End of an Era: The Golda Meir Government and the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria, January-May 1974

ג.1 | The discussions before Kissinger's return: the importance of American aid

After the head of Syrian intelligence, General Shihabi, visited Washington, the Israeli embassy reported that the Syrians had rejected Dayan’s proposal, but agreed for the first time to a demilitarized zone and limitation of forces. Kissinger commented that he would only come if Golda Meir and Dayan told him it was worthwhile (see Gazit’s reply, Document 20, MFA 6857/10). In the meantime, discussions with the Americans continued on the terms of military aid.

At the same time, the war of attrition intensified, in particular around the Mount Hermon outpost. On April 14, it was again captured by the IDF. Syrian commando forces tried to recapture it but were repulsed. Two Israeli planes and several Syrian planes were shot down in air battles. On April 27, the Syrians shelled another post and caused casualties. A helicopter coming to evacuate them hit the side of the mountain and six of the crew were killed. The Syrians shelled the Hermon outposts every day, and the IDF responded with air strikes on the Syrian army camps on the slopes of the mountain. On the night of May 1-2 two soldiers were killed in an attack on a tank unit and two more were captured. The losses increased public hostility towards Syria and made it difficult for the government to make concessions.

The Mt. Hermon outpost recaptured in October 1973. GPO.

On April 11, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine from Lebanon carried out a massacre in Kiryat Shmona, in which 16 civilians and two soldiers were killed. Israel responded with an air strike in Lebanon, and the United States rejected its request to veto a condemnation resolution in the UN Security Council, and even joined in the condemnation. According to press reports, Kissinger justified the vote due to Arab pressure and his desire to ensure the success of his mission to end the war and achieve the agreement with Syria. (For Dinitz’ protest, see Document 21, A 7033/11).

On April 29, a consultation was held in preparation for his arrival (Document 22, A 7073/17).  After Golda Meir and Mossad head Zvi Zamir presented Kissinger’s well-worn geopolitical arguments, Dayan said that it was time for long-term thinking, especially about the next phase of negotiations with Egypt. The actions of the Americans were not unreasonable and they would provide economic and military aid to the Arab states. If Israel was not integrated in this plan, it would not prevent the Americans from advancing. Dayan proposed negotiations with them that would guarantee Israel “arms and grants to buy them and political help on issues important to Israel” – such as deterring the Russians and securing oil sources. In his opinion, they might also be able to obtain a letter from President Nixon, declaring that he considers the withdrawal in the Golan to an agreed line a final one, and that he will not demand another withdrawal. Dayan added that the Purple Line was not sacred. He thought that the eastern neighbourhoods of Quneitra could be given up – about a third of the city

Most of the ministers supported Dayan’s position. Sapir spoke of the high economic and human cost of continuing the war. Peres doubted the chances of success of Kissinger’s plan to drive the Soviets out of the region, but he too thought that the IDF was having trouble meeting its aims, including maintaining the latest weapons. Israel needed a cease-fire and a respite.

Allon argued that the debate about Quneitra was theoretical, because Kissinger had already promised it to the Syrians. If they gave up the Quneitra Valley, they were actually giving up the land of the three kibbutzim. In his opinion, the Americans  had committed themselves to the Arabs to return Israel to the 1967 borders in stages. He was concerned about Kissinger’s need for achievements at any cost, against the background of the Watergate affair and Nixon’s desire to make a state visit to the Middle East. Golda Meir repeated her concern about the atmosphere in the army and in the public. Dayan said that he was not ready to move the military line west in Quneitra, even if this led to war, or to give up the kibbutz land.

At the government meeting on April 30, Dayan’s position on American aid was supported by Dinitz, who arrived from Washington, and the foreign minister. Dinitz described the struggle in Congress to approve financial aid to Israel according to the president’s decision. He warned that the Americans had not yet decided how much Israel would receive in 1975, which hinted at pressure on Israel to cooperate. Dayan repeated his views on the importance of relations with Egypt and the need for US arms and money to pay for them. Israel had ordered arms for a decade, which would cost 4 billion dollars, and for which it could not afford to pay.

