

Meeting between

Dr. Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State
and Delegation
Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
and Delegation

Wednesday morning, 2:50 A.M.
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Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

DR. KISSINGER: Let me report on my meeting with Assad. It took about four and one-half hours. I won't go into the issues, other than the central issue. We had an endless discussion again about the red line, and they took violent objection to the fact that what he had told me about foreign troops appeared in Ha'aretz and on the Arabic broadcasts of Kol Israel, and he said on this basis it is very difficult for them to believe in Israeli good faith and so on. I must report this and some of these matters that we are trying to do on this basis become almost unmanageable if we can't keep a minimum of confidence with him.

Well, let me talk now about the central issue. Frankly, I went there in order to construct a letter, that I 's tell him what the Israeli concerns were and that he would say he understood them and he would act accordingly, and I told the Prime Minister before I went what I thought might be attainable in that sense.

I said to him, I want to tell him formally and strongly that, first of all, what I was going to say publicly, that if attacks across the line by whoever were contrary to the cease fire,

that the cease fire could not survive if this turned into a Fedaheen area. That more than that: that I as the person who had had a role in convincing Israel in coming to this point could not take the responsibility in asking them to take the last step unless I understood what his intentions were with respect to the Fedayeen.

And I said to him, I would express my views to Israel in a memorandum based or in a letter based on this conversation. Well, it turned into an endless discussion. What I am reading from - because I thought this was sufficiently important - I talked to him only with my interpreter and no one else. I asked my interpreter, while I was seeing Gromyko to write down the essence of the conversation concerning the Fedayeen as he understood it.

I made some notes as he was talking and then I compared the two. I also told him that I couldn't justify myself 25,000 civilians returning to Kuneitra and then have that whole front blow up into a Fedayeen operation.

Now, these notes are more orderly than the conversation was. The conversation was more in circles that he'd raise one point and then I'd go back to it and then I'd sum up and so forth. First, he made a long explanation of why the question of Palestinians is a particular problem for the Syrians. First, because as a people without a country, without an identity and without any support from the world community, Damascus is a traditional center of Arab nationalism - I am just reading - could not publicly

dissociate themselves from them and he said the Israelis knew this very well, and this is why they were raising these points now in order to prevent a disagreement. I am just reporting to you. He said, there is a feeling of despair among them which leads to radical acts but this can be tempered by certain elements of their leadership with whom the Syrians are in contact.

Now, then, I said all of this is fine, but we need to know exactly what is going to happen at this front. What are your intentions and with respect to foreseeable events. And let me repeat again that I do not believe that the cease fire can survive or that it is consistent with the cease fire that this be used for Fedayeen activity.

He said, we have committed ourselves to the cease fire. We are serious about the cease fire. Two. We are anxious to do nothing to upset the cease fire or that any actions be caused which might upset the cease fire. We will be extra careful about the border areas, specifically there will be no fire across our front line into Israeli-held territory by anyone. There will be no stationing or launching sites in our front lines against Israeli-held territory. There will be no possibility for organized armed bands to cross into Israel. No Fedayeen will be, can be stationed in our front area, facing Israel. We cannot guarantee that individuals may not occasionally sneak through because we cannot have full control over all of this but we can make sure

that they do not come from the border area, so that they do not start from the border area. And he said, he cannot know that I convey anything to Israel, that these are the views as he gives me. (Reading from papers.)

My own notes are consistent with this. Crossing isn't going to happen. Groups cannot cross. Individuals should not cross. He just said, it is more difficult to prevent. Will not permit positioning on the front line.

I am repeating to you notes that I took, as he was going along.

All right, this is where we stand.

MRS. MEIR: Do I understand that you told him that you will convey that to us?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but I said I would do that, but he said he cannot - this is what he tells me he is going to do, and he said, if it becomes public it will be very difficult.

MR. ALLON: This is going to be a sort of official letter from Assad to you, a protocol?

DR. KISSINGER: No. That's all it is.

