Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's Ambassador in Washington, 1968-1973

א.1 | From Chief of Staff to Ambassador

We know the late Yitzhak Rabin as a Palmach fighter, as chief of staff during the Six Day War and as the defence minister and prime minister of Israel, but there is one important period in his life which is less familiar —his posting as Israel’s ambassador to the United States. Why did the celebrated general, who many speculated would immediately enter politics, choose a post that seemed so remote from his previous activities? In his book ‘The Rabin Memoirs‘ (p. 95), Rabin wrote that, based on his military experience, he identified the new reality that Israel faced and understood the importance that the American administration would have in shaping it. The war had not only added territory and strategic assets to Israel but also placed before it weighty policy choices. Rabin sought to take a significant part in leading the diplomatic effort, and on December 3, 1967, the government approved his appointment to the position. On March 5, 1968, a year after he had first mentioned the idea to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Rabin presented his credentials to the US President, Lyndon Johnson, at the White House.

א.2 | Diving in at the Deep End

After many years in the defence establishment, Rabin encountered a foreign work environment: border observations were replaced by cocktail parties, and meetings in command headquarters were replaced by meetings with senators. Even interviews with the media now had to be conducted in a foreign language. Naturally, Rabin understood that at the beginning he would need help until he could acclimatize and deal with tasks that were less natural for him (Document 1).

One of the people he recruited to help him was Simcha Dinitz, then the minister at the Rome embassy with extensive diplomatic experience. In an interview (held in 1998 as part of the Israel State Archives’ memorial project), Dinitz recounted that Rabin, who knew him from when he was chief of staff, recruited him to the position of minister for public affairs in Washington to help him in areas where he was less proficient: public diplomacy, the media, academia and the Jewish community. When Dinitz left this position about a year later to serve as the head of the bureau of the new prime minister—Golda Meir, Rabin regretted his departure, but Dinitz told him: “Yitzhak, you don’t need me today as you needed me in the first year, because you’ve gotten used to these peripheral things” (File GL-15557/16, pp. 3-5).

The connection between the two did not end there, as most communication between Rabin and Golda Meir now passed through Dinitz, as can be seen from the list of documents given here. Rabin’s decision to use Dinitz’s help was probably correct, as the political arena was not going to wait for him until he felt comfortable in the position. While he was trying to create connections in Washington, a change occurred in the US Administration’s attitude towards Israel, and Rabin had to act.

In 1973, when Rabin left Washington, Dinitz replaced him as ambassador. Dinitz (left) and Rabin (right) talking near Blair House in Washington, 1/2/1973. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

During Johnson’s term in the White House, the strategic relationship between the American administration and the Israeli government became closer. After the Six Day War, the United States stood by Israel’s side in the intense diplomatic campaign waged against it by the Arab states, with the help of the Soviet Union. They demanded that Israel withdraw from all the territories it had captured, even before conducting any negotiations with it. Israel was firm in its position that it would not return to the June 4 borders without real compensation, but agreed to conduct separate and direct negotiations with each of its neighbours and to certain concessions in exchange for recognition of its right to exist and full peace treaties (not just temporary arrangements). Resolution 242, adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967, expressed the positions of both parties. The resolution established on one hand the principle of “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,” whereby Israel was required to withdraw from territories captured in war. On the other hand, it established the cessation of hostilities and recognition of the sovereignty and independence of states in the region. A special UN representative would be appointed to advance contacts toward achieving peace agreements on the basis of this resolution.

In May 1968, about three months after Rabin’s arrival, Egypt announced that it was ready to enter negotiations through the UN representative Gunnar Jarring, without demanding Israel’s withdrawal as a precondition. Following this announcement, the American administration pressured Israel to take part in the Jarring talks. Rabin was summoned to return to Israel for a consultation at the foreign ministry held on May 22 (File MFA-6724/6, p. 18). Two days later, he participated in a discussion, defined as top secret, with Prime Minister Eshkol and his advisors, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and senior officials from his ministry, and Mossad chief Meir Amit. Most of the discussion dealt with the worrying changes in the Administration’s approach and the various options available to Israel. Rabin presented the American positions, and in summing up, noted: “Today there is a psychosis of peace in America. I hope it will pass” (Document 3). Two days later, on May 26, he presented these issues at the government meeting.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (on left) with UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring (on right) in Jerusalem,  December 1967. In centre, Eshkol’s political secretary, Adi Yaffe. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO.

