The Road to Oslo: The Secret Negotiations Between Israel and the PLO, January-September 1993

ב.1 | Introduction

In June 1992, elections for the Knesset were to be held in Israel, and Yitzhak Rabin, the Labour Party leader, pledged to reach an agreement with the Palestinians within six to nine months. In April 1992 Yossi Beilin, head of the dovish “Mashov” group in the Labour Party and a prominent supporter of Shimon Peres, Rabin’s rival, met with Terje Rød Larsen, head of the Norwegian Institute for Social Sciences (FAFO) which had carried out research on Palestinian society. Larsen’s wife, Mona Juul, worked at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. According to Beilin in his book “Touching Peace” (1997), they agreed on a plan to establish an unofficial channel for talks with the Palestinians after the elections in order to advance the peace process.

The Labour Party won the elections and Rabin was elected Prime Minister. At that time, the talks with Palestinian representatives from Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip that began following the Madrid Conference (1991) were still being held in Washington. In the talks, an interim agreement based on autonomy, elections for a Palestinian Authority and negotiations on a permanent agreement after a transitional period were discussed. Disagreements emerged regarding the size of the Palestinian Council and its powers, reflecting the Palestinian fear that the interim agreement and the establishment of autonomy would become the permanent solution, as planned in Menachem Begin’s original autonomy proposal. Without open support from the PLO and its chairman, Yasser Arafat, there was no real progress in Washington.

Rabin’s speech in the Knesset on presenting his government, 13 July 1992

Prime Minister Rabin and Shimon Peres had competed for many years for the leadership. After the victory, Peres became Foreign Minister and they reached an agreement on joint activities, but Rabin excluded Peres from the main channels of the peace process – contacts with the Americans on an agreement with Syria and the talks with the Jordanians and the Palestinians in Washington. Peres and Beilin, who became Deputy Foreign Minister, were left with the field of multinational talks on regional issues such as the water problem and the Palestinian refugees. To expand the participation of the Palestinians in these talks, Peres turned to Egypt. In November 1992, Peres proposed to President Hosni Mubarak to establish autonomy in Gaza first before expanding the process to Judea and Samaria. (The Egyptians made this proposal back in the 1970s, after the signing of the Camp David Accords). Arafat did not reject the idea.

Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, 2018. Pthotograph: Wikimedia

In December 1992, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli academic and Beilin’s partner in the Economic Cooperation Fund (ECF), a research body  to promote peace that sought to influence government policy, met in London with Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei), one of the leaders of the PLO and the head of its economic department, and Afif Safieh, the PLO representative in the UK. Abu Ala came to London as part of the steering committee of the multinational talks, and the meeting was made possible following contacts between Beilin and Hirschfeld and the Palestinian activist Hanan Ashrawi and Larsen. This meeting led to the opening of a dialogue between Hirschfeld and his student and fellow-academic, Ron Pundak, a former member of the security establishment, and the PLO in January 1993.

These talks were at first unofficial ones, and even after official representatives joined them  in May 1993, they remained secret and so far no record of them has been found in the government  files at the Israel State Archives. However, the Archives recently received a collection of documents on the “Oslo Process” from Dr. Hirschfeld, along with many additional documents on the activities of the ECF. It is now possible for the first time to get a first-hand picture of the negotiations in Norway and the path to the Declaration of Principles on an interim agreement and to mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The process was preceded by talks between Hirschfeld and Beilin and Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, which began in 1989 following the first Intifada. The leaders were Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, who became members of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks. They were affiliated with the PLO but not official members of the organization. Among other meetings, in 1989 “proximity talks” between Palestinians and Israelis, including Hirschfeld and Beilin, were held in The Hague, the capital of the Netherlands, which also served as a prelude to the Oslo process. These meetings, along with contacts with pro-Jordanian residents of the territories, are documented in the Hirschfeld collection

In this chapter we present a selection of unpublished sources from the collection. The files on the Oslo Agreement have been scanned and appear on the ISA website (mainly in Boxes P 5513, P 5514). They include minutes of the meetings, drafts of the agreement, reports to Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres and records of internal meetings of the Israeli negotiators. High-level talks in which Prime Minister Rabin took part are not included in the collection, and on this subject we have used secondary sources. Dr. Hirschfeld also gave the Archives a collection of “Appointment Diaries” including handwritten notes he made during the talks. Transcripts of some of them are in the scanned collection. With the kind help of Dr. Hirschfeld, we also deciphered and transcribed a conversation that was not previously printed, which appears in the selection given here.

One of the Hirschfeld diaries

For links to data on all the files in the collection uploaded to date, see here.

ב.2 | The Back-Channel Talks in Norway: January-May 1993

The first page of notes on the meeting with Hanan Ashrawi in Hirschfeld’s diary

Hanan Ashrawi

The talks in Washington did not progress, even though agreements could be reached on certain issues. Echoes of the difficulties appear in the conversations of Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak with Faisal al-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi. At the end of November 1992, Hirschfeld met with Ashrawi and heard about the positions of the parties (Transcription, Document No. 1). In retrospect, it is clear that despite her complaints about the attitude of the Israeli representatives, it was Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis who were not interested in allowing the local residents to reach an agreement with Israel.

