The Story of the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

.1 | 23 October 1973: Fighting Continues Despite the Ceasefire, SC Resolution 339

On 23 October there were no cabinet or government meetings, and the leaders’ activities were documented only in the bureau journal, which shows that despite the ceasefire, fighting continued on both fronts. The IDF commanders were eager to take advantage of their success for additional achievements. During the morning Golda approved the bombing of a store of oil tanks not far from Damascus, as a preemptive action against a Syrian attack. Elazar wanted to drag out the fighting on the southern front for two more days in order to complete the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army, which was on the eastern side of the Suez Canal in the southern sector, opposite the Mitla and Jiddi Passes, and he sent Bar-Lev to persuade the prime minister.

Bar-Lev met with Golda in Tel Aviv and expressed surprise that pressure was being exerted on the IDF to end the fighting. In fact he wondered why Israel had accepted the ceasefire while the IDF was in full momentum. After he heard why Israel had agreed to the US demands, Bar-Lev explained the difficulties of stopping at the present stage. The IDF was deployed in long lines which would be hard to defend against a huge army, and before the Egyptians had suffered a decisive blow. “From this war they must reach the conclusion that nothing can help, that they cannot destroy Israel”, he said. Bar-Lev wanted her to approve several more days of fighting to complete the encirclement. The prime minister agreed  and gave the high command freedom of action to improve its positions on the southern front.

Civilian buses carrying reinforcements across the Suez Canal, 23 October 1973. Photograph: Avraham Kugel, GPO

At 18:03 the prime minister made an announcement to the Knesset, in the presence of the president, on the government’s decision to accept Security Council Resolution 338. As for the military situation, she said that on the Syrian front Israel was positioned along better lines than those of 6 October; and on the Egyptian front, although the Egyptians had achieved some successes, the IDF’s breakthrough to the western bank of the Suez Canal provided Israel with great advantages and neutralized the Egyptian threat. She emphasized that “we agreed to the ceasefire not out of weakness, but at the height of military initiatives and momentum” (See: the statement in the Knesset). Now that the war was officially over, the restraint that the opposition adopted while the fighting was going on came to an end, and the government’s decision was bitterly criticized by its spokesmen.

Later that day the IDF forces swept into the southern part of the area west of the Suez Canal and reached the outskirts of the city of Suez. Thus, the IDF cut off the Egyptian Third Army from its supply sources, and the Israeli forces were deployed on the Cairo-Suez road at the 101 kilometre mark. The continued fighting and the Israeli military successes enraged the USSR, and the Americans were not happy either. For fear of the collapse of the US position in the Arab world, and a confrontation with the Soviets, Kissinger decided to halt the Israeli offensive. He approached the secretary-general of the UN and the Soviets with a proposal to draft another Security Council resolution calling on all the parties to observe the ceasefire and accept a delegation of observers to supervise its implementation. Israel, for its part, made every effort to convince the Americans that its military movements were a reaction to violations of the ceasefire agreement by the Arabs (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/2, LV/252). The Soviets, for their part, exerted heavy pressure, hinting that the US was cooperating with Israel, and worked for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to pass an additional resolution, with a demand to the fighting parties to return to the positions they were in when the ceasefire resolution was passed, which was, of course, aimed at Israel. Israel vehemently objected, but Kissinger told Dinitz that the US could not oppose it and would not veto the resolution, although it would make it clear that the implementation of the withdrawal was not practical (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/256, 257). Soon afterwards Kissinger demanded, in Nixon’s name, that Israel stop firing immediately, or at least stop its offensive (See: Telegram No. LV/258).

This new development, and the bitter experience of the last few days, set off alarm bells in Israel. It feared that an pattern was developing, in which the Egyptians and the Soviets would decide on steps convenient for them, and after the latter had obtained US  agreement, Israel would find itself again and again confronted by dictates putting it in an unfavourable position. Golda told Dinitz in a telephone conversation to transmit a message to Kissinger that was polite but very firm. She made it clear why Israel could not agree to this behaviour, and therefore could not agree to pull back its forces to the lines of 22 October (See: Telegram No. LV/259).