MR. ALLON: You mean, all the conversation for which minutes have been taken?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: You will convey that to us?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: In addition to the public statement?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

(Silence)

MRS. MEIR: Israelis don't talk?

MR. EBAN: That's obviously the maximum that we are going to get on this issue and we ought to meet and decide tomorrow on this point.

DR. KISSINGER: The thing that I find amazing, that yesterday I was asked to bring back a paper that he understood what I had said and that he would act accordingly. Now he has spelled out in a detail that I never thought was possible and it seems to present enormous -

MR. SISCO: Silence!

MR. PERES: You warned us not to talk about it, so we are not. (Laughter)

MR. ALLON: Of course, when one compares this to what you were promised yesterday, there is a progress which can really be very helpful, very. The only question is: what happens? Which may happen sooner or later that this sort of thing is leaked out and they may get embarrassed and deny or something like that. I mean, there will be no official statement and we will make efforts to keep it secret but as ^{we} all know in an open society, it happens, here and in America.

DR. KISSINGER: I would have thought that if responsible Israelis concerned with the result and not with the publicity, this is one of the secrets that a major effort should be made not

to get out, unless it is being violated. In that case, you have a different problem.

Secondly, I was told that - or one of the arguments I heard today was that what was happening as a result of this agreement was sort of a legitimized terrorism. The more I thought of this the stranger this argument seemed to me. First, you obviously will not accept the fact that terrorism is consistent with the cease fire. Secondly, you will get a public American statement saying that it is not consistent with the cease fire and an offer of political support.

And, thirdly, you have some rather detailed assurances, which are infinitely more detailed than the one that I was asked to produce; infinitely more detailed than the one that I was asked to produce.

MR. ALLON: You said earlier about his position on the present red line. What was the ultimate result? He accepted?

DR. KISSINGER: He accepted.

MR. DAYAN: May I say: do you think that we could get a letter from you, besides what you suggested would be said on behalf of your government, that you will also say something like that: that you have reason to believe that the Syrian so-and-so, that their interpretation or their understanding of the cease fire is that no crossing or things like that?

DR. KISSINGER: I am prepared to put what I have said here

into a letter to the Prime Minister and to add underneath it that the United States would feel an obligation if this were violated to call this violation to account, or something like that; that we could work out. I would do it with precision. I would like it as a secret letter. I do not want to -

MR. DAYAN: Can the Prime Minister say in public what I said, that she has reason to believe; when she will be asked what is the Syrian attitude about this point, could she say in public without mentioning the letter from you, that she has reason to believe that they understand and so on that the cease fire means it obliges the parties to prevent crossing or firing across?

DR. KISSINGER: They have promised me not to refute any public statement or the public statement you will read. They are very sensitive about having concluded with you against the ^{even} Palestinians/indirectly. This is their concern about saying that you have reason -

MRS. MEIR: For instance, something like this - just thinking aloud -

DR. KISSINGER: If you don't mention the Syrians. If you say, you have been given assurance or something like that. Do that it can be interpreted as if you have been given additional American guarantees, just as long as the Syrians are not mentioned.

MRS. MEIR: Something like this, for instance: after reading your official statement: either I volunteer or in the rebuttal and I hear all the nice things that Mr. Begin and General Sharon will

say, I will say that it is inconceivable that the United States would say this to us without reason to believing that this is what will happen, or something like that, that the cease fire will be kept. We have to work out something that we can say, something based on the public statement.

DR. KISSINGER: You can certainly say that it is inconceivable that they would say this to us without having said this to others as well. That's inherent in the nature of a public statement.

MRS. MEIR: We will have to -

DR. KISSINGER: You can say anything about assurances so long as they don't mention Syria.

MR. DAYAN: We can avoid mentioning Syria, but we are looking for a formula, trying, something like that: if the Prime Minister can say that she is sure that you wouldn't have said it unless you would have been assured that this is the only interpretation, without mentioning Syria; this is the only interpretation to the cease fire agreement. Not mentioning Syria but saying that this is the only interpretation.

MRS. MEIR: I understand that it is inconceivable that you would make a statement of this kind, that you would authorize to read out this statement unless there was a good basis for it.

