s visit, since he was committed to hold a government meeting on the autonomy plan first, and to present the treaty to the Knesset. This news surprised and angered the president. In his diary he wrote: “I couldn’t believe it. I stood up and asked him if it was actually necessary for me to stay any longer.” Carter asked Begin if he really wanted peace. The prime minister insisted that he did, but Carter was convinced that he was trying to block a treaty. His only hope was to appeal to the government, the Knesset and the Israeli public.

Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter at dinner with Prime Minister Begin and his wife Aliza in Jerusalem, March 1979. Photgraph: Ya’acov Sa’ar, GPO.

On Sunday 11 March Vance gave Dayan a copy of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the US, including guarantees of Israel’s oil supply. He showed Dayan the latest version of the joint letter, and Dayan said that if the Egyptians insisted on autonomy in Gaza first, Israel would see this as the end of their role in the process. Vance was worried about hold ups caused by the Knesset vote and suggested that the parties initial the agreement, but Dayan said approval was a foregone conclusion if the government approved the treaty. (See  Document No. 80).

After a visit by Carter to the president of Israel, Yitzhak Navon, who tried to convince him of Begin’s sincerity (see the publication on Navon’s contribution to peace on our Hebrew website), to the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, and to Mt. Herzl, the talks began. The Israeli delegation consisted of Begin and a group of ministers, with Zamir and other top aides. Begin insisted that Carter should chair the meeting, since a president outranked a prime minister. Carter described his talks with Sadat and the “outpouring of sentiment” in Egypt for peace. He presented the situation as “now or never”: if the treaty was not concluded during his visit, it would be very difficult to do so later. He mentioned the Egyptian request to change the word “derogate” in Article VI. Begin said that this article was vital to prevent Egypt joining in a war between Israel and Syria, but he agreed to try to find another word. To prove that Egypt was still hostile to Israel, Begin quoted from attacks on Israel and the Jews in the Egyptian official press.

Sadat’s proposed addition to the joint letter – to send Egyptian liason officers to Gaza– aroused bitter opposition. Carter said that Egypt had only made the suggestion on ‘Gaza first’ in order to be helpful. He shared the suspicion that Israel wanted to delay implementation of the autonomy plan, especially in view of Sharon’s plans to settle a million Jews in Judea and Samaria. Sharon defended his plans, and Begin and Yadin insisted that autonomy was an Israeli initiative and the government stood behind it (Document No. 81).

That afternoon, Carter said that he could not devote any more time to the Middle East. He would like the treaty “not to be just a piece of paper that both sides have signed reluctantly … with remnants of animosity and distrust” but to revive the atmosphere of genuine friendship and trust of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David summit. He believed that the problems could be solved, especially if Israel would reconsider a commitment for early withdrawal in Sinai. He asked the government to be “forthcoming and generous”. A late night government meeting was called. Before this Vance met with Dayan who wanted the subject of liason officers postponed to the autonomy talks. It would be much easier to persuade the government without it. The government meeting, which lasted till 5 a.m., approved new formulations on Article VI and agreed that to reconsider the early withdrawal. But it remained adamant in opposition to an Egyptian presence in Gaza and demanded a permanent Egyptian guarantee to sell a fixed amount of oil to Israel.

The Israeli side expected Vance to go to Cairo to receive a reply, not realizing that, in effect, Carter had full authority from Sadat to negotiate. At 10:30 the next morning, after receiving the government’s decisions, Carter again met with the Israelis, this time with the entire government (Document No. 82). He admitted that they had indeed “been forthcoming, in some instances very generous” but asked for more. He argued that the refusal to refer to Gaza in the joint letter undermined the US commitment to ensure that autonomy was implemented.  He asked for details of the stages of the withdrawal and insisted that the US guarantee of Israel’s oil supply was sufficient.  Begin demanded that the phrase on liason officers be removed. After normalization there would be free access to Gaza for the Egyptians. Carter was insistent: “To me it is a very crucial issue and your response has not been adequate”. This was the first that the US had taken a position that it considered important to its own integrity. “[And] unless there is some assurance that the [Egyptian] negotiating team can have access to the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, I do not feel that I can carry out my commitment to the American people nor to you nor to the Palestinian Arabs nor to Egypt. It is a crucial issue to us and I think it is something you will have to decide.”

Begin replied: “Mr. President, we shall sign only what we agree to and we shall not sign anything to which we do not agree.” Israel would carry out every word of the Camp David agreement but could not be forced to accept additions. He agreed to call another government meeting. After Vance said that he had tried and failed to persuade Egypt to give Israel a guaranteed supply of oil, Justice Minister Tamir argued that Egypt was perpetuating the Arab boycott. Despite Israel’s great sacrifices, Egypt refused to give this assurance of good faith.

