The Cairo Agreement: Israel's negotiations with the PLO, October 1993-May 1994

ב.1 | Reaction to the Oslo Agreement

On September 13, 1993,  Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas), representing the PLO, signed the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (“Oslo I Agreement”) at the White House in the presence of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and US President Bill Clinton. Secretary Christopher witnessed the agreement with the representative of Russia, and Rabin and Arafat shook hands.

For details of the negotiations on the Declaration of Principles, see “The Road to Oslo” publication.

For the full text of the Declaration:

The main points included:

• establishment of an interim Palestinian Self-Governing Authority
• IDF withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho within six months of the entry into force of the agreement (October 13, 1993)
• elections to a Palestinian National Council within nine months of the entry into force of the agreement
• fixing a five year transition period until the permanent agreement. This period would begin with the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Negotiations on the permanent settlement would open two years after the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. The issues discussed would include controversial subjects such as Jerusalem and the refugees.
• the Autonomy Council would first be given authority in Gaza and Jericho and later throughout the West Bank, excluding issues to be discussed in the permanent settlement
• a strong Palestinian police force would ensure internal order. Israel would continue to be responsible for the security of Israelis, residents of the settlements and protection from external threats
• cooperation at the crossings between Gaza and Egypt, and between Jericho and Jordan. Israel would continue to control security at the crossing points
• the elections to the Council would be conducted under international supervision.

Appendices to the agreement included arrangements for economic cooperation and regional development

Recognition of the PLO and the agreement signed with it, which reversed previous government policy, took the Israeli public by surprise. There was a gulf between those who supported the Declaration of Principles and its opponents, mostly from the Likud and other Opposition parties. Labour movement members, who had settled in Judea and Samaria under the policies of the Alignment governments, also feared the future. Although jurists had ruled that the prime minister was not obliged to bring such agreements to the Knesset, Rabin decided to seek its approval. On September 21 he presented the agreement to the Knesset, highlighting the prospect of a new era of peace. He made it clear that Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip would remain under Israeli rule, and the IDF would be responsible for security. The authority of the Palestinian Authority would not apply to Israelis. Despite fierce protests from Opposition leaders, the Knesset approved the agreement by a majority of 61 coalition members to 50. Eight Shas members and three Likud members abstained.

Excerpts from Rabin’s speech in the Knesset

Given the deep concerns raised by the agreement in national religious circles and among the settlers, on September 22 Rabin met with the leaders of the moderate religious Meimad movement, Rabbi Yehuda Amital, one of the heads of the yeshiva in Gush Etzion, and Dr. Yehuda Ben-Meir, a former Knesset member. Rabin repeated his commitment to protect the settlements during the period of the interim agreement and agreed that the defence establishment would consult with the settlers on their status and security (Document 3, Meimad Leaders’ Meeting with Yitzhak Rabin, 22 September 1993).

Palestinians celebrating in the streets of the Old City of Jerusalem after the first Oslo Accord, 20 September 1993. Photograph: Avi Ohayon, GPO

There was also fierce opposition to the plan within the PLO, especially from Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO political department, who saw it as surrender to Israel. Supporters of the agreement highlighted the achievements of the Palestinians in bringing Israel closer to recognizing their sovereignty. For the first time, Israel had agreed to discuss in the permanent agreement negotiations issues it had previously refused to consider, such as Jerusalem, the future of the settlements and refugees. They argued that Israel’s agreement to withdraw to defined boundaries implied sovereignty (Document 1, Danny Rothschild to Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, 2 September 1993).

A document in the Hirschfeld Collection sheds light on the attitude of the Hamas to the agreement. On September 14 Ephraim Lavie of the Advisor on Arab Affairs Department in the Civil Administration met with the head of the movement, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in his cell at the Ashmoret Prison where he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment. The sheikh claimed that as an Islamic leader he had legitimacy that Yasser Arafat did not, and opposed recognition of  Arafat as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people.  However Hamas would not act to thwart the agreement by force. He expressed willingness to participate in the elections and government under certain conditions, for example a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. The Intifada would continue because Arafat has no control over it. (File P 5517/1). And in fact, the PLO’s opponents, and especially the Hamas movement, supported by Iran, intensified terrorist attacks.