The pressure that Egypt, backed by the Soviet Union, exerted on Israel to enter indirect negotiations grew during 1968. There was concern that out of desire to reach understandings with the Soviets, the United States would be willing to pressure Israel to compromise with Egypt. This concern was largely realized when the administration began pressuring Israel according to its interpretation of Resolution 242, whereby Israel would have to withdraw from the territories, except for minimal border adjustments, in exchange for a full peace treaty (see the ISA’s commemorative volume on Levi Eshkol (in Hebrew), pp. 600-602, 643-644). Rabin worked to stem the drift in the US position and the narrowing gap between it and the Soviets. He quickly understood that American foreign policy was largely influenced by the Cold War and US involvement in Vietnam (Document 2).

In his conversations with Administration representatives, Rabin repeatedly explained how Israel’s stand against Egypt’s excessive demands served American interests against Soviet influence in the region. For example, towards the end of 1968, in order to support Jarring’s efforts, Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented Egypt with a proposal for a political settlement with Israel without first consulting with Israel. Rusk initiated the plan not only to end the conflict between Israel and Egypt but also to bring the United States closer to the Soviet position (Document 4, see also File MFA-6721/2). At that time, Jarring’s talks also included Jordan and Lebanon (see for example File MFA-5981/5), but they refused to move before Egypt, which was the leading Arab power in the region.

Rabin had another task, which he defined as very important and which accompanied him throughout his stay—ensuring the supply of arms, especially aircraft, from the United States. As the chief of staff during the Six Day War, Rabin knew that Israel had used up a significant portion of its stockpiles and that it needed to reequip with modern quality weapons. He also understood that the Arab states would make every effort to arm themselves for another round. A regular arms supply from the United States was far from certain. This issue arose repeatedly, given the use American governments made of weapons and aircraft supply as a means of political pressure. In October 1968, shortly before the presidential elections, President Johnson announced, also for political reasons, that he would approve the sale of Phantom jets to Israel. The French arms embargo made it clear to Rabin that he needed to persist in his efforts. To this end, he had to convince the State Department, Defense Department, and the White House, time and again, that arms supply was vital to Israel’s military strength, as a condition for its existence and for preventing war (Document 6).

An Israel Air Force Phantom jet takes off, 16/7/1970. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

א.3 | A New President and a New Prime Minister

In 1969, two significant changes occurred: in January, a new president entered the White House—Richard Nixon, and in March, Golda Meir entered the Prime Minister’s Office, replacing Levi Eshkol after his death. These two changes helped Rabin fulfill his role as ambassador. The new prime minister had great trust in Rabin because he understood the IDF’s needs and the country’s security problems (GL-15557/16, p. 21), but this did not mean there were no difficulties in their relationship (see below). With Nixon, Rabin found a common language and understanding of the growing Soviet involvement in the Middle East. He succeeded in creating a close relationship with the National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, who was very close to the president (but was a personal rival of the new Secretary of State, William Rogers). This was a significant upgrade in Rabin’s relations with the president and his circle.

The close ties between Rabin and both Golda and Kissinger, alongside the need for the leaders to speak without fear of leaks, created a unique secret communication channel. This channel connected the Prime Minister’s Office with President Nixon’s office, without the mediation of the Foreign Ministry, with messages passed through Kissinger and Rabin. The two not only delivered messages between the leaders—they often shared impressions and added their personal insights to their reports, which increased Rabin’s influence in the political arena.

The first meeting between the new prime minister, Golda Meir, and President Nixon in the White House, September 1969.  Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

However, Rabin’s increased influence in Washington did not make his mission easier. The Soviets did not agree to apply the policy of détente that Kissinger planned and Nixon adopted to the Middle East conflict and did not intend to restrain Egypt. In 1969, the War of Attrition on the Suez Canal intensified. The situation at the canal and the failure of American-Soviet talks (Document 5) led Rogers to act to calm tensions and achieve a political settlement. He believed that American support for Israel’s position only exacerbated the situation in the Middle East and increased the level of Soviet involvement. In December 1969, Rogers presented a plan that included Israeli withdrawal on the borders with Egypt and Jordan to the June 4 lines (except for insignificant border adjustments), which would be defined as ‘permanent borders.’ The plan also granted Jordan status in Jerusalem. It took into account the desire of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes but ignored Israel’s demand for direct negotiations. While Egypt and Jordan were required to recognize Israel as a sovereign state, the plan did not force them to sign a formal peace agreement.

