End of an Era: The Golda Meir Government and the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria, January-May 1974

ד.1 | The issue of the Israeli prisoners in Syria

During the prime minister’s visit to Washington in early November 1973, she asked Secretary of State Kissinger to convey to the Syrians Israel’s proposal to allow the residents of the enclave to return and to evacuate two outposts on Mt Hermon in exchange for the prisoners. (See Golda-Kissinger conversation, 3/11/1973, A 7075/1)

1. Message from Major General Aharon Yariv to Joseph Sisco, Department of State, Washington; [November 5, 1973] (in English)

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Israel demands from  Syria to receive the list of prisoners, to allow a visit by the Red Cross and to exchange the wounded prisoners on a reciprocal basis. Israel proposes that, in exchange for the release of prisoners, it would allow the Syrian citizens of the enclave under its control to return to their homes and transfer to the UN the outposts on Mt. Hermon that were captured in 1973 beyond the ceasefire lines, but not the Hermon outpost captured in 1967. All the Syrian prisoners would be released.

2. Summary of a meeting between Michel Convers, the representative of the Red Cross in Israel, and Mordechai Kidron, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; November 23, 1973

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After congratulations on the completion of the prisoner exchange with Egypt,  Convers asks about the situation of the Israeli prisoners in Syria. Kidron elaborates on the Syrian response to the Israeli proposal through various channels and their demand for an Israeli withdrawal. This “clearly implies that the Syrians will not separate the humanitarian issue from the political issue.” According to Convers, the solution is “a major [package] deal.”

3 . Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; November 26, 1973 (2 telegrams)

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The issue of the prisoners in Syria is a major obstacle to Israel’s participation in the peace conference in Geneva. Unless the list is received, there will be pressure on the government not only not to participate in talks with Syria, but even not to attend the conference at all. “The reports about the murders [of prisoners] upset the public and rightly so.”

4. Sinai Rom, the UN Department, Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, to Mordechai Kidron, the Israeli Representation in Geneva; 16 December 1973

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A summary of a meeting between the foreign minister, Abba Eban, and a group of parents of Israeli prisoners in Syria: their request to meet Kissinger during his stay in Israel, efforts by the Americans, the Soviets and Egypt to to influence the Syrians to give the list of prisoners.

4A  . Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the United States in preparation for the Geneva Conference; December 20, 1973 (in English)

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Israel will participate in the formal opening of the conference but will not hold any substantive discussion with Syria if the list of prisoners is not received. The United States will show understanding for its position.

5 . Prime Minister Golda Meir, Jerusalem, to the families of the captured pilots in Syria; December 25, 1973

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The Israeli government’s position regarding participation in the Geneva Conference; the efforts of the Americans to help obtain the list of prisoners

6. Excerpts from the government meeting; Jerusalem, January 17, 1974

At a meeting held on the eve of the signing of the Separation of Forces Agreement with Egypt, Minister of Religion Zerach Warhaftig asks why Israel needs an agreement with Syria. Prime Minister Meir and Chief of Staff David Elazar reply that Israel needs to end the shooting incidents on the front and to get back the prisoners.  Warhaftig fears that very few Israeli prisoners are still alive and that an agreement with the Syrians will be one-sided.

The first stage of negotiations

7 . Summary of a meeting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at Ben-Gurion Airport, January 20, 1974

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A record by Mordechai Gazit of a meeting with the secretary on his return from Damascus, in which Ministers Yigal Allon and Abba Eban, Simcha Dinitz and others participated. Kissinger described his meeting with President Assad, who attacked Egyptian President Sadat and listed the conditions that Assad set for the separation of forces agreement with Israel. He said that the prisoners are well treated. In Kissinger’s opinion it is important to enter into negotiations with Syria to relieve the pressure on Sadat. Allon rejected the maps that Assad sent through Kissinger and said he would report to the prime minister. They also discussed a possible separation of forces with Jordan and the implementation of the agreement with Egypt.

8 . Mordechai Gazit, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; January 23, 1974

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A message from the prime minister that her reaction to the ideas brought by the secretary from Damascus is negative. Israel refuses to enter into a discussion or consider a date for it until there is movement on the subject of the prisoners.

9. Oral message from President Anwar Sadat to Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington to Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem; January 26, 1974 (in English)

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Dinitz delivers an oral message that the Egyptian president sent to Golda Meir and Dayan through Kissinger regarding the importance of a separation agreement with Syria for Egypt. He hopes that Israel will make an effort to reach an acceptable settlement with Syria so that Egypt, Israel and the United States can fulfill their common goal. An arrangement would serve the interests of both countries.

