Immediately after the events in Munich, accusations of police incompetence were made in Germany too and probing questions were asked in the media, as reported by the embassy in Bonn (Document 20). Those responsible for managing the crisis, Federal Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the head of the Munich police, Manfred Schreiber and the Interior Minister of Bavaria, Bruno Merk, hurriedly released a statement, explaining what had happened and stating “that the final decision to use force in an attempt to prevent the kidnapping of the hostages was only made after they were officially informed by the government of Israel that it refused to release 200 Arab prisoners in exchange for the release of the members of the Israeli delegation”. Public indignation in Germany was increased due to the approaching general elections, and the events became the focus of an acrimonious political dispute.
Genscher, now Foreign Minister, on a visit to Israel in 1975. Photograph: Moshe Milner, Government Press Office
In the meantime, the joint Federal and Bavarian enquiry commission completed its task. Interior Minister Genscher presented the main points of its report to Ambassador Ben-Horin, beginning an argument over the different versions as compared with Zamir’s report (Document 23). On 20 September the German report was published (Document 24, in Hebrew translation). It investigated three aspects of the events: 1. Security measures in Munich and at the Olympic Village; 2. Efforts to release the hostages without using force; 3. The police operation in Munich and at the Fuerstenfeldbruck airfield. It was noted that there had been warnings about possible terrorist attacks during the Olympics, but no specific reports on Israeli targets. Contacts with Israeli representatives about security for the team were described, pointing out that these did not give the impression that the Israelis were dissatisfied with the security arrangements. In conclusion, the authors claimed that given the terrorists’ intent, even significant reinforcement of the security arrangements would not have prevented a terrorist attack on the Israelis in the Olympic Village or elsewhere.
The second section presented a detailed review of the efforts to release the hostages, and listed the reasons for the Germans’ conclusion that it was impossible to rescue the hostages without the use of force or to fly them to Cairo. The Germans again repeated the claim that this was because, among other things, Israel refused to agree to the demands to release Palestinian prisoners. The third section, on the operation at the airfield, raised a series of operational questions, but no fault was found with the actions of the various arms of the German police. The German Parliament (Bundestag) Interior Committee adopted this conclusion. No disciplinary action was taken, and no one was removed from their post.
Based on the significant differences in the Israeli and German assessments of the operation, the release of Zamir’s reports on the one hand and the German reports on the other created a wave of claims and counter-claims. The Foreign Ministry prepared a summary setting out the differences between the German report and the comments by Zamir and Ben-Horin, and Director-General Gazit sent it to the prime minister. The report presents major differences regarding the stages of the operation, the measures taken by the Germans and the Israelis’ share in the affair (Document 25).
The dispute with the Germans continued in the following days, as can be seen in a letter from Chancellor Brandt to Prime Minister Golda Meir, giving their reactions – especially that of Genscher – to the Zamir Report (Document 26 in Hebrew and German).
See also: Documents 21, 22 and 27.