Border Police and demonstrators against the Accord outside the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, 8 September 1993. Photograph: Avi Ohayon, GPO

ב.2 | The first phase of the talks on the Gaza and Jericho agreement, October 1993

The next stage, implementation of the Agreement, would demand even greater changes from the leadership and the public on both sides.

Appendix 2 of the Declaration of Principles states that both parties will conclude an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho region and sign it within two months of the date of entry into force of the Declaration. Negotiations on this agreement began in October 1993, but the parties failed to complete them on the date set. Initially, the delay was due to problems in choosing the Palestinian delegation, due to Arafat’s difficulties in getting  the approval of the PLO Executive Committee and resistance from some of his former associates. There was also tension between the PLO-Tunis (“the exterior”) and the local leadership in the territories (“the interior”), which had intensified during the Intifada.

On October 6, Rabin met with Arafat in Cairo and urged him to appoint the negotiating teams. He said that weeks had passed since the signing and nothing had happened. “The momentum needs to be realized.” Arafat agreed and asked for gestures such as the return of deported activists and the release of prisoners. Rabin preferred to leave the matter for the negotiations but agreed to a gesture before the PLO Executive convened (see Main points of the Conversation, Document 4, Arafat’s Conversation with Rabin). After the Executive Committee’s meeting on October 10, the Palestinians submitted a list of participants in the committee on the Gaza and Jericho agreement for the talks.

On the Israeli side, the prime minister chose to put IDF officers in charge of key aspects of the negotiations. This decision reflected the view expressed to President Mubarak of Egypt on the eve of the signing of the Agreement, that implementation was Rabin’s direct responsibility, as he was serving as both prime minister and defence minister. Mubarak congratulated him on the signing, but Rabin said the Declaration of Principles was important but the real test would be the implementation (Document 2, Telephone Call between Prime Minister Rabin and President Mubarak).

First page of the record of Rabin’s conversation with Mubarak. Israel State Archives

As proposed by Israel, it was decided to establish four committees dealing with various aspects of the Declaration of Principles. Foreign Minister Peres chaired a general liaison committee; Deputy Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin Shahak was responsible for the committee on the Gaza-Jericho agreement (which was the most important to Rabin), and held talks in Taba and Cairo with Nabil Shaath. However, Israel also sought to preserve the framework of the multilateral talks in Washington, and Major General Dani Rothschild, the Coordinator of Operations in the Territories, held talks about the transition period and elections to the Palestinian Authority with members of the original delegation to Washington, consisting mainly of residents of the territories. Only the economic talks on the establishment of financial institutions in the Palestinian Authority and tax and customs policy were entrusted to civilians. Finance Minister Avraham Shochat and Oded Eran of the foreign ministry headed the Israeli delegation to these talks which were held in Paris, with Abu Ala on the other side. Even the working group dealing with distinctly civilian issues, such as archeological sites, water, agriculture and communications, was headed by an IDF officer – the head of the Civil Administration, Gadi Zohar.

At the same time, Peres used his contacts to mobilize international aid for the Palestinians, in economic affairs and establishing state institutions, especially the Palestinian police. Yossi Beilin dealt with the issue of the refugees and met with Arafat in Tunis. The United States too invited donors – representatives of the European Union, Canada, Japan, Scandinavia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and more – to an economic conference in Washington which opened on 1 October. They agreed to donate $ 2.5 billion over five years, mainly from the United States, the European Union and Japan. Due to disagreements between the Americans and the Europeans, it was decided that Norway would head the group as presiding officer (the “gavel holder”). An important requirement was for the Palestinians to establish orderly economic institutions that could receive the aid money. In the end, an economic council was formed, called PECDAR (Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction).

