End of an Era: The Golda Meir Government and the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria, January-May 1974

א.1 | Syria refuses to give a list of Israeli prisoners

At the end of October 1973, for the first time since 1948, Israel had hundreds of missing soldiers, some of whom were prisoners. This fact, and the images of the prisoners shown on Arab television channels, led to a severe public reaction and added to the loss of trust in the establishment as a result of the war. The Syrians, and initially  the Egyptians too, refused to observe the Geneva Convention of 1949, which established the rights of POWS. They used the prisoners for political purposes as a bargaining chip. It was known that some of them had been murdered, and Israel filed a complaint with the UN and the International Red Cross, which is responsible for the treatment of POWS according to the Geneva Convention (See File G 6695/3).

Looking through photographs of the POWs, ISA press photograph collection, TS 3009/513

Unlike Syria, Israel considered the return of prisoners, determining the fate of the missing and returning the bodies of the fallen as sacred principles, and acted in accordance with the Geneva Convention regarding the prisoners in its hands. It handed over lists of names and allowed visits by representatives of the Red Cross. As early as October 22, the government decided that it would not agree to a ceasefire without an exchange of prisoners.

During the fighting, a blackout was imposed on the number of prisoners and missing soldiers by the military censorship. After the ceasefire, the foreign minister, Abba Eban, announced that Egypt had provided information about the POWs in its hands. However Syria refused to give the Red Cross a list of the POWS. According to press reports, on October 25 a Syrian officer unofficially informed a Lebanese newspaper that it held fifty prisoners from the Hermon outpost that fell at the beginning of the war. On the same day, a group of mothers and wives of the POWs was formed and submitted a petition calling on the government to promote an exchange of prisoners within 24 hours.  The turmoil and dissatisfaction among the family members worsened after they heard that Israel had agreed, under pressure from the US, to transfer supplies to the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Another letter of protest was sent and a debate was held in the Knesset at the request of the Likud. Opposition leader Menachem Begin demanded that the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, intervene with the Syrians for the release of the Israeli prisoners. He also referred to US promises made when Israel agreed to the ceasefire, to get a commitment from the Soviet Union regarding the prisoners.

Demonstration against supplying the Third Army, 11 November 1973. ISA press photograph collection, TS 3010/219.

On October 29, the Egyptians handed over a list of wounded prisoners at a meeting held at Kilometre 101 on the Suez-Cairo road. After the signing of the “Six Point Agreement” between the parties, the POWS in Egypt were returned to Israel during November 1973.  The families of the missing on the Syrian front then became the main pressure group. Their activities had a great impact on the government ministers, and especially on Prime Minister Golda Meir. After the war her sensitivity to criticism increased, she felt that she was not receiving support from the party, and contacts with the prisoners’ families added to her anxieties.

According to the information Israel had, there were about 131 MIAs on the Syrian front, who were considered prisoners. Rumours that many of them were murdered by the Syrians continued to spread, and a report based on Red Cross sources was published in the press that 100 prisoners were murdered. Although the Red Cross denied it, Israel announced that it would not open negotiations with Syria before it handed over the list.

The enclave or salient held by Israel inside Syria. Wikimedia Commons

At the end of the war, the IDF had captured an enclave inside Syria and was within cannon range of the outskirts of Damascus. As early as November 1973, Israel linked the prisoner issue to a proposal to withdraw from territory captured during the war. In response to Israel’s claims to the UN that Syria was not acting according to the Geneva Convention, Syria submitted complaints to the Security Council about Israel’s treatment of civilians in the territories it occupied and the expulsion of the villagers, which were also contrary to the convention. In November 1973, Israel informed the Syrians, through the US and the Red Cross, that it was ready to allow 15,000 villagers who left their homes during the war to return to the territory under its control. It even offered to turn over to the UN the Syrian outposts  captured on Mt. Hermon in 1973, in exchange for the return of the prisoners (Document 1, A 7075/1, p. 74). This concession made difficulties for the government later during the discussions on the separation of forces. In response, the Syrians demanded the evacuation of all the territories occupied in 1973 and the recognition of PLO members as combatants. Israel did not respond to these demands.