His position was supported by the new Chief of Staff, “Motta” Gur, who was appointed on April 14. Gur had previously served twice as the head of the Northern Command. He had also served as the IDF attaché in Washington and participated in the military talks with the Egyptians in Geneva after the conference. Gur believed that negotiations should be conducted from a position of strength, but that the Syrians were realistic and they too had an interest in a period of calm.

Lieutenant -General Mordechai “Motta” Gur, the Chief of the General Staff. Photograph: GPO

At the meeting (Document 23), he warned that if there was no agreement, serious fighting would develop, either initiated by Syria or as a preemptive strike by Israel. Intelligence suggested that Egypt and Jordan would join in. Israel’s dependence on arms and aircraft from the US must be weighed against the need for territory and whether that territory was critical to Israel. Gur did emphasize the importance of controlling the Hermon outposts for electronic warfare and the advantages of the Purple Line, However, Quneitra and the village of Rafid had no military importance, “and if I, as Chief of Staff, have to answer the question of a better relationship with the United States and the continued supply of weapons as against Quneitra and Rafid – my answer is unequivocal and clear.” There was no danger allowing Syrian civilians into Quneitra and in his opinion the Syrians only needed the eastern parts of the city.

Eventually it was decided to present to Kissinger both the map Dayan had brought to Washington and the new map, without the proposal to evacuate eastern Quneitra. The negotiating team could discuss this with him on condition that they clarifed a number of “essential matters”: preserving the settlements, arms supply and financing, Egypt’s commitment not to join Syria if a war breaks out, guaranteeing fuel needs, negotiating another stage with Egypt and the fate of the small community of Syrian Jews (Israel sought to use the opportunity to allow them to leave). This meeting established the outlines of the Separation of Forces Agreement from Israel’s point of view.

Before the arrival of Kissinger, who was coming from Cairo,  the negative publicity about him in the Israeli press increased. “Maariv” reported that Begin had cut short his visit to the US in order to head a campaign against withdrawal beyond the Purple Line. An advertisement by a group called “Citizens for the Prevention of a Political Holocaust” called for action against the government’s  capitulation to the “High Commissioner” (Kissinger). The editorial also opposed withdrawal to satisfy the “Syrian lust for prestige”, in view of the American condemnation of Israeli action in Lebanon.

Demonstrations against the UN vote by the Americans after the attack on Kiryat Shmona near the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, where Kissinger was staying, 2 May 1974. Photograph: Ya’acov Saar, GPO.

The heads of the US Administration were kept informed about the atmosphere in Israel by their embassy in Tel Aviv. Kissinger and Nixon himself wrote personal letters to Golda Meir, in which they tried to justify the vote at the UN. Kissinger wrote that the US had condemned the attack in Kiryat Shmona in another statement. The president emphasized the importance of the secretary’s efforts to weaken Soviet influence in the region and mentioned the generous aid Israel had received during and since the war (Document 24).

ג.2 | Kissinger's last shuttle

Henry Kissinger, 1973. National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution; gift of Time magazine; conserved with funds from The Pritzker Traubert Family Foundation

On May 2 Golda Meir presented Israel’s demands to Kissinger. She asked for American commitments for long-term arms supply, means of payment and “a written presidential commitment that we will not be asked to come down from the Golan [Heights].” She also asked for an Egyptian commitment not to join Syria in the event of war. After his return from Damascus, she would consider whether to bring a new proposal to the government that included giving up part of Quneitra. Kissinger warned that this would not be enough. Assad and Sadat would not accept this proposal, nor would the US: “It is possible to explain to the Americans why it is necessary to hold the Golan to protect Israel in the territory from before 1967 – but it is impossible to explain why it is necessary to hold Quneitra to protect the Golan or the settlements in the Golan”(Document 25, A 7069/8).