The first page of Rogers’ speech setting out his plan, 9/12/1969/ File A-7071/2

Israel protested against the plan, which was prepared without consultation with it and contradicted the common line that the two countries had maintained. Rabin believed that Israel’s criticism of the plan was justified and necessary. In a cable to the prime minister, he wrote that Kissinger, under the guise of a gesture toward Rabin, arranged a brief unplanned meeting between him and Nixon. The president shook Rabin’s hand and wished him well for the New Year (an unusual act, as Rabin wrote in his memoirs (p. 270): “It is almost unheard-of for an ambassador to see the president without prior notice or without even requesting a meeting”). Nixon promised that the United States would continue to provide for Israel’s security and economic needs. Rabin was not impressed by the gesture and determined that it should not be given special attention, and that the line of strong criticism of the administration should continue (Document 7). However, in a report to Eban on the same day (29/12/1969), Rabin noted that Kissinger gave him a “green light to continue with attacks and criticism” but emphasized that the criticism should be directed at the Rogers plan and must not harm the president (File A-7071/2, p. 153). For now, Rogers’ plan fell through—both Israel and Egypt rejected it.

Throughout his tenure, Rabin had to explain Israel’s policy to the Americans, while at the same time, explaining the United States’ position to the Israelis. In a cable from April 1970, reflecting his analytical ability and his capacity to understand the American position in a global context, Rabin explains that in his view, the correct way to speak with the Administration regarding Israel’s military operations is to avoid a situation that would appear as collusion between Israel and the United States. Therefore, Rabin added a recommendation not to ask questions that the Americans would not want to answer explicitly in a way that would express agreement with Israel’s military operations (Document 9).

Wreckage of an Egyptian MIG 21 plane shot down near the Suez Canal, 8/3/1969. ISA, File TS-3001/250

In spring 1970, following Israel’s deep penetration bombing in Egypt, which Rabin supported, the Soviets decided to strengthen Egypt’s air defence and to send Soviet pilots to it. Out of fear of an open clash between Israel and the Soviet Union, Rogers announced in March that the United States had decided to delay the supply of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft promised to Israel. In June 1970, Rogers presented a new political initiative that would bring about a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. Egypt accepted the proposal, and the ceasefire went into effect on the night between August 7 and 8. On the government’s response to the Rogers initiative and Rabin’s role in the contacts, see the publication (in Hebrew) on the ISA website: “Stop Shooting and Start Talking”—Acceptance of the Rogers Plan and the End of the War of Attrition. See also the commemorative volume for Golda Meir (in Hebrew) (pp. 338-343).

א.4 | The Crisis in Jordan Creates an Opportunity for Rapprochement

The special relationship Rabin had with Kissinger, his extensive military experience, and the complex political reality in the Middle East created a special opportunity in September 1970 to advance US-Israel relations. At that time, tension between Palestinian terrorist organizations in Jordan, which blatantly ignored the authority of the Jordanian government, had reached boiling point and led to a violent confrontation — known as Black September. On September 18, a Syrian force invaded Jordanian territory to exploit the situation, support the terrorist organizations, and overthrow the pro-Western regime of King Hussein.

Facing the threat to his regime, the King turned to Israel, through the United States, with a request for assistance. The Americans also had an interest in Hussein’s regime surviving, given Soviet support for Syria, and they supported Israeli intervention, and for the first time explicitly requested that Israel carry out military action. The leadership in Israel understood that the fall of the Jordanian regime was a threat to it and took several immediate actions: conducting an aerial reconnaissance sortie, contacting the Jordanian leadership, and moving forces to the eastern border (File A-7412/9, pp. 180, 178, 134). Israel sought to act with extra caution, based on the assumption that air action would probably not suffice and ground action would also be required. One of the most important aspects in deciding how to act was co-ordination with the United States, for which Rabin was responsible.

Israel sought to receive guarantees from the United States should it intervene militarily in Jordan, especially to ensure American support should the Soviet Union act against it. Rabin worked with the State Department, but mainly with Kissinger, and, as was his habit, sought to add his point of view to the decision-makers, hoping it could help them. In a cable on September 21 to the Prime Minister’s Office, Rabin pointed out the potential resentment that could form in the United States if Israel refused the first ever American approach for a military initiative. But despite the pressures and uncertainty, Rabin recommended waiting until the picture became clearer: “In the current situation, there is no necessity to take the serious risks that military action on the scale discussed entails. I mean the actual entanglement in military action that could lead to deterioration in the overall situation on all fronts, the heavy casualties involved in such action, and the risk of limited confrontation with the Soviet Union. After all, there is no certainty that we won’t find ourselves facing Soviet involvement in Syria as well following Israeli military action of this kind…Therefore, I recommend that at this stage we respond to the United States that for now it seems to us better to wait and see the results of military developments…and we are not ready to accept, for the time being, a positive decision to deploy IDF forces by air or land against Syrian forces in Jordan” (Document 10).