On October 13, the Liaison Committee opened its discussions in Cairo, led by Peres and Abu Mazen. On the same day, talks on Gaza and Jericho opened in Taba, “in an excellent atmosphere”, according to team member Joshua Zakai. An agenda was agreed including the main issues: a schedule for withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho; arrangements for the establishment and operation of the Palestinian police; the crossing points between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho and Jordan; safe passage between Gaza and Jericho; an international presence; transfer of power; economic cooperation and confidence building measures. Two working groups, one civilian and one on security issues, were established (Document 5, Joshua Zakai to Jacques Neriah)

The PLO also pressed Israel to release prisoners, including Hamas prisoners, to create a division between more moderate elements, who might accept the authority of the PA, and the extremists. But Israel found it difficult to act on this request in view of terrorist actions by the opponents of the agreement, such as the murder of two hikers in Wadi Kelt in early October 1993. Peres condemned the murder, committed by the Islamic Jihad group, at the opening of the Knesset winter session, but added that the implementation of the agreement with the Palestinians would not be affected by terrorist acts by the enemies of peace. Shortly before the scheduled release of the prisoners, two soldiers were killed in Khan Yunis by Hamas. Nonetheless, since Gen. Shahak had already promised to release several hundred prisoners, including the sick, women, children under eighteen and men over fifty, the move was implemented (Document 7, Jacques Neriah to Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Sheves).

ב.3 | Differing interpretations of the Declaration of Principles

The statement of principles was vague and general. This ambiguity had made signature possible, but could cause many difficulties, as predicted by the Foreign Ministry’s Political Planning Division in mid-October. The writer also pointed out the problems involved in giving most of the responsibility for the negotiations to military personnel and suggested “more active involvement of staff from the foreign ministry and other ministries” (Document 6, Centre for Political Planning: Declaration of Principles on Self-Government. The author was probably Harry Knei-Tal, the division head). His recommendations, which also included opening a secret channel with the Palestinians at a high level, were adopted only after a crisis occurred.

It soon became clear that the parties interpreted the Declaration and the establishment of autonomy differently: the Palestinians saw them as the first stage for full Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state, while the Israelis saw them as a test period for the Palestinians’ ability to rule themselves and live peacefully alongside Israel. The disagreement focused on the following issues:

• The area of Jericho: The Palestinians demanded the entire Jericho district, about 300 km, and Israel claimed that only the city of Jericho (25 km) was included.
• Control of the border crossings with Egypt and Jordan
• Security arrangements, in particular the Israeli demand for control of the roads and the area around the settlements in Gaza
• Palestinian demands for symbols of sovereignty. These demands, such as the demand for control of the border crossings and the issue of currency and stamps, signalled their desire to highlight the foundations of an independent Palestinian state already at the interim agreement stage.

The city of Jericho and its surroundings, 1988. Photo: Maggie Ayalon, GPO

Security was a major issue between the parties. The Palestinians agreed in principle that Israel would be responsible for external security during the transition phase, while they would be responsible for internal security, but they had a very different interpretation of this principle. This dispute is reflected in a paper on the “Israeli Security Concept”, which states that the purpose of the agreement is to allow both peoples to live side by side in peace and security, while the Palestinians enjoy self-government. Israel will be responsible for security and public order for the settlers and other Israelis in the autonomous areas.  Responsibility for external security requires an Israeli presence along the border with Egypt and Jordan and control of border crossings and movement into the West Bank and Gaza, and “coordination procedures” with the Palestinians. The temporary international presence mentioned in the Declaration of Principles should be minimized. “In the event of a conflict between areas of responsibility, Israeli security considerations will take precedence over any other consideration.” A response on the “Palestinian Security Concept” argues that Palestinian forces are responsible for preventing cross-border intrusions and should therefore control the crossings. Israeli responsibility for the security of the settlers is not an open mandate for a security presence that will embrace all areas from which they had withdrawn. In conclusion, the paper explicitly states that the ultimate goal of the Palestinians is to end the occupation and establish a state that will live peacefully with Israel. Although mutual cooperation is necessary, the ultimate goal is separation (An extract from both papers is in Document 9, Department of Information in the Foreign Ministry to Israel’s Representatives Abroad).