At another meeting that day, with Gur and the ministers, the question of the hills north of Quneitra came up. Kissinger repeated that an agreement with Syria was a better guarantee for Israel’s security than a military line. The goal was to find a line that the US and Egypt could support. Meir still expressed many anxieties. Since Kissinger himself said that the Syrian government cannot be trusted, if there is a war later and Israel is in a position of weakness due to the withdrawal, how will she explain this to the public? Kissinger admitted that this was a difficult dilemma. Israel must ensure its existence. It was not required to transfer the hills to the Syrians, but to the UN force.

As crowds demonstrated outside Kissinger’s hotel, the secretary met with Dayan and heard some ideas for withdrawal from the Purple Line. The next day he offered to try to “sell” Dayan’s idea to Egypt as an American idea. If Assad was offered all of Quneitra, it had a chance of acceptance. Meir replied that if she brought them a proposal for American aid and promises of political support, the government might agree.

On his return from Cairo and Damascus, Kissinger said that Assad had agreed to reduce the shelling and prevent raids. However, he rejected the map presented by Dayan in Washington. According to the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Gamasi, who was sent to Damascus to advance the negotiations, Assad wanted an agreement similar to the one with the Egyptians, including withdrawal from “the enclave and something beyond the [Purple] line.” Sadat agreed to support an agreement on the lines proposed by Kissinger, including expanding the buffer zone and bringing in a civilian Syrian administration.

On May 5, Meir told the government that Kissinger had made it clear that his goal was to reach an agreement with Syria, but if the negotiations blew up, it would be better if it were Syria’s fault and that Sadat would be ready to say so.  The government must act without a guarantee that the concessions would guarantee peace for a long time. “So without any enthusiasm, without an iota of enthusiasm, with a heavy heart and without any illusions, I say there is no choice.” The government authorized the ministerial team to continue negotiations on the basis of the decisions of April 30.  (Document 26).

ג.3 | Resistance to withdrawal increases

As news spread about progress in the talks, the protest movement grew. On May 6, a group of protesters started a hunger strike near the Prime Minister’s house. They submitted a petition agaisnt the drift in the government’s positions “in the face of the war of attrition by the Syrian murderers and the falsification and policy of the American Secretary of State who is tempting us to enter a death trap.” Among the signatories were well-known professors and writers, mostly from the Movement for the Entire Land of Israel, such as Moshe Shamir, Yitzhak Shalev, Eliezer Livne and Zvi Shiloah (Document 27, A 7073/17).

The members of the settlers’ committee in the Golan Heights were determined to prevent withdrawal from Quneitra. In March Harel had even launched an operation to demolish the buildings there, to prevent the return of the Syrians. On May 6 he appeared at a meeting of the Labour Party Bureau with the faction in the Knesset at the head of a delegation of settlers. He argued that any movement  by the IDF away from the Purple Line would endanger the settlements and damage them economically. Withdrawal from Quneitra would make it difficult  to continue life so close to the border. Moshe Baram, who served as chairman, promised aid to the settlements, but also demanded that the party support its negotiating team.  Eban explained the government’s stand in the negotiations, in an atmosphere of scepticism and even hostility. He reminded his listeners that the government had announced its intention to sign a separation agreement and the Knesset approved this step back in January. Those who were impressed by the public outcry and the noisy protests should remember that before the agreement with Egypt, there was a similar outcry. In the meantime, the agreement had proven itself; Egypt observes the cease-fire as compared to the “ongoing tragedy” on the border with Syria. Even if a reasonable agreement could not be reached, an effort must be made to preserve relations with the US. The alternative was the danger of a regional war and perhaps even a crisis between the superpowers. Finally Golda Meir promised that an agreement would not be signed at any cost. If the proposal endangered the security of the settlements, the government would refuse to approve it.

The Golan settlers continued their campaign in cooperation with “Gush Emunim”. A conference of representatives of the Golan Heights, Gush Etzion and the Jordan Valley against the withdrawal brought together a hundred representatives of settlements. An emergency conference of the kibbutz settlements in the Upper Galilee was held, and the Likud organized demonstrations in Jerusalem and Haifa. At a government meeting on May 7, Golda Meir said that there is “a lot of demagoguery” in the demonstrations, but admitted there was genuine anxiety about the fate of settlements. She was very angry about the personal attacks on Kissinger.

