

Meeting between
The Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Walter Mondale
and the
Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin

Sunday afternoon, 4:00 p.m.
July 2, 1978
Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem

Present:

For the United States:

Ambassador Lewis
Mr. D. Aaron
Mr. H. Saunders
Mr. Lipshutz
Mr. Eisenstat
Mr. Quandt
Mr. Clift
Mr. Berman
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Viets
Mr. Blackwell
Mr. Eisele

For Israel:

Prof. Y. Yadin
Mr. M. Dayan
Mr. E. Weizmann
Mr. S. Ehrlich
Mr. A. Sharon
Dr. Y. Burg
Mr. Y. Horowitz
Prof. A. Barak
Dr. E. Ben Elissar
Ambassador S. Dinitz
Mr. Y. Kadishai
Mr. E. Evron
Mr. H. Hurwitz

ישראל
למנדל
הנשיא

H.E. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN: Mr. Vice-President, I welcome you to this Cabinet Room, you and your friends and associates, and our friend, Ambassador Lewis. We have spent in this Cabinet Room, American and Israeli delegations, in discussions, which usually were quite fruitful, and which also brought good results for both countries, so may I express that this will be the case at this conference as well.

I will deal, with your permission, with the problems on the agenda, and I will start with the question which only outwardly belongs to the past. Actually, it is a matter of the future and it may have decisive importance to the future. I refer to the question of the balance of power, supply of weapons. We will not go into the past because it will be futile now to go back to the details of what was already decided in the Senate. Every one of us has got his own point of view, both about events leading to that decision and about the decision itself. But we will not discuss it.

What is important is the question of the future, and may I say in all seriousness which a man can command that we are very perturbed about the possible developments in the future. Saudi Arabia will have a serious number of most advanced planes and since the decision was taken in Washington, the French signed with the Saudi Arabians what is now called the deal of the century. It is from the point of view of financial weight probably the largest deal of supply of weapons of all times. The British follow suit in Egypt and in other countries.

So, on one side, the Western powers, and among them the greatest producers of sophisticated arms, supply our enemies with the modern weapons and, on the other hand, Moscow is arming Syria and Iraq and Libya and other Arab countries as well, and then events take place around us in Ethiopia and in Southern Yemen and in other countries in the neighborhood of Israel, as it is surrounded.

So this is our real preoccupation with the volume of security and to put it very simply, there is a worry in our hearts concerning our future and our capability.


I would, therefore, with your permission, ask our Defence Minister, General Weizmann, to bring before you the urgent requirements we would have in the near future in various fields so that this situation can be redressed and that we can be assured that the balance of our security demands will not be upset.


I myself got a gracious letter from the President in reply to my letter several weeks ago, and he stresses that the United States, under his leadership, will continue to keep Israel's superiority in arms so that it can defend itself. His word "superiority" is of course of great importance and it is meaningful because at any contingency we do not face one Arab state, as you have seen during the Yom Kippur War in which also Saudi Arabia took part; Jordan sent units, the Iraqis sent units, Morocco sent units. We face a combination of Arab states and therefore if it is taken into consideration, it brings us to the conclusion that it is not a


matter of exactly mathematical proportion. This word "superiority" is of great importance, and the President promises me that so it will be kept.


With this purpose, we now have our requirements. We will bring it to you and we hope for a positive reply. I will ask Ezer now to take the floor and give us the explanation.


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












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MR. BEGIN: May we pass, with your permission, to another item on the agenda, which we didn't fix, and which is self-understood. We shall speak about the peace-making process. I understand from yesterday's statement made by the President that quite soon, perhaps tomorrow, a peace plan by Egypt will be produced, will probably be given to you. On the other hand, we know that preparations are being made for a meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, Mr. Dayan and Mr. Kamel, probably in London.

What we would like to stress is that I suppose the logical sequence of events should be that first we get the peace plan by the Egyptians. We want to study it, to analyze it, also to react to it. We have a peace plan. We elaborated it. We produced it. May I say in all humility, we also invested thought in it. And if there is an Egyptian peace plan, we would like to study it in detail.

So may I ask you how would be now this procedure about the two probels, our receiving the plan of the Egyptians and, on the other hand, the consultations, the fixing of the dates and the place of the possible consultations between the two Foreign Ministers?