In File P 5821/2 a fading fax message from Pundak to Beilin reporting Hirschfeld’s comments on his meeting with Abu Ala ansd Safieh, described as “friends” of Hanan, provides the earliest evidence about the nascent “unofficial channel”. Already then Hirschfeld noted that the Palestinians were “looking for an anchor of salvation” against the background of the rise of extremist elements and their fear of losing control in the territories to the Hamas Islamic movement. They discussed a proposal for a declaration of principles. According to Abu Ala in his memoirs, Hirschfeld proposed informal negotiations in Norway.

Hirschfeld reported on the contacts in London to Daniel Kurtzer, a member of the US State Department, and won his support, on condition that the secret channel would not harm the talks in Washington but rather strengthen them. The talks were also conducted with the approval of Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas), the PLO leader responsible for contacts with the Israelis, and he prepared a 10-point proposal on an interim agreement and the establishment of a temporary Palestinian Authority for Abu Ala before the meeting

In December 1992, Prime Minister Rabin decided to exile 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives to Lebanon in response to a number of terrorist acts, most notably the murder of Border Policeman Nissim Toledano. Lebanon refused to accept the deportees, and there was an outcry in Israel and abroad about the legality of the move. The Palestinians in Washington left and the talks were frozen. Rabin agreed to allow Peres to meet with Faisal Husseini, and on January 9, 1993, with Hirschfeld’s encouragement, Peres met with Husseini and asked to renew dialogue with the Palestinians. Husseini raised a series of demands and concessions from Israel (Document No. 2). The next day, Hirschfeld met with Ashrawi and received from her an internal Palestinian document with 13 points that could serve as a basis for a preliminary agreement between the parties. Like Abu Mazen’s proposal, they focused on the establishment of a temporary Palestinian Authority and the transfer of powers to it (Document No. 3).

At the time of Hirschfeld’s meeting in London, a law prohibiting contacts with the PLO was still in force. In January 1993, it was repealed and secret talks began in Norway between Hirschfeld and Pundak, who acted with Beilin’s knowledge, and representatives of the PLO, led by Abu Ala. According to Beilin, he preferred not to inform Peres, who would be obliged to tell Rabin, but it seems that the Palestinians believed that the Israeli government was behind the delegation. In Pundak’s memoirs, based on a diary he kept, he claims that they believed he was Rabin’s representative and Hirschfeld was Peres’ representative. Pundak himself was open to more far-reaching proposals than Hirschfeld, who took into account the internal constraints of the government

On January 21, 1993, the first meeting was held between Hirschfeld and Pundak and Abu Ala in Sarpsborg, a small town near Oslo (See Abu Ala’s opening statement, Document No. 4). Hassan Asfur, Abu Mazen’s political advisor who was familiar with the Washington talks, and Maher al-Kurd, who knew English well and was close to Arafat, also took part. In a speech in Arabic translated by al-Kurd, Abu Ala called on Israel to act to reduce the influence of the extremists (he seems to have meant mainly Hamas and the rejectionist organizations) and Iran. A way must be found to improve the Palestinians’ lives and convince them that the path of negotiations could succeed. The deadlock in Washington was leading to disappointment. Abu Ala proposed a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip within two years, the establishment of an international trusteeship to govern it in the meantime and an initiative for a “Marshall Plan” for its economic rehabilitation based on joint projects. This message, confirmed by Arafat, was passed on to Beilin immediately after the talks. Abu Ala also suggested confidence building measures (CBMs) and steps to make progress in the multilateral talks.

In their report to Beilin (Document  5), Pundak and Hirschfeld wrote that the submission of a proposal that took into account Israel’s needs was a turning point. It would allow disengagement from Gaza and progress towards regional cooperation and did not require Israel to discuss the permanent settlement immediately. The PLO would gain greater involvement in the negotiations and could renew the dialogue with the United States. The Palestinians emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy. The plan would be presented at the first stage as an “American initiative”. The talks were held with the knowledge of the Norwegian government, which hosted and supported them.

Borregaard Manor, near Sarpsborg, where the first rounds of talks were held. Photograph: Wikimedia

At the second meeting in Sarpsborg in February, the two Israelis proposed a first draft of a declaration of principles (DOP) for an interim agreement (see File P 5513/4). This proposal was based on ideas raised in Washington and in previous talks. According to Beilin, he wanted to separate the elections for the Palestinian Authority from withdrawal from Gaza, and to fix the opening of talks on the permanent settlement two years after the signing of the interim agreement. Beilin was not involved in the drafting but approved it afterwards. According to Hirschfeld’s memoirs, the impact of the draft was dramatic and the Palestinians realized that the document could serve as a basis for an interim agreement and the establishment of Palestinian self-government. The parties quickly reached an agreed formula for talks on the DOP according to the guidelines proposed by Hirschfeld. In an evaluation sent to Beilin on February 18, he wrote that the Palestinians’ latest proposal indicates that “the Palestinian leadership is today determined (and desperate) to reach a breakthrough agreement with Israel.” According to messages passed on by the Norwegians, the leadership of the PLO confirmed the agreements reached and was ready to show flexibility on questions that had not yet been agreed upon. In his opinion, there are immediate achievements for Israel along with long-term strategic ones – the replacement of the military occupation regime in cooperation with the Palestinians and withdrawal from Gaza. Hirschfeld suggested that Beilin update the Prime Minister and involve the Prime Minister’s Office in the talks (Document No. 6)

Peres and Hirschfeld’s meetings with Husseini and Ashrawi, with Arafat’s knowledge, continued at the same time, and Husseini requested that Israel give up its deportation policy in accordance with Security Council Resolution 799 of December 1992. In response Peres called for a statement from the PLO against violence.