On the same day, a Knesset debate was held in which Begin attacked Kissinger, claiming that, despite his past as a persecuted Jew in Germany, he was indifferent to the plight of the Syrian Jews and endangered Israel’s security by promoting interim arrangements and withdrawals without peace. He attacked the government’s retreat from its original proposal. Allon, replying for the government, denied that pressure was exerted by the US and promised that the agreement would be submitted for Knesset approval. Control of the Golan Heights was essential not only for the security of the settlements, but for securing the water sources and the security of the north of Israel.

On May 8, upon his return from Damascus, Kissinger said that for the first time he believed there was a chance of reaching an agreement. To some extent, the  opposition to withdrawal helped him in the negotiations. In his talk with Assad, he emphasized the internal difficulties of the Israeli government. Assad claimed that he too had internal problems explaining the new policy to the Syrian people. However, he waived his previous demands and addressed the proposal. Meir claimed that Israel had already reached the maximum concessions it can make. (Document 28, A 7068/9).  That same day, the Likud held a rally against the withdrawal with the participation of thousands in Menorah Square in Jerusalem.

It took another two and a half weeks to reach a line acceptable to both sides. After he managed to gain the support of Sadat and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, they increased the pressure on Syria, which agreed to troop limitations and restricted weapons zones. In the end, Israel agreed to move the military line west of Quneitra and allow civilian Syrian administration in the city, with a buffer zone under UN control. At the same time, negotiations were underway with Kissinger and his staff on the “package deal.” On May 12, Meir sent him a formal letter which detailed Israel’s needs and proposed a long-term military agreement until 1984. She sought the President’s support in Congress to secure procurement funding, an emergency assistance programme, and a fuel supply guarantee. Since the current negotiations involve serious risk, she appealed to the secretary and the president based on their commitment to ensuring Israel’s strength (Document 29, A 7025/17).

The shift in the proposed line inevitably led to the loss of some land worked by the three kibbutzim, and already on May 9, Kissinger wrote to Nixon and expressed his indignation at the inflexibility of the Israeli side on this issue, due to internal opposition. On the other hand, he rejected the demand of the Syrians to gain control of the hills around Quneitra, in order to prevent greater damage to the settlements.

First page of the record of the meeting with Kissinger on 12 May. ISA, A 7076/3

The unrest among the settlers continued. On May 12, they set up a new settlement called Keshet in a day, in a bunker near Quneitra to prevent its evacuation, even though the place suffered from incessant shelling. The main groups that participated in the protest were Likud activists, Golan settlers, “Gush Emunim” activists, and especially the students of the Merkaz Rabbi yeshiva. Many of them feared the possibility that the agreement would be followed by an American demand for a separation of forces agreement with Jordan and a withdrawal in Judea and Samaria. The Likud leaders emphasized the security danger of the withdrawal itself. On May 15, Begin spoke at a Herut party meeting and warned that the concession made by the government only led to demands for further concessions.

On May 13, a sit down strike of 35 families, mainly from the Golan Heights, began in front of the Prime Minister’s office. At the government meeting, Galili said that he met with the settlement leaders, and told them that the government cares more about them than the protesters, who have no links with the settlement movement and are serving a political agenda. The government’s concern for the fate of the settlements was also reflected in the meeting on May 15, in which Admoni of the Jewish Agency participated. He told them in great detail about the damage to the land of each settlement and offered alternative solutions.

Map of the settlements in the Golan Heights, and the proposed lines of separation, April 1974. ISA, File 7024/8

After a few more days of bargaining on the line of separation, Kissinger threatened that if the parties failed to reach a compromise, he would end the talks and return to the US. He asked for their final position. On the eve of the decision, on May 15, a terrorist squad from Lebanon infiltrated the town of Ma’alot and captured a group of religious high school students from Safed who were touring the area. The IDF rescue operation failed, and in the attack 22 hostages were murdered and a soldier was killed.