DR. KISSINGER: Can't you just say that you have been given additional assurances?

MRS. MEIR: You want me to say that in the Knesset? That would be good.

MR. SISCO: "Unless there is a basis for it" is a very good phrase.

DR. KISSINGER: You see, the problem is it forces the Syrians to say something. If you say you have been given additional assurances, what then, what assurances?

MRS. MEIR: That we say, we will report to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is better than to make, to tie the Syrians to public interpretation. They promised me they wouldn't rebut it. Maybe they won't keep their promise.

MRS. MEIR: Moshe, I think to the Foreign Affairs Committee we have to give all the details?

DR. KISSINGER: But can they keep it? If they leak it, before the signing, it will blow sky high. I will guarantee it!

MR. DAYAN: If they leak it, it won't be an official leakage. I watched the television last night. They gave the actual, not very accurate, the full agreement, with forces, numbers of soldiers.

DR. KISSINGER: And I got violent objections.

MR. DAYAN: So have I.

DR. KISSINGER: It was in the Ha'aretz.

MR. PERES: I tried just to take out the problem of the Palestinians and terrorists which they didn't mention, neither on the radio or television.

MR. DAYAN: Well, anyway, ^{if}/somebody from the Foreign Affairs Committee, it will be like a piece of news in the paper with no

official headline.

MR. EBAN: Supposing you meet the committee on Friday morning?

MRS. MEIR: They won't let you.

MR. EBAN: And sign on Friday afternoon.

MR. DAYAN: Perhaps the Prime Minister can say about this that besides what has been published about it, further details were given to the press.

MRS. MEIR: Oh yes, in the Knesset, I wouldn't say anything more.

MR. DAYAN: But if you say that, besides what will be ^{would} announced publicly by the American letter, you/say that further details about this subject have been given and explained to the Committee.

DR. KISSINGER: That would be by far the best formulation from any point of view.

MR. DAYAN: So then it's all right.

MRS. MEIR: That's in the Knesset?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be best in the Knesset.

MR. DAYAN: You see what is happening to me at quarter past 3:00 in the morning?

AMBASSADOR KEATING: It doesn't solve the problem of a leak.

MR. DAYAN: That doesn't matter. It will not be an official leakage. What do you mean by leak from the Committee. It will say that some newspaperman will say something. Nobody of the

Committee will do it officially.

MRS. MEIR: Let me ask you something. Mota (Gur) maybe can answer that. Since this is security, pure security, can't there be a censorship of that in the press?

GEN. GUR: When we left the meeting in the afternoon, I was sitting with the spokesman and the censor. I am afraid, no. That is a political censorship. We were discussing all kinds of things that were published. I am afraid not.

MR. ALLON: Particularly if this will be first published abroad and then Israeli papers copy.

MRS. MEIR: What will be published? The secret letter won't be.

DR. KISSINGER: How could that possibly?

MR. ALLON: If a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee God forbid is giving more or less some details to the newspaperman who sends it first to an American or European paper; it appears there and then next morning they pretend to copy it.

DR. KISSINGER: It will blow sky high.

MR. DAYAN: We can manage.

MRS. MEIR: Let us say one thing - we will do everything - it is in our interest, after all - we will do everything possible that it should not leak and in the Knesseth, all I say is that additional information has been given to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

MR. DAYAN: Last time when we had the Egyptian agreement,

eventually or ultimately we did give them the documents. Not all of them and not right away. So we can manage that only after the signing of the agreement we will - Supposing you, or anybody goes, one of us goes to the Knesseth tomorrow and says, as for the documents, we will give it next meeting, something like that, and that will be after the signing, not right away. You can talk there generally.

MRS. MEIR: We will think it over. One thing you can be assured, as far as we are concerned, we will do everything possible.

DR. KISSINGER: I have every confidence.

MR. ALLON: One point which worries me: once you make a special reference to "further details will be given to the Committee" then the entire public and the press will begin to search what could be the additional details.

