The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | 20 October 1973: The Beginning of the Final Stage – "A Great Victory, Not Only For Israel and America, But For All Lovers of World Freedom"

The fifteenth day of fighting, Saturday, 20 October, marked the last stage of the Yom Kippur War, and its main focus was the IDF’s attempts to improve its positions before the ceasefire resolution, and its continued improving of positions, even after it was passed.

In the morning, Dayan told Golda that he wanted to capture Port Fuad at the northern tip of the Suez Canal. However, these plans were threatened by a severe lack of ammunition. The supply in the emergency stores was almost finished. Although the Americans had approved all Israel’s requests for ammunition, the problem of transporting it was unsolved. On average, 20 flights from the US arrived every day, but these could not fulfill immediate needs, and the supply of ammunition by sea would take time. Without a massive supply of ammunition, the COGS warned, the IDF might be unable to continue to fight. In telegrams Dinitz was instructed to put pressure on the Americans to add 20 urgent flights that very day, carrying ammunition, tanks and mainly 155 mm artillery – which was about to run out completely, and preferably to send it from the US army warehouses in Europe in order to save time (See: Telegram No. VL/970).

Golda decided to intervene and to call Dinitz: “Our friend [Kissinger] has given us a task to carry out, and it can’t be done by praying. If it’s possible to obtain tanks from Germany, then it’s also possible to get artillery shells. It’s a difference of hours. 16 hours is an eternity. Call him now [5 a.m. in Washington]; tell Scowcroft that I really apologise to him, but he must understand that it’s extremely serious”. The Americans promised to send Israel 20,000 artillery shells in the next two days.

An additional matter on the agenda was fuel stocks. This became urgent when Saudi Arabia announced that same day, as did other Arab countries, a cutback in the supply of oil to the US – with fears that the sanctions would increase. At 13:00 Golda met with Zvi Dinstein, the deputy minister of finance, and received reports on  Israel’s stocks of various types of fuel. Although the situation was satisfactory, Dinstein supported the proposal to take over the Morgan offshore oil field in the Gulf of Suez, which was under joint Egyptian-American ownership, as well as the “Tapline” oil pipeline on the Golan Heights which carried oil from Saudi Arabia through Jordan, Syria and the Heights to Lebanon. The takeover was intended to prepare Israel for the impending oil crisis, to release it from the problematic dependence on oil from Iran, and perhaps even as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Golda was not inclined to agree, and said that in any event, American approval must be obtained. Gazit wrote to Dinitz: “Taking over the Morgan oil field opens up a chance of assuring ourselves of a continuous source of oil supplies” (See: Telegram No. VL/975).

Meanwhile, the encouraging reports on the southern front continued. At 18:05 Dayan reported to Golda that if all went well, “then on Monday evening we can hope to be in positions from Suez to Ismailia”. Later Dayan said that there were reports that the Egyptians had 400 Scud missiles, and hinted that it would be better to avoid attacks on civilians, so as not to give Sadat an excuse to launch them. After having supported capturing Port Fuad, Dayan now pulled back, arguing that it might encourage Sadat to ask the Soviets to launch missiles at civilian Israeli targets. “Why on earth did the Russians give him 400 Scud missiles? We know he had only ten. The Russians may incite him”, said Dayan.

At 19:30 Golda and Allon met with Eban, who had arrived from New York. Eban said that Kissinger was very encouraged by the Israeli successes, and was awaiting the completion of the military operations in order to move forward diplomatically. They exchanged impressions on events in the Jewish world and the immense change the war had created in Israel. Eban told of Jewish doctors in the diaspora who were requesting to come to Israel, and Golda told him of the sons of well-known people who had fallen and of the change that had occurred in the public: “This people is completely different, and you wouldn’t recognize it”, she said to Eban. “Those same doctors who were on strike, and El Al workers who are doing everything humanly possible” (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 22).