ב.4 | The first crises in the talks

There were other causes of controversy, such as the tension between the “Abu Mazen-Abu Ala camp” and Arafat’s associates. The director-general of the Foreign Ministry commented at a meeting on the economic talks that the Abu Mazen-Abu Ala camp was more pragmatic than Arafat (Document 8, Foreign Ministry to Israel’s Representations Abroad). On the Israeli side, too, there were differences in approach between those who defined security interests rigidly and others who viewed cooperation with the Palestinians and the trust between the parties as an important element that would also contribute to security.

At the end of October, the talks in Taba reached a crisis after the Palestinians rejected the Israeli withdrawal map in Gaza, claiming that it was not a real evacuation but only a re-deployment. Arafat ordered the delegation to return to Tunisia. Under Egyptian pressure, the talks were renewed and transferred to Cairo, to the Egyptian government guest house. Discussions on transferring some of the military and civilian government’s powers to the Palestinian Authority  sparked debates over issues such as the source of authority (Israel sought to delegate powers through a military order, which would leave the IDF commander sovereign, while the Palestinians proposed that the PLO establish the PA unilaterally); the question of opening representative offices of donor countries in the PA and more. It was decided to have joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols that would give the Palestinians the feeling that they were responsible for security (see Document 10, Joel Singer to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres).

On November 11, Nabil Shaath reported at a press conference on the progress in the Taba talks (see Document 11, Israel’s Embassy in Cairo to the Political Research Department at the Foreign Ministry), at the same time noting the difficulties and the increase in violence. According to him, Egypt did not oppose transferring powers to the Palestinians at the border. Sha’ath emphasized the importance of freeing political prisoners who were jailed for their support of the PLO or participating in demonstrations and rejected the distinction between them and prisoners with “blood on their hands.”

On November 16, economic talks between Israel and the Palestinians opened in Paris. In preliminary discussions with the Ministry of Finance, it was agreed that Israel would aim to maintain identical customs arrangements with the PA as those in Israel (the “uniform customs envelope”). It would pass on the revenue from customs duties on imports into the territories to the PA. It was also hoped  to maintain a free trade zone with Jordan. At the talks working groups were set up dealing with trade and labour, taxation and the banking system. Oded Eran, the Israeli representative, reported that the Palestinians wanted an open border with Israel to allow free export of agricultural produce. Although the agreement was intended to deal only with Gaza and Jericho, it was clear that fundamental questions such as the right to issue currency or the establishment of a central bank would extend beyond this agreement (Document 13, Oded Eran to Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin and others). In a message to Rabin through his political adviser, Jacques Neriah, Arafat offered to move the economic debate to Cairo. He concluded the letter optimistically: “I expect you to achieve peace between our peoples, a peace that encourages me and strengthens my view that peace must be achieved on all other Arab fronts” (Document 12, Oral Message from Arafat to Rabin). However, Rabin preferred not to change the format of the talks.

As the time for decisions approached, it was decided to set up another secret channel in Paris to discuss the remaining issues. On November 25, Neriah, Singer and Shahak flew to Paris. Both sides started working on the draft agreement. Neriah also visited Arafat in Tunis, accompanied by Amos Gilad, the acting military secretary, and asked him to keep his promise to Rabin to give him information about the missing soldiers from the Sultan Ya’akoub battle during the First Lebanon War. During the conversation, Arafat’s insistence on the size of the Jericho area became clearer. Arafat explained that he was interested in controlling the border along the Jordan river from Damia Bridge in the north to Abdullah Bridge in the south, including a “window” to the Dead Sea at the Monastery of the Temptation (Caranthel mountain). He said he was told in Washington that the Israelis were not prepared to increase Jericho’s territory on the western side which was close to Jerusalem, but they would consider expansion eastwards. Arafat claimed that Joel Singer and Norwegian Minister Holst would confirm the correctness of his claim. Before he left, Neriah was given half of the dog tag of one of the missing soldiers, Zachariah Baumel.

