The Cairo Agreement: Israel's negotiations with the PLO, October 1993-May 1994

א.1 | Progress and internal disagreements 

Talks with the PLO in Taba resumed on January 10, 1994. Both parties submitted new versions of the draft agreement of December 27, 1993 and of the Security Annex (for the Israeli draft, see File A 5161/10, p. 51). However the effects of the crisis with Arafat at the end of December were still felt. On January 12, Oded Eran reported to Savir on an encouraging meeting with Arafat’s economic adviser, Maher el-Kurd (see Document 24). However, a report from Stanley Sheinbaum, who visited the PLO leader in Tunis on the same day, presented a bleaker picture. Sheinbaum sought to convince Arafat that his statements on issues that should be left for the permanent settlement negotiations and his demands for symbols of sovereignty were doing harm. Even Arafat’s supporters feared that the Palestinians would be left with nothing. Sheinbaum said that Arafat’s reaction did not indicate any change in his attitude. He explained that his aim was to protect the dignity of the Palestinian people and rejected the claim that his request to expand the Jericho area would include six Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory. Even if it did, he had no objection to the IDF securing the settlements. Sheinbaum felt he could not convince him that Rabin sincerely intended to reach a peace agreement. In view of complaints about the undemocratic way that Arafat ran the movement, Sheinbaum said that the path to strengthening his leadership was holding elections in the Territories (see: Document 25, Eytan Benzur to Eitan Haber, Report on Conversation with Arafat. See also the report by Washington-based researcher Judith Kiefer to Benzur on growing alienation between the PLO in Tunis and the leadership in the territories, complaints about Arafat’s conduct and demands for democratization, Document 28, Eytan Benzur to the Israel Embassy in Washington).

The first page of Sheinbaum’s report to Benzur, File 7705/6

Sheinbaum also warned about the US attempt to revive the Syrian peace channel at the expense of a settlement with the Palestinians. Indeed, as part of these efforts, a summit meeting was held between Presidents Clinton and Assad in Geneva on January 16. Dennis Ross and his team told Rabin that Assad had expressed willingness to normalize relations with Israel and negotiate a peace treaty with it, and had said he did not intend to intervene in the Palestinian talks. It was clear that the price of such an agreement would be complete withdrawal from the Golan, and large sections of the Israeli public were shaken by signs that Rabin was willing to hold a referendum on the issue. But it turned out that Rabin did not even have a majority in the Knesset to pass a referendum law, and the Americans and Syrians saw Rabin’s proposal as an  exercise in evasion. On January 21, Assad’s eldest son was killed in a car accident, and US contacts with Syria were suspended.

The coolness between Peres and Arafat did not last long. On January 22, they met in Oslo at the funeral of Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, after the stroke he suffered in December 1993 proved fatal. Before Peres left, Rabin spoke to him on the phone and expressed his concern that Israel was making too many concessions and that its position was being chipped away without the other side committing itself to the main points of the agreement. “We always give without getting their agreement to something we raised … .. We need to know if there is a deal or not,” he said. Peres promised to clarify this in his conversation with Arafat (see Document 26, telephone conversation between Rabin and Peres). In Oslo, Peres and Arafat decided on another round of talks to solve the problem of the border crossings. They would meet in Davos, Switzerland, during the World Economic Forum conference.

Based on the issues agreed in Oslo, Joel Singer and Abu Ala prepared a new draft agreement that left the points of dispute open. It said that Israel would be responsible for the security of the borders with Egypt and Jordan. Without reducing Israel’s overall responsibility for the Rafah crossings and the Allenby Bridge, the Palestinians would provide services in the Palestinian areas of the transit terminals. Arrangements were also made for preventing Palestinian entry without permission, for access to holy places in the Jericho area, for the security of Gush Katif, for the early exercise of Palestinian powers (early empowerment) in civilian areas and more. The draft was subject to Rabin’s approval (Document 27a. Draft of the Cairo Agreement, January 22, 1994). On his return from Oslo, Peres said in an interview on Israel radio that “this time Arafat was focused and to the point” (Document 29).