​ The Foreign Ministry, which was responsible for contacts with the Red Cross, realized that the POWs were being used as hostages. Their representative, Mordechai Kidron, wrote to the ministry’s Director-General that the Syrians clearly understood the value of the card in their hands. They were not interested in the Geneva Convention and the problem would only be resolved within the framework of a political/territorial deal – that is, including Israeli withdrawal. The representative of the Red Cross in Israel, Michel Convers, also thought that the POW problem could only be solved as part of a “large package” deal (Document 2, MFA 6807/5).

א.2 | The Geneva Conference

Before the peace conference he had organized in Geneva in December 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked Israel to agree to symbolic Soviet participation, and the government reluctantly agreed. But it was determined not to enter talks with Syria unless the POW problem was resolved. In a telegram to Israel’s ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, on November 26, the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit, said that there was great pressure on the government not to participate in the conference at all before the prisoners were released (Document 3, A 7024/10). On December 16, Golda Meir announced the government’s decision not to participate in talks with the Syrians in Geneva until a list of prisoners was given. The Americans promised in a Memorandum of Understanding with Israel (Document 4A, MFA 6823/5), to make every effort to influence the Soviets and the Syrians to hand over the list and observe the Geneva Convention. If they failed, and Israel refused to enter discussions with the Syrians, the US would show understanding for its position.

The Syrians decided in the end not to come to Geneva. As a result, rumours again spread that the real reason was that all the prisoners had been murdered. The protests of the families continued, alongside appeals to Syrian embassies abroad and international bodies. Government representatives also appealed to all possible parties who could help. For example, in Meir’s letter to the families of the pilots held in Syria (Document 5, A 7084/6), she describes efforts by Kissinger and Nixon himself to contact the Soviets in order to influence the Syrians, without success.

Petition from Canadian Jews to the International Red Cross for the release of the Israeli POWs, 17 December 1973. ISA, G 6499/1

א.3 | Starting negotiations: Kissinger brings the list from Syria

In early January 1974, attention focused on the proposed agreement with Egypt. At a government meeting on January 13, it was reported that Kissinger would go to Damascus during his shuttle between Israel and Cairo, because of hints that the Syrians were ready to negotiate. According to Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, Israel had “a special interest in his trip because of the prisoners.” It was decided to tell Kissinger that Israel was ready to negotiate with Syria, on condition that the lists of the prisoners were given and the Red Cross allowed to visit.

Another important issue was stabilizing the ceasefire, which was not observed by the Syrians. They regularly shelled Israeli positions and settlements on the Golan Heights, set ambushes and  started firefights. At a government meeting on January 17 (Document 6), Minister of Religion Zerah Warhaftig asked if Israel was, in fact, interested in an agreement with Syria, because, in contrast to the Egyptian front, he was told that the military position in the north was good. Golda Meir replied that Israel was interested because there was shooting and casualties on the Syrian front. Warhaftig expressed fear that when the POWs’ condition became known, there would be great disappointment, as few were still alive.  Eban reminded him that ten POWs had been shown on television. ​The Chief of Staff, David Elazar, said that the current line in the North was good, but the previous line was also excellent. The difference between the two was a function of political considerations, “whether we want incidents or not, whether we want to have more reserves or less reserves.” Currently, the IDF maintained two divisions there. The mobilization of large numbers of reservists was costly and Israel was under severe economic pressure, due to the need to make up the IDF’s losses of equipment.

Another interest served by agreement with Syria was improved relations with Egypt. According to the Separation of Forces Agreement signed on 18 January, Egypt would keep the territory it occupied in the Sinai, and the Egyptian president promised to open the Suez Canal for the passage of ships and to rebuild the Canal cities destroyed in the War of Attrition. Sadat hoped to reach another agreement that would return a large part of Sinai to Egypt. But for this he needed the backing of Arab countries and an Israeli agreement with another Arab country. Thus a separation of forces agreement between Israel and Syria became an Egyptian (and American) interest. Kissinger said repeatedly, when asked what the next step was in relations with Egypt – that the next step was an agreement with Syria.

On January 20, Kissinger flew to Damascus and met with President Hafez al-Assad. Afterwards he met with Gazit, Allon, Eban and Dinitz at the airport (Gazit’s report, Document 7, A 7069/7). According to Kissinger, Assad said harsh things about Sadat, but agreed to discuss an outline for the separation of forces. Assad claimed that the prisoners were in good condition and demanded a significant Israeli withdrawal in the Golan Heights. Kissinger knew that Israel would reject the proposal, but he wanted to present it as a first step in the negotiations.