In early December, Secretary of State Christopher visited the area, mainly in order to restart negotiations with Syria. In the light of reports that Arafat was trying to drag Americans into involvement in negotiations with Israel, the State Department made it clear that it would not agree (see Document 14, Eitan Benzur to the Israel Ambassador to Washington). In discussions with the secretary in Jerusalem, Rabin asked about funding for the Palestinian police. According to him, Arafat had asked for ten thousand police officers, twice the number needed. The Americans said the World Bank was ready to help, the US would provide non-lethal equipment and the Norwegians would provide uniforms.

ב.5 | Erosion of public support due to terrorism

In his talk with Christopher, Rabin also stressed the sensitivity of Israeli public opinion to continued terrorist attacks. Public protest intensified after Fatah’s involvement in the murder of Haim Mizrahi, a resident of the Beit El settlement, on October 29, 1993. Violent demonstrations were held that included roadblocks and attacks on Arabs. Rabin demanded that Arafat condemn the murder and fulfil his commitment to prevent terror, and Arafat did publish a condemnation. On December 1, another attack took place: terrorists shot at a car near El-Birra and killed two Israelis, Peres condemned the murder and in response to a question in the Knesset, he said that members of the House should “maintain unity since the pain is common to all of us.”

On December 7, Yigal Pressler, the prime minister’s adviser on counter-terrorism, wrote to Rabin that as the negotiations progressed, the campaign by the terrorist organizations against Israelis in the territories, and possibly in Israel itself, would intensify. He thought that they chose to attack settlers in the hope of provoking a violent reaction, which would lead to riots. When the Palestinian police entered Gaza and Jericho, terrorism there might lessen but attacks in other areas of the territories and within Israel may increase. He recommended the government to act to give the settlers a sense of security and to feel that their concerns are being heard. He also favoured increasing the presence of the army (Document 15, Yigal Pressler to Yitzhak Rabin). It is not clear whether Rabin accepted Presler’s advice; he is known to have been in contact with some of the settlers’ leaders and he repeated his commitment that no settlement would be moved in the first stage of the agreement and the responsibility for their security would remain with Israel. (See also Document 3). On December 8, Rabin spoke at a lunch meeting with the Editors’ Committee, where he discussed the wave of terrorism and the security problems. He explained the thinking that had led him to sign the Declaration of Principles and his position in the talks on the Gaza and Jericho. He said he knew there would be opposition to the agreement, especially from the rejectionist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Unlike the peace treaty with Egypt, the Oslo Agreement was not a separation with a clear border between two countries, but an agreement of “coexistence and peace between two geographically mixed [entities] that have no love for each other, with every day thousands upon thousands of vehicles crossing between them.” Rabin said that 120 IDF companies were guarding the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and “maintaining security …[there and in] Gaza areas is a top security priority today.” He quoted his words on the previous day to the NRP religious party faction in the Knesset, that the IDF is doing everything possible within the limits of the law (Document 16, Prime Minister Rabin’s meeting with the Editors’ Committee).

ב.6 | Who will stand on the bridge? Crisis in Cairo

Prime Minister Rabin in Cairo with President Mubarrak and Chairman Arafat, 12 December 1993. Photograph: Zvika Yisraeli, GPO

Since it was now clear that the parties would not reach an agreement on Gaza and Jericho by the target date (December 13), a summit between Arafat and Rabin was fixed for December 12. Before the visit, Neriah and Gilad again visited Cairo and Tunis. Neriah told Arafat that he had checked out his claims about the promises made to him over the size of Jericho and found no evidence for them. He complained about a fax sent to Rabin with the logo of the “President of the State of Palestine” and the map of Palestine, in which there was no mention of Israel. The fax was published in the press and did damage to Rabin. His statement angered Arafat, who said that he was accepted all over the world as the president of Palestine, and Israel wanted to imprison him in Jericho and make him the mayor.

