End of an Era: The Golda Meir Government and the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria, January-May 1974

ב.1 | Formulating a Proposal – and Forming a Government

As the talks with Syria were about to open, Prime Minister Meir was still trying to form a coalition in the face of many difficulties. Within the Labour party, there were divisions between the “doves” and Dayan and his Rafi faction, who supported a national unity government with the Likud. The insistence of prominent rabbis that the National Religious Party should demand amendment of the Law of Return (the “who is a Jew” issue) before joining the government was also causing difficulties. At the same time a popular movement was forming against the government, many of its members reservists demobilized after the agreement with Egypt. At the beginning of February, reserve captain Motti Ashkenazi began a hunger strike in front of the Prime Minister’s  Office. He was quickly joined by other protesters, demanding Dayan’s resignation. Dayan, who felt the party was not supporting him, threatened that Rafi would stay out of the coalition.

Motti Ashkenazi, leader of the demonstrations against the government,  February 1974.  Copyright © IPPA . Dan Hadani Collection, The Pritzker Family National Photography Collection, The National Library of Israel

Another popular movement, Gush Emunim, was founded at the same time. Its leaders saw increased settlement in Judea and Samaria as the proper response to the war and the mood of national depression. They were afraid that withdrawal in the Golan Heights would be a precedent for Judea and Samaria, and would play an important role in the opposition to withdrawal. Many of their leaders were ex-students at Merkaz Harav, the yeshiva of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook.

On February 24, before Kissinger’s arrival with the list of POWs, a first government meeting was held on Israel’s withdrawal plan (Document 13). The Chief of Staff presented the IDF’s maximalist plan for withdrawal within the enclave, dividing it into a Syrian area, a buffer zone area held by the UN and an Israeli area, including the Hermon outposts. Syrian citizens would be able to return. It included a plan for limitation of forces, like those in the agreement with Egypt. Israel would demand that there would be no surface-to-air missiles at a distance of 30-40 kilometres. Police Minister Shlomo Hillel reminded his fellow ministers that Israel had already offered to allow residents of the enclave to return and to transfer the Hermon outposts captured in the war to the UN in exchange for the prisoners. It could not now offer less.

At this meeting, for the first time, concern for the fate of the Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights was expressed. Ministers Yosef Burg and Moshe Kol raised fears that the Syrians would violate the agreement and harass the settlements. Burg also warned against a public backlash, which would lead to demonstrations and petitions against withdrawal. Allon replied that he understood their doubts, but settlers who went to border areas accepted the risks. What they really needed was an agreement to stabilize the ceasefire. It was doubtful whether the Syrians would accept the IDF’s proposals. Dayan warned that the war with Syria could flare up again, and remaining on the current line would certainly lead to war. Golda Meir added that the Syrians would demand a withdrawal beyond the Purple Line (the line of October 6, 1973). But that fear did not justify inaction. She wanted to help the Americans to lift the oil embargo, and also to help Egypt. The Chief of Staff confirmed that the Syrians would submit an extreme demand for withdrawal, including territory beyond the Purple Line, and he defined the IDF’s proposal as “optimistic”.

On February 27, after he had given Golda Meir the list (Document 14, A 7068/9), Kissinger met with the negotiating team, which included the Prime Minister, Eban, Allon, Dayan, Dinitz, Elazar and others (See the record of the meeting in English, A 7068/9). He said that he did not justify the agreement with Syria on military grounds and its content was of no importance.  It was the act of signing an agreement with a radical Arab country that was important, as well as encouraging the moderate Arab countries, including Egypt, and expelling the Soviets from the area. The ministers’ reasons for rejecting withdrawal beyond the Purple Line mainly referred to settlements. The prime minister said that since Israel did not lose territory in the war, unlike the Egyptian front, there was no basis for the Syrian demand for territory beyond the October 6 line. She also resented the fact that Assad did not observe the ceasefire and continued to attack settlements.

Women and children in a shelter in a kibbutz on the Golan Heights. ISA, Press photograph collection, TS 3009/199

After the proposed line was presented, Kissinger said that it was not serious and that he had no intention of presenting it to the Syrians. He suggested postponing the start of negotiations  for ten days and sending an Israeli representative to Washington, with a Syrian one arriving later. He suggested that Dayan (or whoever replaced him if he did not join the government), should come to Washington. Already at this meeting, Kissinger accepted the principle that settlements should not be dismantled as part of a separation agreement. In his opinion, the line with Syria should not be brought closer to the Israeli one and it was better to expand the UN held area. Eban asked  if there was no danger in handing over all of Israel’s assets in the Golan Heights at this stage. Kissinger replied (contrary to what he had promised the Syrians and the Saudis), that negotiations on another withdrawal could be postponed indefinitely.