However, the draft agreement also revealed disagreements among the Israeli negotiators. Members of the defence establishment demanded a more cautious approach, and even Rabin’s adviser Jacques Neriah sent him a paper about the wording reached in Oslo, noting points that needed clarification. He claimed that alongside some Palestinian concessions, Israel had made some of its own in a careless way (Document 27).

א.2 | Progress on civil affairs: “There are no boundaries in the air "

As well as negotiations on Jericho and the border crossings, talks began with Saib Erekat in Washington on issues related to the establishment of the Palestinian Council: elections, the size and composition of the Council, legislative powers, the IDF redeployment and transfer of powers to the PA. At Taba, talks were held on a broad spectrum of non-military issues that required co-operationon between two parties sharing a limited geographical space – water supply, management of archaeological sites, communications, etc. We chose to present one document as an example of these talks – a discussion on January 24 on co-ordinating allocations of broadcasting frequency and the establishment of a telecommunications network which would not disrupt the existing Israeli one. It took place between an Israeli delegation led by Shlomo Wax, director general of the Ministry of Communications, and a Palestinian delegation led by Radwan Abu Ayash, a Fatah activist close to Arafat. It was clear that the Palestinian communications network could not be restricted to Gaza and Jericho alone. “There are no boundaries in the air ” said  Wax, and he asked the Palestinians to present their demands – ” You do not want our broadcasts to interfere with your security forces in Jericho or taxis in Gaza and vice versa.” Before the PA Council elections, the Palestinians sought to broadcast to Nablus and Ramallah as well. In the past, a Jordanian radio station had broadcast from Ramallah. In the Declaration of Principles, Israel agreed to discuss the possibility that the PA would operate radio and television stations. The Palestinians asked if they could use Ramallah, since Jericho, one of the lowest places in the world, was not suitable for broadcasting to the West Bank. As it was a political question, it was decided that it should be discussed at the political level (Document 30, 14th Round, discussion on telecommunications).

א.3 |  The Davos meeting and the initialling of the "Cairo Agreement"

The focus, however, was on the matters of principle to be discussed in Davos. Before Peres left, Rabin held a discussion on the draft agreement, in which Chief of Staff Ehud Barak put forward similar ideas to the comments made by Neriah (in Document 27 above). Nevertheless, he agreed with Peres’ assessment that the document was so strikingly one-sided in favour of Israel on the issue of security control, that it would be hard for Arafat to sign. Peres wanted to soften the wording to allow Arafat to keep his self-respect and to help him to stand up to internal pressure.

On January 27, another discussion was held, in view of talks Uzi Dayan had held with the Palestinians in Cairo. Barak again raised concerns about the undermining of Israeli’s positions. Peres commented:

“Peres – You’re giving them something that stinks (Gaza) and you want to cut it up 3 times [by excluding the roads to the Israeli settlements from Palestinian controlled territory]… You wouldn’t agree to it (to Ehud [Barak]).

Ehud – I would agree.

Rabin – Ben-Gurion would have agreed to accept the Partition plan.

Peres – Arafat is an Arab. He’s not Ben-Gurion.

Rabin – He’s smart. He realizes he’s getting a part. Afterwards there’ll be more, and a commitment to the permanent [settlement]

Ehud – He understands that the process is a historic one.”

At the end of the discussion, Peres said that in the light of the arguments raised in the debate, he saw no point in going to Davos. Had he been given room for maneuver for concessions on Jericho, he could have insisted more on Gaza. But Rabin refused to expand the Jericho area to the north due to its proximity to Israeli settlements (Document 31, Update for Prime Minister Rabin on the Negotiations, 27 January 1994). 

Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat hand in hand at the Davos Conference, Copyright: World Economic Forum

On January 29,  Foreign Minister Peres and Chairman Arafat arrived at the World Economic Forum in Davos and posed for a photograph as they entered the discussion hall together.  They were greeted with enthusiastic applause.  At the same time, Savir, Dayan and Singer met a Palestinian delegation led by Abu Ala. Another draft of the agreement was reached but Rabin stopped the talks for consultations, and Peres left for the United States to update the Americans. Peres told Secretary Christopher that he was trying to make the Palestinians realize that they were being obstinate in insisting on defining everything in advance. If everything went well in the future, no one would need these definitions, and if there were problems, they wouldn’t help. According to him, Arafat made it clear in Oslo that he was well aware of the meaning of the Declaration of Principles and that it did not include the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if the Israelis think he is unrealistic (Document 33, Report on the Christopher-Peres Meeting; Document 32, Press conference with Peres).