At the beginning of March Beilin told Peres about the existence of the Norwegian channel, and a team was formed in which Beilin, Avi Gil and Shlomo Gur, Peres’ advisors, also participated. The talks also received Prime Minister Rabin’s approval in March, (according to Beilin, this was in a private conversation which was not recorded), but he did not have great expectations from them. Rabin knew that there was no alternative to talks with the PLO and according to Pundak’s book, he had heard this assessment from the head of Military Intelligence Uri Sagi. He had already informed the Americans of this, but was reluctant to take practical steps. Rabin was resistant to new ideas and preferred  the Washington talks and the Syrian channel sponsored by the US, but the Israeli participants in the Oslo channel could assume that if Rabin was convinced that it could succeed, he would adopt it.

At this stage, there was talk of establishing a temporary trusteeship regime in Gaza.  In a meeting with Peres on March 16, he said that he did not believe that the Egyptians would agree to take on this task. He even proposed for the first time the return of the PLO leadership from Tunis to the Gaza Strip. Later, he told Pundak that in view of the intelligence reports and the Israeli position papers he was getting on the Palestinian position, he was very surprised by Hirschfeld’s and Pundak’s reports and was sceptical at first. But once he was convinced that there was a real change in the Palestinians’ position, he became enthusiastic.

On March 21, a first joint draft of the Declaration of Principles, the “Sarpsborg Document”, was reached (Document No. 7, Document No. 7A).

The first page of the 21 March draft, File P 5514/1, p. 5

Hirschfeld told the Palestinians that they would submit it to the government and there was a chance that the channel would receive official approval. In a report in English to Beilin, he and Pundak proposed obtaining official approval for the talks and determining principles and a coordinated strategy for negotiations in preparation for the next meeting (File P 5514/1, pp. 28-25). They felt that if they received clearer instructions, an agreement could be reached in a short time. This seemed even more urgent in view of the growing wave of Palestinian terrorism and the imposition of a general closure on the territories, which was causing great damage to the Palestinian economy.

In another meeting with Peres on March 24, Hirschfeld summarized the understanding reached in Sarpsborg: “An Israeli-Palestinian agreement must be built on the following equations: instead of economic dependence, economic cooperation; instead of an Arab boycott, the Palestinians will become a main driving force for regional cooperation; instead of ongoing security problems, a joint struggle against terrorism; and instead of direct Israeli control over the territories, control through cooperation” (File P 5513/5).

Rabin agreed to continue the negotiations in Norway, but at his request, it was decided that the Israeli delegation would not participate in further talks until the talks in Washington were resumed. They did not inform the Palestinians of the real reason for the delay, but claimed that it was a technical one (see Beilin-Larsen talk, Document No. 8). Beilin rejected Larsen’s offer to him to join the talks, but gave Larsen to understand that Rabin would decide the fate of the talks and was involved in setting the date of the next meeting

 In an update with Kurzer on April 13, he criticized Elyakim Rubinstein, the head of the Israeli team in Washington, and praised the talks in Norway. The Americans were still reluctant to have any formal contact with the PLO, but the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Jan  Egeland, kept them updated on a secure phone. In Kurzer’s opinion, the position of the leadership in Tunisia was more moderate than the official position in Washington, and they should be strengthened and offered a gesture in exchange for amendments to the Sarpsborg document (File P 5513/7). Meanwhile the Palestinians had also informed the Egyptians about the progress in the talks and gave them a copy of the Sarpsborg Document (Hirschfeld to Beilin, 6 April 1993, File P 5514/2).

The Israeli move was successful and Arafat forced the Palestinian delegation in Washington to return to the talks, as Pundak and Hirschfeld wrote to Peres. They noted the advantages of the channel for both sides and the Palestinians, and the support of the Americans and Egypt and asked for instructions for the fourth meeting to take place in Norway at the end of the month. On April 25 and 27, meetings were held with Peres, (the second was also attended by Uri Savir, the new director general of the Foreign Ministry). Peres gave Pundak and Hirschfeld his blessing, asked them to concentrate on economic issues and commented “Rabin knows about everything. I read him the papers” (meeting on April 25, Document  No. 9). At this meeting, Peres said that he had heard for the first time from Mubarak about the Palestinian demand for an enclave in Jericho. He pointed out problematic clauses in the Sarpsborg document that should be removed, especially giving Jerusalem residents the right to be elected to the Authority Council. Peres also said that he was ready to move towards a comprehensive agreement if the ultimate goal was a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. In these meetings, according to Pundak, Peres became the driving force behind the Oslo process

At the next meeting in Oslo at the end of April, moves were agreed with the PLO delegation about the next round of the multilateral talks in Rome, which were effective. The Palestinian representatives in the Rome talks enabled the establishment of a trust fund for the Middle East to encourage joint regional investment. They thus proved the usefulness of the Norwegian Channel.