MR. MONDALE: If I can take the second question first, Mr. Prime Minister. I understand that Secretary Vance has been working closely with Mr. Dayan and Mr. Kamel and President Sadat to set a time and that the tentative suggestion was around the middle of July in London. The Egyptians have not yet said yes but we think

they will say yes, and so the posture that we are in is to say that probably it will be held, and we are advising your Minister of Foreign Affairs as soon as we get information. I would anticipate discussing this matter with President Sadat tomorrow afternoon when I meet with him. We do not know yet - we haven't seen the plan - what conditions he might impose on its use prior to that meeting. I think it would be fair to say that we certainly have no objections. In fact, I think it would strengthen the process if you had a copy, so that when the discussions were held, you could speak with having given it serious consideration. Whether President Sadat would put different restrictions on it or not, I don't know.

It is our policy in this most difficult situation that we are in to try to be as candid and to disclose as fully as we can the situation to Israel and to Egypt so that candor prevails, and that would be our policy here. But I do not know yet what conditions President Sadat will place on the disclosure of that plan once it is submitted to us. Some suggest that I might receive it tomorrow. Another suggestion we have heard that it might be a day or two later until it might be made available.

If I may make one point on that plan, and I bring this message from the President to you, Mr. Prime Minister, who, as you know, sends to you his highest regard and affection: that in this exceedingly delicate period, when it is your hope, publicly expressed, and our hope, that somehow we can resume the momentum of negotiations, that all sides try to restr. themselves, subdue their rhetoric, turn down

the temperatures as much as possible so that we might get to that negotiating posture that you quite rightly believe to be essential to be if there is/a process leading to peace.

The Egyptian plan, and I can't speak from firsthand knowledge, because I haven't seen it, will undoubtedly have some aspects in it that you will find unacceptable, that we will find unacceptable. There may be some aspects in it that have elements of hope, some ambiguity which if properly explained might raise opportunities. And it is our hope that the response of your government would be in that spirit and we are making the same suggestion to President Sadat in his rhetoric. And in this process of trying to get to negotiations, we think it is very important that all parties seek to keep that kind of restrained rhetoric.

Mr. Prime Minister, if I might, I'd like to take a few moments to perhaps go more fully into the view of the President and our concerns in the context of the peace negotiations.

MR. BEGIN: With pleasure. I only want to say that so far as restraint in rhetoric are concerned, we have proved it time and again until the last few days, as we read some of the Egyptian press. There are the most vicious attacks, including personal attacks. We do not reply in kind. And we keep restraint also when we answer in public, as perhaps I may prove tonight as well, because we don't want to exacerbate the situation.

What I would like to stress is that we must read the plan, analyze it properly and of course we will have to react. It is our

duty. It cannot stand as such. Either we accept it or reject or make our suggestions concerning the details. But we must react to it, of course. I suppose the United States government will also expect from us a reaction.

So first let us have it. But this is the remark I wanted to make in parenthesis, that so far as restraint in using sharp words is concerned, we will observe it and I hope we shall be able to continue to do so in the future.

Yes, Sir?

MR. MONDALE: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. We had a famous moment of American history when we got two messages from the Russians on the placement of Cuban missiles. One was that they were going ahead and placing and the other one was that they were going to pull them out. Slightly contradictory. And Kennedy decided to ignore the go ahead message and praise the Russians for pulling them out. And that psychology of putting the best dimension on a horribly dangerous situation may have been a fateful and wise approach, and there is no doubt that as we hope to move towards negotiations, at a time when it can be expected that maximalist positions will be stated, and at a time when there are extremists who don't want negotiations, don't want peace, that there will be every attempt to exacerbate, to inflame, to outrage, to challenge, to insult, to defame, and to the extent that it is possible, the President hopes that we can keep the rhetoric as restrained as the situation permits. And if we can get the negotiations started, of course that's the environment in which

great candor and directness can be used on the limitation and the unacceptability of proposals.

And so the President asked me to make that point and to make it as well to President Sadat, which I will.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have honored me and my country by inviting me here at a very difficult time to honor your great State on its 30th anniversary. There are few things in my public career that I value more than that respect. There are few tasks that I have undertaken in my public career that I value more than to be able to express the friendship and the admiration and the love of our people for you and for this great nation. The attachment is special. It is profound and it is enduring.

