The Cairo Agreement: Israel's negotiations with the PLO, October 1993-May 1994

א.1 | Continuing negotiations in the shadow of Hamas terrorism

.On April 6, the economic negotiations resumed in Paris. The parties discussed whether the Israeli shekel would be legal tender in the Palestinian Authority and arrangements for trade in agricultural produce. It was agreed to establish a monetary authority with the powers of a central bank, but they did not reach an agreement on the issues of coinage and the right to print money (Document 92).

Palestinian reaction to the resumption of negotiations

According to a Foreign Ministry briefing, although the Hebron agreement did not meet all of the demands of the PLO leadership, they understood that in the current situation it was the most that could be achieved, and therefore expressed satisfaction. On the other hand, supporters of the peace process in the territories were disappointed and claimed the international presence did not really ensure the security of the population. Michael (Mickey) Harari of the Foreign Ministry analyzed these responses, pointing out that the agreement, together with the return of exiles to the territories and the continued evacuation of IDF camps in the Gaza Strip, was making clear to the Palestinian public the changes to be expected when the Gaza and Jericho agreement was implemented. Yet these changes could not completely erase feelings of confusion and scepticism, or prevent criticism. Some claimed that the leadership was influenced by its members’ desire to return home. They said this return should not be achieved at any cost, at the expense of national interests. As the establishment of the Palestinian government approached, many were concerned whether they would still be able to work in Israel, and how the Palestinian police would treat the local population.

As expected, members of the opposition inside and outside the territories reacted sharply against the Hebron agreement. They condemned Arafat’s return to the negotiations and called on the Palestinian people to continue their struggle. The Foreign Ministry concluded that the agreement had deepened the divide between the PLO leadership and the general public in the territories (Document 89, interview with Farouk Kedoumi, April 3, 1994, Document 94).

The Hammas response: terrorist attacks in Afula and Hadera

A monument in memory of the bus driver killed in Afula, Asher Atia, by the sculptor Reuven Gafni. Photo: Wikipedia

April 6, 1994 marked the 40th day since the Hebron massacre. On this date Hamas carried out a suicide bombing at a bus stop in Afula next to an Egged bus, in which eight people were killed and 55 wounded. In response, the border with Israel was closed to Palestinians and 383 Hamas operatives arrested throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The attack drew sharp criticism in Israel, claiming that it was a result of the negotiations with the PLO, which should therefore be stopped. Demonstrations were held in Afula and other places, and torch-bearing protestors waved signs against the peace process. In Afula, slogans were shouted praising Baruch Goldstein. Peres responded by linking the attack in Afula to the massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs and the attempt by extremists to sabotage the negotiations. He said he felt great sorrow and mourning, but the peace talks should continue as planned and they should not allow Hamas and Islamic Jihad to sabotage them (Document 91).

The UN secretary general and members of the Security Council condemned the attack. Many also expected Arafat to condemn it and the fact that he did not do so increased criticism in Israel. In a meeting that Peres held with Faisal al-Husseini on April 10, Husseini explained Arafat’s difficulty in view of the tense situation in the territories. He himself clearly condemned terrorism. “There is a vicious circle: negotiations are difficult. We have difficulty responding strongly when events like that in Afula occur. You therefore have difficulty implementing the agreement.” Peres said that negotiations on the agreement could end tomorrow. The “Twilight Zone” must be crossed quickly (Document 95).

Talks in Cairo were continuing, but Arafat repeatedly complained to foreign journalists and diplomats that Israel was delaying the negotiations and that the IDF’s withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, which was scheduled to end on April 13, would not take place on time. Despite these complaints, on April 12 Rabin sent Arafat a message through President Mubarak on the need to speed up the talks and not to reopen issues that were already agreed on. The fact that Arafat had not condemned the despicable murder in Afula did not help the Israeli government (Document 93).