MRS. MEIR: Look, that I will say only -

MR. ALLON: You will say in your speech in the Knesseth.

MR. DAYAN: Not necessarily "further". The entire or the detailed agreement.

MRS. MEIR: All the details of the agreement have been brought before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

MR. DINITZ: Could we move the signature possibly for Thursday?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem we may have with the signature is when will we know whether the Cabinet approves it? About what time?

MRS. MEIR: Tomorrow morning. We meet at 7:30. Pretty soon!

DR. KISSINGER: What will the Cabinet announce after the meeting? That's another problem.

MR. EBAN: It will announce that agreement has been reached without announcing the specific points.

(General discussion.)

MR. ALLON: What would you suggest to say after the Cabinet? Let's assume we approve; what should we say?

DR. KISSINGER: I think you should give me an opportunity to inform Damascus and get their reply and check it. Say that you authorized me to convey an Israeli reply to Damascus and you will have a further announcement later in the day. If that's possible -

MR. DAYAN: There was an announcement from Damasuc on our radio at 1:00 oclock this morning, that agreement has been reached and except for one point, and that's the area between the lines, something like that.

DR. KISSINGER: Today I didn't talk to anybody. I made no statement to the press, and I told the people on my plane, who are going crazy, who yesterday were all reporting failure are today reporting the opposite. I gave them no information so that it wouldn't focus on terrorism. I said, several unresolved issued which I am discussing with the Israeli Dabinet.

MR. DAYAN: That was not on your behalf. They mentioned that you didn't say it. But a Syrian officially said after you left.

DR. KISSINGER: But that's not unhelpful.

MR. DAYAN: On the contrary. It sounded very good.

MR. ALLON: Let's assume that we are saying that we are very close to a successful conclusion of negotiations and we are expecting some further clarification today - and within a few hours -

DR. KISSINGER: That you have asked me to -

MR. ALLON: Something like that. Call it clarification.

DR. KISSINGER: That's good. And we can warn Damascus ahead of time why that's being done.

Now on the signing, if we are going to consider signing on Thursday, we have got to get a lot of things moving fast, and I don't know whether it is technically possible.

MR. SISCO: It is technically possible.

MRS. MEIR: Thursday night.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is preferable myself; don't you, Joe?

MR. ALLON: We have to have our Knesseth meeting during the day.

DR. KISSINGER: Assad would prefer it because he was very unhappy about publishing the documents a day and one-half before they would be signed. He said whether I believed it or not, this agreement would lead to a very intense and difficult debate in Syria and he didn't want to have the debate before it was already signed, and he preferred to get it signed and then he would have an accomplished fact. That makes sense. Therefore he implored me to implore you, he doesn't know anything, to have the Knesseth

secret (Laughter).

MRS. MEIR: The first preference is not to have a Knesseth but if we have to go to the Knesseth, then let's have it secret!

DR. KISSINGER: He has concerns on the following order: To get the documents, by which we mean the agreement, the UN protocol and the map, published only on the day the agreement is signed. That he feels very strongly about. Secondly, not to have the US proposal published. That's for the same reason.

MR. PERES: US proposal on thinning out of forces?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: We checked - we didn't bring it to the Knesseth also on the Egyptian agreement; only to the Committee.

DR. KISSINGER: Thirdly, on Fedayeen, he has the difficulties which I have read to you. So those are his concerns. If you are thinking of signing on Thursday, then we'd better get a cable off to him today and say that in light of his own concern with the Knesseth debate, we think it would be best to sign the document Thursday evening, in which case there would be no unwelcomed publicity to affect the document and then the documents could be published - and then we publish.

MRS. MEIR: It will be brought to the Knesseth -

DR. KISSINGER: When you bring something to the Knesseth, how do you do it? Do you give them the documents?

MRS. MEIR: Just a speech.

DR. KISSINGER: You don't hand them the document?

MRS. MEIR: No.

MR. RABIN: The last time it was handed -

DR. KISSINGER: It is important to get it clear. I think he would most prefer to get them published after signature. That is his strong preference which he repeatedly expressed.