10. Prime Minister Golda Meir to President Sadat, Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; January 27, 1974 (in English)

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The prime minister’s answer to Sadat’s message. Israel is ready to enter into talks with Syria on the separation of forces at any moment. The question of the fate of the Israeli prisoners in Syria is the obstacle to opening the talks. In view of the suffering of the family members, at the very least Syria must hand over a list of prisoners and allow a visit by representatives of the Red Cross. Israel is ready for a prisoner exchange with Syria.

11 . Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; February 11, 1974

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The prime minister (who appears under the code name Malachi) was informed about the plan to transfer the list of prisoners in Syria to Kissinger (Naftali) and to guarantee a Red Cross visit to them. After the move is completed, Israel will agree to hand over the main points of its separation of forces plan to Kissinger.  Until the visits are made, Israel will not forward any proposals.

12 . Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; February 11, 1974

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The prime minister’s opposition to Kissinger (Naftali)’s attempt to link the lifting of the oil embargo on the United States and receiving the lists of Israeli POWs in Syria.

13. Excerpts from a government meeting; February 24, 1974

Link to the full record of the meeting, pp. 16-78

Chief of Staff David Elazar’s remarks on the IDF’s plan for separation of forces within the enclave in Syria; Minister Shlomo Hillel’s warning about the difficulties and dangers of the plan; Yigal Allon presents the advantages of an agreement.

14 . Summary of a conversation between Prime Minister Golda Meir and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Jerusalem; February 27, 1974

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Kissinger gave the prime minister the list of prisoners in Syria, which included 65 names. Everyone is alive and well and the Red Cross visits will take place soon. The prime minister handed the list to the chief of staff. Kissinger reported on the international situation, the positions of the Syrians and Assad’s demand for an Israeli withdrawal beyond the October 6, 1973 line (the “Purple Line”). Meir rejected this claim completely. Kissinger’s assessment that the prospects for another settlement with the Egyptians are good, however the Syrians will demand withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which is impossible. He is inclined to postpone the negotiations to Washington, and in the meantime the oil embargo will be lifted. Assad refuses to discuss the situation of the Syrian Jews.

15. Conversation between Prime Minister Golda Meir and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Jerusalem; March 1, 1974

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Sadat’s position regarding negotiations with the Syrians. For the first time he appeared in civilian dress for the meeting with Kissinger. Golda Meir’s claim that any withdrawal beyond the Purple Line in the Golan Heights is “dynamite” in Israel.

16. Excerpts from a government meeting; Jerusalem, March 3, 1974

Link to the full record of the meeting

In response to a question from Warhaftig, Dayan explains the social and economic factors pressurizing Israel to reach a separation of forces agreement with Syria as soon as possible. Objectively, perhaps the situation puts more pressure on the Syrians, but in practice Assad does not care about 15,000 villagers who were driven from their homes and live as refugees. Israel is in great need of American aid – “In my opinion, we are under a lot of pressure”.

ד.2 | Dayan's visit to Washington: March 1974

17. Points from the conversation between the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister; March 18, 1974

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Dayan wants to make it clear that he is not happy with the government’s decision on the separation of forces plan to be presented in Washington and describes the difficult mood among the reservists in the north. In his opinion, Israel should put pressure on the Syrians so that they agree to a buffer zone between the forces and establish a withdrawal line that does not affect the defensive one.

18. Moshe Raviv, Israel Embassy in Washington, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem; March 30, 1974

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Summary of the Kissinger-Dayan conversation in Washington on March 29, 1974. After Kissinger described his meetings with the Soviets in Moscow, and the danger that they would sabotage the talks with Syria, Dayan presented the separation of forces plan approved by the government. Kissinger’s negative reaction and his hesitation whether to present the plan to the Syrians, or even to the Syrian representative who will come to Washington. Israel must withdraw from territory in the Golan Heights itself. If the separation plan is closer to the Egyptian model, it will be easier to get Egyptian support. Dayan’s fear of renewed war in the north and the involvement of foreign forces from Eastern European countries. At the end, Dinitz asked about the approval of economic aid to Israel and the president’s plan to visit the Middle East.

19. Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington to Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem; April 3, 1974 (in English)

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Passes on a letter from Kissinger to the prime minister following the conversation with Dayan, saying that he understands that there has been progress in thinking in Israel and that the plan presented by Dayan has some positive elements. However, it has no chance of being accepted by the Syrians and its presentation could lead to the breakdown of the talks and the risk of war. As he explained to the prime minister in Jerusalem, Israel should propose a withdrawal that preserves its settlements and security interests in the Golan Heights, which will greatly assist joint moves with the US and limit the Soviet Union’s ability to interfere with the settlement.

20. Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, to Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington; April 16, 1974

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Confirms Dinitz’s line in his conversations with Kissinger (Naftali). He should not be given more information about Israel’s withdrawal line beyond the prime minister‘s message in her reply [0f April 9]. The prime minister’s response to the secretary’s request to receive a private message that “it was worthwhile for him to come” so that he can visit Damascus. He should make the visit without further hints at the line.

ד.3 | The Kissinger shuttle and signing of the agreement with Syria

21. Simcha Dinitz, Israel Ambassador in Washington, to Mordechai Gazit, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem; April 23, 1974

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His conversation with Kissinger’s assistant, Eagleberger, on the US vote on a Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s actions in Lebanon. According to Eagleberger, the president (Edward) gave instructions not to veto the resolution or abstain. Dinitz strongly protested about the one-sided American position and claimed that it would cause indignation in Israel and harm the negotiations. Explanations by  Kissinger (Naftali) who also spoke about his emotional commitment as a Jew to Israel. “As a Jew, I worry more about Israel than as a foreign minister for the United States. America is a big country and can bear a lot, but the State of Israel is in danger and any mistake can cost your existence.”

22. Political consultation in preparation for Kissinger’s visit to Israel; April 29, 1974

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After a presentation of Kissinger’s probable positions by Meir and Zamir, Dayan argued that the time has come for long-term thinking, especially about the need for further negotiations with Egypt. The actions of the Americans are not unreasonable and they plan to provide economic and military aid to the Arab countries. Israeli opposition will not prevent the Americans from continuing these moves. Dayan proposed negotiations with the Americans on fundamental issues that would guarantee Israel “arms and grants to buy them and political help on issues important to Israel.” In his opinion, it is possible to withdraw from part of Quneitra. They could also get a letter from President Nixon that he will not demand a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

23. Excerpts from the government meeting; April 30, 1974

Link to the full record of the meeting

The opinion of the new Chief of Staff, Mordechai “Motta” Gur, on the danger of war with Syria and the benefits of a separation of forces agreement. Dayan’s comments.

24. President Richard Nixon, Washington, to Prime Minister Golda Meir, Jerusalem; April 30, 1974 (in English)

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Following talks between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the president emphasizes the importance of Kissinger’s mission for US policy in the Middle East – promoting the peace process and reducing the influence of the Soviet Union. He is troubled by reports of an atmosphere of distrust towards the United States in Israel, despite the generous aid he had approved and the airlift during the war. The Administration will not demand any concessions that would endanger Israel’s existence.

25. Conversation during lunch between the Prime Minister and Dr. Kissinger; May 2, 1974

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Faced with criticism from Golda Meir and Dinitz of the US stand at the United Nations, Kissinger presents the political and internal situation in the US and its plans in the Middle East. Golda Meir presents Israel’s demands for commitments from the US on the eve of  negotiations with Syria.

26. Excerpts from the government meeting; May 5, 1974

Link to the full record of the meeting

A report from Prime Minister and Eban on the first stages of the talks with Kissinger, his response to the Israeli proposal, a report on his talks with Assad and Sadat.

27. Petition to Prime Minister Golda Meir; May 6, 1974

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A petition by a group of hunger strikers against the dangerous tendencies of the government to withdraw in the Golan Heights and Mt. Hermon. Among the signatories were well-known professors and writers, most of them members of the Movement for the Entire Land of Israel, such as Moshe Shamir, Yitzhak Shalev, Eliezer Livne, Zvi Shiloah and more

28. Meeting between the Prime Minister and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Tel Aviv, May 8, 1974

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On his return from Damascus, Kissinger said that for the first time he believed there was a chance of reaching an agreement. In his talk with Assad, he emphasized the internal difficulties of the Israeli government. Assad claimed that he too has internal problems explaining the new policy to the Syrian people. However, he waived his previous demands and addressed the proposal seriously. Meir claimed that Israel has already reached the limits of the concessions it can make

29. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Jerusalem, to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; May 12, 1974 (in English)

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A formal letter detailing Israel’s military needs and proposes a long-term military agreement until 1984. She asks for the president’s support in Congress to ensure procurement funding, an emergency aid programme and a guarantee of fuel supplies.  The negotiations with Syria involve a heavy risk, and she appeals to the secretary and the president, on the basis of their commitment to ensuring Israel’s strength.