MK Geula Cohen tears up a piece of paper, pretending it is the Camp David accords, during President Carter’s speech at the Knesset, 12 March 1979. Ya’acov Sa’ar, GPO

Carter and Begin left to speak in the Knesset. In Carter’s speech he said pointedly: “The people of the two nations are ready now for peace. The leaders have not yet proven that we are also ready for peace enough to take a chance.” Begin’s speech was interrupted by members of the right and the Communist party, and MK Geula Cohen was removed from the chamber.

Carter believed that Begin took pleasure in showing him the strength of Israeli democracy. However in the government meeting which followed Begin was angry and upset, and complained that the Americans did not appreciate Israel’s sacrifices, which had led his opponents to call him “Petain” (the French collaborationist president in World War II). Begin now realized that Carter was negotiating for the Egyptians, and would not discuss any proposals which he thought they would not accept. Begin regarded the demand for details of the stages of the withdrawal as Egyptian effrontery, backed by the Americans. The ministers voiced suspicions that Egypt wanted a foothold in Gaza in order to restore Egyptian rule or to encourage the establishment of a Palestinian state. Most of them wanted a firm stand against further concessions. However some, among them Health Minister Eliezer Shostak, Housing Minister Gideon Patt and Finance Minister Ehrlich, felt that not all Israel’s demands were reasonable. Shostak said they should not insist on specific quantities of oil and long term arrangements. On Gaza and Carter’s suspicions of Israel’s intentions over autonomy, he said “they have a right to suspect us and it is a very sensitive point”. He did not reject the idea of liason officers and Sharon objected: “That means a Palestinian state within the month.”  Ehrlich was also willing to compromise on oil. In an atmosphere of confusion and despondency, Patt complained that no one was listening and Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abuhatssira said that it was impossible for a group of thirty people to conduct negotiations. According to the schedule Carter was about to leave, and roads and Israeli air space had been closed. Eventually the government decided not to change its decisions and to ask Carter to transmit them to the Egyptians (Document No. 83).

At 4:45 the delegation met with Vance and Brzezinski. Vance proposed an idea: “You have got two issues that were not rooted in Camp David ….one of them is the Gaza issue. One is the question of oil. Suppose one drops both of those issues, and inasmuch as oil is a more weighty kind of issue, that could be taken care of, that we are prepared to give our guarantee”. Yadin said that the suggestion reminded him of the old joke about the rabbi and the goat (the rabbi solved the problem of a family whose house was crowded by putting in a goat as well. When he took it out there was much more room…).  Vance was proposing to take out the two “goats”, Gaza and the oil. However Israel could not drop the demand for oil which was part of normalization. Begin agreed: Israel would accept 50% of Vance’s proposal and drop Gaza (Document No. 84).

After the meeting, exhausted from a sleepless night, Begin went home to rest. Vance went back to his hotel. Carter had agreed to stay another night, but his press secretary was already briefing the press on the failure of his mission.

“What we have achieved up till now is no less than a miracle”: Last minute solution and the signing of the treaty, 26 March 1978

 The government had refused to make further concessions, but the prospect of the president of Israel’s most important ally leaving empty-handed was grim. According to his memoirs, Weizman accused his colleagues of missing the chance for peace and hinted at resignation. A group of ministers remained, apparently asked by Yadin to try to find a way out – Dayan, Shostak, Patt, Burg, Sharon, Abuhatssira, Tamir and Yadin himself. It was this group, several of them little known to history, which brought about the breakthrough. The meeting was not recorded, but it seems that they proposed a new formula on the oil question, which Dayan thought the Americans might accept. Dayan telephoned Begin, who authorized him to speak to Vance. They met again and Vance agreed to propose to the Egyptians not to mention Gaza in the treaty, if the oil issue was settled. (Egyptian access to Gaza was already promised in the normalization agreement). Dayan said that Israel would accept a general commitment by Egypt in the peace treaty to sell oil to Israel and a long term American guarantee. He asked for twenty years, and they eventually agreed on fifteen.  Vance and his staff drafted another clause in the treaty, to be added to Annex III on trade relations. Carter invited Begin to breakfast at Dayan’s suggestion.

The agreed minute on oil supply. See ISA, File  6868/7 p. 100

The following morning Vance showed Dayan the new clause. They then joined Carter and Begin. Carter presented the formula as his proposal, and Begin said he would bring it to the government. Carter also requested gestures towards the Palestinians, including freedom of movement (which they already enjoyed) and of association, and the release of political prisoners. Begin agreed to consider them. Dayan requested that the official press in Egypt should stop personal attacks on Begin. Before he left Carter proposed to Begin that the Gaza question be dropped, and Begin accepted gladly.

