Immediately after the events in Munich, accusations of police incompetence were heard in Germany as well and probing questions began to be asked in the German media, as reported by the Israeli embassy in Bonn (Document 20). Those responsible for directing the crisis, Federal Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the head of the Munich police, Manfred Schreiber, and the Interior Minister of Bavaria, Bruno Merk, hurried to release a statement the next day, explaining the course of events and stating “that the final decision to use force in an attempt to prevent the kidnapping of the hostages was only made after they were officially informed by the government of Israel that it refused to release 200 Arab prisoners in exchange for the release of the members of the Israeli delegation”. The public storm in Germany was intensified by the approaching general elections, and the events in Munich became the focus of an acrimonious political dispute.
In the meantime, the joint Federal and Bavarian enquiry commission into the events in Munich completed its task. Interior Minister Genscher presented the main points of its report to Israeli Ambassador Ben-Horin, thus beginning an argument over the different versions as compared with Zamir’s report (Document 23). On 20 September the German report was published, and is presented here in Hebrew translation (Document 24). The report investigated three aspects of the events: 1. Security measures in Munich and at the Olympic Village; 2. Efforts to release the hostages without using force; 3. The police operation in Munich and at the Fuerstenfeldbruck airfield. It was noted that there had been warnings about possible terrorist attacks during the Olympics, but no specific reports regarding Israeli targets. Contacts with Israeli representatives about security for the athletes were described and it was pointed out that these meetings did not give the impression that the representatives were dissatisfied with the security arrangements. In conclusion, the authors claimed that given the terrorists’ intent, even significant reinforcement of the security arrangements would not have prevented a terrorist attack on the Israelis in the Olympic Village or elsewhere.
The second section presented a detailed review of the efforts to release the hostages, and listed the reasons for the Germans’ conclusion that it was not possible to rescue the hostages without the use of force, or to fly them to Cairo. The Germans again repeated the claim that this was impossible because, among other things, Israel refused to consent to the attackers’ demands to release Palestinian prisoners. The third section described the details of the operation at the airfield. A series of operational questions were raised and, in view of the circumstances at the scene, no fault was found with the actions of the various arms of the German police. The German Parliament (Bundestag) Interior Committee adopted this conclusion. No disciplinary action was taken, and no one in Germany was removed from their position.
Based on the significant differences in the Israeli and German assessments of the operation in Munich, the release of Zamir’s reports on the one hand and the German reports on the other created a wave of reaction and counter-reaction from the Israelis and Germans involved. The Foreign Ministry decided to prepare a summary setting out the differences between the German report and the comments by Mossad chief Zamir and Ambassador Ben-Horin, and Director-General Gazit sent it to the prime minister. The report presents major differences between versions regarding the different stages of the operation, the measures taken by the Germans and the Israelis’ share in the affair (Document 25).
The dispute with the Germans continued in the following days, as can be seen in a letter from Chancellor Brandt to Prime Minister Golda Meir, giving their reactions – especially that of Genscher – to the Zamir Report (Document 26 in Hebrew and German).