Syria controlled the al-Sa’eqah terrorist organization and was influential among the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon. The fact that it refused to give an official and open commitment to prevent acts of sabotage from its territory gave a boost to the opponents of the agreement. In Jerusalem they demonstrated and demanded to “stop the talks”. But outside of religious circles there was no mass mobilization for resistance to the withdrawal.

ג.4 | The end of the negotiations and the signing of the Agreement

Kissinger’s threat to stop the talks was successful, and Assad said he would give up all his demands if agreement could be reached on Quneitra. He was ready to accept any solution offered, on condition that there were no Israeli positions on the hills opposite the city. Kissinger agreed to deliver his proposal and asked for details of the Israeli weapons and positions on the hills and a promise to the Syrians that Israel would not attack from them. Gur was ready to give it and to recommend that Israel accept the American offer.

The decisive government meeting was held on May 17. Meir presented a few minor concessions. If they were accepted, Kissinger would present them as an American proposal. If Assad did not accept it, he would not blame Israel for the failure. According to Gur, the response to his plan at the General Staff was positive and the entire General Staff was willing for greater concessions. “The importance of arms from the US and a period for [re]organizing the army and a known respite for the reserves seemed so important that the officers told me stop “getting bogged down” about another kilometre more or less, make a separation [agreement], we will organize the army properly and get the arms we need.”

Eban once again presented the price of a rupture with the US: “I don’t know any other way to ensure the security of the country but through the United States. Maybe those shouting “Jew Boy” [against Kissinger] have another way or recommendation. I have no other way or recommendation other than maintaining a minimum of harmony with them.” Golda Meir still found the decision hard. “What can I do?” she said, “As God is my witness, I didn’t want to give up Quneitra”, but there was no choice. 18 ministers voted to approve the plan presented by Meir and the ministers to Kissinger, if he obtained Syrian consent (Document 30).

On May 18, Kissinger managed to get Assad’s agreement to the proposal (Document 31, ). At the next government meeting, on May 19, much time was devoted to the demonstration of religious high school students outside the prime minister’s office and to Golda Meir’s complaints that “during school hours they come [here] from all the religious schools and all the yeshivas.” Eban explained that Kissinger and the Syrians wanted to end the negotiations quickly because they were convinced that it was “now or never.” A military agreement would be signed in Geneva on the model of the one with Egypt, including clauses on a ceasefire and prevention of terrorism. Golda Meir added “I personally would be happy if we could pass this on to the next government, but our responsibility requires that this government take it upon itself.” She proposed to bring the agreement to the Knesset after it was initialled and before signing in Geneva.

Women preparing for the night at the sit-down strike outside the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, 19 May 1974. Photograph: Moshe Milner, PMO

Additional difficulties arose regarding the status of the UN force in the Golan Heights, the reduction of forces, and Syria’s commitment to prevent cross-border terrorism. On May 28, Golda Meir told Kissinger that the government expects the wording on the prevention of terrorism in the Syrian agreement to be the same as the wording in the Egyptian one. Dayan said it would be difficult to recommend signing an agreement without a guarantee on this point. (Document 33, MFA 6857/11). Assad was not ready to give a public commitment, but Kissinger said that he would agree to the US and Israel announcing the American position, that action against the terrorists on the part of Israel will be considered self-defence (Document 34, A 7033/11).  Assad gave a verbal commitment to Kissinger that Syria would prevent terrorist acts in the Golan Heights and the prime minister announced this in the Knesset. The agreement was accompanied by a series of letters and understandings with the US – but not the long-awaited letter on the US position on the Golan issue.

A message from Kissinger about assurances from Assad on preventing terror, 30 May 1974. ISA, A 4996/10.

The letter was finally signed by Nixon’s successor, President Ford, and delivered to Prime Minister Rabin with the signing of the interim agreement with Egypt in 1975 ( See Appendix, Letter from President Ford). The wording of the agreement was unanimously approved by the government on May 29 and signed in Geneva on May 31, after being approved by the Knesset, with a majority of 76 votes in favor and 36 against.