On February 1, Joel Singer issued a revised draft of the agreement (see File 8621/9, additional drafts in file A 7760/4). After another round of talks in Cairo, the first agreed draft of the Gaza Agreement was reached, and initialled by Peres and Abu Ala on February 9. In a summary to Foreign Ministry staff, Savir outlined the main points: the size of the Jericho area would be 55 square kilometres, but an attached  letter confirmed that Rabin and Arafat would decide on the final size at the end of the negotiations. The agreement detailed complicated arrangements to allow Israel security control. At the border crossings, the Palestinians were given a symbolic presence at the terminals and administrative powers over Palestinian passengers. Israel rejected their claim to station a police officer or official on the bridge, but agreed to place a police officer and a flag at the entrance to the Palestinian terminal. The parties also agreed that  checks on suspicious people would be made with the Israeli policeman sitting behind a one-way mirror (Document 34, Draft agreement on Gaza and Jericho, February 9, 1994, Files Nos. 10429/2, 7760/4.

In an interview with Israel Radio on February 12, Peres was asked about the reservations of the defense establishment. He said it was the duty of the military echelon to provide military advice, just as statesmen should determine what is politically necessary. He added that the Palestinians want a Palestinian policeman to greet people arriving at Jericho. “Now, apparently, you can say: ‘What is the argument about a policeman?’ But the argument is not about a policeman, the argument is about a sea of ​​emotions and a sea of ​​anxieties and a sea of ​​suspicion and a sea of ​​hope, and sometimes you can find a formula to overcome the problems” . At the Foreign Ministry, Savir said that, contrary to press reports on differences between Peres and Rabin, the Davos agreements were valid. He believes that in Cairo, the Palestinians and above all Arafat himself, had begun to move from negotiation to decision-making (Document 36). At a press conference in English on February 10, Savir added that he sees the agreement as a first sign of the parties’ ability to solve problems. Compromise was achieved through pressure by Peres (See File 11005/2). 

The Israeli side thought the Cairo agreement was a balanced one. After all, Knei-Tal of the foreign ministry argued, Israel had succeeded in getting Palestinian agreement to the principle of its exclusive responsibility for border security by showing flexibility on practical arrangements at the crossings. These arrangements would let Palestinians arriving there keep their dignity by the use of invisible controls. (See Document 35). However, many Palestinians did not agree. According to Michael Harari of the Arab Department, they saw the agreement as an Israeli achievement, and the critics included supporters of the PLO and the political process. Opponents of the process rejected it and described it as surrender (See Document 37).

The opposition in Israel also rejected the agreement. On February 15, a Likud delegation, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, visited French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé. As well as opposing withdrawal in the Golan Heights, Netanyahu argued that the government’s plan would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. He said a Likud-led government would respect the signed agreements, but the other side did not respect them and armed groups such as the “Fatah Hawks” continued to engage in terrorism. Knesset Member Eliyahu Ben-Elissar commented that the Rabin government’s majority depended on a single vote and said he did not believe that such cardinal decisions should be made on the basis of such a tiny majority. Juppé said that France would continue to support an agreement that was consistent with its traditional view on seeking peace (see Document 38, Israel Ambassador to Paris to the Director of the European Department).

א.4 | Talks in Taba and Cairo to finalize the Gaza and Jericho agreement

Despite the initialling, the wording of the agreement was not final and further discussions on details were needed. On February 14, another round of talks was held to draft detailed sections on the Palestinian police, the liaison mechanism, joint patrols etc. At the same time, the talks in Washington continued, and the Israelis emphasized that the PA’s elected council could pass legislation, but the laws would have to be approved by Israel to ensure they did not contradict the Declaration of Principles. They demanded the names of the candidates for the council and of the professional members who were to join it later (see Document 40, Danny Rothschild to Rabin and Peres). They also discussed who would determine the electoral law, who would be allowed to vote or stand for election, and whether parties which opposed the Oslo agreement would be allowed to participate.