In the April meeting Abu Ala also brought up the enclave in Jericho and emphasized its importance in order to convince the internal opposition that the leadership was not selling out the West Bank in exchange for control of Gaza. According to Pundak and Hirschfeld’s report, for the leadership in Tunisia led by Arafat, Abu Mazen and Abu Ala, the success of the channel  and signing a “package deal” has become “almost a personal test” of leadership and honour and they will be ready to make concessions to achieve it (File P 5513/7) p. 178).

The hesitations of Rabin, who preferred the framework in Washington, prevented rapid progress. However, following another meeting in Oslo and the intervention of the new Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, who participated in some of the meetings, Faisal al-Husseini was returned to the team in Washington, at the request of the Israelis and the Americans (Report to Peres and Beilin, 11 May 1993, P5514/2). A multilateral meeting in Oslo on the subject of refugees was also successful, with the help of Abu Ala and the Norwegians. Again the dialogue with the Palestinians proved its effectiveness.

Johan Jørgen Holst, then serving as Defence Minister, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 16, 1993. Wikipedia.

As the meetings progressed, the differences between the parties regarding the draft statement of principles were narrowed down, problematic issues were postponed to the permanent settlement and a gradual transfer of the powers of the military government to the Palestinian Authority was proposed, in coordination and cooperation with Israel. Tthe Palestinians now demanded an authoritative response from Israel. The time had come for official representatives to enter the talks. According to Beilin, since ten months had already passed since the formation of the government and there was no real progress elsewhere, Rabin approved the move. According to Pundak, Peres himself wanted to go to meet with PLO representatives, but Rabin preferred to send a senior official – Uri Savir.

ב.3 | Uri Savir and Joel Singer join the talks

Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister, and Uri Savir, his media adviser, in 1985. Photograph: Chanaiah Herman, GPO

On May 20, Uri Savir, who was very close to Peres, joined the talks. Savir was asked by Peres to find out how serious the Palestinians were and to clarify the proposal on Jericho. (On April 14, Mubarak had sent a message to Rabin that the Palestinians would be ready to accept the proposal of “Gaza first” if it included Jericho, and Rabin understood that it involved control of the bridge over the Jordan near Jericho, which Israel opposed.) Savir should emphasize that Israel opposed the inclusion of Jerusalem and international arbitration in the DOP.

 Although he had never previously dealt with Middle East issues, Savir quickly became involved, and on May 22 he sent a positive report to Peres (Document No. 10; a transcript of the meeting is in the Hirschfeld Diary). In the talks Savir emphasized that Israel had not yet accepted the draft declaration and further negotiations were needed. The Palestinian side argued that an agreement would open the way for economic and regional cooperation, and for security arrangements, including Israeli withdrawal and demobilization, and disbanding the terrorist organizations with the entry of a strong Palestinian police into the territory. Savir attached to his report ten points for immediate implementation and suggested the continuation of the talks, including the preparation of annexes on security and economic issues. Pundak and Hirschfeld also made a report, emphasizing the need for rapid progress, in view of the closure of the territories, the isolation of Jerusalem and the deterioration of the economic situation, which led to increasing pressure on the delegation in Washington (File P 5513/7, p. 146). They even suggested completing the negotiations on a DOP and its formulation during the next round of talks, at the same time as the talks in Washington, and recommended that experts be brought in, including a jurist – lawyer Joel Singer

Singer, who was working for a private firm in Washington, had served as the legal advisor to the Israeli defence establishment and participated in talks with Egypt and Lebanon. He established the Civil Administration for Ariel Sharon in 1981 and was known as a tough professional who enjoyed Rabin’s trust. Later he was appointed legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If he recommended the continuation of the contacts, there was a good chance that Rabin would accept his opinion.

In early June, Singer arrived in Israel and heard from Hirschfeld about the negotiations so far. (See Hirschfeld’s summary, June 2, 1993, File P 5514/7). Hirschfeld emphasized that with the signing of the DOP, the Palestinians would accept the principle of the interim agreement and thus the interim period would begin. He expressed hope that the agreement would strengthen the moderate camp among the Palestinians and that they would have an interest in restraining the extremists in order to ensure further withdrawals and progress towards the permanent settlement. Singer’s positive report was recorded in a letter to Peres (Document No. 11). Singer pointed out several “holes” (lacunae) and unclear wording in the draft, proposed several alternatives for the government in Gaza after the Israeli evacuation and concluded “if these changes are introduced into the agreement, and the other side accepts them, the proposed agreement can serve as the basis for a real breakthrough”

In another document, Singer presented additional demands Israel should make to the Palestinians, including the ending of the Intifada, the amendment of the Palestinian Covenant and the establishment of security cooperation. To achieve this, Singer supported the idea of ​​mutual recognition with the PLO – which was also necessary to ensure that the Palestinians would accept legal responsibility for the implementation of the agreement. However Rabin and Peres opposed it, and Singer was forced to propose it as his “private” suggestion.