This was Golda Meir’s final Knesset appearance. She said she was happy to retire as the fighting on the northern front came to an end, and she hoped that the next government would sign not only separation of forces agreements, but permanent peace treaties. An eight-hour debate was held, and five members of the Likud were not present for the vote. Gideon Patt of the Liberals left the building because he did not want to vote against the agreement. The NRP factions and Torah Judaism split; the NRP Young Guard members Zebulon Hammer, Yehuda Ben-Meir and Eliezer Abatavi abstained and some members of Agudat Israel voted against. The Citizens’ Rights party, Moked and Rakach (the Communists) supported the agreement together with the Labour Alignment. Likud leader Shmuel Tamir said that the result of the Yom Kippur War was a clear political defeat for Israel, and it was time for the members of the Alignment to admit it. Sharon said that the Likud supported a separation agreement with Syria, but a different one. He listed the concessions made by the government: “What didn’t you give up? You gave up everything, on the issue of an emergency force, the attitude to terrorism and the fate of the Syrian Jews. What did we get [from Syria]? We got much less, in my opinion, than we could have gotten if we had taken a firmer stand.” During the debate, some thousand opponents demonstrated outside the Knesset building. A group of young people from the Golan Heights shouted that the Knesset was “Kissinger’s rubber stamp” and were thrown out.

The signing ceremony in Geneva was described by the Israeli representative, General Herzl Shafir (Document 37, A 7069/6). At the ceremony, General Siilasvuo, the head of the UN emergency force, called the agreement the fruit of an “exceptional feat of diplomacy” and a milestone on the road to peace (Document 37, Appendix).

At a military conference on 31 May, Gur said that he believed the Syrians would want to keep the agreement. “The Syrian army not only supported the agreement but actually participated in its promotion and implementation.” That day the ceasefire came into effect and the wounded prisoners were returned to Israel on June 1. On June 3, Rabin presented his government with a majority of 61 (without the NRP and with the participation of a Citizens’ Rights representative). On June 6, the rest of the POWs were returned and received in an enthusiastic and emotional welcome at the airport in Lod by Rabin and Golda Meir together.

Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir with the families of released prisoners at the airport, 6 June 1974. Photograph: GPO

To demonstrate their commitment to the settlements in the Golan Heights, the government approved the transfer of 15 million pounds in compensation at its meeting on May 29 (see Galili’s letter to the prime minister, Document 32, A 7069/6).

On May 31 Eban  gave the ambassadors of the European Community details about the agreement with Syria. He emphasized Egypt’s involvement in reaching it and explained the differences between the separation of forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights. According to Eban, Assad was under pressure from extreme civilian circles in Syria and from Libya and Iraq. American influence in Syria had increased, but Israel’s efforts to include the issue of Syrian Jewry in the negotiations had failed (Document 36, A 7069/6). Egypt’s support for the agreement was expressed in a statement by Sadat after meeting with Kissinger on 30 May, in which he welcomed the achievement of separation of forces on the Syrian front as another step towards a permanent peace, based on the resolutions of the Security Council. Sadat praised the wisdom of President Assad and the positive and effective role of the US, and welcomed the expected visit of President Nixon (Document 35, A 7069/6).

In a letter brought to Israel by Dinitz in June, but addressed to Prime Minister Meir and dated 31 May, President Nixon expressed recognition of Israel’s needs as appearing in her letter of 12 May to Kissinger and promised his support (Document 38, A 7025/17).  In mid-June Nixon himself visited the Middle East. Some months after his resignation in August 1974, Kissinger initiated a new round of talks with Egypt which culminated in the Interim Agreement of September 1975 (Sinai II). (See the publications in the ISA’s blog in English – “Turning Point on the Road to Peace”, Parts I and II and on our Hebrew website).  Israel’s relations with Syria have undergone many changes since 1974, but the borders and arrangements fixed in the Separation of Forces agreement are still valid today.

The Solel Boneh construction company building new houses and public buildings in Merom Golan, November 1974. Photograph: GPO

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