I am aware that despite that, we have gone through a period of great anxiety for you and for all of us, sometimes suspicion, sometimes doubt about the trust of our relationship. And I would like you to know that we not only respect and admire your leadership and the leadership of your government and the values of this society, but it is our deepest desire to be seen as your best friend and your best ally.

We, of course, pray for peace and you, above all, want peace and when we differ, as we have and as we may, I hope that those differences can be kept in the context of a difference between people of goodwill and not in any way seen as a threat to the independence of Israel, to your full authority, which those of us who believe in a democracy as yours, to pursue your own negotiating strategy, or that you would ever think that we would withhold

essential security or economic assistance hostage for your negotiating posture. We have not done that. We will not do that.

We believe that we are in a period where time is crucial. No one knows whether peace is possible. There is certainly more than enough material to make a devastating case that it is hopeless. The only thing that I think propels us all is that there has been a change of historic proportions since you came into office. The Jerusalem visit, recognition of Israel, first time face to face talks between leaders of an Arab nation and Israel, pledge of no more wars and the rest, and that we should use this time, however much is left to us, to pursue the possibilities of peace.

We fear that there may be a time limit. We hope there isn't. But we note that Sadat continues to suggest October as a time of fundamental decision for him. We don't know what that means. It may mean that he would abandon any efforts towards negotiations. I don't raise that point as a threat, because I don't mean it that way, but I would hate for us to lose this window during which negotiations were possible without having pressed that possibility to the fullest, and I know you share that same viewpoint, and the President feels very strongly that we must use this time to the maximum to achieve that objective.

And we want to be of help. We want to avoid mistakes. We want to prevent anything that undermines your trust and faith in us. We fully accept the agreements and the undertakings in the 1975 accord that we should seek to fully consult with you in any of our

negotiations moves. And we intend to do so and we hope we have done so. And it is in that mood and in that frame of mind and in that spirit that we hope that we can go forward and improve our working relationships and the appearance of those relationships. And it is in that spirit that I visit, under your kind invitation, your country.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President. Your words are to us of great importance. May I also stress that I myself personally visited your country and Washington four times. The first visit, at the invitation of the President, was wonderful in all aspects. During the second visit we brought our peace proposal, in December. It was praised. I remember the words, "a notable contribution", "a long step forward", "great deal of flexibility" and in general, as I was also empowered by the President to say to President Sadat in Ismailia, a fair basis for negotiations. There were other words, all of them positive. You heard them very well because you sat together in the Cabinet Room, and with these words in our ears, music in our ears, we went to Ismailia, and we presented our peace plan, which is fair; yes, a fair basis for negotiations, to the President of Egypt and his advisers. And I tell you that the atmosphere in Ismailia was also an understanding. We couldn't reach an agreement on a common formula about the problem of Palestinian Arabs. Therefore we adopted the famous method, the international document which was used also by America in China, that each side states in its own words the case. So did we. President

Sadat, at a common public press conference, read out the two formulas; one the Egyptian. Egypt's position is that ⁱⁿ the West Bank and the Gaza Strip there should be formed a Palestinian States. Israel's position is that in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District the residents should enjoy self-rule, on the basis of that plan of autonomy that we brought. We actually reached an agreement on a declaration of principles, but only because we did not have agreement on that point, that written declaration was prevented by the advisers of President Sadat. Such was the atmosphere.

President Sadat summed up the conference with the words, "It's a most successful conference here and we shall negotiate." I don't contend that he approved totally of our peace plan in both parts, although he had a few good words for both parts. He had also reservations, it is true. But the summing up was, we shall negotiate.

We agreed that we shall have two committees. Both committees started later negotiations. One came also to Jerusalem and suddenly it was disrupted. This is in short the story of the negotiations which were started and which were suddenly, actually surprisingly, disrupted. It was also a surprise to the American delegation, to the Secretary of State. It was a surprise also to the Egyptian delegation.

Since then there is one question before us: let us start again the negotiations. In fact, our Defence Minister then was several times in Cairo and he spoke to his counterpart and he also met President Sadat. But we speak about proper negotiations in the framework of two committees.

