

### **Extract from a meeting in Golda Meir's bureau, 9 October 1973**

Brig. Gen. Lior: There is a report from Simcha Dinitz. At 08:00 Simcha has a meeting with Kissinger. He is going to a difficult meeting together with Motta ([Shalev]). Simcha asks that before the meeting:

- A. before 08:00, to give him a serious paper;
- B. to settle things clearly with regard to equipment

The prime minister, Mrs. Meir: I want to bring up a crazy thought: what would be if, secretly, I with a suitable military man were to fly to Washington for 24 hours. What do I mean by that? To expose Nixon to the severity of the situation. This is what the Russians did. More than we have, we do not have. It's people's lives as against a Soviet array. I'll tell him: either you go with us and do this for us, but only with equipment. We have the whole list in our hands. The most difficult operation, is how to get [it] out and how to get there. We will look for a way. He might say: just sympathy. His self-pride may be awakened, [by] what they (the Russians) are doing to him. I do not promise myself successes, but it seems to me that outside of military action, it seems to me, without boasting, that this is the main card we can use with the Americans, and it may succeed. American tanks in Europe, so what does he do to us, why does he not give [them].

Minister Y. Galili: They do not see the situation. According to a report from yesterday, they do not know the situation. They think that within two to three days we will finish getting rid of the [Egyptian] outpost.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: Let an army man come, face to face, without complications, to clarify the situation to him. There is no objective necessity for us to be destroyed.

Defence Minister M. Dayan: Golda, we will not be destroyed.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: To tell him: We will not be destroyed, but it will cost us terribly.

Defence Minister M. Dayan: For six years the Russians crammed them with equipment and prepared them.

Prime Minister Ms. Meir: This is what I want to bring to his attention. I want to ask if this [idea] is completely insane.

Defence Minister M. Dayan: Yes. But it needs to be done.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: If it's not completely insane, I want Simcha to put this to Kissinger at 08:00, and to say: this is what I want. Totally incognito, secrecy. I will go and no-one will know. An army man will come with me. Our spirit was not broken, nor was the fighting spirit broken. The soldiers are Egyptians, but the whole formation is Russian. They prepared them for six years. All they could absorb, the Russians gave them.

Defence Minister M. Dayan: This is the most powerful missile system in the world. Even in Moscow there is nothing like it.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: I will leave without the government's knowledge. Confidentiality here is crucial. How do we do that, we'll think.

Minister Y. Galili: What do you want from him (from Nixon)?

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: Let him give everything he has. He has tanks in Europe, let him give them. We want Phantoms, let him give [them]. [He] will see it as his front, and not make us gasp for breath before he gives us a single Shrike [missile]. What I want is not to present him with a picture that we are collapsing. In Vietnam half a million soldiers – that is not [needed]! But [to send] the equipment, if he has tanks in the warehouses. He might say: Sorry, no. So well and good. I do not think so for some reason. Some people can be sent. But here, as in 1948, it seems to me, as I said to Ben-Gurion, I can do it. What would be if we asked Haig [the White House chief of staff] to come here incognito? Let him come here for 24 hours, visit the north and the south, hear the [situation] described and decide.

Minister Y. Allon: I propose to give both alternatives. Let him choose.

Defence Minister M. Dayan: You should ask that you go [to Washington] and then Haig will come to visit. Your conversation with Nixon and a visit from Haig is no substitute.

Minister Y. Galili: Kissinger should be asked.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: I suggest that at 08:00, in Simcha's meeting with Kissinger, he will tell him, in private, that I have come to the conclusion that a conversation with Nixon is necessary. If I go, I will go without the knowledge of the government. I will go and come back incognito. I have a feeling that I at a moment where I need a conversation with him and a feeling that he will understand. I will take with me someone who will explain the military matters to Haig. I need to talk to him out of appreciation for his friendship and I would not do that to anyone else. And I have the impression that a conversation between us is essential now. I would not want him to decide now. I do not want to make it easy for him by proposing Haig Not to let him choose. If I were he I would say let Haig go. I suggest that Simcha make an attempt. This is not contrary to tradition, the information that Simcha will convey.

[.....]

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: As for the 'crazy' idea, for God's sake, it stays here.

Lieut. General D. Elazar: I have no experience of what you tell Jews during a war. In incidents we tell the truth. In war it is forbidden to tell the whole truth. [We'll say that] we are attacking, etc. This thing needs to be considered. Yesterday I was a little optimistic. I spoke with more optimism. I want them to believe in the south that things are going well in the Golan and vice versa.

[.....]

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: If we need pilots, I am sure that Jews can be recruited. Quietly, of course.

Lieut.General D. Elazar: Not yet.

Minister Y. Galili: We need to prepare an explanation for what will happen in Damascus [an Israeli bombing raid]. He [Dinitz?] will see it already after Damascus.

Prime Minister Mrs. Meir: I even suggest that he see him [Kissinger] three or four hours after Damascus. I suggest he wake him up right after Damascus and before the meeting and tell him. That Simcha should know, should wake him up and tell him what and why and wherefore. We must maintain our relationship with him.