The government was to meet at 21:00, but a consultation was held earlier by the prime minister and her staff with Eban, Allon and Galili on the question whether to capture Port Fuad. No decision was reached (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 23). Before the government meeting, the COGS reported to Golda on the military situation. Dayan summed up the Israeli casualties, which reached 1,019 dead and 4,988 injured, and the loss of equipment, which included 99 airplanes and no less than 1,180 tanks. “If it weren’t for the US, I don’t know where we would be”, he said. He repeated that the best line to hold at the end of the war would be the Canal line, and it would be best if the IDF were on both sides.

“I believe that there are people in the American administration that would do everything they can in order to end the war, simply so that they could sleep at night”, Golda said at the government meeting, and added: “One man in the White House [Scowcroft] was woken at night at 3:00 a.m., and again at 5:00 a.m., in order to deal with the issue of transporting the ammunition.” The American aid arrived due to the friendship between the two nations, but mainly because Israel had proved that it had the strength to recover from the blows it had absorbed: “If, heaven forbid, we had gone downhill, this investment in arms and equipment that we are receiving would not have come. It came because we were given the credit that if we were given help, we could use it”.

Previously, Tsur had given the government a detailed report on the military supplies from the US: Israel’s requests, items that had already arrived, and those expected. With regard to planes, the response to Israel’s requests was satisfactory; however, the shortage of ammunition was due to transport problems, arising – among other things – from the embargo declared by European countries on the transit of arms shipments. In addition, Israel feared possible action by Egyptian submarines against ships carrying military supplies. Dinitz was asked to examine the possibility that the Sixth Fleet would guard the supply ships, as the Soviets were doing (See: Telegram No. VL/980).

The chief of staff then reported on the southern front. Dayan too complained of supply difficulties, especially in light of the massive aid that was streaming in to the Arab countries. As for the Scuds, he said: “What the USSR is giving them is enough to destroy Tel Aviv”. Dayan said that it was likely that a second Jordanian brigade would enter the fighting, but the signs pointed to it also being sent to the Syrian front, and not attacking Israel from Jordan. Considering the conditions in which the war started, the indications were that it would end in a great victory.

Volunteer artists performing for soldiers in Sinai, 20 October 1973. Photograph: Ron Ilan, GPO

The rest of the meeting dealt with the Americans and Kissinger’s trip to Moscow. Golda and Eban praised Kissinger, but the prime minister declared that she had no illusions about th US motives. Ultimately, the Americans and the Soviets were acting according to their own interests, some of which were mutual. She  did not ‘buy’ the story that Kissinger had received an urgent invitation to Moscow, and she thought that the trip had been coordinated in advance with the Soviets: “We have the impression that he didn’t go there urgently. He took a large entourage with him, and it’s impossible to say that he hurried to pack an El Al flight bag and flew to Moscow, because Moscow told him to come immediately”. However, an agreement would not be easy to reach, and she expressed the hope “that they won’t surprise us… and we will learn about it from the radio”.  She thought that it would take another two or three days before they would have to deal with a ceasefire resolution, and the government decided to establish an inter-ministerial committee to prepare Israel’s conditions for negotiations on a ceasefire (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 18).

These impressions were reinforced by the telegrams from Dinitz. Kissinger asked Dinitz to tell Golda on the eve of his departure that he had no clear instructions and would have to play the talks “by ear”. In the existing military situation, he felt that he was in a position of strength, since “you have made that possible for me. You have brought about a situation in which America and Israel emerge victorious from this war that was forced on us by the Arabs and the Russians. This is a great victory, not just for Israel and America, but for all lovers of world freedom” (See: Telegram No.LV/194). This was the first time since the war began that the secretary had linked Israel and the US together in this way – as full partners and allies. Before he left, Israel equipped Kissinger with a detailed report on the situation (See: Telegram No. VL/974), and it was agreed that Israel would continue to update him on an ongoing basis. The first report Dinitz received on the talks in Moscow, which he passed on that night, apparently reinforced Golda’s assumptions. (See: Telegram No. LV/212 below; summary by Gazit on the time factor in Kissinger’s talks in Moscow, 16-22 October 1973, File A 7023/1).