Now, if the two Foreign Ministers meet, wherever they meet, we shall consider it, let me say, at least a start of the negotiations. Our message is that we want to renew the negotiations. Whatever differences of opinion between the parties concerned, nothing in the world has been achieved without negotiations. I cannot say that everything was achieved by negotiations, but very much was achieved throughout history among many nations which waged war even for centuries, not only for many years. So this is our attitude and you may inform the President about it, that we want to renew the negotiations, and we suggested many times, several times, both in writing and orally to President Sadat that those negotiations be renewed.

Now, there is also a reply of General Gamasy to General Weizmann about the proposed meeting. I mentioned to you that there is an exchange of letters. Well, he says, also, do you expect a new approach - whatever he thinks to be a new approach. For the time being, he doesn't suggest a meeting but he doesn't exclude it in the future if there is what he terms a "new approach".

So summing up our point of view - please take note of it - the Government of Israel stands completely without any reservation whatsoever for the renewal of the negotiations between us and Egypt and for the start of negotiations between us and our other neighbors.

This is our point of view, and if the United States can help bring about a meeting between the parties, we shall appreciate it. Very positive.

MR. MONDALE: This is, of course, Mr. Prime Minister, why we are seeking to get the London talks going. We realize it is only a beginning, but it would provide you a chance to respond directly to the Egyptian proposal. Perhaps it would provide an opportunity to make progress to get the negotiating momentum under-way. We think that that is a crucial objective and we are totally committed to it.

I would like to make one other point, if I might, and that is on the issue of Israel's security. ^{We,} /As you know, take the often publicly expressed view that the basis for negotiations ought to be the general part of 242. I won't go into that again. It's been discussed many times. But there is another element of 242 that we see as being compelling and arguable and absolute and on which we totally agree and that is the issue of security. And we would not expect Israel to accept a bargain which risks your security, and as the President has indicated to you and to Mr. Dayan and to others - Mr. Weizmann - we are open to a broad range of options, and I think most of them would be acceptable to us and would have our strong support: demilitarized zone, limited force zone, electronic sensors, buffer zones, international forces. I heard your eloquent statement - those do not interest you. It is possible, and we are not pressing the possibility of some kind of bilateral security guarantees. The possibility of indefinite Israeli defence force locations at crucial points, and even some other matters of high sensitivity that I know the President discussed with you. In addition to the demand that there be true peace, with peace treaties, with normalized relations,

with normal borders. I wanted to underscore this. The President asked me to underscore it so that you fully appreciate, as I believe you do from our earlier discussions, the extent to which we are joined with you in seeking as a part of the peace settlement the kind of defence assurances that you see to be necessary for your own security. I wanted to make that point because I think you will find us very responsive to that concept.

MR. BEGIN: I only want to say, Mr. Vice-President, security to us means how to preserve as far as a man'd mind can go forever the lives of our civilian population. This is the real interpretation of our security, because as you saw it in the hospital in the morning, this is the problem. Those who connive at our destruction do distinguish between soldiers and civilians. Civilized mankind says the distinction means war is always cruel; a soldier is the same human being as every other, even wearing a uniform, but he has got arms, so the distinction ^{is} between armed men and unarmed men. And there is an attempt made by humanity for centuries. Now, they do distinguish between soldiers and unarmed civilians in the opposite sense. They do not attack a military post, an outpost. They always attack civilians, and you saw it with your own eyes, men, women and child.

So we rack our minds how to create a situation in which our civilian population, the bulk of which lives in a very narrow piece of territory, 9 miles from the sea shore - If I may ask you, what is in Minnesota 9 miles?

MR. MONDALE: About \$50 million worth of land! (Laughter) I get your point.

MR. BEGIN: Anyhow, it's only 9 miles, a cramped, very small piece of territory. That population being in the range of potential enemy fire is a big danger to us and creates war. We want to prevent war. Therefore, in our plan of autonomy, which we wrote with great sincerity and invested in it real thought, we want to live with our neighbors together in human dignity. They will deal with their own affairs. They will elect their own body to deal with their daily affairs. We will not interfere. What we want to preserve is public order and security. That was the phrase and this is now the question that the Foreign Minister when he was in Washington suggested and also we spoke to Ambassador Lewis, that we conduct negotiations with the partners, what does that mean, how it will come true. But this is really our point. This is our great issue, great problem. It is a matter of great concern. We must make sure that our civilians are not hurt any more, so far as we can. This is what we propose. There must be negotiations. We didn't say when we wrote the plan, we wrote it, accept it. We never said so. May I say around this table that this is what we hear from the other side: Give us Judea and Samaria, give it to Jordan; give us the Gaza Strip, then we shall negotiate. Take out your men, then we shall negotiate. We never used such language, may I say, such a meaning of language.