The cautious actions Israel took proved, in the end, to be justified. The very threat of Israeli participation in the fighting and the firm stand of the Jordanian army succeeded in deterring the Syrians, and they withdrew to their territory. The events raised Israel’s standing in the eyes of the American administration, and its status as a strategic asset strengthened. On September 24, President Nixon sent a letter to Prime Minister Meir expressing his appreciation for the Israeli response:

Nixon’s message expressing appreciation to Israel following the events of Black September events. It was passed on by “Cardinal”, a code name for Henry Kissinger, September 23, 1970. File A-7412/9, p. 89

More about the course of events and Israel’s involvement can be read in Files A-7412/9, MFA-9341/9.

On October 15, the White House approved a new arms deal with Israel, but the change in the American administration’s perception of Israel was not absolute and did not happen all at once. The main considerations guiding US foreign policy remained dealing with the Cold War, and particularly the Vietnam War, but the discourse in the White House became more sympathetic. Through his close relationship with Kissinger, Rabin managed to continue defending Israel from political pressures from Rogers and others in the administration, Arab states, and the Soviet Union, as emerges from the documents in this publication (and see especially Document 18).

א.5 | The Ambassador's Role according to Rabin

The foundation of an ambassador’s duties is representing his country in the country where he serves and fostering relations between the two. An example of this can be seen in a conversation between Rabin and Kissinger on September 20, 1972, two weeks after the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Following Israel’s initial military responses in Syria and Lebanon, Rabin described the magnitude of the shock that had gripped the Israeli public. He explained to Kissinger that the massacre marked the opening of a new front against Israelis abroad—against which one must act decisively and even “jump the gun” before the blow falls. During this conversation, Rabin also shared the message he had conveyed to Golda: Kissinger is treating the events with appropriate seriousness and intends to bring the terrorism issue up at a debate in the Security Council (Document 22). See also the ISA publication on the massacre of the Israeli  athletes in Munich.

However, alongside these duties, Rabin believed that given his experience, the unique perspective he had as a former chief of staff and his close ties with the White House—he had an obligation to be proactive and to express his own positions. This approach caused friction between him and Foreign Minister Eban and the prime minister, who sometimes criticized him for his excessive independence. In a cable to Foreign Ministry Director General Gideon Rafael, Eban raised serious complaints against Rabin. Among other things, he claimed that Rabin held meetings with media figures without prior approval, in which he criticized the government, although he had not presented arguments to the government itself.  (File MFA-5969/3, p. 21). In response, Rabin wrote directly to the foreign minister that as long as it did not contradict an explicit order—he would continue to act as he saw fit.

Rabin’s sense of commitment and his tendency to express a clear position also found expression in a meeting with Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on February 23, 1971. This conversation, which dealt with political contacts with Egypt and the question of Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai, took place several months after Nasser’s death (September 28, 1970) and Anwar Sadat’s rise to power. Unlike his predecessor, Sadat was interested in rapprochement with the United States and not reliance only on the Soviet Union. As part of a renewed initiative by Jarring, who submitted a kind of “questionnaire” to both sides, Sadat expressed willingness for a peace agreement with Israel in exchange for complete withdrawal on all fronts. The pressure on Israel increased. During that meeting, Rabin told Sisco: “I said that as chief of staff I faced a very critical moment in Israeli history when within two-three days UNEF disappeared at dizzying speed and by moving Egyptian forces to Sharm el-Sheikh, Nasser placed us before the choice of surrendering or firing the first shot. I will not lend my hand to anything that could lead to a repetition of such a situation and I don’t want any chief of staff to face such a choice” (Document 11). Despite Rabin’s strong words in his meeting with Sisco, he recommended that the government give a more positive response to Jarring’s questions in order to show goodwill to the Americans (The Rabin Memoirs, pp. 151-155).