Dinitz passes on Scowcroft’s report, 20 October 1973. File A 4996/5, p. 371

The long day ended with a consultation with Zamir at 23:45. Zamir reported his view that Sadat would not agree at this stage to a ceasefire, and a long war of attrition might develop on the existing lines – a scenario very unwelcome to Israel. Reports that Sadat would not agree to a ceasefire under any circumstances were also received from other sources. Zamir added that great amounts of arms continued to reach Egypt, but he thought  that the Egyptians would not fire Scud missiles unless they felt threatened. He claimed that the Arabs’ perception of the war was that it had returned their honour to them, because this time they were not defeated (For the full minutes of the day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 20.10.73).

.2 | 21 October 1973: Kissinger Surprises Israel

On 21 October the IDF attack in the south continued and there was fierce fighting “with the Egyptian forces, who continued to conduct a stubborn holding operation to prevent Israeli forces from taking control of the Cairo-Suez axis and cutting it off”, as Gazit wrote to Dinitz that evening (See: Telegram No. VL/992). After a long period during which the Syrian front was almost not discussed, the morning began with reports on the plan to capture the Hermon outposts that night. A war of attrition was developing in the north, characterized by heavy artillery fire.

During the government meeting at 11:00, Sapir reviewed the efforts to raise money to finance the war, both in Israel and abroad. In his characteristic sarcastic way Sapir reported on his travels among Jewish communities around the world. He attributed the tremendous response to the great fear that had overcome the Jews about the fate of Israel. They had previously seen it as invincible and now they suddenly saw it fighting for its life. However, he also referred to the debate about the days preceding the war. He strongly denied an item about to appear in the New York press which, according to the editors, came from authorised sources in Israel, saying that he and Golda had opposed calling up the reserves before the war. For the record Sapir also denied a rumour that the IDF’s fighting capabilities had been weakened by cutbacks in the defence budget and in arms purchases, which he had initiated. Enraged, Sapir defined these rumours as a ‘blood libel’, and asked: “Would I have raised a hand against purchasing a plane? Did this sort of thing have to be heard by parents whose sons fell in the war, or by women whose husbands fell?”. His fierce denials attested to the strength of feeling that accompanied this controversy. Golda replied that all would be cleared up later. She intended to reach conclusions “in a collective manner”, rather than looking for a scapegoat; meanwhile  she preferred not to deal with the issue.

Eban spoke after Sapir, and began with an encouraging report on Nixon’s request the previous day to Congress to authorize special aid in the sum of $2.2 billion for Israel, part of which would be defined as a grant. He shared with the ministers his and the Americans complete surprise at the outbreak of the war, and the expressions heard from them during the first few days, that Israel had “disappointed them” in its military capabilities. He described the debates in the Security Council on who was to blame for the war and on the ceasefire resolution. As for Israel’s standing, the foreign minister presented data showing that the sympathy for Israel in the Western world was much greater than sympathy towards the Arabs. This contradicted the policies of several Western governments, mainly in Europe, whose fears of an oil crisis caused them to declare an embargo on arms shipments. In Eban’s opinion, the talks in Moscow would last several days before Israel learned of their results, and he was sure that the Americans “would not agree to anything without consulting with Israel” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 19).

In the prime minister’s bureau, no special urgency was felt.  Throughout the day updates on the fighting were sent to Kissinger. Dinitz was asked to send him a request to the Soviets to warn Sadat against launching missiles into Israel (See Telegram No. VL/982). Later, Lior reported on slow progress in the south, accompanied by heavy fighting, and on the preparations for the battle to conquer the Hermon outposts, to be carried out by paratrooper and Golani (infantry) brigades. In addition, a decision had to be taken whether to capture Port Fuad and the Morgan oil field, an action that Elazar wanted to carry out very close to the ceasefire. Lior reported on the view of the Intelligence Branch that the chances of a ceasefire in the near future were small, which also gave the impression that the last minute operations were not urgent. Meanwhile there was discussion of personal issues, such as complaints by Dayan, Lior and others about Allon’s frequent visits to the fronts, and his attempts to interfere in military activities, despite his lack of understanding or authority to do so. Golda also expressed her displeasure, and asked Galili to intervene and put an end to it.