MRS. MEIR: That's impossible. I thought we may do something like that: We may send our delegation to Geneva on Thursday with instructions, They don't sign until we signal to them that they may sign, which will be immediately after the Knesseth debate. Now, the Knesseth debate, I suppose, what will it be?

MR. RABIN: Four to six hours.

MRS. MEIR: If it is a four-hour debate, it means six hours. I have to introduce the debate. That's not included in the four hours. Then somebody has to close the debate on behalf of the government. That is not counted in the four hours. Then there is voting. That's six hours. If we start at 3 o'clock -

DR. KISSINGER: Then you can't sign on Thursday.

MRS. MEIR: We can start at 11 o'clock.

MR. PERES: Even 10:00.

MRS. MEIR: No. 11:00 o'clock. Then it is six hours, means 5 o'clock.

MR. DINITZ: 4 o'clock Geneva time.

MRS. MEIR: Then it means between 4:00 and 5:00 Geneva time they can sign.

DR. KISSINGER: Give a precise time, 5 o'clock Geneva time.
Can that be done?

MRS. MEIR: You see, our people will be there. They don't have to travel after the debate, but the instructions will be when they get a signal they sign.

DR. KISSINGER: Then we'd better get a cable off tonight to Assad saying that in light of his great concern not to have the documents published, except on the day of signature, Israel has agreed to sign on Thursday. If that's technically possible for him.

MRS. MEIR: Thursday late afternoon.

DR. KISSINGER: Then the debate would be on the same day as the signing and the documents would be published the same day as the signing. I think it would avoid a lot of trouble.

MRS. MEIR: Now, if we do that, then do we get our wounded POW's on Friday?

DR. KISSINGER: 24 hours after. The wounded prisoners are released 24 hours after. The other prisoners are released the morning after.

MR. ALLON: So this is Friday late afternoon.

MRS. MEIR: I got permission from Rafael and Burg even on Saturday.

DR. KISSINGER: You would get them, assuming the signature is set - can one set it for 6 o'clock; 5 o'clock Geneva time is 6 o'clock Israel time.

MR. EBAN: Let's make it 6 o'clock Geneva time.

DR. KISSINGER: All right, 6 o'clock Geneva time. Joe, you say we can do it, but you must recognize that we cannot get this thing into motion until an official announcement has been made and for a variety of reasons we won't be able to make an official announcement until tomorrow afternoon. Can we still do it?

MR. SISCO: Yes.

MR. MOW: We can put all the motions for the mechanics without any -

DR. KISSINGER: Can the UN? They have somebody there? Can they get somebody there in time?

MR. SISCO: Yes. We will send out a wire this morning and get someone there. Why don't you and I talk about it?

DR. KISSINGER: The Israelis may know how you can get somebody there between Wednesday morning and Thursday evening when you can't send out a cable until Wednesday afternoon.

MRS. MEIR: Do they have to come from New York?

MR. SISCO: They have got someone there.

MRS. MEIR: They have UN people there?

MR. SISCO: They may want someone else. You are going to have to send the cable shortly before the announcement. You are not going to wait until the announcement at 5 or 6 o'clock tomorrow night.

MR. DAYAN: May I say, even on Thursday, while everybody is there, if the actual signing will be postponed by two hours

because of technicalities, it doesn't matter.

DR. KISSINGER: That doesn't worry me. What worries me: to get the people there on time.

MR. EBAN: Would it matter to you if there is a ? in Geneva?

DR. KISSINGER: It doesn't worry me but worries some people that I have to worry about. Simha can explain it all to the Israeli delegation and Rabin. I have something that has to be taken into account here, and even with that, you think we can make it?

MR. SISCO: Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: My problem is: supposing they have to send somebody from New York, he'd have to be able to get on the evening plane at the latest in order to make it.

MRS. MEIR: Tomorrow is only Wednesday.

MR. EBAN: Where is Sillasvuo?

MR. SISCO: In Cairo, I think; so that will help.