What we said, we made a proposal; let us negotiate. Perhaps you have counterproposals, amendments, improvements, other proposals.

So, yes, indeed, the President told me during the last visit: we know that Israel has security problems. We are deeply aware of it. We are aware of it. He added something I prefer not to quote it now, but that is what he said. We are aware of it. Israel has security problem. No question about it in his mind.

We want to negotiate and bring about the resolve of this security problem, to be positively solved.

Yigal Horowitz, the Minister for Industry, Trade and Tourism.

MR. Y. HOROWITZ (Consecutive translation from Hebrew): Mr. Vice-President, the Minister wishes to address you, Mr. Vice-President, in a few personal words. We know what war is. My family knows what war is. In the last war I lost a niece and nephew and I have two sons who fought in the last war. So, therefore, I can say we know what war is on our flesh.

I have to tell you, Mr. Vice-President, if it is ordained that we might have to disappoint the United States and the world and we say, no, we shall not return to the 1967 lines and the restoration of the PLO on the borders of Kalkilya, then this may have to be so because we know full well what war means, and I am ready to take the risk, one whose family has suffered so much, even for war so that we don't have to return again to those 20-30 kilometers from Tel Aviv. And you should know, Mr. Vice-President, that the Yom Kippur war was child's play compared to what we would have to face if those borders were, God forbid, reinstated.

MR. MONDALE: Mr. Minister, it is difficult to be in our position, believe me. We believe in national independence for ourselves and, if we do, we have to believe in national independence

for Israel. Our approach is not one in which we presume to have any authority to direct what you decide to be in the best interests of Israel. And I hope you accept that that's the spirit in which we are here. But when we make suggestions, it is a suggestion that a friend makes to another friends and not in any other relationship.

Secondly, I would quickly concede that I don't know and have no way of knowing the pain and the suffering that you as an Israeli and your family and your friends have gone through. I have never seen a spectacle in my country like I saw today in that hospital of an 11-year-old Arab boy trying to hold his leg, one brother splintered for life, the other brother killed. I can describe it, but I don't know that I can feel it. And there is a big difference and we try to understand but I would be the first to concede your point that we might not understand it in the full sense.

And that's why our position always has been that, first of all, peace is in Israel's interest, and it is, of course, your own leaders, your Prime Minister, who always eloquently stated that, that military victories although essential are still temporary unless somehow human relations and tensions over the process change.

And that's why we urge peace and have sought to play a role as a cataly_st and a friend in bringing about peace; not because we enjoy that posture. It is hard for me to explain. There is no joy at all. President Carter said, the happiest six weeks of his presidency was the period during which President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were talking and didn't need us around, and those were

the happiest days.

What we say and suggest is that negotiations be commenced which permit the parties under the principles of 242 to develop an agreement that in your view serves your interests of security and peace. We have never demanded complete withdrawal to the '67 lines. We understand that those lines must be negotiated by the parties and be agreeable to you. We have never had one single contact with the PLO. They are out of it. We comply fully with the 1975 agreement that there will be no contacts until they first accept the permanence of Israel and accept 242. We have never espoused PLO. As a matter of fact, the President has stated repeatedly that we are opposed to an independent Palestinian State. We don't want it. We want some kind of connection that would be decided in the negotiations with Jordan. And all of it is designed to assist in the peace making process and all of it assumes a settlement which is consistent with your perception of your security.

MR. A. SHARON: Mr. Vice-President, Mr. Prime Minister, Distinguished Guests: In a way I find myself in the same position. I don't know, it looks strange to belong to a nation which is the only one maybe in the world that has to convince of its right to exist and its right for security. I don't know any nation in the world that had to sit or their representatives have to go all around the world and try to convince of its right to defend itself. I am afraid that we are the only ones around the world.