At 19:00 Golda held a consultation with Dayan on the attack on the Hermon, which would be carried out that night. He passed on information, which he defined as questionable, according to which there were still 40 Israeli soldiers dug in there who had not surrendered. As a result the air force had not attacked the outpost with heavy bombs. Dayan reviewed the plans for the southern front, and noted that the Egyptians were not collapsing and were not ready for a ceasefire, and that they already had more tanks than they did at the outbreak of the war. Golda said that according to information from Zamir, the Egyptians were indeed reluctant to reach a ceasefire (For the full minutes of the consultation, see: Cabinet Document No. 24).

However, within a few hours it became clear just how wrong Golda, Eban, Dayan and the others were about the timing of the ceasefire and the Americans’ plans. The US chose to act in a way that Israel’s leaders had preferred not to face up to since the massive American military aid had begun, and exacted a political price for this aid which accorded with their interests. At 20:00 Dinitz reported on fragmentary information he had received that the super powers had reached agreement in Moscow on conditions for a ceasefire. Later he reported on the full proposal. It included three sections 1) a call for a ceasefire within 12 hours; 2) implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts; and 3) immediately afterwards, negotiations under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Scowcroft relayed Kissinger’s opinion that  this was a great achievement for Israel, because the proposal did not contain a demand for it to withdraw from its latest conquests, the mention of Resolution 242 was extremely limited and it included a call for direct peace negotiations (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/223, 225). The Israeli leadership was surprised both by the contents of the proposal and by the very short timetable fixed for its implementation. They were no less surprised by the fact that the decision was made without any consultation with them. Israel was requested to agree to it immediately, and it was made clear that the joint proposal would be raised for discussion at the UN Security Council that same night (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 21.10.73).

Golda’s initial reaction was to try to buy time. She replied through Dinitz that she could not reply immediately, because she had to call a government meeting, which could not be done by the deadline the Americans had set (See: Telegram No. LV/226).

Dinitz relays Golda’s reply, 21 october 1973. File A 4996/5, p. 357

She asked that Kissinger come for consultations to Israel, and expressed her disappointment at his actions. In Israel they did not yet know that the agreement reached in Moscow was basically an American proposal, which accorded with the intentions of Kissinger and his assistants even before the talks began (see Kissinger, Years of Crisis, pp. 553-555).  “I don’t understand what’s so urgent for them, what did they threaten him with?… he promised twenty times not to agree to anything before we saw it”, she told her staff and Dinitz in a telephone conversation. However, deep down, Israel’s leaders understood that the die was cast, and a ceasefire was now a matter of hours. Golda told Sapir and Dayan, and Dayan called Bar-Lev and made it clear that a last effort must be made to gain military advantage.

A series of discussions were held which continued throughout the night, ending at 06:30 the next morning. Just before midnight the ministers were urgently called for a government meeting; and even before that, a consultation was held with several ministers, who were later joined by the COGS and Zamir. Elazar reported on the progress of the battle on the Hermon, and as for the ceasefire, he said: “We’ll tell them [the forces] now [that they must succeed] ‘at any price’, and they’ll agree”. Golda’s reaction was: “Oh, that’s terrible!” As for Kissinger, the speculation was raised that the Soviets threatened him with sending in troops to persuade him to agree. However Zamir repeated his assessment that the Egyptians would not agree to the ceasefire (For the full minutes, see: Cabinet Document No. 25).