On June 7, Peres received a letter from Rabin (which was published in the “Maariv” newspaper in 2003) with a demand to stop the talks in Oslo. There are various theories about the origin of the crisis. Savir thought that Rabin was angry about his ten-point document, and it is possible that Rabin, who did not trust the information he received from Peres, suspected him and the negotiators of wanting to sabotage the Washington talks. Hirschfeld and Pundak wrote a letter to Peres about the merits of the understanding reached by the Oslo process, in contrast to the proposals discussed in Washington. As part of a “give and take” deal, the Palestinians would receive self-government and a move towards negotiations on the permanent settlement, in exchange for an end to terrorism and the implementation of a security plan, and local and regional cooperation. Attached to the document was a detailed schedule starting with the next meeting in Oslo, the signing of the DOP and  the implementation of the agreement, up to the opening of the negotiations on the permanent settlement (see File P 5513/7). Peres wrote an explanatory letter to Rabin, and  Rabin relented and agreed that Singer would go to the next meeting in Oslo and propose to the Palestinians to amend the document. According to Pundak, the crisis contributed to Rabin’s increasing involvement in the process and acceptance of the main idea. He began regular meetings with Peres, Beilin and Singer.

On June 13, Singer and Abu Ala met in Oslo and began to discuss issues such as the elections to the Palestinian Authority and its powers (a minute apparently made by Hirschfeld on June 14 is in File P 5513/1). Singer asked about arrangements for implementation of the agreement in practical areas – education, taxation and more. (In fact, these issues were not agreed before the signing of the DOP and many months passed until the Cairo Agreement and the Protocol of Paris on economic issues were signed in May 1994. See the publication on the Cairo Agreement).

Singer requested changes in the wording of the Declaration to make it acceptable to Israeli public opinion. An important discussion was held on the responsibility for internal security. Abu Ala claimed that the Palestinian side needed a strong police force to protect public institutions and control extremist groups. Singer asked to specify that Israel would be responsible for external  security and Abu Ala proposed an annex on security matters. The Palestinian police would act in coordination with Israel and would be trained in Egypt and Jordan. He hinted that the Palestinians wanted to postpone the Palestinian Authority elections for six to nine months and that the withdrawal from Gaza should take place before the elections. Gaza needed aid for development, employment and investments. Abu Ala summed up his position: “Without security everything will collapse and without [handling the] economy there will be no security.” Singer explained Israel’s opposition to trusteeship and Abu Ala said that the decision was up to Israel. In fact, the trusteeship idea was dropped.

Singer argued that the draft DOP contained many unclear sentences. The explanations he heard from Abu Ala were reasonable, but the understandings must be formalized. He proposed to draft an “agreed interpretation” and Abu Ala did not reject the proposal. Singer promised to report to the leadership in Jerusalem and added that he believed the final wording would require several weeks of work. The Palestinians were concerned by his searching cross-examination and anxious for some immediate progress.

On June 15, Singer sent a report on the meeting to Rabin and Peres. He pointed out that in fact the Palestinians now agreed to Israel’s position that the interim settlement would not apply to the Israeli settlements, the IDF and the security zones and East Jerusalem. He explained their proposal for the gradual transfer of civil powers in various areas. The IDF would continue to be responsible for external security and would reorganize its forces as it chose. If there was no trusteeship in Gaza, the Palestinians would need assistance to overcome the opposition. They would also need the return of the leadership from Tunis. Elections to the Palestinian Authority would only be held after the withdrawal. Singer added that if Israel wanted, the PLO was ready to sign a public agreement including an end to the Intifada and terrorism, recognition of Israel and a declaration that the Palestinian Covenant was invalid, and more. Singer asked for permission to continue negotiations on the drafting of the agreement and the understandings. At this stage it was still assumed that the DOP would be presented to the delegations in Washington as an American proposal (Document No. 12).

Singer began work on a revised statement of principles, which was approved by Rabin, and an agreed interpretation. He again recommended the signing of a document of mutual recognition. On June 28, another meeting was held with Abu Ala in Oslo, after Singer’s departure was postponed due to Rabin’s wish to read the documents. The Palestinians reacted angrily to reports of another secret channel between Minister Ephraim Sneh and Nabil Sha’ath. Singer reassured them that he was in direct contact with Rabin, who had gone  through the documents sentence by sentence: “Starting today, I saw Rabin this morning, Rabin understands that [what we are doing] here is it.” Singer emphasized that both sides agreed to the main idea of ​​the statement, but clarifications were needed. He demanded a series of amendments that alarmed the Palestinians. They also discussed a list of questions sent by Arafat, and it turned out that Arafat agreed to the preparation of a special security agreement for Gaza and Jericho (see the minutes in File P 5513/7).

On July 3 to 6, marathon meetings were held in Norway to reach an agreed formulation of the DOP. After the Palestinians overcame their original objection to reopening  the document, the parties managed to reach an agreed text with the exception of a few clauses. However it seemed that Abu Ala was very worried about the reaction of the leadership in Tunisia.

Hirschfeld’s diary shows talks with Rabin and Peres on 8-9 July 1993. According to Pundak, Singer tried to explain to Rabin the meaning of the clauses in legal language, and he had also to overcome his basic suspicion – of the PLO and Arafat, and also of Peres and Beilin. At this point, Rabin began to correct the wording himself. Since he would be responsible for presenting  the agreement to the government, the public and the army, they tried to give weight to his opinions. Both contributed to the final result –  Peres provided the vision and Rabin the details and the security dimension.