DR. KISSINGER: I will send a cable to Assad tonight. We will have an answer by the time your Cabinet decision is made and then we will know. I will certainly have an answer very quickly.

MRS. MEIR: Good.

(General discussion)

DR. KISSINGER: Gromyko was very worrisome. He made a vicious speech about the Palestinians, worse than the worst speech I heard Assad make. Joe was with me. And he said, he can't sign anything;

we will urge him not to sign anything.

MR. ALLON: He told this to you?

DR. KISSINGER: If he said it to me, you can bet what he is saying to him. Then he said, moreover, I hope you aren't working out any private assurance with him, and he said, it is intrinsic in the Palestinians that there cannot be any promises because any country that makes a promise, first of all, it is technically impossible and secondly, any country that makes a promise makes itself a victim of attack or shifts the attack to some other country. Totally gratuitous. I didn't ask his opinion about the Palestinians. On the other hand, he is playing a pathetic role there.

MRS. MEIR: Is he staying at the guest house?

DR. KISSINGER: He is staying at another guest house. It was sort of pathetic. He had the whole evening free. I told him I'd stop by on the way to the airport. He must have had 600 press there waiting for us, and we talked for maybe 15 minutes, and that was it. He obviously didn't know anything about the contents of the agreement. Assad told me he hadn't shown him a map.

MR. ALLON: According to the press, I think he had a meeting with Arafat in Damascus?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right.

MR. ALLON: So maybe this is one of the reasons why he stressed the Palestinians.

DR. KISSINGER: The Russian strategy is: first, to get everything back to Geneva. Secondly, to get everything lumped together.

Thirdly, to pick an issue on which the United States cannot possibly do anything for the Arabs, namely the Palestinian issue and in which other Arabs cannot fail to support the Palestinians in order to push us out of our role. That is the Russian strategy.

(General discussion)

MRS. MEIR: Look, I want to tell you - we don't exchange compliments around this table, but since I feel terribly guilty on behalf of everybody that you had to make another trip to Damascus after you said you weren't going and it was compensated by a meeting with Gromyko. I want to tell you that we appreciate it very, very much. I know we took the pleasure of Mr. Sisco going alone -

DR. KISSINGER: It couldn't have been done any other way. I was very dubious when I went up there, but it is clear to me now that it couldn't have been done -

AMBASSADOR: KEATING: Assad kissed Sisco this time.

DR. KISSINGER: I wish he'd shave - Assad has been kissing me for three weeks. This time he kissed Sisco too.

(General discussion)

GEN. GUR: Before that, there should be a working group tomorrow about the maps.

DR. KISSINGER: Oh yes, for God's sake, I promised them something. I promised them that I would send up your 1:25,000 map.

GEN. GUR: We have it ready. I want it to be discussed between the working group. There is a problem about the map. There

is a different between the Syrian map and our map and they might go into discussion about the old purple line if we use their map and I think the best thing will be that Mr. Sisco or anybody will sit with Motke (Gazit) and to decide -

MR. SISCO: What is the problem so the Secretary will know.

GEN. GUR: The problem is that in the Syrian map, in the map that you brought from Syria, and our maps about the old purple line, there is a difference.

DR. KISSINGER: How much?

MR. SISCO: As to where it is located?

GEN. GUR: A few hundred yards in different places. This is something that we knew before and we had already all those discussions through the years. There is no use to go over all those discussions now because it doesn't have any connection with the changes that we did now. So we must be very explicit about the changes that we did during these negotiations without going into all discussions.

DR. KISSINGER: I told him - they are eager to get the map - I told him that any discussions about it really would have to take place in the military working group, but he said that they would appreciate it if they could have it in Damascus before their officers leave so that they could study it. I said I was going to send it to Geneva.

GEN. GUR: We have ten copies, Mr. Secretary. The problem is only that we decide here before we send the map that we are not going into discussions about the old purple line. If everybody understands that, then there is no problem, because we have already 10 copies ready and you can take them tomorrow and send them.

MR. SISCO: When you say 10 copies, are these copies different?