On the morning of April 13, 1994, the day of remembrance for Israel’s fallen soldiers, exactly one week after the attack in Afula, a Hamas suicide bomber boarded an Egged bus leaving for Tel Aviv at the central station of Hadera. When the bus left the station, he placed a bag with an explosive device on the floor and blew it up. Five people were killed and 30 were injured. When rescue workers arrived, a pipe bomb exploded, which fortunately did not hurt anyone else. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

The continuation of the attacks and the outraged public reaction increased the pressure on both sides. Arafat, who had been under American pressure since the attack in Afula, expressed his regret in a speech that day before the European Council in Strasbourg. He rejected “unfortunate actions by Palestinian extremists against innocent civilians,” but did not explicitly condemn the attack in Hadera and linked it to Israeli policy which was delaying the implementation of the DOP. According to a briefing by the Foreign Ministry, based on a report by the Palestinian News Agency, Rabin and Arafat spoke on the telephone on Arafat’s initiative (text not found) and Arafat expressed his sorrow and conveyed his condolences to the families of the victims. At the same time, however, PLO Radio Algeria, the organization’s official propaganda mouthpiece, made extremist comments and praised the operation in Afula. According to the briefing, the PLO did not see the attacks as obstacles which would hamper continued negotiations with Israel. It added that in Cairo the parties had reached an agreement on a number of issues: the Palestinian police, the release of prisoners (and whether they would include Hamas operatives, which the PLO believed would help them reduce Hamas’ opposition) and the agreement to return another group of deportees. There was also progress in the discussions of the Civil Committee and the Economic Committee in Paris. It seemed that the PLO wanted to sign and implement the issues that were agreed and leave the controversial ones for later. However, there had recently been a reverse in the positive tone and they mention a number of issues whose conclusion is a condition for signing. The author of the document believed that Arafat himself was behind this position, and behind the attacks on Israel that he and his staff express publicly (Document 96).

The progress in the talks sent the donor countries into high gear in their activities to raise international funding for the establishment of the Palestinian police force. Following their meeting, which took place in Cairo on March 24 (see Chapter 3 above), it was decided to establish a small coordination committee including Norway, the sponsoring countries (Russia and the US), the EU, Japan, Egypt, Israel and the PLO. The committee would meet in  Cairo and organize assistance and securing donations A joint PLO-Israeli security committee would receive the funds and transfer them to the Palestinian police. The Palestinians wanted to receive the donations in cash while the donors refused to give funds directly to the PLO, as long as there was no qualified and reliable body to accept them (Document 97, Review of the Arab Department 2, 20.4.1994).

On April 21, the Foreign Ministry reported to Peres’ bureau on the Cairo talks: the wording on the transfer of civilian powers had been agreed, despite disagreements over the map of Gaza. Reports had also been received about statements on behalf of Hamas indicating a change in their positions. Hamas’ political bureau had declared its readiness to run in the elections and to take part in self-governing bodies, subject to Israel’s full withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967. Hamas was also prepared to reconsider the types of attacks it made (against civilians). The attacks in Afula and Hadera were “unusual” since the movement’s policy was to harm only “soldiers and settlers.” The report raised the possibility that the statements were made in order to present a more moderate image and not to lose the opportunity to take part in the implementation of the “Gaza and Jericho” agreement (Document 99).

א.2 | Arafat and Peres meet in Bucharest; another round in Cairo

On April 20, Arafat met with Peres in Bucharest at a conference of the Crans Montana organization, a Swiss body that unites world leaders to work for the future of humanity. Terje Larsen also participated in the talks. In a tense conversation with Peres, Arafat claimed that there were still many problems in the Cairo talks on jurisdiction and airspace. The discussion focused on the interpretation of “jurisdiction”. Was it about controlling the territory (the Palestinian approach) or the question of “which defendant will be brought before which judge in which place for what offence?” (the Israeli approach). Another issue was the fate of the missing in action from the Sultan Yacoub battle and the pressure of their families on the government. The Palestinians raised the question of releasing prisoners from Hamas, and Akram Haniye claimed that Arafat was the leader of the entire Palestinian people, not just of Fatah. Arafat asked for the release of the Hamas leader, Sheikh Yassin, on the grounds that it would create a division within Hamas and would serve the interests of the PLO and Israel. Arafat claimed that the Israeli representatives in Cairo were raising difficulties about the entry of the Palestinian police. The continued closure of the territories and the killing of Fatah members in Gaza at the end of March had hurt him greatly. Peres tried to encourage him and talked about a regional solution and development plans.