After visiting Cairo, Kissinger returned to Israel and explained Sadat’s position: if Israel insists on withdrawing to the Purple Line and war breaks out, he will be forced to support Syria. But a withdrawal of a few kilometres more, perhaps from Quneitra, could solve the problem. Golda Meir replied that talking about withdrawing beyond the Purple Line was “dynamite in Israel”. Kissinger emphasized that Sadat was ready to help convince Assad to accept a proposal similar to the separation agreement with Egypt (Document 15, A 7069/8). In another meeting with Assad on March 1, Kissinger talked about the difficulty of changing Israel’s position. Assad presented Syria’s minimum demands – a withdrawal of about 8-10 kilometres, including Quneitra and the hills around it.

After visiting Saudi Arabia, Kissinger returned to Washington and did not stop off in Israel. At a summit of Arab countries, it was decided to end the oil boycott of the United States, but to re-evaluate the decision two months later – to ensure progress on the agreement with Syria.

At the government meeting on March 3, Warhaftig asked whether the separation agreement was more urgent for Syria or Israel. Could Israel risk renewing the war? In his opinion the aim should be a full peace agreement. Dayan explained that Israel was paying a high price for not having an agreement, including the continued mobilization of 20,000 reservists. Maybe, seen objectively, the situation put more pressure on the Syrians, he said, but in practice Assad did not care about the villagers who were driven from their homes. Israel was in dire need of American aid and “in my opinion, we are under a lot of pressure.” (Document 16, extracts from the meeting). The government decided to accept Kissinger’s request to send a representative to Washington.

At the same time, the war of attrition in the enclave was intensifying. The Syrians shelled the settlements on the Heights and IDF positions and began to build a new road to the outpost at the peak of Mount Hermon, abandoned by the IDF in the winter due to weather conditions. The war of attrition affected not only the talks with Kissinger but also the formation of the government, which had reached a crisis point. At a meeting of the Labour Party Bureau and the Alignment faction in the Knesset on March 3, after it was decided to set up a minority government based on the support of 58 Knesset members, attacks on the leadership were again heard from the left and threats not to vote for the list of ministers. Others warned that a minority government would not last long and said that a national unity government should be established. Golda Meir then announced that she would inform the president that she was giving up the attempt to form a government. She left the hall amid cries of “Golda, don’t go…” A delegation was chosen to appeal to her to return, which she did. But the infighting continued. Many attacked the idea of a unity government, due to the Likud’s opposition to the Geneva Conference and the agreement with Egypt, and the fear it would prevent an agreement with Syria.

After it was suggested that Yitzhak Rabin should replace Dayan as Minister of Defence, Dayan and his colleague Shimon Peres agreed to enter the government in light of reports of the danger of renewed fighting in the north. Some suspected these ministers and the government of exaggerating the danger of war for political purposes. On March 8, Galili said that some of the public was convinced that the news about tension in the north was intended to help form the coalition.

On March 10, Golda Meir presented the government in the Knesset. She spoke both of strengthening the IDF and refusal to return to the 1967 lines, and of the need to transform the cease-fire and separation of forces agreements into peace treaties. Begin ridiculed the government and Meir and Dayan personally for their lack of credibility, and for their use of information about the threat of war for political purposes. Nevertheless, the Knesset expressed confidence in the government by a majority of 62 to 46.

The new government with President Ephraim Katzir, 10 March 1974. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

ב.2 | Dayan's visit to Washington

Moshe Dayan and Henry Kissinger, January 1974 . Photograph: Warren K. Leffler, Library of Congress

Before the visit, a government meeting and a consultation were held to discuss the position Dayan should present. In the government meeting, the Chief of Staff again presented the IDF’s plan. The prime minister was aware of the Syrian demands for a larger withdrawal. When Yitzhak Raphael asked if the government proposal was only an opening position, she made it clear that different messages were intended for Kissinger’s ears. Dayan commented that if the purpose of his trip was to present the IDF plan, Kissinger had already seen it and “you can send him a reminder by mail.” Golda Meir said that Dayan could tell Kissinger that Israel was willing to give up the enclave, and the government confirmed this statement.

During the consultation, Dayan repeated his opposition to the tactic of submitting a rigid proposal, with the intention of later withdrawing from it, and claimed that it would lead to a harsh public reaction (and Begin did attack the government later for its concessions). He thought it was important to establish a more flexible line, even if it was not presented at the moment. He had consulted with the commanders of the Northern Command past and present, Mordechai “Motta” Gur and Yitzhak Hofi, and toured the area with Gur. Dayan asked how important Quneitra really was to Israel and about the possibility that the settlements that bordered it, Ein Zivan, El Rom and Merom Golan would lose some of their land.

The settlements were established after the Six Day War to ensure that the Syrians would not return to shelling the Galilee from the Heights. Kibbutz Merom Golan, the earliest, was established  as a partisan initiative by a group of young people, most of them from the United Kibbutz movement. In July 1967, they settled in an abandoned Syrian camp and later moved to Quneitra. Later the settlement was approved by the government. A central figure among them was Yehuda Harel from Kibbutz Menara .

Entrance to the children’s house at “Kibbutz Golan”, later Merom Golan, in Quneitra, 10 November 1968. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO.