Extract from Golda’s message to Kissinger, 23 October 1973. File A 4996/5

The harsh tone of the message attests to the crisis of confidence that developed after the secretary’s trip to Moscow and his actions there. Kissinger sensed this and made every effort to soften the picture. In his talk with Dinitz and Shalev, and in a private meeting with Dinitz, he repeated that things could have been much worse for Israel were it not for his intervention. He spoke with warmth about his visit to Israel, and his emotions at “meeting with the people in Israel; he felt that he’d met with a great nation”. He explained that the resolution resulted from US interests, which would ultimately also serve Israel. Kissinger reminded them of his support for continuing the Israeli attack, and claimed that the resolution had no practical significance since he did not expect Israel to return to the 22 October lines, but at most to make some small territorial gesture (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/260, 261). However, Golda rejected this proposal, and promised “that if the Egyptians stop firing, we will too” (See: Telegram No. LV/264).

On 23 October the Security Council adopted an additional resolution, Resolution 339, calling for a ceasefire, which included a demand for the immediate return of the forces to their positions on 22 October, and the dispatch of observers to the fighting zone to supervise its observance.

.2 | 24 October 1973: Strained Relations with the US

On the morning of 24 October Gazit, in his routine updates to Dinitz, reported that for the first time since the beginning of the fighting, “in general, last night was quiet on the Egyptian front” and likewise on the Syrian front (See: Telegram No. VL/9). Although during the day fierce fighting developed in the south, in general the tension on the military front was subsiding, while the political front began to heat up.

During the early morning, consultations were held at Golda Meir’s bureau, first at the Knesset in Jerusalem and later in Tel Aviv, on the question of whether and how to respond to SC Resolution 339. These were the beginning of two days of intensive discussions and hard bargaining with the US (For the full entry for that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 24.10.73). The Israeli leaders were determined not to withdraw to the 22 October lines, which meant in fact to end the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Since the maintenance units and the main reserves of ammunition, oil and food of the Third Army were on the west bank of the Canal, in the area captured by the IDF, the encirclement meant that the huge Third Army could fight for no longer than a few days. Neutralizing a whole Egyptian army corps, not to mention destroying it, was a tempting possibility for both the IDF commanders and for the civilian leadership. Therefore Israel claimed that the advance was the result of Egyptian violation of the ceasefire. Golda had already told Dinitz to tell Kissinger that if Egypt would honour the ceasefire, “he has my word that nothing will happen”. At the same time she rejected, on Dayan’s recommendation, Kissinger’s demands for some gesture of symbolic retreat, for fear that it would serve as an precedent for greater demands.  As for the IDF’s continued activity, Golda gave an unequivocal instruction in a consultation at 03:30: if the other side didn’t fire, neither would Israel. “Ultimately, there is a limit. The government can’t say that it has accepted the ceasefire, and at the same time we continue moving and shooting”, she said. (See Extract from the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal 24 October in English)

Golda, Dayan, Galili, the COGS, Zeira and Aharon Yariv, Zeira’s predecessor, took part in the discussion which was opened by Golda with a clear statement: “He [Kissinger] can forget about his demands for a retreat of 200 or 300 metres in one direction or another”, to which there was general assent. Dayan proposed a ceasefire from 07:00 and that he would determine the deployment of the UN observers together with the head of the observer force, General Ensio Siilasvuo. But he also made it clear that afterwards the IDF’s local actions to improve its positions would continue, although without use of the air force or the artillery. This proposal was approved and Dinitz was instructed to obtain US approval. With the Third Army surrounded, a situation defined by Dayan as “a historic event”, and the Egyptians displaying panic, high spirits and joking prevailed at the meeting. As usual, it was Galili who tried to moderate the enthusiasm and present the tremendous pressure that would almost certainly be exerted on Israel. Elazar reported that the IDF had cut two of the three roads that led from the Suez Canal to Cairo. After discussing how to deal with the local population in the areas captured by the IDF, several  participants made mocking comments about the statements of opposition members in the Knesset, that Israel, and not the government, had won the war. (See the full record of the discussion, Cabinet 27A)