The next day they met again and agreed on the arrangements for the last round of negotiations, which would open in Cairo on April 24 in three committees and continue until the signing of the agreement. Arafat agreed to appoint representatives to the committees and again demanded an increase in the number of police officers, out of fear that they would not be able to deal with the situation in Gaza, describing them as “a small force in the jungle”. That evening, Peres announced, after receiving approval from Jerusalem, that it had been agreed to allow the entry of a thousand policemen immediately after the signing of the agreement (Document 98).

The opening of Arafat’s speech in Bucharest, 22.4.1994, File MFA 10429/7

In an interview with IDF radio, Peres was asked about his meetings in Bucharest and, among other things, whether he thought Arafat could control the territory. He replied:

“There is no doubt that of all the Palestinian leaders he is the most prominent and authoritative. It must be said that Arafat, for several years, has decided to come down from the heights of statements or murderous ambushes to earth, to a realistic basis for negotiations. He has compromised and a person should be judged by what he does, not only by what he says” (File MFA 8582/2).

On his return, Peres told the members of the Labour faction in the Knesset about the meeting . He also described the discussions in Cairo on issues “on the fine line between autonomy and sovereignty.” Peres believed that at this stage there was no point in fighting over symbols. If Israel intended to insist on taking responsibility for security, it should be more generous in other areas. The agreement was important, but its practical expression was more important. The relationship on the ground was just as important as the borders. If there were different relations between Israelis and Arabs in Hebron – the  presence of 400 Jews there would not have been such a problem (Document 100).

On April 24, the Israeli delegation headed by Shahak left for Cairo for another round of talks. In talks between Shahak and Uzi Dayan and Muhammad Dahlan and others, Israel achieved its security aims: it kept responsibility for external security and control of the passages to and from the autonomy, three highways in the Gaza Strip, the airspace of the Gaza Strip and the areas containing the settlements. Most of the area of ​​Gaza and its surroundings and the responsibility for internal affairs were transferred to the Palestinians. The agreement also defined the mechanism for cooperation in security matters – a committee for security coordination and cooperation, joint patrols and joint mobile units. It was also decided that the PLO leadership and its chairman would move their seat to the autonomous territories so that they could lead their people on the spot. The progress in the discussions was described in a detailed report from the office of Deputy COGS Shahak. The discussions sometimes progressed back and forth like dance steps – with the Palestinians going back on things that had been agreed upon and making new demands. However, the common desire to reach an agreement overcame all the difficulties (Document 101.).

There were concerns on both sides and among the Americans that Arafat’s position among ordinary Palestinians was not stable enough, and as a result his ability to control the territory and manage the PA’s complex system was also in doubt. Eli Shaked from the Foreign Ministry’s Division for Political Planning suggested widening the potential circle of Palestinian partners. In his opinion, the focus on the PLO based in Tunis and its representatives in the territories ignored the challenges posed by Palestinian society to the PLO. He thought that Israel had made a mistake in not cultivating the relationship with authentic leaders in the territories, who had created a power base during the Intifada. Shaked suggested exploring the possibility of a combination between the PLO, with its resources, and the young leaders to accelerate the implementation of the “Gaza and Jericho” agreement in order to strengthen the pragmatic trend and increase the pressure on Hamas (Document 102, “Does the PLO/Tunis have an alternative among the Palestinians”).

On April 28, Peres went to Cairo to meet with Arafat, with Christopher and with Mubarak in order to resolve the issues that remained in dispute and to prepare a meeting between Arafat and Rabin. Following the four-way meeting, the Americans sent a document that presented the main points agreed upon. Both sides had comments and nevertheless managed to agree on May 4 as the date for signing the agreement.