I'd like to emphasize that Israel, not like other countries, has got very complicated security problems. There are lucky countries

without any security problems. There are countries who have got global security problems. Israel has got also global, in our terms, security problems. For instance, will Egypt join again with Syria and Iraq and Jordan as in the last war, or should we be aware of any Soviet interference in case of war that all of us would like to avoid? Can we expect American pressure that will be in our hardest time? That is, I would say, part of our security problems.

But we have another circle of problems that I would call a circle of small security problems. We have been fighting a small war here for many, many years. Terrorist activities did not start after the Six Day War. I can tell you, Mr. Vice-President, that in the '50s, Israel had more than 1000 casualties as the result of terrorist activities, by the terrorists who crossed the border, mostly from Samaria, Judea and the Gaza Strip. The problem was, of course, that Israel is a small country. In order to emphasize, I can tell you the Bay Bridge in San Francisco is longer than Israel; Israel is narrower than the Bay Bridge in San Francisco. And you have to know that terrorist activities did not start in this part of the world after the War of Independence in 1948. We had hundreds and hundreds of casualties in the '30s, during what used to be called then the Arab riots or the Arab rebellion between 1936 to 1939. We had casualties in 1929, casualties in 1921, casualties in 1920. Arab terrorists or what we call the small scale security problems were a crucial fact in this part of the world for many, many years.

Now, I heard what you said about guarantees, about your

awareness for our security problems and several, I think two or three months ago, I read about a group of American Senators who applied to the President and mentioned that since the peace settlement in Indo-China or Vietnam, the number of Cambodians that were killed in the most brutal way was above one million people. Mr. Vice-President, we did not hear yet one word about that and we did not see any one act that had been taken. It is exactly the same situation we were facing here in Lebanon, a situation where during about two years, more than 70,000 people were killed. We didn't hear even one word by anyone in the world; the Christian world did not say a word about that. The only ones who got up and, as you know, gave certain support were only ourselves. No one said a word about that.

So, you know, when people speak about guarantees, maybe I would not trust even that, because I think that we got guarantees in 1957, when we withdrew from Sinai then, and it didn't help us in 1967, but still now when you speak about global problems maybe guarantees have something to do.

When we speak about the daily problems, these small wars, and you have to know that Israel and the Arab countries were much closer to peace in 1949-1950 than now, and we came to the present situation as a result of this small war, and, you know, one can say, look, you can try, but that we have tried already. We are not speaking about things that may happen. We speak about things that happened already and we are speaking about situations that we were

facing for years.

I am not an expert about the principles of 242. I am a farmer; rather, I would say, maybe I am a peasant. I was born a farmer and though I served in the military for so many years and I have my Law Degree, I am a farmer.

I would like to put it in simple words: if you ask me, is it possible for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, the answer is no. And I can tell you, Mr. Vice-President, I don't see any government in the country, not in the past, and not in the future - as a matter of fact, this government was the only one who dared to come out with such a plan. I don't see any government which has dared to come with such a plan. If there is a direct question and I give a direct answer: if you ask me, can we withdraw our troops from the West Bank now or in the future, the answer is no. Can we restrict our troops to encampments in the West Bank or you can use any other terms, the answer is no. Can we restrict ourselves, let's say, to certain roads? The answer is no.

But if you ask us, are we going to try and make every effort not to interfere in the lives of the local population, the answer will be positive. As a matter of fact, that is our policy even now. And, of course, I would say, if relations will come in the future to a situation, let's say, relations like in the Common Market in Europe, where borders are open, commercial contacts, everything is open, it may be that the security needs that we are talking about now might be reduced. If you ask me, I am sure that Israel will be

happy and glad to reduce these needs. But so long as we have not arrived to a situation where there is no danger of war any more, what one can call a true peace or no danger of war, there are certain, I would say, steps that Israel should preserve.

And I would like again to say one thing, with your permission. I am very much afraid of a situation that what we, and mostly you, United States, are trying to do now, will not bring us to peace; it will bring us to war. I am afraid that if the Arab~~s~~ will be over-promised and they are over-promised because they are promised things that Israel will not be able to do, and if Israel will be over-pressured, and I am afraid that it might be a situation that Israel may be over-pressured, that will not bring to peace. That will bring to war. What will be the result of this war? Militarily, Israel will win the war; no doubt about that. But all of us will lose. We will lose lives. The Arabs will lose their achievement in the last war and they had an achievement. And I am afraid to say that the United States will lose its foothold in the Middle East, because if the Arabs after all will attempt to achieve what they want to achieve by political means, and they are trying to do it now; if that will fail, I am afraid that they will turn back to the Soviets and that is what I am trying to warn now: that over-promising to the Arabs and over-pressuring Israel will not bring peace. It will bring war and all of us will lose.