Israeli soldiers talking to Egyptian farmers on the West Bank of the Canal, 23 October 1973. Photograph: Avraham Kugel, GPO

On the Syrian front firing had stopped. But despite attempts to enforce moderation on the army, while Israel presented to the Americans an appearance of keeping the ceasefire, the IDF continued its advance on the Egyptian front, using the air force and the artillery. The Egyptians tried to break out of the encirclement and Sadat sent urgent messages to Nixon, complaining about the continuing Israeli attack. He asked the US to ensure supplies to the Third Army, and even to send American and Soviet forces to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire and, in effect, to protect Egypt from the Israelis. The Administration now realized that the encirclement of the Third Army had made the Egyptians dependent on it, and provided the US with a unique opportunity to gain influence on Sadat during the negotiations that would follow the war. In order to take advantage of this opportunity the Administration had, first of all, to restrain Israel. Kissinger angrily demanded that Dinitz relay a forceful message to Golda, demanding that she end the fighting forthwith.

At 16:00 another consultation was held to discuss Kissinger’s demand. The participants claimed that his anger resulted from failure to understand the situation, since Israel was only reacting to Egyptian aggression. Golda told them about Sadat’s appeal to the Americans and that “every five minutes there are five telephone calls from the White House, and Naftali [Kissinger] yells that he is losing his credibility with the president, the Pentagon and others”. Suggestions were made as to how to convince the Americans of the truth of the Israeli version, such as a talk with the US ambassador; inviting the American military attaché to see for himself who was violating the ceasefire; and stopping Israeli air activities. Golda made it clear that she wanted complete quiet in both sectors. (See the full record of the discussion, Cabinet 27B)

At this point Nixon decided to exert the full weight of his position and demanded a stop to Israeli offensive activities. Haig, the White House chief of staff, called Dinitz from the president’s room. Dinitz reported to Golda on the call by telephone and in a detailed telegram.

Extract from Dinitz’ telegram describing the call from Haig, 24 October. File A 4996/5, p. 272

In reaction to Dinitz’s explanations Haig reported that the president was happy to hear that Israel had not started the fighting, which was dying down. But if it turned out that this was not so, he again threatened that Nixon would be forced to take drastic action (See: Telegram No. LV/267). Nixon’s blunt message was well understood in Israel, and the army commanders were ordered to stop all activities.

That afternoon the prime minister and Zeira met with Ambassador Keating. Golda told him that Israel was committed to the ceasefire, and wanted to protect its friendship with the US and the American administration’s trust at any cost (See: the summary of the Golda-Keating meeting). Afterwards  Dinitz passed on a message from Golda to Kissinger, repeating her words. Golda even asked the secretary for suggestions as to “what else we can do in order to fortify our credibility, or contribute to ease the tension?” (See: Telegram No. LV/268). Immediately afterwards the prime minister, Zeira and Galili held a short consultation on the issue of the prisoners and the strained relations with the Americans. Galili raised, for the first time, Bar-Lev’s idea of offering Egypt an exchange of territory – Israel would retreat from territories it had captured west of the Suez Canal, and the Egyptians would do the same from identical areas on the east bank.( See the full record of the discussion, Cabinet 27C) At  19:15 Dinitz called Golda to say that “feelings here [about relations with the Administration] have calmed down”.