GEN. GUR: They are different because they are copies of our map.

DR. KISSINGER: As I understand, he is saying it does not affect any changes that came about as a result of the negotiation. So, therefore, if there are differences in the purple line other than those negotiated, then it is between you and the Syrians. We have absolutely nothing to do with this, if it doesn't affect the location -

GEN. GUR: There won't be any -

DR. KISSINGER: If the Rafid salient doesn't disappear as a result of it!

MR. SISCO: How soon can we get those?

GEN. GUR: They are ready.

MR. DINITZ: You had another point that you wanted to mention about the change in the text of the agreement to demilitarize zone.

DR. KISSINGER: This is partly my fault in not keeping notes properly. They wanted in the US proposal the same

terminology as in the agreement. In the agreement it says, "The area between Line A and Line A-1 will not have any military forces."

GEN. GUR: That's right.

DR. KISSINGER: So in the agreement they want to say, that the area of separation between Line A and Line B will not have any military forces. They want to have the same phraseology; one, to make it consistent with the other document and, two, because they say it translates very badly to say demilitarized.

MR. DAYAN: But on Mount Hermon there will be an additional -

DR. KISSINGER: The Mount Hermon thing is not affected. This is just to replace the word "demilitarized" with the words "not any military forces." Any other provision remains exactly the same.

I told the Prime Minister, the Syrians are sending a General and a Colonel to Geneva.

One other thing - I don't know whether we reported that to you - the proposal will be signed by their Chief of Staff. The US proposal about thinning out.

MR. EBAN: That will be done where?

MRS. MEIR: That they will do in Damascus?

DR. KISSINGER: The way this will be done: their chief of staff will sign it in Damascus. Our Chief of our Interests Sections - I have positioned him there - and he will give it to Khaddam tomorrow. He will deliver the signed document to him, what we were going to say Friday morning, now it will have to be Thursday, and we will be notified and that will then complete the process.

MRS. MEIR: All documents will be signed by military, is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. ALLON: But this particular one will be signed by the Chief of Staff?

DR. KISSINGER: The one in Geneva will be signed by the General they are sending there.

GEN. GUR: Is it a major general?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know. They said a general officer and a colonel will go to Geneva. In the thinning out agreement, it will be signed by the Chief of Staff. I mean the US proposal will be signed by the Chief of Staff in Damascus. And then we will handle it the same as Egypt. They will send it to us.

MR. DINITZ: That will be instead of the President. In the Egyptian agreement, the President signed it.

DR. KISSINGER: They want to treat it as a military thing. I had it for one happy half-hour at the foreign minister level but then Khaddam protested that he was not the proper official for thinning out.

MR. DAYAN: We will have to tell the Red Cross to get ready, if they are to take the prisoners on Friday. We have to make some preparations. What time the wounded will be -

DR. KISSINGER: 24 hours after signing.

MR. DAYAN: And the others?

MRS. MEIR: The others are the morning after.

MR. DAYAN: After the committee.

DR. KISSINGER: I have got the names of our Arabs he wants released. They look like hard cases to me. He made it clear that this is not - but they have not exactly short sentences, one 24 yrs, one life, one 35 years. I guess bicycle thieves! I have now transmitted it to you (handing paper).

MR. ALLON: Maybe we can get the Jewish community out.

DR. KISSINGER: He didn't know any of them. He said they were published in the Beirut newspaper and that's how they came to his attention.

(General discussion)

DR. KISSINGER: We will then send a telegram to Assad now and Simha, will you go with me to get that letter prepared? We will send a cable to Assad saying that for the reasons he gave us about publication and the impossibility really of avoiding a Knesseth debate, we recommend that the signing be Thursday evening; that Israel has agreed.

MRS. MEIR: I am thinking now, maybe we should move the Knesseth meeting forward an hour, if we have to get the prisoners back 24 hours later.

MR. PERES: I think 9 o'clock in the morning we can call the Knesseth, on Thursday morning.

DR. KISSINGER: Sign 5 o'clock.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 3:45 a.m.)