The Cairo Agreement: Israel's negotiations with the PLO, October 1993-May 1994

א.1 | Preparations for the transfer of responsibility for security in Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinians

After the dramatic signing ceremony in Cairo, Israel and the Palestinians made preparations for the implementation phase. According to the agreement, the IDF was to begin evacuating the Gaza Strip and Jericho immediately and to complete the process within three weeks. Preparations in the media began in Israel even earlier. On April 4, a month before the signing, the head of the Prime Minister’s bureau, Eitan Haber. sent Rabin and the Chief of Staff a paper on the media and information aspects of the withdrawal. Haber’s proposals related to the messages that, in his opinion, should accompany the move, to be directed towards Israelis, Palestinians and the international community. These were intended to reduce the damage to the image of the IDF and to Israel and to get over the message to the Palestinian population that the withdrawal is Israel’s contribution to progress in the peace process, and was made from a position of strength rather than weakness (Document 90).

On May 5, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the Israeli missions abroad a statement by the IDF spokesman on the withdrawal detailing the security arrangements on the Gaza border to prevent infiltration and the smuggling of weapons into Israel, and to maintain the security of the Israeli settlements. The process also required the establishment of coordination and cooperation mechanisms with the Palestinians (Document 113). Arafat’s request to postpone the withdrawal in order to prepare raised many concerns, especially for Rabin. In a meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Torre Godel in Cairo after the signing, Rabin said that Israel was not interested in postponing the evacuation but did not want to leave without being sure that responsibility was transferred to a body that would receive it in an orderly manner. He added that this was why he previously opposed unilateral withdrawal from Gaza (Document 114).

On May 13, an advance force of several hundred Palestinian policemen entered Jericho and took responsibility for the city, and a base in Khan Yunis was handed over to the Palestinian police

IDF soldiers fold up the flag before leaving Jericho, May 13, 1994. Photo: Avi Ohayon, GPO

Handing over the keys to the Hanan base to the Jericho police commander, 13.5.1994. Avi Ohayon, GPO.

א.2 | Reactions to the agreement and difficulties in setting up the Palestinian Authority

Foreign Ministry reports showed that the Palestinian opposition and some Arab states condemned the agreement and described the signatories as traitors. They announced that they would try to thwart it, but at the same time stressed that they would not damage Palestinian self-rule. The Hamas movement called the 4th of May “a black day” and declared two days of mourning. Even among supporters of the process in the territories, especially in the areas not included in the agreement, many reservations were heard, and concerns about difficulties in transferring Gaza and Jericho to Palestinian management. However, there were also signs that the Palestinians recognized that a new chapter had opened for them with the signing of the agreement, and that there was a change in attitudes towards Israel in Egypt, other parts of the Arab world and international organizations. (Document 112, Review prior to the Cabinet Meeting, 5.5.1994, Document 118, Responses in the Occupied Territories to the Cairo Agreement 9.5.1994). In fact, the signing of the agreement did help Israel improve its image and its economic and political situation. For example, at a conference in Alexandria, it was decided to establish an organization of Middle Eastern countries for small and medium-sized businesses, with Israel among them. The UN welcomed Israel’s increased involvement in the organization and spoke of its participation in the UN peacekeeping forces (Document 112).

Soon practical difficulties also emerged in the implementation of the agreement in the Palestinian camp. Even before it was signed, Arafat was having problems in putting together the Palestinian Authority. According to Foreign Ministry experts, the process of selecting members revealed the delicate fabric of  relations between “domestic” and “foreign” leaders and the PLO-Tunis fear of transferring power to the territories. Arafat was looking for a formula acceptable to the international sponsors and Israel, but without tying his hands for the future. Many personalities who opposed Arafat’s decision-making and centralized rule sought to define the Authority’s powers and to secure an important place for the PLO’s executive committee. Arafat’s disregard for their views during the negotiations and the fears of the residents of the territories in view of the arrival of the Palestinians from Tunis contributed to these difficulties, along with inter-organizational struggles and concerns for the PLO’s own status. Arafat tried to find a balance between the candidates from the territories according to their geographical and organizational affiliation and to appoint the representatives from Tunis without causing internal struggles. “His manipulative ability within his camp does not require proof, but his practical ability (as viewed by the” man in the street “,” the younger generation “of Fatah activists in the territories and even senior members of his organization seeking to move from”an organization to a state”) is still very much in question”, the author of the report concluded (Document 119).

As happened at several earlier stages, a personal meeting between Peres and Arafat now helped to moderate the difficulties. On May 18, the two met in Oslo. The meeting was also attended by former US President Jimmy Carter, who continued to be active in promoting peace, Norwegian Foreign Minister Godal and members of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams. Arafat spoke of the celebrations in Jericho and Gaza with the entry of the police force and mentioned the opposition to the agreement. Peres emphasized the economic difficulties and the need to increase American aid, and undertook to work with EU leaders. Carter promised to write an article in the “New York Times” and suggested that President Clinton put pressure on Saudi Arabia to agree to help (Document 120).