Meanwhile Syria’s position on the ceasefire issue was not clear. It was discussed in a consultation at 20:45, with Eban, Allon, Galili, the COGS, Zeira and the director-general of the foreign ministry, Avraham Kidron. Eban related that according to the UN ambassador, Tekoah, the Syrians had told the UN secretary-general, Kurt Waldheim, that they accepted the ceasefire, and requested that UN observers be posted on the new line. The general feeling was that Israel should agree to the Syrians’ request. As for the southern front, the COGS explained that the IDF would prevent any transfer of water and food supplies to the Third Army, which could hold out for three or four days at most. After that he thought that whole units of the Third Army would withdraw without their weapons in the direction of Cairo – a step that the IDF would allow; or, alternatively, the pressure would result in the surrender of individual soldiers. (See the full record of the discussion, Cabinet 27D)

At 22:00 the government met. Elazar reviewed the deployment of the forces on the southern front, up to the approaches to the city of Suez – which the IDF forces had not entered, for fear of heavy losses. He described the Egyptian losses, and their reinforcement by Libyan and Moroccan units. He reviewed the amounts of captured equipment, and estimated that “there’s a reasonable chance that we’ll be able to raise a division with Russian equipment”, including 300 -400 tanks. Eban reported the decision on implementing the ceasefire with Syria. On the issue of supply of food to the Third Army. Dayan proposed that Israel would enable the soldiers to pass without their weapons from the eastern side of the Canal to its western side. “Not that the food will come to them, but that they’ll come to the food”, he said. Sending supplies to the Third Army would allow it again to become a fighting force. A discussion took place on the UN observers, and the claim that Israel was holding up their deployment. Several ministers raised the demand that the ceasefire agreement ensure that the Egyptians would not move their anti-aircraft missiles, in order not to repeat the events of August 1970 (when the Egyptians violated the ceasefire by moving anti-aircraft missile batteries close to the Canal). The government decided to enable the Third Army to pass through the territory being held by the IDF without their weapons and that the IDF would remain in its present positions.  (See the record of the Government meeting, Dcument No.22)

.3 | Soviet Threats and the US Reaction

During the night it became known that the USSR had reacted very harshly to the continued fighting. The Soviets feared that more Israeli military successes would bring down the regimes they supported in Egypt and Syria, or at least to a significant weakening of their influence on them, and decided to spare no efforts in putting an end to the war, this time for good. They presented the Security Council with a draft resolution containing a censure of Israel and deployment of international forces to supervise the ceasefire. Kissinger told Dinitz that the US would veto these clauses. After Dinitz praised his position the secretary said sarcastically: “I thought perhaps you’d like some Congolese army to come – some of those you trained…” (See: Telegram No. LV/274). But the Soviets were not satisfied with this. In a letter sent by Brezhnev to Nixon that night (the next morning according to Israel time), he repeated the previous proposal to send a joint Soviet-American force to the Middle East, in order to enforce the implementation of the Security Council resolution. He hinted that if this were not done, the USSR would consider unilateral military action. In an unprecedented move, not customary in international relations, the Americans gave a copy of Brezhnev’s letter to Dinitz, and he sent it to Israel (See: Telegram No. LV/276, in English). The Americans sent a message to Israel that Nixon intended, in his reply to Brezhnev, to reject both the Soviet proposal and any unilateral action, and to threaten that any action of this sort might result in unforeseeable consequences. In addition, Nixon convened an urgent meeting of the National Security Council. In reaction to the Soviet missive and the hints of possible military intervention on behalf of Egypt, the US put the American armed forces on high alert (Defcon 3), including nuclear weapons, and reinforced the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea; raising the danger of a nuclear confrontation between the super-powers to a height unprecedented since the war began.

On the morning of 25 October, Dinitz reported that the Americans were moving forces, ships and aircraft to deal with crisis. It also led to increased American pressure on Israel, which faced a critical choice – to agree to return to the lines of 22 October, or to risk Soviet intervention and a threat to world peace. The Americans announced that they would not send forces to the Middle East despite Sadat’s request, but they also made it clear to Israel that they now supported the Soviet demand for withdrawal and would not enter into a confrontation with the Soviets on the issue of supplies for the Third Army. Israel rejected outright any return to the 22 October lines.  It proposed two alternative solutions: an exchange of territory with the Egyptians, in which the Israeli forces would return to the east bank of the Suez Canal and the Egyptians to the west, with a demilitarized zone between them; or allowing the units of the Third Army to link up – without weapons – with the Egyptian forces on the west bank of the canal. However, in a telephone conversation with Golda at 05:40 Dinitz reported that Kissinger thought these proposals would be unacceptable to the USSR . In any case, they would be discussed by the National Security Council. (See: Telegram No. LV/278).