.3 | 22 October: Talks with Kissinger and Ceasefire - SC Resolution 338

With the news from Moscow, the IDF stepped up its attacks in order to gain as much territory as possible before the ceasefire came into effect.  IDF forces poured towards the city of Suez while cutting off the Cairo-Suez road. In the north forces of the Golani infantry brigade completed the recapture of the Hermon outpost after a fierce battle with heavy losses. Simultaneously, forces of the paratroop division took control of the Syrian part of the Hermon range.

The capture of the Hermon, 21/22 October 1973. Wikimedia, IDF Spokesman’s Unit

The political leaders were also working frantically. At the government meeting, which ended at 04:00 a.m., the prime minister reported on the decision in Moscow and expressed her frustration at the situation in which, contrary to the promises made, Israel was left facing a fait accompli. She repeated her opinion that the reason was a Soviet threat to intervene actively in the war. Dayan and the chief of staff reported on the battle for Mt. Hermon and on the southern front, where very fierce fighting was taking place and progress was slow and difficult. During the meeting a message was received from Nixon (sent the next day in a formal letter), saying that the ceasefire proposal was good for Israel. He used similar arguments to those of Scowcroft and explained why there was no time for preliminary consultations with Israel. Nixon asked the government to agree to the proposal and support it. He also promised that the arms supply would continue (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/232, 232A).

For the first time since war broke out, the government discussed the political prospects after it. The ministers believed that Israel had no choice but to accept the American proposal. Many of them felt that Sections 1 and 3 of the proposal (See above), were also advantageous to Israel and opened the way for future peace negotiations. They supported Dayan’s demand to include in the ceasefire agreement the opening of the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits to Israeli shipping and to apply the ceasefire to all the belligerent states, including Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc. In addition, they demanded the inclusion of an exchange of POWs. As for the second section (on Resolution 242), there was disagreement between those who thought that there was no essential difference in the text compared with previous ones, and those such as Galili and Dayan, who thought that detailed clarifications should be sought and on no account should the Arab interpretation – withdrawal to the 5 June 1967 lines – be accepted. It was clear that even now the government was determined not to retreat to those lines.

Several ministers expressed the hope that the ceasefire would bring a fall in the army’s casualties, and even expressed a hint of criticism at the heavy losses during the crossing of the Suez Canal. Warhaftig complained: “The number of losses we had on the other side of the Canal are close to those of the Six Day War”. Allon also aimed veiled criticism at the COGS about the attacks on fortified positions at a high price, and hoped that every effort would be made to reduce losses in the coming battles, because “our position in the political talks will not be determined by whether we control 3 kilometres more or 3 kilometres less”.  He even noted that since the Egyptians felt that they had come out of the war in a tie with Israel, “it may well be that it will be easier for the Arabs to negotiate” on a political settlement.

Elazar warned that the ceasefire would halt the momentum of the Israel attack. It might create a temporary lull, during which the Arab armies could regroup with the large amounts of Soviet arms being sent to them and afterwards resume firing; Israel would find itself in a much worse state facing refreshed forces, “and we’ll find ourselves again facing a difficult holding battle.” In conclusion, Golda repeated that the government, which learned the details of the proposal from the radio, was facing a fait accompli. However Israel in fact had no choice and could not refuse the president’s request, because of its dependence on American arms. Golda also linked her assent to the influence of the losses in the war on morale in a small country in which everybody knew everybody. The two crucial decisions the government made during the war – concentrating first on the Syrian front, and deciding to cross the Suez Canal – were made although it was clear that they would incur heavy losses. But they had changed the face of the campaign and brought about a process leading towards a ceasefire, with Israel in a much better position. She attacked Warhaftig fiercely, saying: “when shots are fired there are losses, and it cannot be otherwise”. The government decided unanimously to respond positively to the US president’s request on the ceasefire, on condition that it include a prisoner exchange and that it be implemented mutually. In addition,  the prime minister was authorized to receive clarifications on a list of issues. With regard to Resolution 242, it was decided that the Israeli representative to the UN, Yosef Tekoah, would say in his speech that Israel was not prepared to return to the 5 June 1967 lines, and had a right to secure and agreed borders, to be determined in peace treaties (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 20).