 Joseph Sisco (on the right) and Yitzhak Rabin, during Sisco’s visit to Israel, 28/7/1971. Photo: Moshe Milner, GPO

As ambassador, Rabin was formally subordinate to the foreign minister, but tension existed between them that preceded Rabin’s appointment, as Rabin and Eban belonged to different political camps in the Labour Party and held different political views. Eban was a Mapai supporter and Rabin belonged to the ‘Ahdut HaAvoda’ camp. This tension was not helped by the fact that the two had fundamentally different approaches to diplomacy: Eban was the traditional diplomat who used his impressive speeches as a central working tool, while Rabin, the Israeli ‘sabra’ and military man, saw himself as a ‘straight talker.’ A good example of this gap can be seen in their perception of the UN: Eban believed it was essential for Israel to fight for its standing in this arena, while Rabin thought the effort at the UN was “a waste of state money for a futile purpose.” In his direct way, he wrote: “Certain elements in the FM [Foreign Ministry] make an effort to instill in the public at home through political ‘briefings’ in Jerusalem that the UN is an important international stage. So far, the UN has been a stage for anti-Israeli demagoguery…” (Document 20, see also Document 13).

Prime Minister Meir on arrival in Philadelphia, receiving flowers from Mrs. Rabin. Behind her the mayor of Philadelphia and Foreign Minister Abba Eban, 24/9/1969. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

The existence of the special communication channel between Nixon and Golda, which passed through Rabin and Kissinger, increased the tension between Eban and the ambassador. While Rabin was careful to update the minister and the Foreign Ministry routinely, on sensitive political matters he reported directly to the prime minister. The aim was, among other things, to prevent leaks, which were common when cables passed through the Foreign Ministry (GL-15557/16, p. 7). Therefore, Rabin was careful about allowing as limited a distribution as possible for his cables, especially regarding Eban and his staff (Document 14).

Rabin even believed that Eban and his staff were trying to sabotage his moves, whether by downplaying the embassy’s achievements, such as in the Ministry’s reviews that contained “distortions and half-truths” (Document 19), or through leaks to the press designed to embarrass him (File A-7061/3, p. 14). In a letter to his wife Leah, he wrote that some Foreign Ministry people were conducting a smear campaign against him and he apologized that she and Dalia, their daughter, had been caught up in this situation (Document 12).

As mentioned before, even with Golda, Rabin did not have a completely smooth relationship. The prime minister trusted Rabin, but was often angry about his excessive independence. Dinitz recounts in his interview that sometimes the tension reached a point where they had to call in Education Minister Yigal Allon, Rabin’s commander in the Palmach and long-time friend, to smooth things over.

The fact that Rabin sometimes did not refrain from expressing his opinion also highlighted the gaps between his political worldview and the prime minister’s approach to the same issues. Facing pressure to advance negotiations with Egypt, Golda expressed a firm position that favored a limited arrangement, which she made conditional on the Americans abandoning the Rogers plan (for more on Golda’s position see the commemorative volume on Prime Minister Meir). As mentioned, Rabin thought that Israel should show more flexibility regarding Sadat’s proposal of February 4, 1971, for partial withdrawal in Sinai, to gain the cooperation of President Nixon. In such cases, Rabin sometimes shared his personal positions with Kissinger, something that in the prime minister’s eyes weakened Israel’s position, and she reprimanded him for it. Rabin ‘realigned’ his views according to her instructions, but his conduct worried her.

In an interview conducted by the Rabin Center in 2002 with Amos Eran, who served as political advisor at the Washington embassy under Rabin, Eran said that during one of her visits to the United States, the prime minister asked him: “Has Sisco brainwashed Rabin?… Does he have such influence on him?” Rabin’s need to reflect the American position and the proposals he made accordingly gave Golda the feeling that he was expressing the American position more than Israel’s needs (See the interview in File AD-3732/10, p. 241).

Despite the tensions, working relations between Rabin and Golda were good and based on mutual trust and appreciation. The prime minister understood the value of Rabin’s success in weaving good ties with the White House, and perhaps did not want to lose him as an asset given the challenges of the period. Rabin, for his part, respected her, and even in his final days as ambassador, when she visited the United States in early 1973, he stood by her side and worked to help her.

This is evidenced by the extensive correspondence between the Prime Minister’s Office and the ambassador in the period preceding her last visit to Washington during Rabin’s tenure (26 February-11 March 1973). During the visit, he took part in her conversations with the president and senior Administration officials and held talks to ensure its success (see for example: Files A-111/24, MFA-6723/11, A-7062/8). Among other things, Rabin worked on every possible front to minimize the damage created just a few days earlier following the Israeli downing of a Libyan civilian aircraft over Sinai and the US response (the Libyan aircraft incident). An example can be seen in his conversation with Kissinger on the eve of the prime minister’s private conversation with Nixon (Document 25).