In an interview on the weekly TV magazine, “Yoman HaShavua”, Peres referred to the emerging agreement and the claims that Israel had suffered a defeat and had agreed to give the Palestinians symbols of sovereignty. In his opinion, there is no reason not to be generous in this regard because a stamp, a passport and an area code do not make the Palestinian entity a state. The passport was defined as a travel document (Laisser Passer): “This is autonomy… what was agreed upon must be translated into the language of reality and in this reality we are not the jailers of Gaza… the more generous we are – not about terrorism – but about people who are not terrorists, about people who do not want to live under our government – the more we will behave wisely for our own sake, not for someone else’s sake” (Document 105).

א.3 | Signing the agreements, May 1994: "Wonderful prospects.....[and] deep apprehension"

The Paris Agreement

On April 29, Abu Ala and Finance Minister Shohat signed the economic agreement in Paris. It was attached to the completed Gaza and Jericho agreement that was subsequently signed in Cairo, and it was decided that the security agreement would take precedence  in any case of conflict between them. For the full text of the Agreement

In an interview with Radio Monte Carlo, Abu Ala expressed his satisfaction with the economic agreement, considering that it was an interim one. He detailed the achievements of the Palestinians, especially the establishment of a monetary authority that would be the source of the official economic authority of the Palestinian Authority. In practice, the Authority would serve as a central bank without the right to issue currency and as the main means of “injecting new blood into the veins of the Palestinian economy that were destroyed during the years of occupation.” The agreement included the possibility of importing goods from Arab countries. Abu Ala added: “At no point was 100 percent independence achieved. I do not want to attribute more to the agreement than is in it, but its importance should not be underestimated either… This is the nucleus for the creation of a Palestinian entity” (Document 103).

On May 1, the last round (No. 22) of the Cairo talks was held. The final details were finalized, based on the talks between Peres and Arafat on April 28. The wording of the agreement was refined and its adaptation to the economic agreement and security issues such as the return of deportees and the definition of the maritime space were discussed (Document 115, Benny Lavie, report on the final talks and the ceremony, May 6, 1994). On May 2, Shahak returned to Jerusalem for the final consultation with Rabin, who accepted some Palestinian demands. Peres also participated and the record indicates tension between them on the question of which countries would take part in the international presence in Hebron and whether to agree to Arafat’s wish for the participation of a Turkish representative (Document 106). On the same day, a memorandum of understanding between Israel and the PLO regarding the establishment of a temporary international presence in Hebron was signed in Copenhagen. It was signed by the governments of Denmark, Italy and Norway, and states that the force will operate in accordance with the agreement signed between Israel and the PLO on March 31 ( the final version in English is in File MFA 10918/4).

The negotiations with the PLO were conducted in the shadow of a fierce public debate. The deep differences of opinion were heard clearly in a stormy debate in the Knesset that day, before the consultation with the Prime Minister. The Likud faction, Zomet, the NRP and Yeud (which split from Zomet) submitted motions of no confidence in the government and attacked it especially for its performance in the fight against terrorism and the way the negotiations were conducted. Rabin was not present and Peres delivered the government’s answer. To the sound of loud and incessant interruptions, Peres repeatedly clarified that according to the agreement to be signed in Cairo, autonomy gave the Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho full self-government, but security and foreign relations remained in Israel’s hands, and the settlers would also remain in their homes. Peres declared:  “We reject the idea of ​​a Palestinian state and prefer full autonomy. By establishing autonomy we are actually preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. We will reckon with the murderers but the others will be able to live with dignity.” At the end of the debate motions of no confidence were rejected by a majority vote. See the full debate on the Knesset website.