Dinitz transmitted the government’s decision to the Americans, and told them that Golda was preparing a reply to the president. He also reported that Kissinger had confirmed his visit to Israel later that day (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/239, 240). In the draft letter to the president, which apparently was not sent, Golda outlined the sections in the agreement that worried Israel: the issue of the borders in the implementation of Resolution 242, clear definitions of the positions of the armies, POW exchange, Soviet involvement, etc. (See: Draft of Golda Meir’s reply to President Nixon). But meanwhile, at about 04:00 (Israel time) on 22 October 1973 the Security Council met for an emergency session and  passed Resolution 338, which repeated the American-Soviet agreements: 1) a call for a ceasefire within 12 hours; 2) to be followed by the implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts; and 3) the start of negotiations under appropriate auspices for a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

At noon the secretary of state arrived in Israel from Moscow, and stayed for six hours before going on to Washington. The talks began with a private meeting with the prime minister. Golda expressed the general feeling that the government of Israel had been ‘led down the garden path’, and that the tight timetable forced on it prevented it from reaping the fruits of victory. Kissinger explained that the late report to Israel and the lack of coordination in advance resulted from communications problems he had had with Washington; although he could have predicted “that there is one person in the world who would not believe him, and that would be the prime minister of Israel”. He even claimed that when he left for Moscow, Israel’s military strategy was not clear to him. He attempted to send a message to Israel that if it needed several more hours, he could delay the time that the ceasefire became effective slightly, but the communications problems prevented the transfer of the message. Kissinger explained the urgency by the fear of Soviet military intervention, because the Soviets were ‘in a panic’ over the Egyptians’ situation, and feared for Sadat’s fate.

Kissinger explained why he was forced to include a reference to Resolution 242 in the proposal, claiming that it was a softened version compared with the Soviets’ demands. This section had no practical significance and was not linked to the third one, which spoke of direct peace negotiations. Kissinger explained that of all the possible options, the super powers’ auspices for these talks was the best. Under pressure from Golda for an explicit commitment on a prisoner exchange within a short period of time, since Israel “can’t live with a situation in which prisoners would not be exchanged”, he replied that it would be publicly specified that there was such a commitment. He admitted that there was no clear Soviet commitment on the issue, and refused Israel’s demand to link the ceasefire to it. He promised that as long as the Soviet airlift to the Arabs continued, so would the American airlift to Israel. The secretary hinted that if there were still urgent military gains to be made, it would be possible to continue the fighting a little longer, and to improve Israel’s position in the south, even after the ceasefire became effective. “I’ll be on the airplane, and when I reach Washington I will send a protest”, Golda quoted his words. Kissinger vehemently rejected rumours that he had already settled the border issue with the Russians, and at the end of the meeting told her on a personal note “You know I don’t consider Israel a foreign country”. Twelve of his family members had been murdered in the Holocaust. Despite her reservations about Kissinger’s behaviour, Golda could not ignore the massive American aid  sent in direct flights whose number at that time already stood at about 150, and Kissinger’s great personal contribution to it (For reports of the Golda Meir-Kissinger talk, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 22.10.73; Telegrams Nos. VL/997, 998).

Extract from the stenographic record of the lunch meeting with Kissinger, 22 October 1973

Afterwards the secretary, his assistant Joseph Sisco and US ambassador Keating met for a working lunch with Golda, Allon, Dayan, Eban and Rabin. After an exchange of jokes, the meeting dealt with the ceasefire arrangements and the possibility of contacts with the Egyptians on this issue, and the continuation of diplomatic moves. The Israeli participants raised the exchange of prisoners, and Kissinger promised to make every effort for their immediate release. Dayan told the guests about the improvement in the Egyptians’ fighting abilities, compared with the Six Day War, and noted that the Palestinians had also fought together with them. In conclusion the Israelis pressed the secretary about the nature of the coming negotiations, and were promised that they would be direct talks (For the complete minutes of the talk in English, see: Cabinet Document No. 26).