Prime Minister Meir, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger meeting in the White House, 1/3/1973. Photograph: Karl Schumacher, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and NARA, Wikimedia.

א.6 | Winding down — And on to Political Life

As well as disagreements with the prime minister, Rabin’s disappointment with her, as leader of the party, also grew over her failure to promote him to a ministerial position. Rabin believed that the government was the next place where he should be. He was the chief of staff of the Six Day War, had gained political-diplomatic experience, and had several loyal friends in the party, like Yigal Allon and Israel Galili, who wanted to see him promoted. But despite this, his rivals in the party, including Eban, blocked his path to the government again and again. Rabin thought that if Golda Meir had thrown all her weight behind him, he would already have returned to Israel and been appointed as a minister.

Rabin’s preparation for his future role is expressed in a letter he sent to Leah in July 1971. He shares with her the importance he attributes to defining a unique identity before entering political life: “The most important thing in my view is to create a public image that stands on its own and is not afraid to say things that are not acceptable to part of the leadership (or even most of it) and even to part of the public. This is not a goal in itself, but to the extent there are issues that I believe are decisive and must be addressed and they require confrontation, it’s better to confront them than to humble oneself before those who believe that all the wisdom in the world has descended and is at their disposal” (Document 12).

The need to advance his political career became more urgent in his eyes when in 1972, while he remained as ambassador, the chief of staff who replaced him in 1968, Haim Bar-Lev, was appointed as minister of trade and industry. Rabin, for his part, understood that he could no longer rely on the promises he received from Golda and others. In a letter from May 1972 to Leah, Rabin shares with her his dilemmas about the future and raises the possibility that he will have to return to Israel and be more active on his path to politics (Document 16).

Leah did accompany Rabin on his mission, but could not always be by his side and divided her time between Washington and Israel. The letters he wrote to her reveal another facet of Rabin’s personality—the family man dealing with the difficulties of life far from home, the longing for home and the close connection with his wife, which enabled him to share with her the challenges of the position and dilemmas regarding his political future (these letters and others are held in File G-12824/10).

Yitzhak and Leah Rabin, 24/1/1968. Photograph: Fritz Cohen, GPO

In the summer of 1972, Rabin was preparing for the end of his appointment and transition to the next stage. In a letter to Leah from August 9, he shares with her the mixed feelings evoked by summing up this period in Washington: “I admit that as has happened to me in the past, this time too I am leaving the position with regret. I enjoyed it very much and of course I think I succeeded in it completely. It’s always hard for me to leave a position I’ve worked in, that I’ve invested so much in. Interesting that this feeling now is more tangible to me than when I left the position of chief of staff. At the end of the chief of staff period, I had the feeling that I had reached the end of a certain chapter, I had reached what they call ‘a good old age,’ meaning a state where it’s possible to stop. Actually, this will also be true regarding my position in the USA. However, apparently the feeling of great uncertainty about the future bothers me” (Document 21).

On March 10, 1973, Rabin returned home after a stay of about five years in Washington. While he was preparing for the elections scheduled for the end of October, in which he was a candidate, the Yom Kippur War broke out. The upheavals that came in the wake of the war, Golda Meir’s resignation from the prime ministership in April 1974, and Rabin’s victory over Shimon Peres in the elections for party leadership brought Rabin on a ‘fast track’ to the position of prime minister in early June 1974 (He had entered the government as Minister of Labour in March 1974). He took the experience accumulated in Washington, alongside his ties with the White House, with him to the new position. However, an episode from the ambassadorial period left a stain that would accompany him onward into his first term as prime minister—the affair of the dollar account which he had not closed as required by law. In 1977, when the affair was revealed by the press, Rabin decided to resign from his position as prime minister. A confidential consultation of senior government figures on April 11, 1977, alongside additional testimonies in File A-7117/11, tells us more about the affair.

Space here does not permit a full account of all the areas of Rabin’s activity and achievements during these five years. In this publication, we sought to focus on the main aspects of his activity, especially in the first two years, in which he shaped the role and his approach to the position. The documents in this publication, and certainly the files recently opened especially for it, will give the reader a more complete picture. You can see more about his activities in the later years of his term (1971-1973) and on additional topics such as relations with American Jewry and activity on behalf of Soviet Jewry in the collection of documents and files following this publication (see the list of files and the list of documents).

Gift presented to Rabin at the end of his period as ambassador on January 22, 1973 by the National Committee for Labor Israel,  File G-12/7

Written by: Elad Kreizel

Editor-in-Chief: Michal Zaft

English editing: Louise Fischer

Hebrew version

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