30.  Stenographic record of the government meeting; May 17, 1974

Meir presents a few more small concessions. If accepted, Kissinger will present them as an American proposal. If Assad does not accept the offer, the talks will be halted. Kissinger will not blame Israel for the failure. According to Gur, the response to his plan at the meeting of the General Staff was positive and the entire General Staff was willing to give up more. Eban and Dayan again presented reasons in favor of the agreement. The government approved the additional concessions, if the Syrians accept the offer.

31. Mordechai Gazit, Director of the Prime Minister’s Office to Mordechai Shalev, Israel Minister in Washington; May 19, 1974

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Kissinger returned from Damascus and said that Assad accepts the line with corrections in the Quneitra area in accordance with the American proposal. Israel announced that it would accept the offer after they reach an agreement on the limitation of forces and the deployment of a UN force. The US and Israeli teams started working on drafts of the agreement and the accompanying documents.

32. Israel Galili, Minister without Portfolio, Jerusalem, to Prime Minister Golda Meir, Jerusalem; May 26, 1974

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In anticipation of the possibility of reaching a separation of forces agreement with Syria, Galili asked the Jewish Agency Settlement Department to determine the needs of the settlements close to Quneitra, mainly to guarantee them compensation in land and alternative water sources. The people in the settlements are concerned. They should be encouraged and a land preparation plan should be carried out without delay, which will cost about 15 million lirot. He wants to bring the plan to the government meeting where the separation of forces with Syria will be approved.

33. Meeting between Prime Minister Meir and Secretary of State Kissinger; May 28, 1974

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Israel’s demand that Syria undertake to prevent terrorist attacks from its territory. Golda Meir told Kissinger that the government expects the wording of the Syrian agreement on this subject to be the same as the wording of the Egyptian agreement. He explained that the United States is ready to give a letter of commitment on its stance on terrorism, based on what Assad had said to the secretary, that Syria would prevent terrorist acts from the Golan. Kissinger decided to go to Damascus again to address this problem.

34. Meeting between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his delegation and Prime Minister Golda Meir and the team of ministers; Jerusalem, May 29, 1974 (in English)

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The secretary reported on Assad’s willingness to commit to preventing terrorist acts against Israel, provided that this is not publicized in any way. The prime minister and the participants in the meeting are looking for a formula that she can declare publicly without mentioning the Syrians. President Nixon will announce the success of the negotiations. Arrangements for the signing of the Separation of Forces Agreement in Geneva after its approval by the government and the Knesset.

35. Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem: Sadat’s statement in response to the signing of the Separation of Forces Agreement; May 30, 1974

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According to the Middle East Press Agency in Cairo, the Egyptian president made a statement after his meeting with Kissinger on May 30 in which he welcomed the achievement of the separation of forces agreement on the Syrian front as another step towards a permanent peace based on justice, according to the Security Council resolutions. Sadat praises the wisdom of President Assad and the positive and effective role of the United States. The Egyptians welcome the expected visit of President Nixon.

Text of the Agreement on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website

36. Nissim Ya’ish, Europe Department 1, Jerusalem, to the Israeli missions in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, Rome, London and Copenhagen; May 31, 1974

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A report on the meeting of Foreign Minister Eban with the ambassadors of the European Community in which he presented the agreement with Syria. He gave details about Egypt’s involvement in reaching it and the differences between the separation of forces agreements in Sinai and the Golan Heights. According to Eban, Assad was under pressure from extreme civilian circles and from Libya and Iraq. The importance of the agreement  on the international level – American influence has increased in Syria as well. However Israel had failed in its efforts to include the issue of Syrian Jewry in the negotiations.

37. Major General Herzl Shafir, Geneva, to Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, [Tel Aviv]; May 31, 1973

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A description of the signing ceremony of the separation of forces agreement with Syria in Geneva

Appendix: General Silasvuo’s remarks at the signing ceremony; May 31, 1974, A 7069/6

38. President Richard Nixon, Washington, to Prime Minister Golda Meir; May 31, 1974

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The US Administration’s response to Israel’s requests in the letter of May 12, 1974: a commitment to provide Israel with airplanes and missiles, economic aid and oil. (The letter was dated 31 May but given to Dinitz in June.)

ד.4 | Appendices

Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel regarding the Separation of Forces Agreement with Syria; September 12, 1974

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President Gerald Ford’s letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; September 1, 1975

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