At the summit, Rabin discovered that Arafat was claiming Palestinian sovereignty over the borders with Jordan and Egypt. However, he did recognize Israel’s security considerations and was willing to accept security coordination as defined in the Declaration of Principles. He offered Israeli and Palestinian patrols at the border and international control of the crossing. Rabin was taken aback by Arafat’s position, which contradicted everything discussed in Taba. He feared that without Israeli control of the crossing there would be arms smuggling and uncontrolled entry of Palestinians from the diaspora. In order to prevent a breakup of the meeting, he suggested appointing negotiating teams for ten days of consecutive talks (see Document 17. Main points from Rabin and Arafat’s Meeting in Cairo). He telephoned Secretary Christopher and told him that Arafat’s stand represented a completely different interpretation than that previously agreed. He was sorry that he had not spoken to him personally before. According to Rabin, the Egyptians were also astonished and Mubarak warned Arafat that he might miss an opportunity which would never return. Rabin emphasized that he was ready to be flexible and to find a face-saving solution for the management of the crossings, but would not give up responsibility for the lines facing Egypt and Jordan. He would offer a compromise on Jericho, but only as part of a “package deal” (Document 18, Rabin-Christopher call, December 15, 1993). On December 14, Neriah sent a paper to Rabin detailing such a “package”, including concessions on other issues that would make it easier for Palestinians to accept Israel’s position on security. He wrote that “the approach to dealings with Arafat must be based on a ” package “, which is basically “give and take “- a combination of maintaining Palestinian dignity and Israel’s security requirements. He proposed that Rabin should adopt fallback positions for a personal conversation with Arafat, including the extension of the Jericho area towards Aujah and the Dead Sea (Document 19, Jacques Neriah to Yitzhak Rabin).

Arafat’s side of the story can be seen in a letter he sent to an American Jewish peace activist who had previously served as a go-between with the Israelis, Stanley Sheinbaum. Arafat was very angry about negative publicity in the Israeli press about him and his meeting with Rabin. He also outlined his interpretation of the Declaration of Principles and claimed that Israel was seeking to establish a ghetto for Palestinians in Jericho (Document 20, Yasser Arafat to Stanley Sheinbaum, December 24, 1993). To overcome the disagreement, it was decided to convene a meeting of the Oslo Steering Committee chaired by Peres and Abu Mazen. Abu Mazen, who had not received a mandate from Arafat to negotiate, refused to come, and Yasser Abed Rabbo led the Palestinian delegation. They were looking for concrete proposals that could bridge the gaps. The Palestinians waived their demand for border control, and Israel proposed expanding the Jericho area to 55 square kilometres.

In four rounds of talks in various parts of the world, the parties managed to find a formula for control of the crossings – the border terminal would be divided into two: one terminal controlled by Israel for passengers to Israel and the West Bank except Jericho, and one, jointly controlled, for passengers to Gaza and Jericho. On December 28-27, further talks were held in Cairo and a draft agreement was reached. Peres himself dictated the final version to his assistant and submitted it to the Palestinians. The next day they claimed that the wording did not reflect their agreement and sent a fax with some comments. Arafat then rejected the draft and Nabil Shaath sent another fax reiterating his previous demands on the size of the Jericho area, control of the bridge and an international presence. Nevertheless, he finished his message with New Year greetings and hopes for a meeting in the near future (see: Document 21, Fax Message from Nabil Shaath to Amnon Shahak). In response, the Israelis refused any further concessions and Peres returned to Israel. It seemed that Arafat felt that he would receive more concessions from Rabin than Peres.

Rabin asked Shahak to formulate an answer in his name that expressed his opinion on the controversial issues. Israel agreed to the stationing of a Palestinian policeman and a Palestinian flag at the entrance to the Jericho terminal to serve West Bank and Gaza residents, but continued to demand an Israeli check of the luggage and of suspicious people. Israel offered to include the sites of Aujah, the Caranthel and Nabi Musa in the Jericho area (see Document 22. Amnon Shahak to Nabil Shaath ). In the meantime, Peres wrote that the talks should be renewed on the basis of the agreements reached in Cairo, without changes or new demands. Sha’ath replied that the Palestinians were committed to the Declaration of Principles and agreed to resume the talks (see Document 23. Exchange of messages between Shimon Peres and Nabil Sha’ath). On January 6, Peres and Abu Mazen announced their return to the Taba talks based on the Declaration of Principles and the Cairo understandings.

Checking luggage at the Allenby Bridge crossing point to Jordan, 13 August 1985. Photograph: Nati Hornik, GPO