At 06:00 the government held an urgent meeting to discuss these issues. Golda repeated Israel’s proposal for an exchange of territory and said: “We are talking about a demilitarized zone of, let us say, 10 kilometres from each side, that is, 20 kilometres between the armies, with the Canal in the middle. And if they want to – they’ll open the Canal. We don’t care”. In fact, she was returning to Israel’s prewar proposal for an interim agreement to open the Canal  – and this was to form the basis of the separation of forces agreement with Egypt signed in January 1974.

Dayan, Elazar and other ministers opposed retreat to the lines of 22 October, which would be a severe blow to the soldiers who had paid such a high price to reach the present positions. Withdrawal would also place the IDF in a difficult position if the fighting resumed. “Even the line where we are now is not a ‘knock-out'”, said the minister of defence, and added: “We did not administer the final blow, because there was a ceasefire”. The COGS spoke with great bitterness about the situation, where Egypt has “wonderful conditions for conducting a war. As long as they are succeeding – everything’s fine; when you’re losing – the war is stopped”. He saw withdrawal and ending the encirclement of the Third Army as “bordering on a catastrophe that we won’t be able to endure”. The narrow Israeli bridgehead would be threatened from both sides by two Egyptian armies that would be reinforced and would return to their full fighting capability.

An Israeli patrol near a road sign on the way to Cairo, 24 October 1973. Photograph: GPO

Golda and her government were faced with a difficult dilemma, and the meeting took place in an atmosphere close to an impasse. The ministers expressed great fear of a large Soviet force taking up positions on Israel’s borders. Peres called for every effort to be made to prevent such a move. In reply to Moshe Kol’s words, that the threat of Soviet intervention might be a “bluff”, the prime minister said: “I need to tell him  [Nixon] whether to take a risk against the USSR, or not. I can’t say… that it might be a bluff. That’s the dilemma”. Although the prime minister took into account the possibility that the threat of  Soviet intervention and a global war did not have a strong base in reality, as in fact it turned out later; she also had to consider the possibility that the threat was real. During the meeting, she again spoke to Dinitz, who read her the text of Nixon’s assertive reply to Brezhnev’s letter, and reported that the Americans were moving large forces to the Mediterranean. These steps demonstrated the US’s determination to stand by Israel. Golda praised this attitude, which led to a great improvement in the atmosphere. It seemed that Nixon and his staff had not discussed the Israeli proposal at all, and the meeting dispersed without any decision (For the full minutes of the meeting, see: Government Document No. 23).

Later Dinitz reported that the Americans had decided not to transmit the government’s proposal for exchange of territory to the Soviets, because the time was not right, and because “in any case there was no chance that they [the Soviets] would have accepted our proposal” (See: Telegram No. LV/285). After the meeting the prime minister received the text of Nixon’s reply (See: Telegram No. LV/280/).

Throughout this time the Americans played a sort of double game. On the one hand, Kissinger demanded Israel’s partial retreat; and on the other, Dinitz reported that Kissinger had asked for an estimate of how much time Israel needed to finish off the Third Army, before Soviet intervention would force the region to face a new situation. He estimated that if the Soviets decided to intervene, then the Egyptians would attack the next day, and the Soviets would enter the arena a day later (See: Telegram No. LV/283).