Afterwards they were joined by COGS Elazar, Tal, Air Force Commander Peled and  Intelligence chief Zeira, who briefed the secretary on the situation and the deployment of the IDF forces. Peled reviewed the serious implications for Israel of the stationing of the Soviet anti-aircraft missiles in Egypt, especially the SA-6 missiles, and the air force’s losses, which reached 102 planes. He also gave the losses of the enemy air forces, which together had reached about 460 planes. Zeira reviewed the Arab losses and the massive Soviet supplies which would allow them to attack again within a few days. The attack capabilities of the Egyptian armoured corps and air force had been more or less destroyed. However, the Syrians were building up a force that would include some 1,400 tanks and Iraqi and Jordanian forces, intended to recapture the territory taken by the IDF, with the aid of anti-aircraft missiles. The intelligence chief estimated that the Syrian army was slightly better than the Egyptian one. Elazar noted that the two armies and their commands fought much better than they had in 1967.

After the commanders left, Kissinger presented the events as a great military and political victory, which had been achieved by heroic fighting. Golda expressed her warm thanks to Nixon, Kissinger and the Administration for what they had done for Israel in the days “which, for us, were the most terrible ever… and which contained some very, very bitter hours”. “You will always be able to rely on us as your friends”, the secretary summed up (For the full documentation of the meeting in English, see: Cabinet Document No. 27).Despite the friendly atmosphere, the meetings signalled to a great extent the end of the close cooperation, at least on the surface, between the US and Israel during the war, and the beginning of a period of tension between the two countries.

Exactly twelve hours after Resolution 338 was passed, at 18:52, the IDF forces received an order to stop firing; and at 19:50 Lior reported that fire had stopped. (For the full entry of that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 22.10.73).

Despite Golda’s dissatisfaction with the way in which the ceasefire had been forced on Israel, she could not help but also feel great relief at the fact that Israeli soldiers would no longer fall in battle. At a meeting of the Foreign and Defence Committee of the Knesset, Golda argued that to achieve a ceasefire on reasonable conditions was a moral obligation of the government towards its citizens and its soldiers, and outlined its advantages, first of all, the saving of soldiers’ lives. She shared her difficulty in comforting the families of the fallen, and said: ” I have nothing to say. But I want  – for myself – to be reinforced by the knowledge that if I meet such a family – to know in my heart that to the extent that we tried, even at some risk, to save their son – we did it” (See the meeting of the Foreign and Defence Committee of the Knesset – 22.10.73).

At 22:30 the government met again. The COGS reported that “there were still shots being fired here and there”. He also reported on the end of the battle on the Hermon and on Israeli losses of tanks and planes. Dayan reported that the Egyptians, who had announced their agreement to the ceasefire, continued to shoot, and if this continued the IDF would take advantage of it to complete the capture of  territory beyond the Suez Canal to the south. This held also on the front against the Syrians, who had not yet agreed to the ceasefire. Several ministers wanted to avoid any initiative that would result in major battles and additional losses. However, the government decided that if the Egyptians continued fighting the IDF was authorised “to conclude the action of the forces to reach the Suez Canal at the southern part of the Great Bitter Lake and south of that (towards Suez)”. The decision to agree to the ceasefire aroused the criticism of the opposition and the government decided to convene the Knesset for an announcement on this issue. The prime minister reported on the talks with Kissinger. In answer to questions on the diplomatic process, Golda, exhausted from almost two consecutive days of discussions without sleep, said that it was still too early to reply to that, and “if there are no other problems, we can  go to sleep” (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 21).

Golda Meir, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the Oval Office, March 1973. Photograph: Wikimedia, NARA