I want to tell you, all of us, Mr. Vice-President, want peace, and I am talking to you as one who also started as a corporal, not in the armoured corps, but in the infantry, and I participated

in all the wars and all the battles of this country in 30 years.

I didn't miss even one of them, and I saw all the fears and all the most terrible things of war, and believe me, those who saw all these things, they are striving for peace more than anybody else, and we are all fighting to get peace. But one thing I would like not to under-estimate: though we would like to have peace and we believe that we will have peace, we are a nation that we are ready to fight and I can tell you that though I participated in all the wars and, believe me, I am striving for peace, I am ready to fight again another 10 wars in order to secure the existence of the people of this country and this land. And though I believe that we will arrive to peace and we will make all the possible steps towards peace, you must take into consideration for us some of the questions and some of the demands are questions of death and life and we want to live. Thank you!

MR. DAYAN: I do not want to repeat what we discussed in your room, but I think I have to do it here, but I promise to be very short. The first one is about the sovereignty of Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, and it is stated in our proposal for the self-rule and this is our position. That is to say, that we say this question of sovereignty stands open. We do not mean that it should stand open forever. What we mean, it just now stands open, and it is up to any party, like any other principle, to bring it up after five years. It might be us, that we shall bring it up. We do not mean that (number 24 [?] there), that what we propose is that it will be the permanent status of the area. This is one point.

The second point is about the role of the Palestinian Arabs in deciding or determination of their future. We are really very close to a formula of what is known as the Aswan language - not exactly, but by the meaning. That is to say, that they should participate with the other parties in the determination of their future, and, as a matter of fact, we introduced it in the working paper that we worked out with your people in Washington last year, but until then, until last year, the interpretation of all the Israel governments and the American government was that it was really only Jordan that should be the partner for the implementation of the peace treaty based on the 242. And the Palestinian Arabs were mentioned there only as refugees - the refugee problem. But we proposed it and we accepted it and we stand up by that that they should participate with other parties in the determination of their future; not alone and we do not mean by that that they should have self-determination for the establishment of a Palestinian State, but for what it says there.

The main point I wanted really to make is about the place of Egypt in all this. Just now, whatever we say about Jordan and about the Palestinian Arabs, as a matter of fact, it is only Egypt that in a way, maybe not in the full way that we would have liked to have seen it, but sometimes, it is only Egypt and its President that is ready to negotiate with us for peace.

Now, here again, before the Sadat initiative, last year, we proposed and it was accepted by your people and ours, that there

would be four parties in the negotiations for the determining of peace, which would be Egypt, which controlled in the past the Gaza Strip, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians and our country. Just now, if it is only Egypt, we do not say that just because of that they should not be the representatives of the other side or that we don't want to negotiate with them over Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip. We would like the others to participate and to join but if they don't, we are ready to do it with Egypt and we have to be realistic and to face facts and the fact is that it is only Egypt. The question is: Is Egypt ready? Not whether Israel is ready. But is President Sadat ready to negotiate over peace between Israel and Egypt and over Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip, even if other Arab leaders are not coming in, and this just now is really the situation.

But what I am trying to say is, we haven't received the Egyptian proposal and the little bit that we heard was not encouraging but that doesn't mean that we reject Egypt as a partner for negotiations for peace over the Gaza Strip, and if President Sadat will be ready for that and the Israel government will approve, over the entire Judea and Samaria, together with other parties. The Israel government has not decided about it. We asked whether President Sadat is ready to do it and we haven't received any answer, so we don't know. And just to have symposia and answering questions without a real foundation for that, I think really there is no use to do that.

But what I want to say is that ^{if} Egypt is the only one to

negotiate peace with us, not only over Sinai but also Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, we do not reject it offhand, but we want to know whether President Sadat is ready for that.