ב.4 | Crisis with Arafat: July 1993: "Where there is a will, there is a way".

The first page of Arafat’s letter, 11 July 1993. File P 5514/3

Arafat was also required to change his role – from an ideologue and leader in exile to the head of the Palestinian Authority. At this point, a crisis developed with the Palestinians, described by Pundak as “a battle of giants, by means of emissaries, between Arafat and Rabin.” According to Hirschfeld, the Palestinians were testing whether additional concessions could be gained, especially on the question of recognizing the PLO. During the meetings on July 10-12, two letters were sent by Arafat to the Israeli delegation. The first was read out by Abu Ala on July 11. In it Arafat stresses the importance of an immediate Israeli withdrawal and his own return to Gaza, and offers to provide guarantees of the PLO’s serious intentions (Document No. 13). The Palestinians also put forward a series of new demands and proposals for changes in the DOP (see Files P 5514/3, P 5513/2). Although the wording of the letter was moderate, according to the report by Hirschfeld and Pundak (Document No.14), this was “the most difficult meeting of all the ten meetings that have taken place so far in the Norwegian channel”. But it was an important one in which Israel’s red lines became clear.

One of the new demands was for withdrawal from Gaza and the entire Jericho district immediately after the DOP came into force and Arafat’s immediate return to Gaza. The Palestinians also demanded an extensive transfer of powers and control of the borders. Led by Savir, the Israelis rejected the demands and made it clear that these were not cosmetic improvements as they claimed, but fundamental changes in the DOP. Israel did not intend to enter into negotiations on them and they must return to the last draft. The official talks were halted, but there were personal talks mediated by Larsen and consultations with Abu Mazen and Arafat. A second letter was dictated by Arafat on the telephone about his commitment to the talks. The text appears in Abu Ala’s memoirs (pp. 198-199) but was not found in Hirschfeld’s files (Abu Ala does not relate to the first letter).

Arafat’s comments on the July 6 draft of the DOP, File P 5513/2

The final meeting was chaired by Savir and Abu Ala, who had planned it in advance. Abu Ala announced that he would return to Tunis in order to convince Arafat to focus his demands and change the wording. Savir emphasized that the current draft was already a far-reaching compromise by Israel. It was agreed that at the next meeting the Palestinians would make an effort to bring an acceptable  draft, but in addition, the conditions for the return of the Palestinian leaders to Gaza and the security principles demanded by Rabin must be clarified. In their report, Hirschfeld and Pundak added that they learned much from the crisis about the decision-making process in the PLO, the influence of Egypt on Arafat and the negative attitude towards their leader among the Palestinians themselves. These factors, with the visit of the Norwegian foreign minister to Tunis, might lead to a more realistic position on the part of the PLO.

With this visit Holst became a mediator rather than a facilitator. On July 17, Peres and his team, Beilin, Savir, Hirschfeld and Pundak met with Larsen and Mona Juul who had accompanied Holst to meet Arafat in Tunis. They reported on the meeting and handed over a letter from Holst to Peres (Document  No. 15) describing their meetings with Arafat; a public meeting in which Arafat attacked the Israelis and the Americans, and a closed meeting in which “we met another Arafat.” It is clear to him that he must close a deal soon. According to him, he trusts the Norwegians because they have no secret agenda or interests in the talks. Holst emphasized that the DOP was an interim agreement whose main aim is to build trust. Arafat explained the importance of Jericho as a foothold in the West Bank. It was chosen because it was not close to Israeli settlements and included a refugee camp. He was confident of his ability to deal with Palestinian opposition to the agreement.  at the next meeting with the Norwegians Peres showed great enthusiasm for the talks, although he emphasized that the Norwegians should not negotiate in Israel’s name. He proposed compromises and emphasized the need to end the negotiations and begin implementation. As for economic aid, he suggested a conference of countries with foreign aid budgets in which they would be asked to give priority to Gaza. The PLO needed foreign aid in order to compete with Hamas. “We don’t want the PLO to lose. We don’t like them, but considering the alternative, we become romantic [about them].” Peres rejected Larsen’s proposal for a meeting between him and Arafat for fear of leaks. They could meet after the signing (Document  No. 16).

On July 20, Holst met again with Arafat in Tunis and gave him some of the Israeli positions, urging him to reach a historical breathrough. Afterwards he met with Pundak and also wrote another letter to Peres. Holst wrote that Arafat mentioned the difficulties but added “Where there is a will, there is a way”.(File P 5513/8). Holst told Pundak that Abu Ala played a central role in the meeting and insisted on the need to concentrate on signing the DOP. Arafat was relaxed and focused and it was clear that he had decided to adopt the path of an agreement with Israel. Arafat would ask for “something symbolic” on Jerusalem and accept a “functional solution” and not a corridor between Gaza and Jericho (see File P 5514/3).