The final discussion with Arafat

On the afternoon of May 3, Prime Minister Rabin arrived in Cairo and met with Arafat to sum up the negotiations. The talks were held under the auspices of President Mubarak and Secretary Christopher and recorded by Minister Yossi Sarid. First, Rabin pressed the Palestinians for a timetable for taking over responsibility in Gaza. “Three quarters of a million people in the Gaza Strip need a salary and security,” Rabin said. Arafat spoke of a transition period of two to four weeks for the deployment of the Palestinian police force, while Rabin argued that it should be shorter, due to the danger inherent in the presence of Israeli and Palestinian forces in the area at the same time (see Document 41). Later, sharp differences of opinion between the parties were revealed. Nabil Sha’ath raised the Palestinian demands for a considerable enlargement in the area of Jericho, civil responsibility for the southern shore of Gaza and placing a Palestinian policeman on the Allenby Bridge, and demanded a Palestinian administrative director at the Rafah crossing. Rabin brought up the issue of the missing soldiers and noted the pressure he was under in this regard. Arafat promised to fulfill his commitment but claimed that the matter was in Syria’s hands.

At this point, Mubarak and his foreign minister entered the room. Mubarak, who was celebrating his birthday that day, urged the parties to make a personal gesture  – the Palestinians  should give up on the other issues, and Rabin would give the Palestinians something further in the Gaza Strip to preserve their dignity. In the end, Rabin agreed to expand the area of ​​the Jericho enclave by 6 square kilometres and to grant Arafat limited civil control over an additional 5 kilometres of the southern coast of Gaza, despite its proximity to Israeli settlements. At the last moment, after accepting the compromise, Arafat again returned to the issue of the size of the Jericho enclave and the policeman on the bridge! Rabin was not ready to commit, and it was agreed to continue talks (Document 107). Rabin saw the demand for a policeman on the bridge as a fundamental issue on which he was not willing to compromise. In the consultation held in the Ministry of Defence on April 30, he insisted on Israeli security control along the entire length of the border, and claimed that the policeman symbolized giving the Palestinians a share in responsibility for it. Rabin made it clear that he saw the land border in the West Bank as the central point. In his opinion Arafat understood this very well and therefore was not that interested in Gaza (Document 104).

The signing of the Cairo Agreement, May 4, 1994

After the meeting, which lasted well into the night, both sides worked out a final text. On May 4 at 11 a.m. the signing ceremony for the self-government agreement in Gaza and Jericho began in the congress hall in Cairo. Thestage was decorated and, behind a transparent curtain, the set of the opera “Aida” by Verdi could be seen. Great tension was felt in the air. Many Palestinian leaders from the territories who supported the process but criticized the wording of the agreement and protested that their appeals to the leadership in Tunis to suspend the signing were not answered boycotted the ceremony (Document 118).

In their speeches, Rabin and Arafat thanked the Egyptian president for his efforts. Arafat pointed out that this was a first step: “If this step was necessary to complete the efforts and needed special courage after many periods of violence, then the next steps will require more courage and a more comprehensive view and a lot of patience, in order for us to carry it out and reach a stable peace that will not be shaken or harmed by anything…” (Document 109, Yasser Arafat’s speech in Cairo, May 4, 1994). Several drafts of the Prime Minister’s speech at the ceremony are in File A 7705/7 of the Prime Minister’s Office. According to the final text, Rabin, who chose to speak in Hebrew, emphasized that the purpose of the agreement was to allow the Palestinian Authority to manage the lives of the Palestinians, and to ensure the safety of the Israelis: “We are approaching that new road with firm resolve, with great hope. We know that it offers wonderful prospects. But we also approach it with deep apprehension. We are convinced that our  two peoples can live on the same patch of territory, ”Every man under his vine and his fig tree” , as the Prophets foretold, and bring to this land, a land of rocks and of tombstones, the taste of milk and honey that it deserves” (Document  108).

Peres and Secretary Christpher try to persuade Arafat to sign the maps, 4.5.1994. Photograph: Zvika Yisraeli, GPO

After the speeches, Arafat signed first but did not sign the maps attached to the agreement. Rabin demanded that he sign. Arafat refused and a crisis broke out in the middle of the ceremony, which was televised live in view of the whole world. Only under pressure from Mubarak, at the end of a fifteen-minute break in the ceremony and the broadcast, the crisis was resolved and the leaders returned to their places. Arafat managed to extract from Rabin a promise to send him a letter containing the list of problems still to be settled – especially the question of the policeman on the bridge. Arafat signed the maps but added a note in Arabic. After Neriah, Rabin’s Lebanese-born advisor who knew Arabic, confirmed that it was not an explicit condition, the ceremony was completed.