Carter telephoned Begin from Cairo to tell him that Sadat had agreed to the new proposals. That day Carter sent Begin a letter summing up their agreements (Document No.85). If Israel reinstated its proposal on phased withdrawal, Sadat would renew his agreement to the exchange of ambassadors. Sadat had agreed to the addition on oil and even offered to construct a pipeline from the oil wells to Eilat. Begin read out the letter at a government meeting on 14 March. Minister Haim Landau protested against the actions of the group of ministers, which had undermined the government’s decisions. Dayan and Yadin replied that they had acted with Begin’s approval. Landau added bitterly that he could sum up the agreement in one sentence: “Israel gives, Egypt receives and the Americans pay.” Nevertheless the new formulations were approved and Begin called Carter to tell him (Document No. 86).  Carter responded “That is the best news of my life, wonderful news.” Begin congratulated Carter on the speech he had made on his return.

In a telegram to Israel’s representatives abroad, Ciekanover, the Foreign Ministry director-general, summed up the final moves (Document No. 88). We can see Carter’s own view in a briefing to leaders of Congress on 14 March. According to Zvi Rafiah of the Israeli embassy (See Document No. 87), he praised Sadat, Begin and Dayan, but noted that it was much easier to deal with Sadat, who could settle the knottiest problems in half an hour and left the details to his foreign minister. Begin was a “semanticist” who wanted to check everything. (Senator Daniel Moynihan tried to explain that Begin was a lawyer, and when he wrote something he really meant it). In Jerusalem Carter had learned with horror about the delays Begin wanted, because Sadat could not wait any longer for an agreement. Carter was also worried about Arab opposition. Sadat said that he would deal with the Arabs if Carter would take care of Israel. Carter added with a smile, “I don’t know who got the better deal”. Egypt needed massive economic and military aid; Israel too would benefit.

After a stormy debate lasting 28 hours, the Knesset approved the peace treaty on 21 March. Two days later Begin and the Israeli delegation flew to Washington for the signing ceremony. Some details still had to be settled on the timing of oil deliveries and the withdrawal from El Arish as well as understandings between Israel and the US and the talks continued even though the ceremony could not be delayed. For example, Attorney-General Zamir sent Rosenne a telegram on questions like whether the treaty would include the Arabic term “salaam” or “sulh” (both meaning peace) or whether the Hebrew names  Eilat and Ophira (Sharm el-Sheikh) would appear (Document No. 89). Ariel Sharon tried to protest against Israel’s promise to move the Military Government headquarters away from the centre of Gaza, but this undertaking was included in a letter from Carter to Khalil on Israel’s gestures to the Palestinians. Begin told him that implementation could be delayed (Document No. 92).

Menachem Begin meets Anwar Sadat at the Egyptian ambassador’s home in Washington, 26 March 1979. On the left, Israeli ambassador Evron. Photograph: Ya’acov Sa’ar, GPO

On 25 March, the day before the signing, Sadat and Begin met to settle the remaining issues. Begin agreed to speed up the handing over of El Arish and the oilfields and Sadat agreed to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil. After receiving the approval of his delegation Begin telephoned Sadat to confirm the arrangements (Document No. 90). Afterwards Begin told Secretary Vance that the meeting was “warm and positive” although there were some tense moments. Vance promised that Carter would agree that Sadat would make a declaration in his presence on additional points Israel had requested on the oil issue. On the same day the three sides had signed the maps giving the stages of the withdrawal and the zones of limitations of forces at the State Department. Tamir signed for Israel on the maps prepared by the Americans, with the lines drawn up by Zalman Enav. The maps also included the international border between Egypt and Israel. Egypt’s signature marked the first time an Arab state had recognized the border – and by extension, Israel itself. As a result of the last minute agreement between Begin and Sadat, Enav then had to work all night updating the map….

At 11 a.m. on the morning of 26 March Carter and Begin met at the White House. Dayan, Brzezinski and Vance were also present. They summed up the final understandings between Israel and Egypt, and raised preliminary ideas on the negotiations on autonomy. Yet another crisis was averted after Begin said that he could not change the text of the footnote on the issue of Judea and Samaria as presented to the Knesset. If he were forced to do so he would resign. Fortunately a compromise was found. Carter reported on Sadat’s comment that after his meeting with Begin “he now feels that in the future he will be able to approach the prime minister directly during a crisis, and find an appropriate arrangement”. He added that “today is an historic day” which was achieved thanks to Begin and Sadat: “What we’ve achieved till now is no less than a miracle… and the hand of God was present in what has been achieved till now” (Document No. 93.

After lunch all the actors in the drama met on the White House lawn for the signing ceremony. In Begin’s speech he paid tribute to the efforts of President Carter who had never accepted defeat. Begin also joked at his own expense about Carter’s impatience at his fondness for legal details and his “intransigence”: “Our friend, President Sadat, said that you are the “unknown soldier” of the peace-making effort. I agree, but, as usual, with an amendment. A soldier in the service of peace you are; you are, Mr. President, even, horrible dictu [terrible to say], an intransigent fighter for peace. But Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, is not completely unknown. And so is his effort, which will be remembered for generations to come.”

After long months of talks and nerve racking delays, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt became a fact which changed the face of the Middle East.

For the text of the peace treaty and the MOU with the USA