Before the next round, Rabin approved several more compromise proposals. On July 25, the delegations met again and Israel presented a revised proposal for the DOP. However the Palestinians presented a new version (see File P 5513/2) but promised that the changes could be discussed and a solution found. Savir rejected the new proposals and said he was close to giving up on the negotiations. The parties agreed to sit down and revise the wording of the Declaration again. The Palestinians demanded mention of UN Resolution 242 and the recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians. An atmosphere of crisis again prevailed and Abu Ala and Savir warned against losing a historic opportunity. Abu Ala announced his resignation and Savir who was close to despair, left for Israel.

But in a report to Peres, Singer, who had remained in Norway, judged that the Palestinians’ goal was tactical and said that he was overall very optimistic. He quoted Abu Ala’s statement that in Tunis it was decided to give Israel unilateral recognition and the cancellation of the articles in the Palestinian Covenant. Abu Ala brought with him a draft of this statement and gave it to Savir (see File P 5513/2). They began to build a “package deal” of concessions and mutual achievements, on issues such as the voting of the East Jerusalem residents in the elections and the mention of Resolution 242.  The Israelis announced that they had reached the limit of their concessions and asked for a response from the Palestinians.

In their next meeting with Peres, he said: “We started with “Gaza first” and now we are at “Arafat first”. The options are Arafat now or Arafat later. I am in favour of Arafat now but I am not sure that I can lead such a move [now].” He was very much afraid of a scenario in which Arafat would return to Gaza with an army and the title of president which would mean in practice Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state. The negotiators claimed that an agreement could not be reached without allowing Arafat to return to Gaza, but Peres feared that Rabin would not agree. He noted that there was considerable trust between him and the Prime Minister “and this [as we know] is not a natural thing. The natural thing is the other way around”. They also discussed what to report to the Americans and Singer presented the proposed “package deal” (Document No. 17). (More details are in the report he prepared for Rabin on July 29, see File P 5513/2). Rabin’s response was positive and he seemed willing to consider recognition of the PLO, if the organization accepted Israel’s proposals.

In the discussions with Peres, the team members referred to another letter from Holst dated July 27 (not found) and his suggestion that he would negotiate to bridge the positions. Pundak told them of tension between Holst and Larsen and speculates in his book that the letter reflected Holst’s desire to make political capital ahead of the general elections in Norway.

After receiving a positive answer from Abu Ala about the Israeli proposals, another meeting was scheduled in Norway on August 13 to “close the deal.” In the meantime, Peres wrote to Holst with messages for the Palestinians –  that  the negotiations should be concluded before opposition forces or other initiatives gained strength – in view of the visit of Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the region to promote the Syrian channel (see Peres to Holst, 5 August 1993, File P 5513/8).

ב.5 | Closing the deal and initialling the DOP in Oslo: 19 August 1993

In early August Hirschfeld went to Paris and worked with Abu Ala on a Palestinian proposal that was much more moderate. Before he left he received instructions from Savir “not to negotiate” but merely to listen to their position and to report (see Hirschfeld’s diary). Larsen, who also took part in the talks, went over the Palestinian proposal and marked which points were negotiable and which were not. (See File P 5514/4, File P 5513/3).

First page of Larsen’s comments, File P 5513/3

A summary of the meeting (Document No. 18) stated that the Palestinian leadership, including Arafat, was ready to accept a seven-point declaration on  recogntion of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and ending condemning the use of teror. This declaration could be postponed until after the signing of the DOP. The seven points were “a historic turning point in achieving reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians before a peace agreement and before any Israeli concessions, when the only price is recognition of the PLO.” The Palestinian concessions on most of the controversial issues were also listed.

On August 13, a final round of talks before the signing was held in Sarpsborg, in which the question of mutual recognition and the disputed points were discussed. The relations of the PLO leadership with the delegation in Washington, which reached a crisis in early August due to disagreement over answers to an American proposal also came up. The delegation  threatened to resign, but after a visit to Tunis, Arafat convinced them to show patience and told Ashrawi the main points of the Oslo agreement – without details on the negotiations with Israel.

After it seemed that the rest of the problems in the DOP had been resolved, Abu Ala called Arafat, who rejected some of the new formulations and insisted on issues that were sensitive from Rabin’s point of view. Once again there was a crisis in the talks. Peres, who was about to arrive in Oslo in order to initial the agreement, first went to Stockholm, where he met with Holst. With Peres by his side, Holst held a telephone conversation with Arafat and Abu Ala in Tunis, which lasted through the night. They managed to resolve all points of dispute and formulas were found for the problematic clauses that included mention of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the issues to be discussed in the permanent settlement, the status of the military government and the control of the border crossings with Jordan and Egypt. According to Abu Ala, he and Abu Mazen hugged  and kissed in congratulation.

On the night between August 19 and 20, Abu Ala, Hassan Asfor, Uri Savir and Joel Singer signed their initials on the agreed text of the Declaration of Principles, in the presence of Peres and Holst. In his opening remarks, Abu Ala thanked Minister Holst, Larsen and Mona Juul and the members of the Norwegian staff for their contribution to the agreement. He congratulated Peres and the Israeli delegation and emphasized the need for cooperation on the road to peace (Document No. 19).

In a meeting with Abu Ala, Peres took upon himself to get the consent of the Americans and described the expected resistance in Israel. Abu Ala presented the Palestinian reaction, the need for support from the United States and the Arab countries and for immediate changes on the ground.