Jebelayyah refugee camp in Gaza, 1992. Photograph: Ziv Koren, GPO

Since 1948, the Palestinian refugee issue has been one of the most emotionally charged subjects in any political settlement in the Middle East. In the Oslo agreement, Israel agreed that at the interim stage the return of refugees who left the territories after the Six Day War (“the 1967 DPs”) to the self-governing authority could be discussed. This had already been agreed at the Camp David Conference with Egypt in 1978. However, the 1948 refugee question and the “right of return” were to be discussed in the negotiations on the permanent settlement, and they still loomed in the background. The Foreign Ministry reported on a PLO census carried out with Egyptian help to discover how many displaced people from the Gaza Strip were living in Egypt and in the Arab countries. The report adds that the Palestinians attach great importance to the issue, which is part of the “right of return” and they are trying to chip away at Israel’s position by use of vague formulae in their favour (See Document 39. See also a report by Hadas, head of the Israeli delegation to the Refugee Working Group in the multilateral talks, to Yossi Beilin on progress in a session on family unification, Document 42).

Prime Minister Rabin and Finance Minister Avraham Shochat, 15.8.1993. Photograph: Zvika Yisraeli, GPO

There was little progress in the economic talks, despite several talks between Abu Ala and Finance Minister Shochat. According to the Israeli side, the Palestinians went back on previous agreements (Document 44, Ilan Plato to Yitzhak Rabin).

On February 20, the negotiating team on Jericho and Gaza reported to Rabin, Peres and Barak on the latest round of talks. Dayan presented some alternative plans for the withdrawal from Gaza. The head of Southern Command, General Matan Vilnai, spoke of the dangers involved in the transition period between the exit of the IDF and the takeover of Gaza by the Palestinian police and his impression that the other side was not yet prepared. He said that it was surprising “that we are still in control of what is happening there.” The evacuation must be carried out as quickly as possible, but in an orderly way. Rabin agreed, stressing that the first stage would certainly be “unpleasant”, but the main thing was to ensure security for the settlements and the roads (Document 41).

On February 23-21, another round of talks (the 16th) was held in Cairo. Both delegations were staying in the same hotel and personal relations between them grew closer. The Palestinians were not happy with parts of the agreement, but on the other hand, they wanted very much to sign and get implementation started. Nabil Shaath and Shahak set a deadline for the signing – March 10, 1994. On February 22, Singer produced a new draft that included a final or almost final text of 12 of the 24 articles in the agreement and a draft of the Security Annex (see File MFA 8585/6). According to Benny Lavie, Shahak’s bureau chief, there was progress on civilian issues such as communications (see above, Document 30), with the exception of the Palestinians’ demand for an international dialling code. A joint text was agreed on archeological sites and the principle of transfer of state land registration to the Palestinians was agreed, except in settlements and security areas. The Security Committee discussed security arrangements in Gaza and Palestinian claims against the inclusion of the coastal area in Israeli security territory. Some of this area was “Moasi land”, which was cultivated by a special method that exploits groundwater in the sand. The Palestinians presented their plan for deploying the Palestinian police and discussions were held on the release of prisoners and their demand to release members of all the organizations, not just Fatah members. Lavie noted that the round which had started disappointingly ended with success, thanks to Shaath’s contribution and their stay in the same place, that created “chemistry and close relations” (see Document 45, Deputy Chief of Staff’s bureau to the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  see also: Document  43, Briefing by the Center for Political Research and Planning).

After their return to Israel, Neriah received a message from Abu Mazen that an agreement should be reached before April 13. A final meeting between Arafat and Rabin should take place around March 15 (Document 46). Thus, by the end of February, it seemed that the obstacles had been overcome and the signing of an agreement to implement the Oslo agreements was closer than ever. They decided to hold another round of talks on February 28. But three days before that date, an unexpected act of violence upset their plans, deeply shocking all the parties and postponing the signing of the agreement for another two months.