On January 26 Sadat sent a message to Golda Meir through Kissinger on the importance of an agreement with Syria (Document 9, A 7069/7). Dinitz, who delivered the message, suspected that it was a Kissinger initiative, as part of a campaign of pressure that was also intended to lead to the lifting of the oil embargo imposed on the US during the war. In the prime minister’s reply, she explained that the problem of the POWs prevented Israel from entering into negotiations and emphasized the plight of the families (Document 10, A 7059/9).

Israel’s position on the POWs was an obstacle to Kissinger’s plans. According to Allon, the secretary wanted to call a special government meeting on January 20 to decide on opening negotiations with Syria. Allon and Eban refused and warned that no representative would be sent to Washington until they received the list. Dinitz was told that the prime minister’s response to the ideas from Damascus was negative (Document 8, A 7059/9).

As a way out of the impasse, Dinitz suggested to Kissinger that the Syrians give the secretary himself the list, and then Israel could begin discussions with the Americans. A similar idea was presented by the Egyptians, and Kissinger wanted to adopt it and to present a “scenario” for transferring information to each side simultaneously through his mediation.  (See Documents 11, 12, A 7059/9). At a government meeting on February 3, Meir described a similar plan proposed by Kissinger – that Israel would give him a proposal for Syria, as soon as the list of prisoners was in his hands. Kissinger and the Egyptians had also offered a similar move in exchange for information on the number of prisoners alone, without their names, but she refused. Many ministers opposed this and Yisrael Galili expressed concern about the reaction of public opinion if it became known that the government had compromised on its terms.

On February 5, Kissinger proposed to Assad that first he would be told the number of prisoners and then the list of names would be given to the Syrian embassy in Washington. After the Red Cross visited them, Israel would present a concrete proposal for separation. At the same time, however, Kissinger linked the negotiations with Israel with the lifting of the oil embargo, after he learned from the Saudis that Syria was working to preserve the embargo until there was progress on the separation of forces. He announced that he would not continue his efforts until the embargo was lifted. Under American pressure, the Syrians accepted his proposal to transfer the list simultaneously with an Israeli answer to their proposal for separation of forces. On February 7, Kissinger received a message from the Syrians that they were holding 65 prisoners. The number was given to Golda Meir by Dinitz and kept secret.

After press reports that the government was giving in to American pressure, on February 8, Golda Meir told settlers from the Golan Heights and Galilee that the Heights were an inseparable part of Israel and there was no question of withdrawal from the June 1967 ceasefire lines, including the town of Quneitra. This greatly angered the Saudis. Nevertheless, following a summit meeting of Arab leaders, including Assad and Sadat, on February 19-20 the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Egypt arrived in Washington with the list of POWs and delivered it in a sealed envelope to Kissinger. They promised to lift the oil embargo within two weeks and asked the president to send Kissinger to the Middle East. Nixon agreed but rejected the attempt to link the lifting of the oil embargo and the separation agreement. On February 26, Kissinger met with Assad and received permission to give the list of names to Israel. Assad promised to allow the Red Cross visits.

On 27 February Kissinger handed over the list to Golda Meir (Document 14, A 7069/8) which was a great relief for the government and public. The government decided that the exchange of prisoners would be the first clause in any agreement. On March 1, Red Cross visits began. On March 3, Golda Meir admitted to the government that she knew that the list of prisoners was in Kissinger’s hands “a few days” before his arrival. Eban noted that there were unrealistic expectations that the agreement with Syria would be similar to the one with Egypt, including the immediate release of the POWs. He quoted Kissinger’s opinion that Sadat wanted to prevent war but Assad wanted to destroy Israel. Had it not been for American and Egyptian pressure, he would not have handed over the list of prisoners. In spite of the ministers’ complaints about the media coverage of the families’ attacks on the government, Allon said that receiving the names was a great achievement that would enable Israel to maintain its position in the struggle with Syria.

Allon, Kissinger and Golda Meir, 27 February 1974. Moshe Milner, GPO.

Thus the government managed to meet the conditions it set for opening negotiations. Now the country’s leaders could turn to a more difficult task: formulating a proposal for the separation of forces and, in fact, for withdrawal.