ב.6 | The mutual recognition letters and the signing of the Declaration of Principles

Peres and Holst flew to the United States and on August 28 informed Secretary Christopher and the American peace team headed by Dennis Ross about the agreement with the PLO. The Americans preferred peace talks with Syria and were surprised by Rabin’s decision to favor the Palestinian path. Nevertheless, they decided to support the agreement and to host the signing ceremony at the White House.

On August 26, Arafat had convened the central committee of Fatah and the executive committee of the PLo and told them about the agreement. He also told the members of the delegation in Washington about the existence of the Norwegian channel but denied that they had reached an agreement. The opposition to the agreement gained momentum, both in Israel and in the Arab countries and among the Palestinian opposition.

On 30 August Rabin and Peres presented the agreement at a government meeting. The stenographic record of the meeting has now been declassified and can be seen on the ISA website. Rabin explained why he preferred the agreement with the Palestinians to the Syrian channel, which was not yet ripe, and why it was necessary to deal with the PLO.

On September 1, Hirschfeld and Pundak sent a document to Beilin summarizing the “development of the Norwegian channel” (Document  No. 20). On September 6 they met with Feisal al-Husseini and Sari Nusseibi, a pro-PLO academic from East jerusaelm, and discussed how to ensure local support for the agreement (Document No. 21).

The documents of mutual recognition and the commitment of the Palestinians to renounce violence and amend the Palestinian Covenant still had to be finalized. Negotiations continued, based on the seven-point document. The Palestinians had difficulty committing to changes in the Palestinian National Council, and claimed that they could not give an order to end the Intifada, which was a popular uprising, but Arafat could call for an end to violence and terrorism. An attempt by Peres to repeat his conversation with Tunis by phone through Holst failed. On September 8-9, a meeting was held in Paris with the participation of Abu Ala, Savir and Singer, with Holst and Larsen, and in the end they reached an agreed formula. For this purpose, the direct involvement of Arafat was required, as he had to sign on recognition of Israel’s right to exist and a waiver of the armed struggle against it, contrary to the fundamental principles of the PLO.

Holst went to Tunis to obtain Arafat’s signature on a letter to Rabin on September 9 in which the PLO recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, recognized UN Resolution 242, pledged to renounce and terrorism, accept responsibility for the prevention of terrorism, and amend the Palestinian Covenant calling for the elimination of Israel. The next day, Rabin signed a letter (dated September 9) in which Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and undertook to negotiate with it (Document No. 22). In doing so, both sides recognized each other’s legitimacy and undertook to resolve their conflict within the framework of UN resolutions.

Rabin’s letter to Arafat, 9 September 1993. File A 412/3

Arafat’s letter to Holst. File K 887/17

Peres also gave Holst an undertaking not to harm Palestinian cultural and religious institutions in East Jerusalem, on the understanding that these  were not bodies related to the PLO or the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinians agreed that this document would not be published. The PLO agreed to call on the Palestinians to return to their lives – that is, to end the Intifada, and this commitment was also included in a letter to Holst.

There was tension in Israel about who would go ot the ceremony in Washington. In the end Rabin decided to go in order to please President Clinton, but Peres would sign the agreement. Peres refused to add Beilin, Hirschfeld and Pundak to the official delegation. Pundak and Hirschfeld arrived at the ceremony as guests of the Israeli embassy. Abu Ala suffered a similar fate.

After a last minute change in the wording so that it mentioned the PLO, on September 13, 1993, Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen signed the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (“Oslo I Agreement”) at the White House in the presence of Rabin, Arafat and President Clinton. Secretary Christopher witnessed the agreement with the representative of Russia, and Rabin and Arafat shook hands, in a photograph that symbolized the opening of a new era in relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The declaration opened with the words “The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.“

Prime Minister  Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat shake hands, as President Clinton looks on, 13 September 1993. On the right, Secretary Christopher and Abu Mazen, on the left, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Photograph: Avi Ohayon, GPO

Yair Hirschfeld at the White House, 13 September 1993, courtesy of Dr. Hirschfeld.

For the full text of the Declaration:

The main points included:

• establishment of an interim Palestinian Self-Governing Authority
• IDF withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho within six months of the entry into force of the agreement (October 13, 1993)
• elections to a Palestinian National Council within nine months of the entry into force of the agreement
• fixing a five year transition period until the permanent agreement. This period would begin with the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Negotiations on the permanent settlement would open two years after the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. The issues discussed would include controversial subjects such as Jerusalem and the refugees.
• the Autonomy Council would first be given authority in Gaza and Jericho and later throughout the West Bank, excluding issues to be discussed in the permanent settlement
• a strong Palestinian police force would ensure internal order. Israel would continue to be responsible for the security of Israelis, residents of the settlements and protection from external threats
• cooperation at the crossings between Gaza and Egypt, and between Jericho and Jordan. Israel would continue to control security at the crossing points
• the elections to the Council would be conducted under international supervision.

Appendices to the agreement included arrangements for economic cooperation and regional development

The next stage, implementation of the Agreement, would demand even greater changes from the leadership and the public on both sides. See the publication on the Cairo Agreement.