The permanent site of Merom Golan was very close to Quneitra. At the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, the settlements were evacuated in a hurry, but this did not convince the government or the public that they had no security value. Together with Yehiel Admoni from the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, they prepared a plan to double the population in the Golan and strengthen its defences, parts of which were approved by Finance Minister Sapir. However, as Harel wrote in an account of the founding of the Keshet settlement, found among Galili’s papers in the ISA (see File G 7454/2, pp. 35-42), the first months of 1974 were a turning point. The agreement with Egypt, Kissinger’s manouevres and the general atmosphere “caused us to conclude that the general line in Israel tends towards concessions.” After they learned from sources in the IDF and from Galili that withdrawal beyond the Purple Line was being considered, the settlers decided on intensive activity to prevent it. This included meetings with all the ministers and with the factions in the Knesset, with the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, meetings with intellectuals, appeals to the youth movements, and more – including an appeal to the Herut Party Central Committee on January 19 and a meeting with Golda Meir on February 8. Stickers were printed with the slogan “The Golan is an inseparable part of Israel” and signs were hung on balconies.

The ministers were not indifferent to the plight of the kibbutz members, who feared that their security would be compromised and they would be forced to leave. Allon and Galili, both kibbutz members, were identified with settlement in the territories and in the Golan Heights in particular. On the other hand, there were ministers, such as Sapir, who had warned in the past against blind adherence to the principle of settlement, which could become a trap. For example, at a government meeting on May 13 on the settlers’ protests, Sapir repeated arguments that he had used in 1968, against establishing facts that would later make it difficult to withdraw, even in return for important concessions.

Before his trip, Dayan brought up the possibility of partial withdrawal from Quneitra in a conversation with Golda Meir (Document 17, A 7068/9). He was still not satisfied with the government’s decision of 17th March but did not try to change it. Dayan sketched on a map places where the IDF could withdraw from the Purple Line without damage to the military line and the defence of the settlements. It was possible that the Syrians would agree to expand the buffer zone – if both sides withdrew. The prime minister hinted that she could agree to a small withdrawal in Quneitra at a later stage, if the Syrians agreed to limitation of forces and an area under UN control.

On March 29, Dayan presented the IDF plan to Kissinger in Washington, who rejected it, as expected, saying that he would not present it to the Syrian representative who was about to arrive. He made it clear that a small withdrawal beyond the Purple Line was necessary. At the same time, fighting with the Syrians escalated, and Dayan stressed the danger of war, involving Cuban forces and experts from Eastern Europe (Document 18, A 7069/8).  On April 3, Kissinger wrote to Meir warning that there was no chance that the Syrians would accept the offer brought by Dayan. It could lead to the breakdown of the talks, and very possibly the renewal of war, with disastrous results. He asked her to reconsider (Document 19, MFA 6857/10).

Meanwhile, government meetings were focusing on the threat of a Syrian attack. On March 31, Chief of Intelligence Zeira presented information on a possible attack in April, which Egypt might join. The Chief of Staff mentioned the option of calling up reservists who had been released, and announced that the state of alert in the Air Force would continue, leave would be cancelled and the release of some troops would be delayed. Trauma from the beginning of the Yom Kippur War resurfaced, and it was decided to mobilize a limited number of reservists. The danger of escalation and the pressure of the POWs’ families had its effects on the prime minister. She sent a reply to Kissinger hinting that the government might change its position.

ב.3 | Publication of the recommendations of the Agranat Commission: the government resigns

On April 1, the Agranat Commission’s partial report was published. It found that the head of Intelligence Zeira and COGS Elazar were responsible for the intelligence and operational failures before the outbreak of war and recommended that they should leave their posts. The committee refrained from drawing conclusions about the political leadership. However, the public did not accept the distinction between the political and military echelons. Elazar resigned on April 2, and there were demands that Golda Meir and Dayan accept ministerial responsibility and resign. Motti Ashkenazi resumed his activities, and the “Davar” newspaper called on Dayan to resign. On April 11, the Knesset was to vote on a motion of no confidence and the protest movement announced that it would hold a large demonstration in front of the building.

Demonstrators listening to Motti Ashkenzai outside the Prime Minister’s Office, 1 April 1974. Photograph: Moshe Milner, GPO

On April 9-10, a stormy debate was held in the bureau of the Labour party and the faction in the Knesset in which Dayan was harshly attacked. Several speakers supported the resignation of the government and the election of another candidate to form a new government. After it was decided that the government would hold a discussion on the issue of ministerial responsibility (see the publication on the Agranat Commission, part 2), on April 10, Meir announced her resignation and the government fell. A vote was taken in the party to choose a new leader.  Rabin defeated the second candidate, Peres, by a small majority and began consultations on formation of a new government.

Despite the political upheaval, the previous government continued talks with Kissinger and the Syrians on the Separation of Forces Agreement. They now had the status of a transitional government, like that which signed the agreement with Egypt in January 1974. At the end of April Kissinger planned to return to the Middle East to wrap up the negotiations with Syria.