א.3 | Arafat's speech in Johannesburg

As the Palestinians and Israelis moved forward in the sensitive phase of implementing the agreement, there were developments that cast doubt on Arafat’s commitment to the agreements.

At the meeting in Oslo, Peres confronted Arafat about remarks he made on May 10 at a mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa, during a visit to mark Nelson’s Mandela’s inauguration.  In his speech, Arafat said that the agreement with Israel was only a first step and that the Muslims must continue their “jihad” on Jerusalem. He claimed that he had received a letter from the Israelis in Cairo promising the PLO responsibility for the holy sites of Islam and Christianity in Jerusalem, a statement that caused the government and especially Peres much embarrassment. Arafat also claimed that the agreement with Israel was worthless and that its status was similar to the 10-year agreement made by the Prophet Muhammad with the Quraysh tribe, which the Muslims later violated (for the full transcript of the speech in English, see File MFA 10985/8   p. 28). The Israeli government reacted very strongly to the speech, especially after the murder of two soldiers on the Gaza border. The Gaza Strip was closed, and Rabin demanded that Arafat withdraw his statement. In his conversation with Peres, Arafat claimed that his words were not understood correctly and Peres asked him to issue a correction before a press conference that was about to take place (Document 120). In an interview with Israel Radio the next day, Peres said that Arafat’s words in the mosque were indeed unnecessary and outrageous, but at the press conference he had reiterated his commitment to the agreement and to resolving disagreements by diplomatic means and called for an end to terrorism. Peres also noted that Arafat and the PLO leadership had not been involved in terrorism since the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993.

Only two days later, Arafat unilaterally announced a change in the legal situation in the territories.  Yoel Singer announced that from a legal point of view, this was a violation of the agreement and that the declaration had no validity (Document 121, Arafat’s announcement on May 24, 1994).

The storm over Arafat’s speech in Johannesburg continued. In order to prove that Arafat’s claim about the holy places in Jerusalem was false, on June 6 Peres was forced to publish the secret letter about the protection of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem sent to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst in October 1993. Following the publication, MK Benny Begin wrote to Knesset Speaker Prof. Shevach Weiss, and claimed that in the government’s announcement to the Knesset about the Gaza and Jericho agreement, the prime minister had said that there were no secret appendices. He demanded another vote on the government announcement. Peres replied that the letter was addressed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister and not to the PLO, and did not change anything about the current reality in Jerusalem. In an opinion sent to Weiss, the Knesset legal adviser agreed with Peres’ view (Document 122).

In addition, Peres replied to a question in the Knesset on this matter. As he was heckled by Likud and Moledet MKs, Peres repeated the government’s position that Jerusalem would not be divided and is the capital of Israel and not part of the autonomy. Peres explained that he sent the letter to Holst, and not to Arafat, because he did not want to make any connection between Arafat and Jerusalem. He even decided to appear  in a TV interview with journalist Dan Margalit and to explain why the letter was written. Margalit was not impressed by his claims and remarked, “When you write to Holst, you are writing to Arafat, because even when Arafat promises something to Israel, he promises through Oslo.” He also claimed that the letter recognized and strengthened Faisal al-Husseini’s Orient House institution in Jerusalem. These words prompted Peres to lash out against “the media joining the opposition’s defamation” against him, claiming that the agreement was “the smartest, most necessary and best that Israel has made.” (Document 124).

Orient House, originally a hotel owned by the Husseini family that served as the centre of Palestinian activity in Jerusalem. Photo: Wikipedia

א.4 | Towards the next stage

On May 25, the withdrawal and redeployment of the IDF in Gaza was completed. The prime minister expressed satisfaction that Israeli soldiers had left the alleys of Gaza and praised Southern Command for completing the operation and transferring responsibility to the Palestinian police. Despite previous concerns, the transfer was carried out in cooperation with the Palestinians, as Rabin said in a broadcast on the TV programme “Mabat”: “We know and trust the IDF, but we did not know the other side. But according to what I heard, a relationship was formed that allowed a proper and orderly transfer. ” (See also Arab Department 2 Review, Document 123). However, there were a number of incidents that indicated difficulties in relations with the Palestinians. In Jericho, for example, Palestinian police confiscated weapons from Israeli settlers. After the intervention of the Israeli authorities, the weapons were returned, but the settlers stated that they did not recognize the authority of the Palestinian Authority.

On June 13, the Foreign Ministry published remarks by the director general, Uri Savir, in Brussels on the 8th of that month. In an interim summary, Savir noted the successes of the Palestinian Authority, but also pointed to problems, especially in the economic field. “On the Israeli side, it is necessary to move from a state of confrontation to a state of peaceful coexistence, and we must adopt a different rhetoric,” said Savir. In this context, he said that “Arafat’s speech in Johannesburg had caused enormous damage, and whoever wants to stop the process will put Jerusalem at the top of the agenda.” He mentioned the fact that the Oslo process had only begun after the PLO agreed that Jerusalem would not be part of the autonomy. In conclusion, Savir said that Israel believes that the process is irreversible and it will continue to adhere to it (Document 125).