And the last point I want to make, for all of us, we want, you want and we want to resume the momentum of the negotiations. I have the feeling that every time that you or the Egyptians or the Jordanians or I don't know who is asking the Egyptians to come out or to be partners to a public announcement, they must go very very extreme. Whether you call it the declaration of principles or a peace proposal or whatever it is. If they have to come out and to face the entire Arab world with their own proposals or participation in the declaration of principles, then they right away go back to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs for sovereignty, for withdrawal from all of the Arab territories, which of course doesn't mean that they don't ask us to accept 242. But they don't accept it. Just try to have President Sadat accept 242 for Sinai; that is to say, that we don't have to go all the way back. I would like to live to that day to see that President Sadat will accept 242 or that anyone would put pressure on him to accept 242 as a basis for Sinai; that is to say, that we don't go all the way back.

But what I am trying to say: that if we shall find ourselves in London or anywhere again being asked to work out a public statement with Egypt about the principle of declaration of principles, or whatever it might be called, guidelines for negotiations over the West Bank, once it becomes a public announcement, President Sadat will go

very, very extreme. That far we shall not be able to come.

DR. BURG: I am very happy that the Minister for Foreign Affairs brought us back to the description of danger of war but also to the process of creating peace, if possible. I would like to say as a member of the governments of Israel since 1951, on and off, that this government is not less interested in peace than all the governments that we had before. When you mentioned the varieties of possibilities concerning Israel's security, you heard from our side something about what kind of major dangers minor modifications would mean for us. I wouldn't like to send you to Minnesota; for me it is enough in New York that Broadway is twice as long as Israel would be wide according to the '67 borders.

But I believe and we all believe that a modus vivendi with the Arab population and the Arab states can be worked out. For the first time, after 29 years anyhow, there was one Arab State which was prepared to speak out openly in favor of peace. If he really means it or not, we will know it. But anyhow up to today it didn't happen with any other Arab leaders. From that point of view that is something very hopeful that happened in our area. The question is: how we can proceed?

Anyhow, this government, as every responsible government, is more interested in avoiding a war than discussing the question of winning the war. In this we are all united and I only wanted to say this in order to give proper accent to what was said this afternoon. Thank you very much!

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Vice-President? Then we must remind ourselves that we have tonight a dinner - with speeches!

MR. MONDALE: We Parliamentarians, when we get together, it can go on and on. I used to tell Senator Humphrey that a speech didn't have to be eternal to be immortal (Laughter).

I want to thank you for what has been for me a most useful discussion. I am sure we could go into great detail in many of the aspects that were raised this afternoon. I look forward to our meeting tomorrow, Mr. Prime Minister, where I might bring up some additional points that I think may have some merit on this whole matter of seeking to resume negotiations. We seem to be together on the question of trying to get them resumed. It is in the context of negotiations that these issues are best resolved, when we are talking directly to the other side. Your agreement has to be with them and not with the United States. And if we can, together with their help, get into that negotiating posture, I think we are all the better for it.

Mr. Prime Minister, this morning, I lent to the Speaker two documents that are very important to our history and yours. One was the declaration by President Truman recognizing Israel, the first nation to do so, 14th of May, in his handwriting, with 6-10 underlined, which we are lending, the original document, for a year, together with a letter from Mr. Weizmann telling Truman to get going on the issue, both of which are very interesting documents, particularly the Truman document, because it tells us something what is

happening to public rhetoric. It was three sentences long, signed Harry Truman. Everybody could understand. They used simple, declarative sentences. Today the same declaration undoubtedly would be 50 pages with appendices and indices and cross references and so on. And we have copies of those two letters which we would like to give to you as a gift, and, of course, I also have a personal letter from President Carter to you that I would like to leave with you.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you! Anybody else. Our guests? My colleagues already took the floor. If one of our guests wants to do so, please do so.

If not, I will thank you, Mr. Vice-President, for this discussion. I think we had a very constructive conference. We exchanged views. We might have differences of opinion as there are between friends, but I think that the discussion was very serious. We shall continue tomorrow. We shall continue tonight and we shall continue tomorrow.

Mr. Vice-President, Gentlemen, thank you all very much for your visit, and I hope that we will meet again in two hours time again in the Knesseth. So I, with your permission, adjourn this meeting, expressing again our gratitude to the Vice-President and everybody who participated. It was a good meeting and thank you very much, Mr. Vice-President.

(Meeting adjourned at 5:40 p.m.)

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