However, the Soviet threats and the fears of a global confrontation had their effect. Messages from Sadat to the Americans indicating his willingness to adopt the US position on the international force to supervise the ceasefire also convinced Kissinger that Egypt had tied its fate to American policy. Kissinger demanded an immediate reply from Israel on its agreement to stationing an international force in Sinai. In addition, the secretary raised the issue of supplies to the Third Army, and asked whether Israel could find a solution that would make it possible to send non-military supplies through the UN. Later, Dinitz transmitted a message from Kissinger, saying that Nixon himself supported the demand for a retreat to the 22 October lines, and in view of the danger of a confrontation between the super-powers, it was not possible to act otherwise (See: Telegram No. LV/287). Israel agreed to an international force, but opposed including observers from the USSR or a return to the 22 October lines (See: Telegram No. LV/286). In her reply, Golda expressed appreciation of the US’s stand in the face of the Soviet moves. She expressed her regret at the inability of the US to oppose withdrawal to the 22 October lines. In any case, the exact location of those lines was not an absolute matter, but was open to interpretation and discussion between the parties (See: Telegram No. LV/288). The Americans promised that their ambassador at the UN, Scali, would emphasise this point.

From reports by the military secretary it became evident that battles were continuing, although at a lesser intensity. Lior reported that an Israeli force of paratroop reserves had been surrounded inside the city of Suez, and had extricated itself. The report was received with surprise by Allon, since only a day earlier the COGS had told the government that the forces would not enter Suez.

The impending end of the war brought out even more the strained relations among the army commanders on the southern front. Lior reported that Elazar and Dayan had decided that Gorodish could no longer remain in his post. Bar-Lev and Elazar were demanding that Sharon be dismissed from the command of the 143^rd Division, since: “he is undermining the work of the command”; and Lior added: “The minister of defence is scared to death of the present constellation”, in which the Likud leaders, Begin and Rimalt, were supporting Sharon and even complained that other commanders had received more publicity than him. Golda spoke with Dayan, who said that Elazar had spoken to him about Sharon and had complained that he was being circumvented, adding “perhaps I should draw personal conclusions…” Dayan rejected both Elazar’s hints and the demand to dismiss Sharon, and promised to put things right after the war. But Golda did not give in: “How do we get rid of Sharon without causing an earthquake?” she asked, and added: “The army commanders should be warned; it is not acceptable for the commanders to deal with public relations in the midst of the firing”.

At 21:15 the prime minister and Galili met with Bar-Lev, who asked to end his army service and to return to the government. Bar-Lev thought that from a military aspect Soviet intervention would not constitute a significant threat to the Israeli achievements. In order to push Israel back to the 22 October lines they would need a great number of tanks and planes, and it was not reasonable that they would send these types of weapons to the Middle East; certainly not in the next few days.  He also recommended not to give in to the demand for withdrawal to the 22 October lines; Israel should claim that the IDF advance forces had reached their present lines even before the ceasefire became effective. Bar-Lev estimated that the Third Army only had enough food and ammunition for one more day; but he surprised Golda and Galili with his proposal to leave it in place and allow the supply of food and water, while it was unable to fight, “because if they leave, they’ll be given new tanks”.

The day ended with a discussion of whether to allow the transport of medicines to the surrounded Egyptian force. At noon Gazit wrote to Dinitz that Israel had agreed to the transport of medicines to the hospital in the city of Suez, which was cut off, but had refused to approve their transport by helicopter to the Third Army (See: Telegram No. VL/23). Now Lior related that a convoy of 12 Red Cross trucks, carrying medicines and plasma for the Third Army and Suez, had been stopped on the way. He said that the COGS and Dayan recommended that the medicines should not be transferred until a list of Israeli POWs was received and the Red Cross was allowed to visit them. However, Golda decided against them, saying “I cannot face the world if we do not approve the transfer of medicines… we won’t be able to face even our own public” (For the full entry for that day, see: the Prime Minister’s Bureau Journal – 25.10.73).

During the afternoon, Washington time, it became evident that the tough US position towards the USSR had had its effect. The Security Council passed an additional resolution, No. 340, which – apart from the paragraphs included in the previous resolution, including a call for withdrawal to the 22 October lines – also included a decision to create an emergency UN force to supervise its implementation. But it would not include American and Soviet troops or forces from states that were permanent members of the Security Council. This resolution ended the international crisis, and the alert in the American army was called off. Resolution 340, supported by the US, is seen as the formal conclusion of the Yom Kippur War.