Jericho map, Jewish Virtual Library

The full text of the agreement

Summary of the agreement in File MFA 10918/5

Full length video of the ceremony:http://https://www.c-span.org/video/?56568-1/israel-plo-peace-agreement

Various interpretations have been given to Arafat’s “stunt” at the ceremony. Some have argued that he sought to add a dramatic dimension to his achievement by postponing the debate on the enlargement of the Jericho area and the policeman on the bridge. In an article in the “Haaretz” newspaper a few days later, which was distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the commentator Ze’ev Schiff wrote that, according to the Palestinians, Arafat was not satisfied with the agreement and his goal was to show his people that he was fighting for their interests. Schiff claimed that Arafat was not surprised when he was presented with the maps for signing and was already planning not to sign when he parted with Rabin at 02:30 a.m. However he did not assess Rabin’s reaction correctly and thought that Rabin would not want to ruin the ceremony. (Document  117)

After the signing, Rabin and Arafat exchanged the promised letters. According to the letters, the PLO would ensure that the Palestinian Authority act in accordance with the agreement and in cooperation with Israel, and would assist in the return of missing soldiers and the bodies of soldiers who were killed and not returned to Israel. The PLO would bring the changes to the Palestinian Covenant as agreed in September 1993 for the approval of the Palestinian National Council at its next meeting . Arafat would be the chairman of the Palestinian Authority but not the president of Palestine. The parties would continue discussions on the interim settlement and begin discussions on the permanent settlement. In another letter dated May 8, Rabin repeated and emphasized the content of Section 13 of the letter confirming that Israel was ready to continue discussing four issues that were not agreed (Document 116, Arafat’s letters to Rabin 8.5.94 in the Foreign Ministry announcement). Immediately after the signing, the Israeli government announced the release of the Palestinian prisoners. They were required to sign a statement of support for the agreement and a commitment not to return to violent activity against Israel.

At a press conference held by Rabin, he referred to the practical steps planned for the coming days for the implementation of the agreement. Rabin repeated Arafat’s request to postpone the withdrawal of the troops until the Palestinians had organized themselves. Israel did not need more than two or three weeks to withdraw its forces, but he understood  that the Palestinians were not used to managing their community life. Rabin also tried to explain the controversy that had threatened the continuation of the ceremony and the considerations that prevented him from agreeing to Arafat’s demands on Jericho (Document 111, press conference in English, 4.5.1994).

The long and exhausting negotiations, full of ups and downs, crises and expressions of suspicion and mistrust and the feeling that the agreement was fragile and fraught with difficulties had their effect. The festive ceremony was not accompanied by exaltation and uplifting of spirit, as expected from such a historical moment. In the summary by Benny Lavie about the final negotiations and the signing, he added details about Arafat’s “exercise” which was “strange  and shameful …and time will tell what this agreement will produce and what its nature will be. And good luck!” he wrote (Document  115).

Peres’ press briefing after the signing of the agreement  in Cairo, File MFA 8582/3

In a radio interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, the interviewer noted that there was not much euphoria in the air. Beilin replied that euphoria is not a good thing: “We are closing a chapter and opening  a chapter in our history and that’s good enough.” Beilin was also asked about the right-wing protestד and said: “I very much respect these positions that oppose our opinion. It is more than legitimate, as long as of course it is reflected in legal frameworks… I also see the pain of the people because they think that leaving Gaza is a terrible thing. And although it’s hard for me to understand it, I must understand that this pain is authentic…unfortunately there are quite a few who think that what we did is a very serious mistake from a national point of view…but it seems to me that…all in all, there is a great sigh of relief in the public today by many reservists and regulars…who know that they will no longer receive a summons to Gaza” (Document 110).

The signed maps, 4.5.1994. Photograph: Zvika Yisraeli, GPO